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vii ABSTRACT 
This thesis is  a study into the foundational  elements of the theologies  of John 
Macquarrie  and  (in  comparison  and  contrast)  Karl  Rahner,  in  respect  of their 
differing concepts of  the Self-Revelation of  God, in the context of  their particular 
validations of  the authenticity of  the religious pluralism of  World Religions. 
Both Theologians are,  in essence,  ontological and  anthropocentric in  respect of 
their  methodology  and  largely  concerned  with  the  immanence  of God  in  the 
beings of creation (principally human beings).  The contrast arises in respect of 
the particular method of  theological development.  Macquarrie's concern is with 
the  phenomenology  of Holy  Being  as  present  and  manifest  in  the  particular 
existential  symbols  of divergent  cultures,  whereas  Rahner's  concern  is  wholly 
epistemological in respect of  the 'universal logos'; and therefore his development 
is along metaphysical lines. 
The basis of Macquarrie's religious  pluralism lies  in  a synthesis  of ontological 
unity  and  cultural  diversity;  symbolic  and  psychological.  Holy  Being  (God) 
reveals  itself  to  different  cultural  groups  through  the  essential,  existential 
symbols of the particular cultures.  The principle of unity is  the universality of 
Being and the admissible principle of diversity appears in terms of the different 
symbols.  The different  symbols themselves,  then,  including the hermeneutic in 
respect of them, results necessarily in religious pluralism.  The basis of Rahner's 
religious pluralism lies in his understanding that the human constitution includes 
a  pre-concept  of all  being,  including  the  Being  of God;  and  a  supernatural 
element whereby all men are necessarily epistemically oriented towards God.  As 
with  Thomas  Aquinas  knowledge  and  Being  are  equated  therefore  Rahner's 
whole theology is grounded in a universal epistemology of both an ordinary and 
a  supra-ordinary  nature.  These  factors  give  rise  to  Rahner's  doctrine  of 
'Anonymous Christianity' through which all men are implicit Christians, and other 
religions are, to some degree, perversions of  Christianity. 
1 CHAPTER  1 
Introduction 
The basis for the validation of  religious pluralism and therefore the authenticity, 
or partial  authenticity,  of all  'world  religions'  in  the respective  theologies  of 
John Macquarrie and Karl Rahner lies in their particular conceptuality of God's 
Self Revelation to man. 
Both Theologies begin from the same, ontological and anthropological, starting 
point through the influence of the philosophy of Martin Heidegger.  From this 
beginning Macquarrie develops  existentially and  phenomenologically,  through 
the application of existential  philosophy  and  process philosophy.  He adopts 
Edmund HusserI's Phenomenological descriptive method and  is  influenced  by 
Paul Tillich,  Rudolf Otto, A N Whitehead,  Rudolf Bultmann and Karl Rahner 
himself,  amongst many othersl.  Rahner develops epistemologically through a 
metaphysic  which  bears  the  marks  of the  profound  influence  of Thomas 
Aquinas.  Both theologies could be properly categorised as anthropocentric and 
both thinkers,  whilst apparently holding to a doctrine of the transcendence of 
God, in effect spend their whole concern in respect of God's immanence in the 
beings of creation.  Macquarrie's theological  position,  in  this  respect,  moves 
from an early pantheism to a higher pantheism which he terms 'panentheism' or 
'dialectical  theism'.  Rahner  develops  his  position  along  the  lines  of 
transcendental Thomism. 
Macquarrie  is,  of  all  things,  an  eclectic  extraodinaire  therefore  the 
influences  on  his  thinking  are  enormously widespread  and  diverse.  We 
have mentioned those (though our list is by no  means exhaustive) who are 
directly  relevant  to  and  involved  in  the  particular  area  of study  in  this 
thesis. 
2 Both  Macquarrie  and  Rahner  understand  'Revelation'  as  a  transcendental 
experience through which man's present limitedness (in Macquarrie's case,  his 
present  state of 'inauthentic  life')  is  transcended through the  negation of the 
limits.  Macquarrie's view is  of an existential encounter of certain, predisposed 
or attuned,  individuals (who are,  in  effect,  prophets and who go  on to found 
world religions) with Holy Being; as made manifest and present in the available 
(cultural)  existential symbols.  This is  an  holistic  experience which,  since it  is 
non-verbal,  is  more  conative  than  cognitive.  Rahner,  in  direct  contrast, 
understands  Revelation  as  consisting  of the  (ordinary)  human  epistemic 
capacity,  by  virtue  of their  constitution  as  created  finite  spirits;  who  are 
coincident with the Spirit of God through the logos.  Macquarrie's term for the 
Self-Revelation  of Being  (God)  is  "Primordial  Revelation"  or  "Classical 
Revelation",  Rahner's  corresponding  term  is  "Primordial  Delimitation" 
(,delimitation' is Rahner's primary term for 'creation'). 
Our  primary  contention  IS  that  the,  contrasting,  concepts  of Primordial 
Revelation as held by Macquarrie and Rahner are both essentially of  'Creational' 
and  not  'Historical'  Revelation.  The basis  of their  respective  validations  of 
religious  pluralism  lies  in  the  particular  views  of 'Creational'  or  'Natural' 
Revelation that they hold.  It follows that their respective theologies are both, 
at heart, forms of 'Natural Theology'.  - 'Creational Revelation' may be defined 
as  the  general  and  universal  Revelation  of the  immanence  of God  in  and 
through the beings of His  creation.  'Creational Revelation'  corresponds with 
the  category  of 'General  Revelation'  in  Reformed  Theology.  'Historical 
Revelation',  on  the  other  hand,  may  be  defined  as  the  inbreaking  of the 
transcendence of God, in self-disclosure, into the personal history of mankind. 
The  account  of such  an  'Historical Revelation'  is  given  in  the  Old  and  New 
Testaments;  the  principal  factor  being  the  incarnation  of  God  Himself 
(Emmanuel) in the Person of  Jesus Christ.  This type of  Revelation corresponds 
with the category of 'Special Revelation' in Reformed Theology, as it is always 
particular and never universaf. 
It  follows  then,  if we  are  right,  that  the  validation  of the  authenticity  of 
religious pluralism in respect of  world religions, in the theologies of  Macquarrie 
2  For a good summary of  the concepts of 'general' and 'special' revelation in 
reformed theology  see  Louis Berkhofs Systematic  Theology,  Banner of 
Truth Trust, Edinburgh 1984 pp. 36-40 
3 and  Rahner,  is  based  on  the  universality  of 'Creational  Revelation'  at  the 
expense of the particularity of 'Historical Revelation'.  Such a view demands 
also the universality of (saving) faith which arises from and is a product of  the 
transcendental  experience  of the  Revelation  of the  immanence  of God  in 
creation.  In Macquarrie's case,  it  appears that the  dynamic  of this  universal 
faith  is  'ontological recognition'.  In Rahner's case faith  is  the intrinsic  reality 
which necessarily results from the supernatural element in the constitution of 
human  beings  which  (epistemologically)  orientates  them  towards  God; 
therefore  faith  is  necessarily  involved  in  the  ordinary  as  well  as  the 
transcendental, epistemic experience.  The presupposition of this thesis,  in this 
respect,  is  that  saving  faith  (meaning  the  faith  through  which  sinners  are 
justified; as discussed by Paul in Romans chapter 5 et al)  is a product of some 
form of  synthesis of  'Creational' and 'Historical' revelation.  Our contention here 
is that Macquarrie and Rahner are,  at worst, one sided and biased in favour of 
the Revelation of  the immanence of God with only a quasi treatment of God's 
transcendence  and,  at  best,  vague  and  obscure  in  respect  of the  distinction 
between the two elements. 
This universal, implicit faith aspect is developed by Macquarrie from its genesis 
at the revelatory encounter of individuals with Holy Being, who is  recognised 
as  the  depth  aspect in  the  beings  (symbols)  of the  experience,  and  through 
particular hermeneutic activity in respect of the phenomenon of the particular 
existential symbols of the encounter.  Religious diversity is understood, in this 
way,  as  arising,  primarily,  from  the  diversity  of symbols;  and  the  divergent 
theologies, which follow, from the particular, ongoing hermeneutic activity.  In 
Rahner's case implicit faith,  which he terms 'anonymous faith',  is the basis for 
his  concept of 'anonymous Christianity'; upon which his  own validation of the 
authenticity of  religious pluralism is grounded. 
The  similarity  of context,  namely that of an  anthropocentric  and  ontological 
nature, in which the theologies of Macquarrie and Rahner are housed, throws 
the contrast of  their differing  theological developments into sharp focus.  Such 
a  contrast  is  itself a bright  light  through which  the  two  positions  are  more 
clearly seen.  It has been thought helpful to juxtapose the relevant aspects of 
the two views,  in  schematic form  (see  fig.  1,  page  6).  The  schematic  also 
indicates the structure of  the thesis. 
4 It should  be  noted  that  this  thesis  is  primarily  an  analysis  of text  of the 
applicable writings of  John Macquarrie and Karl Rahner. 
It should be understood that in  view of the fact  that John Macquarrie is,  in 
every way,  an  eclectic and therefore often wholeheartedly adopts the position 
of certain others,  for example Rudolf Otto, in respect of particular aspects of 
his own theology, it has been considered to be admissible to include analysis of 
the works of  those others in direct elucidation of  Macquarrie's own position. 
The  inclusive  form  of the  term  'man'  for  'man  and  woman'  is  intended 
throughout the thesis. 
The capital "B" is used for 'B'eing when the term is  used for being-in-general 
or Holy Being/God. 
BRIEF OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS 
Chapters  2  and  3  are  outlines  of the  ontologies  of Macquarrie  and  Rahner 
respectively, as relevant to the subject of  the thesis.  They serve as a backdrop 
and  ground  of and  for  their  understandings  of the  Self-Revelation  of God; 
which  are  dealt  with  in  chapters  4  and  5.  Chapter  6  is  an  analysis  of the 
contrast between Macquarrie and Rahner's view of Revelation, in terms of the 
elements  which  are  considered  to  be  vital.  Chapter  7  is  a  study  into  their 
respective understandings of 'faith' which is the result of  Revelation.  Chapter 8 
is  on Macquarrie's development of the concept of 'symbol'  as  relevant to the 
revelatory encounter and chapter 9 is  on Rahner's development of 'anonymous 
Christianity'.  Chapter 10 serves as the conclusion to the thesis and deals more 
explicitly with religious pluralism; in Christo  logical perspective. 
5 FIGURE 1: Juxtaposition of  the relevant positions of  Macquarrie and Rahner. 
MAQUARRIE  RAHNER 
- Beginnings -
/ 
•  Ontological  &  Existential  unity  &  continuity with 
Being-in-general & the beings, which appear 
•  Anthropocentric conte)..1 
•  Influence ofM. Heidegger 'Being and Time' 
(Chapters 2 & 3 - Ontologies) 
-l-
•  Transition from inauthentic to authentic life 
Transcendental e)..'Perience/encounter 
- Development -
/ 
•  Nihilistic World view (Attunement) 
•  Revelation of  Being, through 
Numinous, Mystical encounter in 
terms of available existential 
symbols 
(CHAPTER 4 Revelation: Macquarrie) 
•  Negation of limit through 'logos' 
•  revelation in terms of coincidence 
of divine & human 'logos' as 
necessary function of human 
constitution 
(CHAPTER 5 Revelation: Rahner) 
(CHAPTER 6 Contrast Macquarrie & Rahner) 
I.  Universal 'natural' Faith I  I.  'Anonymous' Faith 
(CHAPTER 7 Nature of  Faith) 
- Basis of Religious Pluralism -
•  Hermeneutic activity in respect of 
particular culturaVexistential 
symbols. 
(CHAPTER 8 Nature of symbols) 
~ 
I.  'Anonymous Christianity' 
(CHAPTER 9 'Anonymous Christianity') 
/ 
•  Authentication & Validation of  Religious Pluralism 
(CHAPTER 10 Conclusion: Religious Pluralism) 
6 CHAPTER 2 
John Macquarrie's Existential Ontology 
2.1 The Meaning of Being 
There  are  really  two  primary  metaphysical  questions  which  act  as  the  basic 
structural elements of Macquarrie's ontology.  They are:  'What is the meaning 
of Being?'  and  'What  is  the  meaning  of the  term  God?'  The  relationship 
between the two questions could be described,  in Macquarrie's understanding, 
as  the nature of religion.  The major formative  influences  on Macquarrie,  in 
respect of  his ontology, are Martin Heidegger and Paul Tillich. 
2.1.1 What is the Meaning of Being? 
a)  The Quest for Meaning 
Macquarrie  considers  that  the  question  of the  meanmg  of Being  is  not  a 
detached,  metaphysical,  speculative  question,  essentially because it  arises,  he 
argues,  in  an  existential  context.  The  existential  context,  which of course is 
anthropocentric,  takes  on  an  ontological  focus  in  respect  of the  primary 
ontological dialectic of  Being and Nothingl.  Macquarrie states:  "We began by 
asking  about ourselves,  and  it was the  confrontation with nothingness in  our 
Being presents itself to human  awareness through contrast with nothing. 
Such  a  contrast  arises  in  the  form  of a  metaphysical  question,  such  as 
Leibnitz  famous  question:  "Why  are  there  entities  at  all,  and  not  just 
nothing?"  Macquarrie  discusses  this  particular  question  in  Twentieth 
Century ReligiOUS Thought, SCM Press, 2nd imp.  1967, p.355 
7 own existence that opened our eyes to being which contrasts with nothing.  So 
our question about being  ...  is  an  existential  question in  the  sense  that it  is 
asked by  someone who is  involved in  the question of being.  Man. ..  cannot 
understand his own being until he has an understanding of  being as such.  Thus 
the existential question leads into the ontological question,,2 . 
As Heidegger would argue,  man is  already in the world,  he  is  a being-in-the-
world, being-in is the primary structure of  his existence: 
'''Being-in' is  thus the formal  existential expression for the being of 
Dasein, which has being-in-the-World as its essential state. ,,3 
Since man has being-in-the-world as  his  essential  state,  'being'  is  the primary, 
essential  issue  for  him.  The  quest  for  meaning,  then,  is  fundamentally 
ontological,  but  it  is  existentially  oriented,  therefore  we  must  look  to  the 
appearances  of man's  existence  to  behold  Being.  The  quest  to  understand 
Being is,  according to Macquarrie,  therefore primarily phenomenological and 
not metaphysical.  His view lies in sharp contrast with that of  Karl Rahner who 
states:  "Our  intention  is  to  produce  an  analytic  of the  being  of man. 
Metaphysics is,  however, the question about the being of that which is,  in the 
way that it is.  It is the question;  'What is  the meaning of being?'  This is  the 
way in  which metaphysics  has  always  been conceived and  still  is  understood 
today,  although under various  disguises.  Man,  in  his  thought  or action  can 
never  halt  at  this  or  that  point.  He  wants  to  know  what  everything  is, 
especially in the unity in which all  is always present to him.  He enquires into 
the ultimate reasons; into the final  cause of all reality and to the extent that he 
recognises each separate thing as  existing,  and ever being brought face to face 
with himself in  such knowledge,  he  enquires into  the being  of all  that exists. 
He practises metaphysics. ,,4 
2 
3 
4 
Principles of Christian  Theology  - John  Macquarrie  Revised  ed,  SCM 
Press 1988, p.107 
Being and Time  - Martin Heidegger  - Basil  Blackwell,  Oxford  1967, 
Trans. J Macquarrie &  E Robinson, p.80 
Hearers of  The  Word - Karl Rahner - Sheed &  Ward,  Revised J B Metz 
1969, Trans. R Walls, p.33 
8 The divergence of  the methodologies of  Macquarrie and Rahner is  seen at this 
fundamental common root of their respective theological developments.  This 
contrast is taken as a major structural element of  this thesis. 
b)  The 'via negationis' 
To return to the question concerning the meaning of  Being, Macquarrie begins 
his answer with a 'via negationis'; he says what Being is not.  His 'via negationis' 
has five points, which are: 
1.  Being is itself not something that is.  (Being is not itself a being) 
2.  Being is not a property. 
3.  Being is not a class. 
4.  Being is not a substance. 
5.  Being is not the 'absolute'. 
Through this route Macquarrie makes a statement about Being as transcending 
the existence of  the beings which appear.  Being is itself not a thing, it is not a 
property of  things, it is not a class of things,  neither is  it an absolute 'thing',  it 
does  not exist  as  things  exist.  It  is  that which  transcends the  existence and 
thinghood  of the beings.  It must  be  understood that  Macquarrie's  'negative 
way'  is  essentially the first  step toward a positive statement in  respect of the 
nature  of Being  in  general.  This  beginning  sets  the  tone  for  Macquarrie's 
doctrine of  God whereby He is conceived as a mysterious transcendence which 
appears in terms of  the beingness of  the beings. 
Heidegger asserts that: "being is a transcendentia pure and simple"s .  Yet there 
is  no  denying that Being, itself,  strikes man's  consciousness with metaphysical 
force.  The nature of the force  is  the  powerful  sense  of continuity  between 
Being and  'the beings'.  The biting edge of the force  is  however the union of 
difference and similarity, there is a dialectical reality to be faced in that Being is 
in  some way present in the beings and indeed in  all  of created being,  Being is 
thus,  the same as  the beings but at the same time it  is  utterly different.  It is 
really and truly immanent and at  the same time wholly other and  absolutely 
transcendent.  Macquarrie states: 
S  Being and Time - Martin Heidegger, p.38 
9 "The difference can be brought out in another way by setting out to 
enumerate  the  beings  to  be  found  within  the  world,  as  stars, 
mountains, rivers, animals, trees and so on.  Clearly one would never 
add 'being' to such a list;  for this is  not another being and  does not 
belong in the same category ... as the items listed.  Yet in some way, 
being is common to all the beings. ,,6 
The  question  arises  'What  is  it  that  Being  has  in  common  with  all  of 'the 
beings'?  The logical  step  is  to think  of it  as  some  property or other of 'the 
beirigs'.  In  dispelling  this  notion Macquarrie lists  some  of the  items  of the 
category of such a property:  "Whiteness,  hardness,  roundness  and  the like,,7. 
Being  can  be  clearly  seen  not  to  fit  at  all  into  this  category.  Indeed  the 
ontological argument for the existence of God fails,  as refuted by Kant, on this 
.  8  very pomt  . 
There is  something of the force of the continuity of Being and  'the beings'  in 
Rom 1.20:  "Ever since the creation of the world His invisible nature,  namely, 
His eternal power and deity,  has been clearly perceived in the things that have 
been made."  (It is  required to substitute the term 'Being' for the deity in this 
case,  however there is  no  strain of an  imposition in  this  respect as  it  will  be 
seen that Macquarrie, with certain qualifications, in effect, considers 'Being' and 
'God' to be one and the same).  The force behind this text is that there is some 
kind  of cognitive  continuity  between the  Creator  and  the  'conscious'  beings 
who have been created
9
.  We contend that it is precisely the nature of  this force 
of  continuity which gives rise to the design arguments for the existence of God. 
The precise character of  the force is seen in the argument of Cleanthes in David 
Hume's  "Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion".  Cleanthes argues that the 
Being of  the world strikes the mind with an immediate impression "with a force 
like that of sensation" 10. 
The  immediate  human  impulse  in  respect  of the  precise  form  of the beings 
which appear is that of continuity between an intelligent Creator and the beings 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Principles oj  Christian Theology - John Macquarrie, p.l08 
Ibid. 
Critique  oj Pure  Reason  - Immanuel  Kant,  B628  (This  IS,  of course, 
Macquarrie's second point in his 'via negationis') 
This  point  of coincidence  is  more  clearly  seen  in  Rahner's  position  m 
Chapter 3. 
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion - David Hume, p  .191 
10 of His  Creation.  The  dynamic  of this  continuity  is  therefore  'Creation'  as 
perceived through the inner logic of its form.  The example used by Cleanthes 
is that of  the eye, with all of  its complexity.  The inner logic of  the form of  the 
eye  strikes human  consciousness with the immediate  impression that it  must 
have  had  an  intelligent  Designer.  The  coincident  medium  of Creator  and 
creature is therefore the design itself. 
Macquarrie's thinking in this respect is consistent with these two aspects, he is 
not  primarily  concerned  however  with  form  on  matter  but  rather  with  the 
mystical  presence  and  manifestation  of Being  itself in  sharp  contrast  with 
nothing.  Being itself or Being-in-General is therefore the common factor. 
c)  The distinctions 
Following from  his  'via  negationis',  Macquarrie  offers  what  he  calls  a  more 
positive characterisation of Being, by a consideration of the distinctions which 
exist  in  respect of its  nature both in  ordinary language  and  in  the history of 
philosophy.  The distinctions are; Being and Becoming, Being and Appearance 
and Being and the Ideal.  His reason for this consideration is  grounded in the 
fact of  Being's universality therefore our analysis is preceded by a consideration 
of  this universality.  Macquarrie quotes Thomas Aquinas as follows: 
"That  which  first  falls  under  apprehension  is  'being',  the 
understanding of which is  included in  all  things  whatsoever a man 
apprehends. ,,11 
This  epistemological  statement  of the  universality  of being  corresponds  to 
Rahner's claim that:  "our (universal) pre-concept or pre-knowledge of 'Being in 
General'  is  the condition for the possibility  of all  other human knowledge." 12 
Macquarrie, as  usual, asks the pertinent question: 
11 
12 
13 
"If the understanding of  being is so universal why is it so difficult to 
give an account ofit?,,13 
Summa Theologiae - Thomas Aquinas,  la,2ae,94. Quoted by Macquarrie 
in Principles oj  Christian Theology, p.ll  0 
See below; Chapter 5 
Principles ojChristian Theology - John Macquarrie, p.IIO 
11 His answer is that Being is too close to be seen.  Its very nature as a universal, 
ever  present  and  indeed  immanent  reality,  allows  it  to  remain  hidden  from 
human awareness.  This is rather like the Pythagorean idea of  the singing of  the 
planets and the construction of the universe in terms of musical harmony.  We 
cannot hear the music however because it has always been sounding in perfect 
harmony,  therefore  our  ears  cannot  pick  it  out  and  we  have  no  way  of 
distinguishing it.  To hear it,  it would be necessary for it to stop sounding and 
then start up again14.  Similarly, in respect of  Being, for man to become aware 
of  it he must contrast it with nothingness. 
This universality in its immediacy and closeness cannot be readily seen, the eye 
that  is  looking  cannot  see  itself,  unless  it  beholds  its  image  in  a  mirror. 
Nothingness  is  the  mirror  of being,  through  which  the  beings  come  to 
awareness.  However there is another approach to this; the mind that thinks, is 
a bivalent reality in that it necessarily thinks two things at once.  It thinks about 
the object of its thought and  it thinks that it  exists.  Descartes'  "cogito  ergo 
sum" is amongst other things, a statement about this kind of  bivalence.  The eye 
then, if  it could think, would think 'what' it saw and would think 'that' it saw. In 
respect of awareness of Being,  human beings think that they have-being and 
they think that there 'is' Being.  It is necessary to hold the concept that there 'is' 
being, before they can meaningfully think that there is 'having-being'.  Being 'is' 
then,  is  the necessary universal  pre-concept to the comprehension of having-
being.  This  factor  is  the  ground  spring  of metaphysical  enquiry.  The 
metaphysical quest proceeds on the emotive force of this bivalence of primary 
14  This Pythagorean doctrine is referred to as  "The harmony of the spheres" 
which  many  philosophers  have  cited,  ego  Aristotle  in  his  'Metaphysics'. 
William  Shakespeare  brings  out the  idea  that  because  of the  nature  of 
human hearing, we cannot hear it: 
"  .. soft stillness and the night 
Becomes the touches of  sweet harmony. 
There's not the smallest orb which thou behold'st 
But in his motion like an angel sings, 
Still quiring to the young-eyed cherubins; 
such harmony is in immortal souls; 
But, whilst this muddy vesture of  decay 
Doth grossly close it in, we cannot hear it. " 
(Merchant of  Venice, Act 5,  Sc.l) 
12 and relative awarenessl5, therefore we do not completely agree with Professor 
Macquarrie that Being is  too close for us to be aware of it,  indeed it  is  the 
awareness  of Being  itself  which  differentiates  human  beings  from  other 
conscious beings. 
i)  Distinction 1 - 'Being and becoming' 
At  the  outset  of our  discussion  of this  distinction  it  should  be  stated  that 
Macquarrie's consideration of  'becoming' as a vital part of  the essence of  'being' 
is  concerned essentially with the idea of process in  respect of God's Being, in 
and through the beings He creates.  We are dealing then with the concept of 
God as a form of 'Creativity' and indeed as an ever ongoing 'Event'. 
The influences on  Macquarrie's thinking  in this  respect are principally, Martin 
Heidegger,  Rudolf Bultmann,  A  N  Whitehead,  and  the  Greek  philosophers 
(Plato and Plotinus).  Lesser influences here would be Leibnitz and Hegel.  The 
concept of  this distinction is introduced and discussed in 'Principles of  Christian 
Theology,16, where we see the influence of Greek Philosophy, and developed in 
"In  Search of Deity"  under the headings  of 'The  One  and  The  Many,17  and 
'Twentieth centuryl: Whitehead,18 . 
The idea of God as  a kind of 'Creative Process' is  a key concept in respect of 
Macquarrie's  theology  and  analysis  of his  thinking  in  this  respect  produces 
valuable insights into  his  view of revelation and  of course of his  doctrine of 
God. 
In Greek philosophy 'becoming' lies  somewhere between 'being'  and  'nothing'. 
('being  and nothing'  is  the underlying  dialectic  in  the discussion of the three 
15 
16 
17 
18 
This factor is,  as will be seen, the basis ofRahner's epistemology.  Cpo  also 
in  this  respect  Calvin's  statement:  "No  man  can  survey  himself without 
forthwith  turning  his  thoughts  towards  the  God  in  which  he  lives  and 
moves".  Institutes oj the  Christian Religion,  Trans H  Beveridge,  W  B 
Eerdmans 1981, vol I Book First, p.37 
Principles ojChristian Theology - John Macquarrie. p.lllf 
In search oj  Deity - John Macquarrie, SCM Press 1984,  p.174f 
Op. Cit.  pp.139-152 
13 pairs of distinctive opposites, and it will be seen that it is the central factor in 
the conversion of  man from inauthentic to authentic life). 
"Whatever becomes, must, in some sense already be; yet the fact that 
it  is  becoming  implies  that it  is  not yet what it  is  on the  way to 
. becoming"19. 
Macquarrie quotes Plato (rather out of  the context of  Plato's own argument): 
"If  there be anything so constituted at the same time to be and not to 
be,  must  it  not  lie  somewhere  between  pure  being  and  pure 
nothing?  ,,20 
He cites Hegel in respect of  the concept  of  '  pure  being': 
"Pure being simple and indeterminate is just nothing. ,,21 
The notion, which Macquarrie is at pains to get across here, is that God is not a 
static undifferentiated unity.  He says:  "Being cannot be identified with a static, 
changeless, undifferentiated ultimate,,22.  If this be so then in  some way being 
must  be  becoming,  in  terms  of some  mode  of differentiation.  Further: 
"Becoming  is  unintelligible  apart  from  some  conception  of being,  in  which 
becoming  is  included. ,,23  As  a  corrective,  however,  he  adds,  "a  mere  flux 
would be chaos,  as  would a sheer pluralism  ... there can be no  intelligibility 
without  some  unity  and  stability  of being. ,,24  The  becomingness  of Being 
therefore is not a mere flux  or sheer pluralism but the becomingness of some 
basic unity.  This  essential unity of Being Macquarrie (and Whitehead) term 
"Primordial  Being" .  The  becomingness  of  being,  Macquarrie  terms 
"Expressive Being" and "Unitive Being".  Whitehead uses only one term, which 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
Principles ojChristian Theology - John Macquarrie, p.lll 
Ibid.  (& Plato's  The  Republic - J  M  Dent &  Sons  1976,  Trans.  A  D 
Lindsay, Bk5:477, p.l70) 
Ibid (& The Encyclopedia oj  the Philosophical Sciences - G.W.F Hegel, 
Logic section 87) 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
14 IS,  "Consequent being".  25  Macquarrie,  not uncritically,  develops Whitehead's 
di-polar concept into a Trinitarian concept in terms of  the three modes of  Being 
(as termed above). 
Reality is a process of events which can be called 'becoming'.  In Whitehead's 
thinking the events are the atoms of the cosmos.  Each atom is  a point in the 
process which moves from the past event by incorporating new possibilities in 
to a new event which in turn contributes to the future event.  This process view 
is of  the very nature of  creativity.  The fundamental unit of  this creative process 
is not the solid particle but the event.  Macquarrie states: 
(Whitehead)  ...  "boldly posits that even in a molecule or an atom, 
perhaps even in an electron or any other sub-atomic event, there is a 
mental as well as a physical pole.  This doctrine of  the omnipresence 
of  mind ... is sometimes called 'Panpsychism",26 . 
The  events  are  also  called  occasions.  The  occaSIOns  are the nature  of the 
diversity which, as it were, flows from a comprehensive unity.  The occasions 
derive their character in respect of  this (whole) comprehensive unity but at the 
same time they in turn contribute to the precise being and nature of  the (whole) 
unity at any given point in the process.  The unity is always therefore in a state 
of changing  diversity.  It is  itself the  creative  principle  in  its  process  of 
becoming.  This creative principle is the coherence which allows intelligibility. 
It must be said, though, that 'Being' is in this way understood to be a process of 
events, which are of  the nature of the becomingness of  itself.  Thus the One is 
at the same time the many and the many are at the same time the One.  All,  are 
of the  nature  of 'event'.  The  events  themselves,  according  to  Whitehead, 
endure only for a very short time.  They come into being,  contributing to the 
precise nature of its wholeness for the short time,  and then they perish.  They 
perish because in themselves they are changeless.  Change comes only in the 
transition from one event (or occasion) to another. 
If  being consists of  a process of perishing events, just where does the principle 
of unity lie?  In Whitehead the unity is  in  terms of the di-polar concept (of 
25 
26 
More accurately Whitehead talks of two natures of God which  are His 
'primordial' nature and His 'consequent' nature.  Macquarrie develops this 
di-polar concept into a trinitarian articulation of  the modes of  Being. 
In Search of  Deity - John Macquarrie, p.143 
15 God's existence).  God,  in His 'Primordial',  eternal,  absolute nature,  as  mind, 
contributes the novel aims or possibilities to each succeeding event.  God in His 
'Consequent',  changing  and  developing  nature,  physically  experiences  the 
process.  This experience of  God involves a real union of  the two natures of  the 
mental  and  the physical therefore the cosmic  process is  God Himself  (This 
'philosophy  of  organism'  involves  equally  the  elements  of  mind  and 
corporeality,  therefore  Whitehead  avoids  the  extremes  of both idealism  and 
materialism) .  The  unity,  then,  is  the  precise  relation  of  Being  and 
becomingness; each are contained in the other.  The relation is the how in the 
statement 'how being becomes',  and  Being itself is  the very dynamism  of the 
dynamic beings.  Being is then the dynamic creativity. In this light it can be seen 
that Being is a dialectical reality.  Macquarrie  makes the case in  "In Search of 
Deity" for a 'dialectical theism' which seeks to exploit and express this dialectic 
in terms of  a doctrine of  God. 
Further insight into the nature of  Being as creativity can be gained through the 
thinking  of Yeow  Choo  Lak,  especially  in  his  article  in  'Being  and  Truth' 
(Macquarrie's Festschrift). 
"Being's  creativity  implies  emergence  and  growth  which  in  turn 
suggests  constancy  as  well  as  advance  or  novelty  or  further 
growing.  For example,  the pulsating vitality and  activity of a rose 
bush can be said to 'consummate' in the first  bud.  In it,  the vitality 
and  activity  achieve  a  degree  of self-blossoming  emergence  or 
unfolding that may be reckoned as  attained,  objectified,  permanent, 
and constant.  Yet the objectified constancy is not static.  Rather the 
assured  constancy  is  viable  and  ongoing  to  the  extent  that  it  is 
already  being  surpassed  by  its  own  dynamism.  The  assured 
attainment then becomes present in another process of  becoming, for 
example, the bud which is the culmination of  the rose-bush's process 
of  becoming, gets caught up in the process of  becoming a flower. ,,27 
Choo Lak goes on to say that:  "Constancy and further growing are correlative 
components of a single activity,  deriving from and contributing to the unified 
27  Being and Truth  - Ed.  Alister Kee &  Eugene T Long,  SCM Press  1986, 
(John Macquarrie's Festschrift) Article by Yeow Choo  Lak p.1l3  (The 
illustration is borrowed from Heidegger.  Heidegger and Whitehead come 
remarkably close in their emphasis on the ongoing character of  entities; see 
Yeow Choo Lak's notes 6 &  7) 
16 constitution of  the ongoing activity. ,,28  Constancy and surpassment are the two 
vital elements of  process, constancy serves surpassment because it has achieved 
attainment  or  satisfaction  which  is  the  basis  for  further  achievements. 
Surpassment serves constancy by preserving its interior integrity in the process 
of growth.  Becomingness is  being's surpassing of itself in  seeking to become 
stronger and to become more.  Being in becoming is  endeavouring to achieve 
more being, therefore creativity of  being is in effect always an overpowering of 
itself to become more. 
Following this logic it can be seen that being is never complete.  There is, so to 
speak, always a gap before it which it must reach out to, and indeed fill,  only to 
find another gap before it,  ad infinitum.  The nature of surpassment can in this 
sense  be  readily  conceded  as  rightly  described.  However  the  nature  of 
constancy is not so clearly dealt with.  It seems to us that the term constancy as 
described here would be better filled by the term continuity.  Continuity as well 
as  constancy,  however,  requires  an  immutable  ground  of being.  A basis  of 
being which does not  change,  therefore the fundamental  and  indeed  essential 
principle  of being  is  a  constant.  This  can  be  well  illustrated  again  with 
reference to Heidegger's rose bush.  The principle of the rose bush's being is 
that it is  firmly  planted in the constancy of the ground.  Therefore whilst the 
rose plant develops into a more beingful expression of its primary nature, it can 
only do so because of  the earth of constancy in which it is planted.  This earth 
makes up the nature of an unchanging ground of  Being of  the rose - stem, bud 
and  flower.  Becoming,  seen  in  this  light,  must  be firmly  rooted in  a being 
which is not becoming but in fact is quite static. In turning the analogy around 
in  this  way  Being must  precede  existence  and  not vice  versa.  (Macquarrie 
never concedes this possibility.) 
Choo Lak says further of  Being's creativity: 
28 
29 
"Being's  creativity  is  understood  as  the  emergent  and  abiding 
presence by virtue of which beings become unconcealed or brought 
into existence.  Being's creativity is the power that holds sway in and 
through the world of  entities. ,,29 
Ibid. 
Op.  Cit. p.1l4 
17 We come then to the concept of presence or appearance.  The appearance of 
the entities, the beings in which Being in becoming is creatively present.  This is 
what  Macquarrie  terms  the  "presence  and  manifestation"  of Being,  in  'the 
beings'.  It  appears  that  Macquarrie  seeks,  through  his  treatment  of this 
distinction,  to convey the idea that Being is  some form  of dynamic  creativity 
which expresses itself in and through the diversity of  'the beings'. 
ii)  Distinction  2 - 'Being and Appearance' 
This  distinction  is  between what  actually  'is'  and  what  'appears'  to  be.  The 
example  which  Macquarrie  gives  by  way  of illustration,  is  also  given  by 
Descartes, with respect to the same issue.  It is  of the stick which is  actually 
straight  but  appears  bent  in  water.  Descartes  was  concerned  with  the 
trustworthiness of sensorial faculties  in  respect  of an  authentic  epistemology. 
Macquarrie,  however is  not concerned with epistemology but rather with the 
distinction of  appearance and reality.  He states: 
"Just  as  in  the  case  of becoming,  so  with  appearing,  that  which 
appears is (for nothing can appear unless it in some sense is) and yet 
it may not be what it purports to be.  Appearing too belongs within 
being as well as being distinguished from being ... being which did 
not  appear  could  not  be  distinguished  from  nothing.  Being  is 
nothing  apart  from  its  appearances.  So  by  'being'  we  most 
decidedly  do  not  mean  some  invisible,  intangible  realm  that  is 
supposed to lie  back of the  appearances,  as  a world of 'things-in-
themselves'.  Being gives  itself in  and  through its  appearances and 
nowhere else.  However it can also be screened by its appearance ... 
where  appearance  misleads.  Our aim  must  always  be  to  see  the 
appearances in their being; and this does not mean seeing something 
else but  rather  seeing the  appearances  as  they  are,  in  depth,  as  it 
were, as  bearers of  the presence and manifestation of  being. ,,30 
Macquarrie is not primarily concerned (as was Descartes) with the integrity of 
that which appears to be (i.e.  real  or false)  but with the  depth aspect of the 
appearance  of Being  itself  His  point  here  is  that  Being  only  exists  in  and 
through  the  actual  beings  which  appear.  This  strikes  one  as  a  radically 
immanentist  viewpoint.  He  states:  "Being  is  nothing  apart  from  its 
30  PrinCiples a/Christian Theology - John Macquarrie, p.112 
18 appearances. ,,31  At first  glance this passage seems to leave no  room for  any 
real  idea of transcendence.  However,  Macquarrie does  have  an  idea  of the 
transcendence  of Being  (God),  which  is  brilliantly  conceived.  The  key  to 
Macquarrie's thinking in this respect is  given by his  understanding of God as 
nothing or better no-thing.  To say that God is nothing is to recognise that He 
does not exist as we do, that is,  as an entity.  God in His existence is outside of 
our ordinary existence,  indeed He has  'more than'  existence,  and He is  "more 
than being,,32.  Indeed the nature of  Being is  'wholly other' with respect to the 
beings, yet at the same time it is completely immanent: 
"Being, which is transcendent of every particular being,  and is thus 
'wholly other' and the furthest from us, is also the  closest, because it 
is present in every being including our own being. ,,33 
Macquarrie's  argument  is  that  Being  only  'gives  itself  in  and  through  the 
appearances.  The givenness is  in terms of the appearances,  and therefore the 
givenness  is  always  an  immanent  and  not a transcendent reality.  The beings 
know  nothing  of Being  apart  from  its  givenness,  in  which  they  participate. 
Therefore if Being-itself is  to  be  known,  human  beings  must  look with new 
eyes and more deeply into the appearances of  Being in the beings.  Macquarrie 
is  arguing that we must come to see the ultimate in the finitude;  we must see 
more  deeply  in  to  the  beings  which  appear to  us,  in  effect  seeing  them  as 
bearers of  the presence and manifestation of  Being itself 
In terms of  the idea of 'presence' of  Being, Macquarrie proposes that the term 
'participation' might also be used. He states: 
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"Nothing  can  be  unless  it  participates  in  being...  Participation 
stresses  the  presence  of being  - its  openness  and  accessibility  of 
being  in  the  beings  - as  over  and  against  its  distance  and 
transcendence as the mysterious act or energy ofletting-be.  ,,34 
Op. Cit. p.112 
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is taken from Johannes Scotus Eriugena. It is his name for God;  See  also 
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19 It can be  said,  in  view  of this  'participation'  of the beings  in  Being,  that  all 
beings are, to some degree, an incarnation of  Being itself  Being is incarnate in 
the beings,  especially human beings,  and therefore accessible within the sphere 
of ordinary appearances  (which is  the  sphere  of human  perception).  This  is 
particularly so, and indeed is demanded, by the concept of being as becoming, 
discussed above.  The participation could be seen to be the becomingness of 
being,  the  'presence'  then,  is  the  appearance  of the  becomingness  of being. 
Concerning Macquarrie's term 'manifestation', he states: 
"The expression 'manifestation' refers to being's opening itself in the 
beings.  The  manifestation  of  being  is  possible  always  and 
everywhere, for being is present in every particular being .. , But the 
manifestation may be, most of  the time, latent, for we have seen that 
for the most  part we  do  not  notice being,  but  concern ourselves 
only  with  the  beings  and  only  in  revelatory  experiences,  whether 
primordial  or  repetitive  does  being  itself take  the  initiative  and 
communicate itself  ,,35 
The idea here is that Being in its immanence is  always manifest in the beings. 
Its a question then of recognition.  Revelation in this sense is  a coming to the 
place of  recognition of something that is already and always there (present).  In 
coming  to  recognise  the  presence  of being  as  manifest  in  the  beings  (and 
nowhere else) nothing objectively new occurs.  The new reality is born through 
a new self-understanding which such recognition (for the first time) brings. 
We have, then, both the immanence and transcendence of  'Being', present to us, 
in the actually appeared beings.  The problem, which has to do with the nature 
of  appearance, is that it is extremely difficult to distinguish the two.  Indeed the 
ability to distinguish (as we shall see) comes only with the force of revelation. 
In any  event  all  that is  available  and  accessible  to  man  are the appearances. 
According to Macquarrie there is  no  Being outside of the  appearances.  But 
with  the  appearances  there  is  always  a  dichotomy.  The  question  of the 
appearances is well put by F H Bradley: 
35 
"We  have  got  ...  reality  on  one  side  and  our appearances  on the 
other,  and  we  are  naturally  led  to  enquire  about  their  connexion. 
Are they related,  the one to the other,  or not?  If they are related, 
and if in any way the appearances are made the adjectives of reality, 
Ibid. 
20 then the 'thing' has become qualified by them.  It is  qualified but, on 
what principle?,,36 
If we  substitute  the  term  Being  for  reality,  which  we  think  the  nature  of 
Bradley's  argument  would  allow,  (it  must  be  noted  that  Bradley  thinks  of 
'reality'  and 'the absolute' as  constituting a unity)  then Being and  appearances 
according to Bradley are poles apart.  If  there is  a relation,  he says,  and if the 
appearances  are  a real  description  of reality  (Being)  then  the thing  in  itself 
(being in  itself)  is  fully  qualified  by  them.  Yet Bradley seeks further,  to the 
precise relation between reality  and  appearance,  and it  is  clear that he would 
not be satisfied by Whitehead's concept of  the relation of  the 'Primordial nature' 
and  the  'consequent  nature'  of Being,  nor indeed  the  relation  illustrated  by 
Heidegger's rose bush.  Bradley's whole argument is  based on the distinction 
between what appears and what is reaL  However he does concede that reality 
is not something else which is unable to appear: 
"We found that reality was not the appearances, and that result must 
hold good; but, on the other hand,  reality is certainly not something 
else  which  is  unable  to  appear.  F  or  that  is  sheer  self-
contradiction. ,,37 
Macquarrie's  concept  of 'participation'  (above)  states  that:  "nothing  can  be 
unless  it  participates  in  being."  Participation  is  the  key  to  the  relational 
problem  for  Macquarrie.  Bradley  has  a  similar  notion.  His  term  which 
corresponds with participation is "sentient experience".  He states: 
"Experience means something much the same  as  given and  present 
fact  ...  to  be  real  or even barely  to  exist,  must  be  to  fall  within 
sentience.  Sentient experience,  in  short,  is  reality,  and  what is  not 
this is not reaL ,,38 
The real then,  is  nothing but sense experience.  Experience is  participation in 
the real, therefore it is itself the real.  Further: "The Absolute holds all possible 
content in an individual experience, where no contradiction can remain. ,,39 
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21 The absolute the real and the appearances come together in sentient experience, 
which is  participation.  It is  worth continuing with Bradley a little further on 
this subject: 
"There is  but one Reality,  and its 'being'  consists in  experience.  In 
this  one  whole  all  appearances  come  together,  and  in  coming 
together they, in various degrees, lose their distinctive natures.  The 
essence of reality lies  in the union and  agreement of existence and 
content,  and  on  the  other  side,  appearance  consists  in  the 
discrepancy  between these  two  aspects.  And  Reality  in  the  end 
belongs to nothing but the single Real. ,,40 
Bradley is  saying that the absolute is  a singular whole of experience,  and it is 
present in (and in a sense, alike) each of  its special appearances; though present 
everywhere again in  different values and degrees.  He says in the same place: 
"Everything is experience and experience is One. ,,41 
A very powerful, though not unchallengeable, point is being made here: namely 
that being which (if it) exists outside of human perception is entirely irrelevant, 
in any immediate sense, to human existence.  Reality, as far as human existents 
are  concerned  is  their  sentient  experience  of,  and  in,  the  beingness  which 
appears.  The ultimate can only be perceived in the (ordinary) appearances.  To 
see  the ultimate  in  'the  beings'  is  to  see  the  beings  'in  depth'  or 'in  a  new 
dimension' as Macquarrie argues. 
iii)  Distinction 3 - 'Being and the Ideal' 
This  distinction,  according  to  Macquarrie,  IS  essentially  the  companson 
between  the  way  things  are  and  the  way  they  ought  to  be.  This  can  be 
understood in  various ways.  (For instance,  it  can be understood morally,  in 
respect of the actual  condition of society against that which it  ought to be.) 
Macquarrie  claims  that  there  is  no  absolute  disjunction  between  Being,  as 
immanent in the beings and the ideal: 
40 
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22 "Rather the distinction seems to call attention to different levels,  or 
perhaps, one should say,  different degrees of plenitude, not so much 
in  being  itself,  but  in  the  manner  in  which  being  is  present  and 
manifest in the beings,  or in the state of affairs which these beings 
constitute.  It seems that the presence and manifestation of  being can 
. be impeded or distorted, and with such a state of  affairs we contrast 
an 'ideal' condition in which the fullness of  being can  manifest itself 
in and through some particular being or group of  beings. ,,42 
It is  clear that,  for Macquarrie,  the  'ideal'  is  not  a  transcendent  quality  but 
rather it  is  a  matter of moral  standard  or degree  in  respect  of a  particular 
(human) being or group of  (human) beings.  The ideal could perhaps be defined 
in  this  light  as;  that  perfection  of a  particular  being  or a  group  of beings 
through which Being itself could be perfectly manifest in  all  of its fullness.  It 
follows that if Being is  'nowhere apart from the beings' it  cannot be perfectly 
and fully  manifest until an individual being or a society of beings develops to 
moral,  and every other,  perfection.  (Macquarrie would of course agree that 
Jesus of  Nazareth was the archetype man of such perfection; which,  of course 
presupposes  an  adoptionist  christology).  Macquarrie  concedes  that  the 
presence and manifestation of Being can be impeded or distorted in imperfect 
beings.  Indeed if we sum up  the nature of this  distortion under the Biblical 
term 'sin,43, Macquarrie states that: 
"We  agreed  that  sin  is  universal  or in  St  Paul's  words,  "all  have 
sinned and fall  short of  the glory of God"; and that the consequences 
of  sin are grievously disabling in human life. ,,44 
It  appears  that,  if sin  is  a  universal  condition,  Being  must  await  a  moral 
evolution through which a being or group of beings reach perfection before it 
can itself be perfect or ideal.  The great weakness here,  which may indeed be 
evidence of a fallacy,  is  that before such  an  evolution takes place Being (or 
God) exists in a state of imperfection and is therefore imperfect.  If God is  at 
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Principles ojChristian Theology - John Macquarrie, p.112 
Macquarrie prefers the term disorder to sin;  See Principles of Christian 
Theology, p.68, although he does agree that the term 'sin' is appropriate to 
religious language;  See p.71  Compare also  the Heideggerian concept of 
'falling',  in  Being and Time,  Div  1.5  sec  38  p.220,  Heidegger  equates 
fallenness with inauthentic Dasein.  (Macquarrie cites this text) 
Principles oj  Christian Theology - John Macquarrie, p.259- Macquarrie's 
discussion concerning sin takes place over many texts; for his most explicit 
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23 any moment imperfect, where does the tendency towards perfection exist whilst 
God is imperfect?  It could only exist as God's desire to perfect Himself; which 
He achieved in  Christ  and the developing  society which followed  Him.  The 
brute fact appears to be that since Christ no  other (human) being has reached 
perfection therefore God remains imperfect in the present day world. 
d) 'Letting Be' - Macquarrie's positive statement about Being. 
Having outlined what Being is not, and then discussing Being in terms of  three 
pairs of  distinctions, it now falls on Macquarrie to say what Being is.  Just what 
does he mean by the term 'Being'?  Since Being does not fall within any of our 
usual categories of  thought, "it must be regarded as strictly -incomparable-,,45. 
It is a transcendence, which must remain mysterious, therefore just what can be 
positively said about it?  Can it be thought of  as a kind of energy?  Macquarrie 
states: 
"Would these paradoxes be sorted out somewhat if we thought of 
being as a kind of  energy that permits beings to be?,,46 
However the term 'energy' is associated too much with physical force therefore 
Macquarrie prefers the term 'act': 
"Act  ... suggests a more highly organised energy,  a unified  energy 
which recalls the peculiar relation of being  and  becoming  ...  The 
expression  which  I  prefer  to  use,  however  to  point  to  the 
characteristic  of being  as  the  condition  that  there  may  be  any 
particular beings is 'letting-be'.  Being,  strictly speaking,  'is'  not; but 
'lets-be'. ,,47 
Being, to Macquarrie therefore, is a kind of  energy, which is a certain quality of 
gracious action.  This  quality,  Macquarrie names  'letting-be'.  Otherwise put, 
letting-be is a form of creativity therefore it can be said that 'being' is creativity. 
This concept fits very well with the concepts of being in existential philosophy 
and process philosophy/theology as discussed above. 
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24 If  we agree that being includes becoming, then letting-be lets being become.  It 
is the nature of the creativity that empowers becoming.  Since,  to Macquarrie, 
as to other existentialists, existence precedes essence, then clearly the letting-be 
creativity is at work in the dynamic of the translation from existence to being. 
With this thought we are at the very root of  Macquarrie's existential-ontology. 
To quote Yeow Choo Lak again: 
"Macquarrie's  favourite  way  of  explaining  the  transItIOn  from 
existence to being  is  by using  Being's  creativity,  which  empowers 
man to  enjoy the maximal  range of his  being.  . ..  Therefore  man 
finds  his  full  existence  by  living within the  wider being which 
supports and complements his 'meagre' heritage of  being.  Thus there 
are resources beyond man's human resources. ,,48 
And: 
"Earlier we mentioned Being's letting-be,  contending that the best 
way to describe being is to say that it lets-be rather than to say that it 
'is'.  To let-be is to enable or empower beings to be,  or to come into 
existence, or to become.  In a word: creativity. ,,49 
Being then, is the dynamism of dynamic beings, it is the very nature and power 
of  becoming  ness.  This dynamism or energy ofletting-be is itself a transcendent 
reality which is,  as  such,  outside of human resources.  Further, in itself it is  a 
mystery which cannot be articulated, it can only be participated in.  That which 
can be articulated is the nature and ethos of  the participation itself, in terms of 
the beings which participate.  'Letting-be'  is  gift-like.  The nature of the gift 
appears  to  be  of a  passive  quality  rather  like  permission  to  be  or  non-
interference-with, however, Macquarrie does not mean this passive sense: 
"By 'letting-be' I mean something much more positive and active,  as 
enabling to be, empowering to be or bringing into being. ,,50 
Even so,  there is  the notion of freedom in  the term rather than determinism. 
The empowering to be does not seem to interfere with the free existence of  the 
particular  being.  Letting-be  suggests  a  gracious  creativity  which  sets  free. 
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25 Therefore the letting-be serves the beings and not the other way around.  This 
is  of the nature of love.  Can we say that  'letting-be'  is  love?  According to 
Macquarrie this depends on the disposition of  the particular (human) being: 
"The  religious  man  experiences  the  'letting-be'  of being  as  being's 
own  self giving,  the  grace  of being  which  pours  itself out  and 
confers being ... but there are also men, like the character in Sartre's 
novel, who experience being as alien and so its letting them be is like 
the imposition of  a burden. ,,51 
There are two senses to 'letting-be' in human experience, which correspond to 
Grace and judgement.  The two senses are also  seen in  Heidegger's terms of 
authentic  and  inauthentic  being.  The  point  here  is  that  it  is  grace,  and  not 
primarily wrath, which constitutes the judgement.  Judgement is in terms of  the 
inauthentic  disposition  which  Being  also  lets-be.  The  burden  then,  is  not 
imposed from outside but is a negative product of  the freedom to be.  Freedom 
to such men is a curse and not a blessing. 
2.1.2  - What is the Meaning of the Term God? 
a)  The relationship of the term 'Being' and the term  'God' 
It is  immediately noticeable that when Macquarrie  comes  to  discuss  God  in 
relation to Being he switches from the realm of the ontological reality of 'God' 
to  that  of human  language  about  Him  and  about  Being.  The  discussion 
changes  key,  as  it  were,  from  ontic  reality  to  human  conceptuality  and  its 
expression.  Primarily,  then,  Macquarrie  does  not  discuss  the relationship  of 
God  and  Being,  but  rather the  relationship  of the words  'God'  and  'Being'. 
Again the concern is with who or what God is  'to us',  and therefore with His 
immanence,  and  not His transcendence.  Macquarrie considers that Being-in-
general  or the Being behind  the beings is  in  fact  the  God who  is  immanent 
(present  and  manifest)  in  the beings  which  appear.  God,  then,  is  Being-in-
general  and  the term God  is  no  more than a  descriptive  name  for Being-in-
general.  Indeed the term God is used for Being-in-general only by those of a 
51  Op. Cit. p.1l4 
26 religious  disposition.  The  primordial  reality  as  it  appears  as  present  and 
manifest in the beings is Being-itself; the general name for Being-itself, which is 
'God',  is  applied  only  through  the  attitude  of faith.  God,  therefore,  is  a 
subjective  term  for  the  objective  reality  of Being,  which  is  essentially  a 
categorial heading, a key term for those of  a particular attitude to life: 
"To  use  the  word  'God'  means  that  one  has  taken  up  a  certain 
attitude towards being, namely the attitude of  faith. ,,52 
The term 'God', then,  does designate 'Being' but only to those of the religious 
attitude  of faith.  The  words  'God'  and  'Being'  are  not  universally  used  as 
synonymous;  it  follows  that those of a religious  attitude would use the term 
'God'  and  those  who  are  not  of a  religious  disposition  would  use  the term 
'Being'. 
'Being' is a neutral term but 'God' is not, and according to Macquarrie there are 
important existential connotations of value,  commitment,  worship,  and  so  on 
associated with the term 'God'.  God, then, is the word used for Being by those 
who have an attitude of faith towards itlHim,  who indeed worship itlHim and 
are  committed  in  a  particular  existential  disposition  towards  itlHim.  Such 
religious persons revere Being as Holy.  Therefore Macquarrie can say that the 
term 'God' is  synonymous with the term 'Holy Being'.  53  The term 'Holy'  sums 
up all that is involved in the attitude of  faith.  In effect God is a qualifying term 
in respect of  'Being' for those of  a religious disposition.  The objective reality is 
summed  up  by  the  term  'Being',  human  conceptuality  in  and  through  a 
particular  emotional  state  expresses  this  attitude  towards  being,  in  human 
language, by the word 'God'.  The term for the objective reality is  'Being' and 
the term for the human disposition towards the objective reality is 'God'. 
What we are essentially concerned with here is  human language about Being. 
In  the  realm  of religion  this  translates  to  language  about  God,  which  is 
theological language.  'Being', however, and not 'God', is the existent objective 
referent of theological language.  Again,  Being is the objective referent which 
subjectively is thought of  (understood) in the terms 'alien' or 'God'.  The terms 
'alien'  and  'God'  exist  as  descriptive  names  for  being  in  respect  of human 
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27 emotional  states and  attitudes.  The linguistic  term 'God'  has  to  do  with the 
attitude and  state which allows one to perceive a 'depth dimension' in 'Being'. 
This  depth  dimension  is  what  Macquarrie  means  by  'Holy'.  The  depth  of 
'ultimate'  Being'  in  the  ordinary  beings,  comes  together  with  the  human 
disposition  or "affective  state,,54  to  form  a  unity,  therefore we  may  call  the 
'depth  dimension'  'God'  (we  mean  here  that  the  character  of the  'depth 
dimension' is  seen in the particular human,  perceptive attitude.  Therefore the 
depth  dimension  is  always  the  subject  and  not  the  object  of  human 
consciousness).  If however,  we were to think of the depth dimension in  the 
particular (human) being, as constituting the presence and manifestation of  God 
in that being, then we could think of  it in objective terms as the divine image in 
man.  If we do  consider these two terms as being synonymous,  and we might 
well do  so,  then the 'depth dimension' in the beings is  a valid reflection of the 
essential  Being  of God  Himself,  but  it  is  not  the  essential  Being  of God 
Himself 
b)  Religious language 
'God' is the key term of religious language,  so  much so  that all  of theology is 
really only talking around this term.  Talking about God arises from religious 
language  as  a  whole  which  in  tum  arises  from  the  kind  of faith  attitude 
discussed above.  This attitude, Macquarrie describes as comprising of affective 
states  or moods,  principally  the  mood  of angst.  That  which  is  disclosed 
through  this  and  other  moods,  (not  excluding  sensuous  intuition)  can  be 
articulated  in  words.  Such  articulation is,  in  effect  the form  and  content of 
religious language.  The mood of angst, when extreme, produces an awareness 
of the  transient  nature  of the  existence  of personal  beings  in  the  world. 
Macquarrie states: 
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"Yet  the  very  attainment  of  such  an  awareness  is  also  a 
transcendence  of mere  transience,  and  it  is  the  awakening  of the 
quest for grace and meaning.  This is the starting point for religious 
language and, a fortiori, for theological language. ,,55 
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28 We  shall  see  later  that  this  particular  awareness,  in  respect  of the  human 
disposition towards Being, takes on the proportions of the revelation of  Being 
(God)  to  some  men,  producing  in  them  a  radically  new  disposition  which 
Macquarrie  terms  'Authentic  life'.  The  revelation,  which  these  particular 
recipients  interpret  in  terms  of the  particular,  essential  symbols,  of their 
particular life  context (culture) finds  articulation,  embodiment  and  expression 
through the particular religious language which results from it. 
Further,  concerning  the  faith  attitude  which  is  the  seed  bed  of religious 
language,  Ian Ramseys book:  "Religious Language"  is  most helpful  (cited by 
Macquarrie).  56  In  "Religious  Language",  Ramsey  refers  to  the  religious 
attitude  as  'discernment'  and  to  discernment  he  adds  'commitment'.  These 
terms are taken on board by Ramsey as borrowed from Joseph Butler and his 
book:  "The Analogy of  Religion Natural and Revealed to the Constitution and 
Course of  Nature. "  Ramsey expounds Butler: 
"It  is  contrary  to  experience  to  suppose  that  'gross  bodies'  are 
ourselves.  Belief in immortality is thus founded in an awareness that 
as 'living agents' we are more than our public behaviour. ,,57 
And Ramsey continues: 
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"Here,  I  suggest  is  the  discernment  without  which  no  distinctive 
theology will  ever be  possible;  a 'self awareness' that is  more than 
'body'  awareness  and  not  exhausted  by  spatio-temporal  'objects'. 
Such  a  discernment  lies  at  the  basis  of religion  ...  without  such 
'depth'; without this which is 'unseen' no religion will be possible. ,,58 
Cited by Macquarrie in God Talk, p.l8 et. al. 
Religious language  - Ian T Ramsey,  SCM Press 2nd  imp  1957,  p.15  -
Ramsey cites:  The analogy of  Religion Conclusion to part 1, Found in the 
edition published  by:  Frederick Ungar Publishing  Co.,  New York  1961, 
pp.117-122, or in  The  Works  ~f  Bishop Butler - Ed.  J H Bernard,  Vol 2 
sec 4 
Ibid. 
29 And: 
"Butler suggests that religion claims a) a fuller discernment, to which 
we respond with b) a total commitment  ... discernment without an 
appropriate commitment is the worst of  all religious vices. ,,59 
Ramsey  terms  the  'religious  attitude',  which  corresponds  with  Macquarrie's 
'attitude towards being',  a  'discernment-commitment'.  The  precise  nature  of 
this  'discernment-commitment'  he  brings  out through various  illustrations,  as 
being the 'depth aspect' whereby the 'light dawns' the 'ice breaks' and the 'penny 
drops'. 
"The  situation  is  more  than  'what's  seen',  it  has  taken  on  'depth'; 
there is something akin to religious 'insight' 'discernment', 'vision'. ,,60 
Ramsey is concerned with the situation whereby the particular attitude adopted 
evokes 'depth' which results in  an  awareness whereby the light  dawns  or the 
penny drops, as it were.  This is what he means by 'discernment which produces 
disclosure'.  This disclosure in tum produces religious commitment.  "Religious 
commitment",  states Ramsey,  "is  a response to something from  outside us  ... 
(it)  is  a  commitment  which  we  give  up  only  at  the  cost  of personal 
revolution,,61.  Clearly this depth evoking,  disclosive attitude,  which produces 
commitment, is set towards an objective reality, which to Ramsey is God.  He 
quotes In 15: 16 in respect of  the initiative of  this objective reality:  "Y ou have 
not chosen me, but I have chosen you. " 
What Ramsey seeks to draw out from  his  various illustrative examples is that 
religious  language  has  an  empirical  basis.  It  arises  from  the  union  of the 
existential situation and the depth aspect of man's search for reality.  Yet there 
is 'something from outside us',  another initiative, therefore it appears that there 
are three  elements  which  in  union  produce  the  awareness  in  the  participant 
whereby  'the  penny  drops'  and  'the  light  goes  on'.  The  response  to  this 
revelation is religious commitment.  Ramsey states: 
59 
60 
61 
Op. Cit. p.18 
Op.  Cit. p.20 
Op.  Cit. p.36 
30 "There  is  now  a  personal  revolution,  the  whole  of one's  life  IS 
altered, we are 'converted'. ,,62 
Ramsey sums up: 
"So  we  see  religious  commitment  as  a  total  commitment  to  the 
whole universe; something in relation to which argument has only a 
very odd function; its purpose being to tell such a tale as evokes the 
'insight' the 'discernment' from which the commitment follows  as  a 
response.  Further  religious  commitment  is  something  which  is 
bound up with key words whose logic no  doubt resembles that of 
the words which  characterise  personal  loyalty  ...  (these  are)  key 
words  suited  to the whole job of living - 'Apex' words. ,,63 
Religious  conversion and  commitment  are  seen  as  being bound  up  with key 
words which serve as the structural pillars of religious language.  Examples of 
such key terms are; 'Christ', 'Jesus of  Nazareth', 'dead', 'risen' and 'ascended'.  In 
comparison  with  ordinary  language,  religious  language  appears  as  'logically 
odd'; it is an odd kind oflanguage.  There are logical peculiarities which appear 
to lack logical integrity.  Essentially we are dealing with observational language 
which  is  specially  qualified.  Religious  language  has  its  foothold  in 
phenomenology but refers to something beyond and transcendent;  herein lies 
the root of its oddness.  Clearly the key term 'God' falls  into that category,  in 
that it refers to the 'something else', which is discerned as the 'depth aspect'.  It 
is  the  discernment  of God  which  produces  some  sort  of conversion,  which 
produces  total  religious  commitment.  The  term  'God'  evokes  a  distinctive 
personal  relationship  of the  human  self and  'the  beyond',  which  Macquarrie 
terms 'letting-be' or 'Holy Being'. The term God might, in Ramsey's terms, be a 
kind of  intimate name for Being whereby the personal aspect is invoked. 
62  Ibid. 
63  Op.  Cit. p.37 
31 2.2 - Insights Into Macquarrie's ontology, 
in Heidegger and Tillich 
2.2.1 - Heidegger on the question of the meaning of Being, 
and the concepts of 'Letting-be' and 'Moods' 
a)  The question of the meaning of Being 
In 'Being and Time' Heidegger begins his  enquiry into 'Being' by seeking to re-
structure the question of  Being itself  He states that:  "today this question has 
been forgotten".  The  reason for  this,  and  therefore  the fault,  lies  with  the 
Greeks: 
"On  the  basis  of  the  Greeks'  initial  contribution  towards  an 
interpretation of  being, a dogma has been developed, which not only 
declares the question about the meaning of being to be superfluous, 
but sanctions its complete neglect.  It is  said that being is  the most 
universal  and  the  emptiest  of concepts,  as  such  it  resists  every 
attempt  at  definition.  Nor  does  this  most  universal  and  hence 
indefinable of concepts require any definition,  for every one uses it 
constantly and already understands what he means by it. ,,64 
The three essential presuppositions of  the ancient ontology of  the Greeks are: 
1.  Being is the most universal. 
2.  The concept of  Being is indefinable. 
3.  Being is of  all concepts the one that is self evident. 
Therefore enquiry into Being is  unnecessary.  The understanding of Being is 
already included in conceiving anything which one apprehends as an entity. 
Heidegger argues that the universality of  being is not that of a class or a genus 
therefore the term 'Being'  does not define the realm  of entities.  Indeed,  the 
universality of  being transcends any universality of  genus.  Heidegger begins his 
enquiry by arguing that being is an utterly transcendent reality, its universality is 
not therefore of  the order of  this ordinary reality: 
64  Being and Time - Martin Heidegger, p.21 
32 · "Aristotle himself knew the unity of  this transcendental 'universal', as 
a  'unity  of analogy'  in  contrast  to  the  multiplicity  of the  highest 
generic concepts applicable to things. ,,65 
Since being is the most universal concept, of the order of utter transcendence, 
it is not the clearest concept but indeed the darkest.  Being cannot be conceived 
as an entity and it cannot have the character of  an entity: 
"Being cannot be derived from higher concepts by definition, nor can 
it be presented through the lower ones ...  Thus we cannot apply to 
being the  concept of definition as  presented in  traditional logic  ... 
but this indefinability of being does not eliminate the question of its 
meaning - it demands that we look the question in the face. ,,66 
What  we  cannot  do  is  apply  what  Heidegger  terms:  "an  average  kind  of 
intelligibility"  in  our attempt at understanding Being.  There is  implicit in the 
enquiry  an  'a  priori  enigma',  therefore  being  is  not  self evident,  it  is  not 
'intelligible without further ado'.  The meaning of  Being is  still set in darkness. 
Heidegger's first  task is  to  adequately frame  the  question  of the meaning  of 
Being.  This is the fundamental question.  He states: 
"Enquiry as a kind of  seeking, must be guided beforehand by what is 
sought.  So the meaning of being must be already available to us in 
some way.  We do  not know what being means but even if we ask; 
What  is  Being?  We  keep  within  an  understanding  of the  'is'. 
Though we are unable conceptually to fix what that 'is' signifies.  We 
do  not even know the horizon in terms of which  that meaning is to 
be grasped ... But this vague average understanding of  Being is still 
a fact. ,,71 
We are considering the meaning of Being as being in  some way accessible to 
us, yet it is entirely different, it is not in any wayan entity in itself, therefore it 
must be exhibited in a way entirely of its own.  That way must be essentially 
different from the way entities are discovered; its conception must be new and 
unique, however, since 'all is being' the way of  conceiving it must lie in essential 
contrast with the means through which entities are commonly understood. 
65 
66 
71 
Op.  Cit. p.22 
Op. Cit. p.23 
Op. Cit. pA2 
33 What Heidegger is  saying,  in  effect,  is  that whilst  being  is  a-priori  enigmatic 
because it  is  not  an  entity  in  itself but  a  'transcendence',  it  is  in  some  way 
understood through the entities.  Here again we have a similar outline to that 
which  has  been  referred  to  as  'the  depth  aspect'  in  the  beings  (by  both 
Macquarrie and Ramsey).  The transcendence of Being is  only to be found in 
and through the particular beings.  It is the ultimate dimension in the temporal 
ordinary  beings  (Heidegger  refers  to  ordinary,  inauthentic,  existence  as 
averageness and every-day-ness).  The question now arises; which entity should 
be taken within which to seek being?  For Heidegger there can  only be  one 
answer to this question: 
"We are the enquirers ourselves  ... We must make our (particular) 
entity  - the  enquirer  - transparent  in  his  own  being  ...  The  very 
asking of  the question is the enquirer's mode of  being ... This entity 
which each of  us is in himself and which includes enquiring as one of 
the possibilities of  its Being, we shall denote 'Dasein,."n 
The question now translates; what is the Being ofDasein ? 
Heidegger says of  theology, in this respect: 
"Theology is seeking a more primordial interpretation of  man's being 
towards God, prescribed by the meaning of  faith itself and remaining 
within it.  It is  slowly beginning to understand once more Luther's 
insight that the 'foundation' on which its system of dogma rests has 
not arisen from an inquiry in which faith is primary. ,,67 
Heidegger is  proposing that the more primordial interpretation of man's being 
towards God is the anthropocentric ontological inquiry into Dasein (the having-
being or existence of  man himself).  Here, we are at the root or starting point of 
both Macquarrie's and Rahner's theological development. 
Heidegger states further on the subject: 
n 
67 
"By  understanding  Dasein's  ontico-ontological  priority  in  this 
provisional manner,  we have  grounded our demonstration that the 
Op. Cit. p.89 
Op. Cit. p.2S 
34 question of  being is ontico-ontologically distinctive ... If  to interpret 
the meaning becomes our task, Dasein is not only the primary entity 
to be interrogated, it is also that entity which already comports itself, 
in  its  being towards what  we  are  asking  about,  when we ask this 
question.  But in that case the question of  being is nothing other than 
the radicalisation of an essential tendency-of-Being which belongs to 
Dasein itself - the pre-ontological understanding of  Being. ,,68 
Heidegger  progresses  from  Being,  to  time,  as  he  develops  the  meamng  of 
Dasein; Dasein is  'temporality';  in this  way 'time'  becomes the horizon for  all 
understanding  of Being.  Historically  is  the  determining  characteristic  of 
Dasein; 
"The question of the meaning of being must be carried through by 
explicating Dasein beforehand in its temporality and historicality. ,,69 
Part of the explication is  that the basic state of Dasein is  being-in-the World. 
Being  is  always  being-in;  being-in-the-World  is  the  state  in  which  Dasein 
operates,  pre-eminently  (in  inauthentic  life)  in  the  mode  of 'every-dayness'. 
However, being is also always 'outside': 
"When Dasein directs itself towards something and grasps it, it does 
not  somehow  get  out  of an  inner  sphere  in  which  it  has  been 
proximally encapsulated, but its primary kind of  Being is such that it 
is always "outside" alongside entities which it encounters and which 
belong to a world already discovered. ,,70 
This state (essential structure) ofDasein as being-in-the-World in terms of,  and 
in identity with,  the other entities of the world,  and  of course other Daseins, 
results in the affective state of  '  Concern'.  The state of  Being-in-the-World then, 
is a state of  concern for Dasein, whose essential nature emerges as 'Care'71. 
68 
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Op.  Cit.  p.26;  The  idea  of transparency  of being  IS  comparable  with 
Rahner's concept of'luminousity'. 
Op. Cit. p.30 
Op.  Cit.  p.35;  The  ontico-ontological  distinction  is  that  between  the 
ontical  and  the ontological; the 'ontological'  is  concerned primarily with 
being, and the 'ontical' is concerned with entities and the facts about them. 
But it  is  being-towards-the-world which  is  concern.  See  being and time 
p.83f 
35 b)  Letting-be 
We have  seen that 'letting-be'  is  Macquarrie's term for  Being and  indeed  for 
God.  Letting-be is a kind of  energy that enables and empowers being.  Letting-
be is in a sense the nature of the transcendence of being,  it is  a kind  of Holy 
creativity.  Macquarrie  understands  (Holy)  Being  as  God;  Heidegger, 
understands 'Being' as Dasein,  therefore all  of Heidegger's analysis is  in terms 
of Dasein.  This includes the concept of 'letting-be' or more precisely 'letting-
be-involved'.  Letting-be-involved is the setting free by Dasein of  the entities of 
the world which are 'ready-to-hand'72. We have, then, along with the concept of 
letting-be, the concepts of freedom and involvement.  The idea of involvement, 
which could be said to be similar to Macquarrie's term 'participation', includes 
the concept of  'concern'.  (That is, the state of  being-in-the-World ofDasein): 
"Letting  things  be  involved  makes  up  the  existential  structure  of 
concern.  But  concern, as being alongside something, belongs to the 
essential  constitution  of care;  and  care  in  tum  is  grounded  in 
temporality.  If an  this  is  so  then  the  existential  condition  of the 
possibility of  letting things be involved must be sought in a mode of 
the temporalizing of  temporality. ,,73 
Temporality is the basis of  Letting-things-be-involved, which is the unity of  the 
relations  in  which  concern  circumspectively  operates.  Letting-be  has  to  do 
with the nature of concern, which in tum derives from the essential nature of 
Dasein,  which is  care.  It appears that letting-things-be is  a creative dynamic, 
born of  care, through concern.  With the term 'previously-Ietting-something-be', 
the creative activity is reinforced: 
72 
73 
"Ontically,  'Letting-something-be-involved'  signifies  that within  our 
factical concern we let something ready-to-hand be so-and-so as it is 
already and in order that it be such.  The way we take this  ontical 
sense of 'letting-be' is,  in  principle,  ontological.  And therewith we 
The  term  "ready-to-hand"  refers  to the  equipment  in  the world  wich  is 
useable  by  Dasein.  Heidegger states,  "When  we  concern  ourselves  with 
something, the entities wich are most closely ready-to-hand may be met as 
something unseable (equipment is ready-to-hand) "Being and Time", 
p 102 
But it is Being-towards-the-world that is concern; See p.83f 
36 interpret the meaning of  previously freeing what is proximally ready-
to-hand within-the-world. ,,74 
However: 
"Previously letting-something-be does not mean that we must bring 
something  into  its  Being  and  produce  it;  it  means  rather  that 
. something  which  is  already  an  'entity'  must  be  discovered  in  its 
readiness-to-hand,  and  that  we  must  let  the  entity which  has  this 
Being be encountered. ,,75 
The notion of  creating that which was not is missing from Heidegger's thinking 
in respect of letting-be, the element of previousness which is  a-priori is  rather 
the  condition  for  the  possibility  of the  encountering  of an  entity  which  is 
already ready-to-hand.  Therefore to encounter something which is  ready-to-
hand we must set it free previous to the encounter, the setting of it free (which 
is not to, not-let-it-be-involved, or indeed to destroy it) is the condition for the 
possibility of  the encounter itself  The encounter takes place in the involvement 
of  the entity which we have let-be, or freed.  In the encounter the being of  the 
entity is disclosed to Dasein, therefore we are, in the nature of  the involvement 
itself,  involved  in  an  epistemological  activity.  All  of this  is  of course  the 
dynamic  of the structure of the temporal  state wherein Dasein has  its  being. 
We  are  essentially  concerned  with  Being  as  an  existential,  and  therefore 
Letting-be-involved  is  the  dynamic  activity  which  makes  up  the  temporal 
structure of  the existential. 
When we talk about the previous disclosure of the involvement of beings we 
are talking about some form of  a-priori knowledge: 
74 
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"But  what  does  it  mean  to  say  that  for  which  entities  within  the 
world are proximally freed must have been previously disclosed?  To 
Dasein's  Being,  an  understanding  of  Being  belongs.  Any 
understanding has its being in an act of understanding.  If Being-in-
the-world is a kind of  Being which is essentially  befitting to Dasein, 
The  term  'ready-to-hand'  refers  to the  equipment  in  the world  which is 
useable by Dasein.  Heidegger states:  "When we concern ourselves with 
something, the entities which are most closely ready-to-hand may be met 
as  something  useable  (equipment  is .. ready-to-hand)"  Being and  Time, 
p.102 
Op. Cit. pA04 
37 then  to  understand  Being-in-the-world  belongs  to  the  essential 
content of its understanding of Being.  The previous disclosure of 
that for which what we encounter within-the-world is  subsequently 
freed,  amounts to nothing else than understanding the world - that 
. world towards which Dasein as an entity always comports itself  ,,76 
The  intelligibility  of the  particular  involvement  is  disclosed  beforehand,  it 
appears to be the content of an innate knowledge,  or understanding, of being, 
which Dasein possesses by virtue of  being Dasein.  This sounds very similar to 
Rahner's  'Pre-concept'  which  is  the  condition  for  the  possibility  of all  other 
knowledge. 
If existence  precedes  being,  then  letting-be-involved  is  the  nature  of the 
dynamic,  whereby  being,  becomes.  The  great  similarity  of Macquarrie's 
concept  and  the Heideggerian  concept  is  clearly  seen  here,  and  a  profound 
insight into Macquarrie's thinking is gained.  Heidegger lays the foundation for 
Macquarrie's  schema  of  the  immanence  of  Being  (God),  and  for  his 
understanding  of  man's  transcendental  encounter  with  (Holy)  Being 
(revelation); through the  a-priori understanding in  the encounter which takes 
place through the previous-freeing of the entity which is  encountered through 
Letting-it-be-involved. 
c)  Moods  (Affective states) 
The nature ofDasein, is 'care', and 'care' is the primordial structural totality of 
the existential  a-priori  attitude  of Dasein.  Care is  ontoiogically prior to any 
other  aspect  of Dasein's  constitution,  indeed  it  is  pre-ontological.  Care  is 
'being-ahead-of-oneself,  it  is  'in-being-already-in',  and  it  is  'being-alongside,77. 
In explicating the element of care, Heidegger quotes an ancient fable  in which 
he says Dasein's interpretation of  itself as care has been embedded: 
76 
77 
"Once  when  'Care'  was  crossing  a river,  she  saw  some  clay;  she 
thought-fully took up a piece and began to shape it.  While she was 
meditating on what she had made, Jupiter came by.  'Care' asked him 
to give it spirit, and this he gladly granted.  But when she wanted her 
name to be bestowed upon it,  he forbade this and demanded that it 
Op.Cit.p.117 
Ibid. 
38 be given his name instead.  While 'Care' and Jupiter were disputing, 
Earth  arose  and  desired  that  her  own  name  be  conferred  on  the 
creature,  since  she  had  furnished  it  with  part  of her  body.  They 
asked Saturn to be their arbiter, and he made the following decision, 
which seemed a just one; 'Since you Jupiter, have given its spirit you 
shall receive that spirit at its death;  and since you Earth have given 
its body you shall receive its body.  But since 'Care' first shaped this 
creature, she shall possess it as long as it lives.  And because there is 
now a dispute among you as to its name, let it be called 'homo' for it 
is made out of  humus (earth). ,,78 
Man  is,  therefore,  most  essentially  'Care'  existing  In  the  temporal  state  of 
'Concern'.  Care determines the state-of-mind ofDasein with respect to its own 
being  and  the  being-in-the-world  of itself and  the  other  entities  which  it  is 
alongside: 
"What  we  indicate  ontologically  by  the  term  'State-of-mind'  is 
ontically the most familiar and everyday sort of  thing; our mood, our 
Being-attuned. ,,79 
Dasein always  exists in,  and in terms of,  some kind of 'mood'. It always has a 
mood which is  the means  of the disclosure (revelation) of its  being to itself 
There is a: 
"Primordial  disclosure  belonging  to  moods  in  which  Dasein  is 
brought before its Being as  'there'  ... a mood makes manifest how 
one is,  and how one is  faring.  In this how one is',  having a mood 
brings  Being to its  'there'  ...  The being  of the there  is  disclosed 
moodwise in its 'that-it-is'. ,,80 
Dasein, then, finds  itself in its thrownness of  being, through a state-of-mind or 
mood.  Moods, therefore, disclose Being.  They disclose Being-in-the-world as 
a whole,  and  make  it  possible  for  one  to  direct  oneself towards  something. 
Moods  are the  constitution of Dasein's  openness  towards  Being in  General; 
through the attunement of  moods Dasein encounters something that matters to 
it.  It is  through the various  states-of-mind  or moods  therefore that Dasein 
discovers and  encounters the world which is  alongside  it.  The  'mood'  is  the 
medium of  the revelation of  being-in-the-world, to Dasein.  However: 
78 
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Op.  Cit. p.llS 
Op.  Cit. pp.235-241; for discussion on Dasein's Being as 'Care'. 
Op.  Cit. p.242 
39 "A state-of-mind not only discloses Dasein in its thrownness and its 
submission  to  the  world  which  is  already  disclosed  with  its  own 
Being;  it  is  itself the  existential  kind  of Being  in  which  Dasein 
constantly surrenders itself to the 'world' and lets the world matter to 
it in such a way that somehow Dasein evades its very self  ,,81 
Dasein evades the Being which is disclosed in the mood.  It flees from itself in 
the face of itself, therefore it finds itself, not primarily in seeking, but in fleeing 
from  facing  up  to  itself  When  confronted  by  the  disclosure  of its  Being 
through  certain  moods,  Dasein  more  often  than  not  evades  them  and  turns 
away.  We see in this action the element of 'threat' appearing.  Heidegger says 
of  threat: 
"Pure beholding,  even if it were to penetrate to the innermost core 
of the  Being  of something  present-at-hand,  could  never  discover 
anything like that which is threatening. ,,82 
We begin to see that the moods which do  not elate but threaten are by far the 
most disclosive, such a mood is 'anxiety': 
"We shall provide an interpretation of anxiety as  such a basic state-
of-mind  of Dasein,  and  as  one  which  is  significant  from  the 
existential-ontological standpoint. ,,83 
Indeed Heidegger argues that since Dasein is  in  a state of 'fallenness',  anxiety 
provides  the  phenomenal  basis  for  explicitly  grasping  Dasein's  primordial 
totality of  Being.  Dasein flees in the face of  itself and of  its authenticity, to an 
absorption in the world of  its concern.  It does not turn away or flee from a fear 
of  the entities in the world, indeed it flees to the entities, and to the averageness 
and  everydayness of the 'they'.  The turning away is grounded in  anxiety,  but 
Heidegger is  clear that,  "  'that'  in the face  of which one has  anxiety is  not an 
entity within the world"; 'that' in the face of  which one is anxious is completely 
indefinite. ,,84  Indeed  entities  within  the  world  are  irrelevant,  anxiety  is  not 
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40 anxious in the face  of anything which is  ready-to-hand.  So  what then is  the 
ground of  anxiety? 
"When  something threatening brings  itself close,  anxiety  does  not 
see any definite 'here' or 'yonder' from which it  comes.  That in the 
face  of which  is  anxious  is  characterised  by  the  fact  that  what 
threatens is nowhere.  Anxiety does not know what that in the face 
of which it  is  anxious is  ...  Therefore that which threatens cannot 
bring itself close from a definite direction within what is close by;  it 
is already there, and yet nowhere; it is  so  close that it is  oppressive 
and stifles ones breath and yet it is nowhere ... In that in the face of 
which  one  has  anxiety,  the  'It  is  nothing  and  nowhere'  becomes 
manifest.  The  obstinacy of the  'nothing'  and  'nowhere'  within  the 
world means as  a phenomenon that the world as  such is that in the 
face of  which one has anxiety. ,,85 
Heidegger is saying that Being-in-the-world itself is the ground of anxiety,  and 
being anxious discloses, primordially and directly, the worldhood of  the world. 
Dasein is anxious in respect of  its potentiality for authentic being: 
"Anxiety makes manifest in Dasein its Being towards its own most 
potentiality-for-Being,  that  is  its  Being-free  for  the  freedom  of 
choosing itself and taking hold of itself  Anxiety brings Being face 
to face  with its being free for the authenticity of its Being and for 
this authenticity as a possibility which it always is. ,,86 
"Anxiety  individualises.  This  individualisation  brings  Dasein  back 
from  its  falling,  and  makes  manifest  to  it  that  authenticity  and 
inauthenticity are  possibilities of  its Being.  The basic possibilities of 
Dasein  show  themselves  in  anxiety  as  they  are  in  themselves, 
undisguised by entities within-the-world to which proximally and for 
the most part Dasein clings. ,,87 
Dasein clings  to the entities through fear,  it  loses itself in  the 'crowd'  or the 
'they'  and  so  sustains  inauthentic  life.  Anxiety  is  the  form  of (non  verbal) 
revelation of  the true state and condition of  Dasein and also of  its potential for 
authentic  life.  The  Being  of Dasein  confronts  itself in  the  anxious  mood 
revealing to it the facticity of the worldhood of the world.  Interestingly, there 
is an element of  the uncanny in this disclosure, there is  the presence of 'threat' 
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41 and  the  'Not  at  home'.  What  is  made  present  to  Dasein's  awareness  IS 
something  alien  to  it,  something  from  nowhere  and  something  which  IS 
'nothing'.  Some  kind  of primordial,  ultimate  reality  which,  whilst  being  so 
close, is at the same time transcendent.  Anxiety is the gateway to the reception 
of  this greater and stark reality of the Being of the individual in the world.  In 
the shock of  Being the Beingness or thereness of Being is uncovered, stripped 
naked, as it were, from its delusion amongst the entities. 
Macquarrie  leans  very  heavily  on  Heidegger's  analysis  of fear  and  anxiety, 
especially in  respect of his  concept of God's revelation to man.  Macquarrie 
stretches Heidegger's  existential/ontological  philosophy  over into  the field  of 
religion.  He states: 
"Although Heidegger does not explicitly say so,  we contend that at 
this point the existential analytic has brought us to the threshhold of 
religion,  and  the  concept  of  anxiety  demands  a  religious 
interpretation - and  with it  the whole concept of human existence. 
For  in  this  fundamental  malaise  which,  springs  from  man's  very 
being,  there  is  disclosed  not only the self and  the world,  but  also 
God.  The disclosure does not indeed yield the explicit knowledge of 
God, but directs man to God as the ground of  his being". 88 
2.2.2 - Tillich - The problem of the finitude 
The term 'the problem of the finitude'  sums up  the fragility and temporality of 
man's being.  Essentially the problem is about the reality or possible reality,  as 
conceived by man, of 'non-being'.  Non-being or nothingness or the nullity, was 
seen by both Augustine  and  Barth as  evi1
89
.  According  to  Augustine  sin  is 
really 'nothing', it arises from nowhere as a deprivation of  the good.  Barth saw 
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42 SIll  and  evil  as  a  kind  of active  nothingness  which  seeks  to  win  back  that 
which it  has  lost to Being.  When  God  created the being of the universe he 
elected what was to be and rejected what was not; the non-being which God 
rejected is conceived as constituting sin and evil. 
Parmenides'  thinking in  respect of non-being (referred to  by both Tillich  and 
Heidegger) has a profound influence.  Tillich states: 
"Parmenides realised that in speaking of nonbeing one gives it some 
kind  of being  which  contradicts  its  character  as  the  negation  of 
being.  Therefore he  excluded it  from  rational thought.  But in  so 
doing he rendered the realm of becoming unintelligible  and  evoked 
the atomistic  solution which identifies nonbeing with empty space, 
thus giving it some kind of  being. ,,90 
What then is non-being,  and what is its significance in  respect of Macquarrie's 
theological development? 
a) Non-Being - Meaning and significance? 
According to Tillich the metaphysical question of  Being is produced, or arises, 
through the shock of non-being.  This  point  is  precisely the apparent  reality 
which serves as the basis of  Macquarrie's position in respect of  the revelation of 
Being.  The contrast of Being and Nothing is  the emotive force of man's new 
self understanding, through the awareness of  the presence and manifestation of 
Holy Being.  The tensions produced by the contrast bring about the affective 
state  or mood  which,  in  tum,  is  the  appropriate  context  or frame  for  the 
reception of Being's self revelation.  It is through this attunement that Dasein 
passes  from  inauthentic  to  authentic  life.  Non-being  is  perceived  in  this 
respect as the limit situation imposed on man,  particularly in respect of death. 
Tillich states: 
90 
"Only man can ask the ontological question because he alone is able 
to look beyond the limits of  his own being and of every other being. 
Looked  at  from  the  standpoint  of possible  nonbeing  being  is  a 
mystery.  Man is  able  to take this  standpoint because he is  free  to 
transcend every given reality.  He is not bound to 'beingness'; he can 
envisage nothingness;  he  can ask the ontological question.  In doing 
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43 so  however,  he  must  ask a question about  that  which  creates the 
mystery of being; he must consider the mystery of nonbeing.  Both 
questions have been joined together since the beginning  of human 
thought. ,,91 
Only when the two questions are dealt with together can there be the possibility 
of 'authentic life'  and indeed  'religious faith',  presupposing of course that the 
most fundamental and primordial question is in fact the ontological question. 
Ontically,  however, it is  argued by Tillich that man is  only able to look at his 
being because he can and must be separated from it.  It is the separation which 
allows  him  to  look  at  being  as  something  strange  and  questionable.  The 
separation is possible, argues Tillich, because man participates not only in being 
but also in nonbeing, (otherwise put, 'in life man participates in death').  Indeed 
unless  man  participates  in  nonbeing  no  negative  judgements  are  possible. 
"Therefore  the  very  structure  which  makes  negative  judgements  possible 
proves the ontological  character of non-being". 92  N on-being  provides  being 
with its  dialectical  nature and  therefore we can go further by proposing that 
unless  man  participates in  non-being,  no  judgement of any  kind  is  possible. 
Tillich states: 
"There can be no world unless there is  a dialectical participation of 
nonbeing, in being. ,,93 
This  view  corresponds  with  Macquarries  dialectical  opposite  of 'being  and 
nothing' which is one of the dialectical opposites in  God.  This dialectic along 
with  seven  others  go  together  as  the  content  of Macquarrie's"  Dialectical 
Theism".94 
Tillich argues, as does Macquarrie, for the dialectical nature of  reality, whereby 
aspects of  that reality are qualified and known in their existence by and through 
their  dialectical  opposite,  in  such  a  way that  the  antithesis  is  a  part  of the 
essential reality of the thesis itself.  Non-being is  an essential element in being 
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44 and vice versa.  We have then a dualistic reality which is essentially summed up 
by the transcendence  and  the immanence  of God.  This  aspect  is  dealt  with 
early on in the history of human thought by Plotinus, in terms of 'the One' and 
'the Many,95.  Non-being exists in dialectical relationship with being, as the limit 
of  being, and 'being' limited by non-being is the finitude. 
b)  Finitude and limitation 
We have the idea of 'the limit'  and limitedness,  with respect to being.  Finite 
being, by definition, is limited on every side and in every aspect or it would not 
be  finite.  Tillich  argues  that the nature of the limitation  is  'non-being'.  He 
states: 
"Nonbeing appears as the 'not yet' of being and as  the 'no  more' of 
being.  It confronts  everything  which  is  with  a  definite  end  ... 
everything which participates in the power of being is  'mixed'  with 
nonbeing.  It is being in process of coming from and going towards 
nonbeing.  It is finite. ,,96 
The limit is non-being, Being-itself has no beginning and no end therefore it did 
not arise out of non-being.  Being is not an entity, it has its own power which 
'is'.  Being  precedes  non-being  in  ontological validity,  non-being  arose  from 
Being,  it  is  literally  nothing  without  its  relation  to  Being.  "Being  is  the 
beginning without a beginning, the end without an end. ,,97  However, Being and 
non-being  exist  in  the  necessity  of the  dialectical  nature  of the  known 
ontological reality. 
Non-being is that limit of the finitude which is  experienced by man as a threat 
to  his  being.  It  presents  itself in  terms  of the  end  to  being  which  man 
anticipates as one of  the moments of his self-transcendence.  Tillich states that 
the  process  of self transcendence  carries  a  double  meaning  in  each  of its 
moments, the dialectic of  Being and non-being are the two sides of the coin of 
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45 the transcendental  experience.  The  dialectic  is  primordially that of the finite 
(Being) and infinite (non-being): 
"In order to experience his finitude,  man must look at himself from 
the point of view of a potential infinity.  In  order to be aware of 
moving towards death, man must look out over his finite being as a 
whole; he must in some way be beyond it.  He must also be able to 
imagine infinity;  and he  is  able  to  do  so,  although not in  concrete 
terms,  but only  as  an  abstract  possibility  ...  infinity  is  a  directing 
concept  and  not  a  constituting  concept.  It directs  the  mind  to 
experience its own unlimited potentialities, but it  does not establish 
the existence of  an infinite being. ,,98 
The  human  mind  continually  transcends  any  possible  object  of finitude,  for 
example, if finite space is thought of  as an objective reality,  one cannot prevent 
the mind from asking the question; 'what lies beyond finite space?'  Infinity seen 
in this way can never be a 'thing' in itself; indeed, Tillich argues that infinity is a 
'demand',  not a thing.  The demand is  that the human mind  goes on endlessly 
transcending  every  finite  space  and  every  finite  time  without  exception.  It 
transcends all finite realities in both directions,  microcosmic and macrocosmic. 
The  mind  itself however,  says  Tillich,  remains  bound  to  the  finitude  of its 
individual bearer.  "Infinitude is finitude transcending itself without any a-priori 
limit" .99 
It is the very demand of the infinitude on the human mind,  expressed through 
the  transcendental  experience,  which  brings  to  bear  the  limitation  of mans 
particular finitude of  being.  The coming to bear of  the infinitude in terms of  the 
limitation of the finitude  is  what is  referred to  as  'the shock of being'.  The 
limitation is perceived in the shock of  being as the threat of non-being.  In the 
precise tension of  the shock, however, there arises the more primordial demand 
or call of Being-itself  Man comes to realise that he belongs not to non-being 
but to Being itself  This is what Macquarrie refers to as  grace.  When man is 
confronted, in his mind, by the power of  non-being, he is thrown to the ground 
(with the force  of revelation).  The  next  demand  on  him  is  the  contrast  of 
Being-itself with the non-being.  (Perhaps in the form of a question rather like 
that  of Leibniz:  "why  is  there  being  rather  than  nothing?")  Through  this 
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46 revelatory process Being-itself is disclosed to man and he beholds as it were for 
the first  time,  Being-itself (or Holy Being).  In this  encounter with Being,  it 
does appear that the limitation of  the finitude has been negated, indeed we have 
the negation of  the negation in and through this transcendental experience. 
"The  potential  presence  of  the  infinite  (the  unlimited  self-
transcendence)  is  the  negation  of the  negative  element  in  the 
finitude.  It is the negation of  nonbeing. ,,100 
In a sense infinity draws close and confronts the finitude acutely pointing to its 
limitation of being.  The demand of the infinite,  however,  calls the finitude to 
transcend itself, thereby negating the limitation of nonbeing.  However, Tillich 
states that: 
"Being-itself is not infinity; it is that which lies beyond the polarity of 
finitude  and infinite self-transcendence.  Being-itself manifests itself 
to finite  being in  the infinite  drive  of the finite  beyond itself  But 
being-itself  cannot  be  identified  with  infinity,  that  is,  with  the 
negation  of finitude.  It precedes  the  finite,  and  it  precedes  the 
infinite negation ofthe finite. ,,101 
We see here that Tillich understands Being-itself, in its primordial reality, to be 
wholly  other  and  utterly  transcendent,  even  to  the  extent  of transcending 
infinity.  Non-being  however  does  not  hold  the  same  status,  it  is  wholly 
derived from the finitude.  Indeed, if the finite  beings ceased to exist then so 
too would non-being.  It is essentially non-being, then, that presents itself to the 
mind of  man,  as limitation and threat, thereby producing the mental and indeed 
emotional state of 'anxiety' (angst). 
c)  Anxiety 
"Finitude  in  awareness  is  anxiety.  Like  finitude,  anxiety  is  an 
ontological  quality.  It cannot be  derived;  it  can  only be seen and 
described.  Occasions  in  which  anxiety  is  aroused  must  be 
distinguished from anxiety itself  As an ontological quality,  anxiety 
is  as  omnipresent  as  is  finitude.  Anxiety  is  independent  of any 
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47 special  object which might produce it;  it is  dependent only  on the 
. threat of  non-being which is identical with finitude. ,,102 
Since there is  no  object of anxiety,  anxiety is  clearly distinguished from fear, 
which  requires  an  object.  Anxiety,  according  to  Tillich,  is  identical  with 
finitude  itself  Therefore  anxiety  cannot  be  conquered  as  fear  can  be 
conquered,  by  conquering its  object.  Anxiety,  then,  is  always  present  even 
though  it  may  often  be  latent.  Tillich  states:  "Therefore,  it  can  become 
manifest at any  and  every moment,  even in  situations where nothing is  to be 
feared. ,,103  Anxiety  as  an  ontological  concept  expresses  finitude  from  the 
'inside'.  Anxiety, then, is of  a revelatory nature, and it has revelatory power: 
"Anxiety is self-awareness of  the finite self as finite.  The fact that it 
has  a  strongly  emotional  character  does  not  remove  its  revealing 
power.  The emotional element simply indicates that the totality of 
the  finite  being  participates  in  finitude  and  faces  the  threat  of 
nothingness. ,,104 
The  question is;  'What  is  it  that  anxiety  reveals?'  It cannot  be Being-itself 
because Being-itself,  according to  Tillich,  transcends  both the finite  and  the 
infinite, it follows therefore that anxiety reveals the ontological reality of non-
being.  Non-being is that which is experienced from the inside, through anxiety. 
We can say,  however, that through the experience of nonbeing,  being-itself is 
negatively experienced. 
Non-being is  experienced in  categories of the finitude,  the examples of these 
given by  Tillich  are  Time,  Space,  causality,  and  substance.  Essentially non-
being manifests itself through the insecurity of the anticipation of the loss or 
destruction of these finite  categories,  in  so  far as they pertain to the being of 
the individual.  Anxiety, then, is about the anticipation of  one's own death: 
"The melancholy awareness of  the trend of  being towards nonbeing 
. ..  is  most  actual in the anticipation of ones own death.  What is 
significant here is not the fear of death. ..  It is anxiety about having 
to die  ...  In the  anxiety of having to  die  nonbeing is  experienced 
from  the  'inside'.  This  anxiety  is  potentially  present  in  every 
moment.  It permeates the whole of man's being; it  shapes soul and 
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48 body  and  determines  spiritual  life.  It  belongs  to  the  created 
character of being  quite apart from  estrangement and  sin  ...  The 
Bible record points to the profound anxiety of having to die in  him 
who was called the Christ. ,,105 
Anxiety when faced in courage, reveals the ultimate dimension in terms of the 
finite  categories  themselves.  Tillich,  by  example  of the  four  categories, 
demonstrates the  nature  of the  union  of Being  and  non-being  in  everything 
finite.  Getting beyond this  anxiety of non-being is  achieved by  courageously 
facing  non-being in  the face  of the full  intensity and  extremity of the anxiety 
itself.  What is  required in  the facing  and  acceptance of one's own death and 
indeed one's own non-being is the 'courage to be'.  The courageous dynamic of 
this acceptance is at the same time the revelatory path to God. 
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Karl Rahner's Metaphysical 
Epistemological Ontology 
3.1 The Metaphysical Quest. 
Man's quest for Being can be said to constitute both the nature and motivation 
of his  need and  desire for ontological revelation.  (F or theists,  of course, this 
impulse  is  satisfied  only  by  the  Self  Revelation  of  God.)  Macquarrie 
understands  this  quest  in  existential  terms;  as  man  participates  in  Being. 
Rahner,  on the other hand,  understands it  as taking place only in  and through 
metaphysical questioning. 
3.1.1 The Metaphysical question 
The point of departure of  man's ontological quest, according to Rahner then, is 
his  facility  of metaphysical  questioning.  Rahner holds that knowledge is  the 
essential constitutive element in man's being, therefore his  quest for being is in 
actuality his quest for knowledge.  This quest is realised through the process of 
asking  metaphysical  questions.  (Rahner  defines  metaphysical  questions  as 
questions about Being) 
"Man  questions.  This  is  something  final  and  irreducible  ...  the 
question is  first  of all  the  only  'must',  the  only necessity,  the  only 
thing beyond question to which questioning man  is  bound  ... Man 
questions necessarily.  But this necessity can only be grounded in the 
fact  that  being  is  accessible  to  man  at  all  only  as  something 
50 questionable, that he himself 'is' insofar as he 'asks about being', that 
he himself exists as a question about being. ,,1 
a) The Question as the starting point of  Rahner's metaphysics and 
the basis of his fundamental ontology. 
"Man must ask the question about being if he wants to be,  because 
only in this  question is  being in  its  totality,  given to  him  ...  The 
proposition stating the necessity of questioning in  human existence 
includes in  itself its  own ontological proposition,  which  says;  Man 
exists as the question about being.  The question is the must which 
he  himself  is,  and  in  which  being  as  that  which  is  questioned, 
presents and offers itself  ,,2 
We  see,  then,  that  according  to  Rahner  questioning  constitutes  both  man's 
existential reality and his  very being.  Questioning and  questionability emerge 
as  the  roots  of Rahner's  ontology  (which,  since  questioning  is  an  epistemic 
activity, we have termed an 'Epistemological Ontology').  However, Rahner is 
referring to 'metaphysical' questions and questioning,  and not all  questions are 
of this  order!  Man  asks  questions  about  all  existents,  therefore  he  asks 
categorial questions as  well  as  metaphysical  questions.  These two orders of 
questions constitute a primary bi-valence in man's ontology which effects every 
aspect of Rahner's 'fundamental',  ontological development.  In our analysis of 
'questioning', therefore, it follows that we must consider both orders and their 
relationship.  The categorial order we shall head 'The questioning of things-in-
the-world' and the metaphysical order,  'Questioning - Metaphysical', we begin 
with a discussion of  questioning in generaL 
i)  Questioning 
The nature of questioning can be seen to be paradoxicaL  The paradox is  that 
man  cannot  ask  a  question unless  he  already,  with  the  question,  knows  the 
answer in  some way and  if he  knows the answer he  has  no  need  to  ask  the 
2 
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51 question!3  Nonetheless  it  does  appear to  be  a fact  that  man  needs  to  ask 
questions.  From the age of early childhood man is  a fervent questioner.  The 
range of this apparently natural questioning appears to be extensive; there are 
questions concerning security, identity and the objects which are bodied against 
him,  in both an immediate and ultimate sense.  The immediate sense is  of the 
categorial  order  (this  is  the  major  domain  of empirical  science)  and  the 
ultimate  is  of the  metaphysical  order.  Both  senses,  (whilst  some  types  of 
question are,  more or less,  ontologically neutral),  are seen to be ontologically 
positive and developmentally wholesome.  There exists also a negative strain of 
questioning arising from what Heidegger would term "idle curiosity", resulting 
in "falling" into inauthentic life.
4  Perhaps we would do little violence by linking 
this concept to the Biblical motif of "the knowledge of  good and evil"  (Gen 3). 
We read in the Genesis story that the pursuit of  such knowledge resulted in the 
fall of  mankind into a sinful and negative (inauthentic) existence. 
The activity of Questioning, then, can be categorial or metaphysical (immediate 
or ultimate)  and  it  can  be  positive  or negative,  leading  in  a good or an  evil 
direction. 
5  Further,  if Rahner  is  right,  and  it  appears  that  he  is,  man  asks 
questions necessarily, therefore to be human in any real sense of  the word, is to 
be a questioner.  The problem of the dilemma of the paradox is no  new thing, 
Plato  was  well  aware  of it  as  shown  by  the  import  of the  questioning  of 
Socrates in 'Meno': 
"How will  you look for  it,  Socrates,  when you  don't  even know what it  is? 
How will you aim to search for something you don't know at all?  And if you 
3 
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It may be  said that Rahner's theology is  the thematic  outworking of the 
resolutions  to  his  intellectual  dilemmas.  In  this  instance  we  have  the 
paradox  of knowledge,  which  is  as  old  as  knowledge  itself  Plato's 
resolution of the paradox is  seen  in  his  principle  of anamnesis  whereby 
man,  who already knows everything, when he  comes upon the objects of 
this  prior  knowledge,  simply  'remembers'  them.  Anamnesis  is  also  an 
important concept in respect of 'historical revelation' (see the article in  the 
Concise  Theological  Dictionary  - Edited  by  Karl  Rahner  &  Herbert 
Vorgrimler, Burns & Oats  London 2nd ed.  1983, p.9) 
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Rahner would term the negative, evil  strain of questioning, 'perversion' or 
'corruption'. 
52 should meet up with it,  how would you know that this is the thing that you 
didn't  knoW?,,6  The  teaching  of 'the  Meno'  is  that  the  human  soul  already 
possesses all  knowledge in  an  innate form.  What's required for this  implicit 
knowledge to become explicit is that the individual 'recalls' or 'remembers' the 
knowledge which his  soul  possesses.  The  implicit  knowledge  is  that which 
makes 'the question'  possible.  The answer to the question is  in  the form  of 
explicit  a-posteriori  knowledge.  Rahner's  understanding  is  similar  to  that 
expressed in 'the Meno'; clearly man cannot ask a real question which is beyond 
the knowledge he already possesses, or else he would not know what he was 
asking neither would he recognise the answer.  Rahner's answer to the dilemma 
is that the knowledge which man must already possess in order to be capable of 
asking  a real  question,  is  a vague,  unthematic kind  of knowledge which the 
answer translates to an explicitly clear and thematic form.  The question itself, 
then,  is  the 'whence'  of the  answer,  yet  the  answer  is  superior in  that  it  is 
explicit. 
Thomas Sheenan defines the a-priori knowledge of  the question as a "knowing 
unknowing" : 
"The classical answer to this dilemma - from Platonic 'anemnesis' to 
Rahner's 'Vorgriff- is to point out a condition between knowing and 
not knowing, a 'knowing unknowing' which, as unknowing, gets the 
question started and which,  as partial or implicit knowing, gives the 
question a direction and recognises the answer when it shows up. ,,7 
Rahner  defines  it  as  the  'whence'  or the  'pre-concept'.  His  use  of the  term 
'whence' (woher) is well summed up by Sheenan: 
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"In every inquiry which is  a real question and not a futile shot in the 
dark, there is what Rahner calls the 'whence', the basis on which the 
questioner  stands,  the  starting  point  from  which  he  launches  his 
question, and the principle from which he can expect a valid answer. 
This  "whence" is  always some prior, implicit knowledge of what is 
being asked about. ,,8 
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53 The  issue  (whence)  of the  real  question  as  already  implicitly,  vaguely  and 
inadequately known, is the very basis of  asking it. 
9  The known-unknown is the 
inner principle in the question's structure, from and through which the question 
reaches  beyond  itself to  the  answer.  It follows  that  the  whence  of real 
metaphysical  questions  must  be  in  some  way  innate  to  human  being.  The 
whence  of metaphysical  questions,  then,  is  intrinsic  to  the  created  human 
constitution which leads on to the view that men from birth, already possess a 
total pre-knowledge or pre-conceptuality ofBeing-in-general. 
ii)  Questioning:  Things-in-the-World 
Man is thrown into an existence amongst the things-of-the-world, including his 
own body (or corporeal organ as Rahner puts it).  He awakes to a situation of 
being totally 'in-the-world'.  Therefore he  is  thrown into  a  questionability  in 
terms of and concerning the things-of-the-world.  He seeks to know more fully 
that which  he  already knows vaguely,  therefore he  asks  categorial  questions 
about 'the things' and their relations. 
We have seen that, according to Rahner, man questions necessarily because he 
is  necessarily  on  a  quest  for  Being,  and  Being  is  only  accessible  to  him  as 
something  questionable.  This very  reality  is  grounded in  that  he  himself 'is' 
insofar as he asks about Being and in that he himself 'exists' as a question about 
Being.
10  Man is both a question and a questioner yet man is not primarily on a 
quest for knowledge (which he  surely is)  but a quest for Being.  His quest is 
principally for Being itself,  and  not  for  knowledge  about  'the  beings'  which 
appear to  him.  His  ultimate  necessity  is  to  ask  the  metaphysical  question, 
which is 'essentially' metaphysical.  Rahner says: 
9 
10 
"  ... not just any question can ground the necessity of questioning as 
such:  man could turn away from this or that question and thus free 
himself from the impelling need to question: he could sometimes get 
away from such a question completely.  However the question about 
The  interesting  and  relevant  parallel  to this  dualism  emerges  as  that  of 
'creational'  and  'historical'  revelation.  Creational  revelation  is  clearly 
seen as the necessary whence of  historical revelation. 
As note 1. 
54 being in its totality is  the only question from which he cannot tum 
away, which he must ask if  he wants to be at all. "II 
But just how is  man to ask the question about Being itself?  How can he ask 
about a transcendent reality which does not appear to him  as  a thing-in-the-
world?  Could this be done apart from the phantasms
l2 by some kind of pure 
intellection?  To elucidate this matter we tum to Thomas Aquinas;  Question 
84,  article  7,  book  1  of the  'Summa  Theologia'.  The  title  of this  article 
corresponds precisely with our present question: 
"Can  the  intellect  actually  know  anything  through  the  intelligible 
species which it possesses, without turning to the phantasm?" 
The Thesis of  the article is that: 
"It is impossible for our intellect in the present state of  life, in which 
it  is  united  with receptive  corporeality,  to know anything  actually 
without turning to the phantasms. " 
What Thomas is  saying here is that man does not have the capacity to know 
anything (in actuality) apart from the phantasms.  The intellect requires the use 
of the  corporeal  organ  (in  this  case  the  human  brain)  to  function.  If the 
corporeal organ is  damaged in  some way the intellect  cannot function,  body 
and mind  are therefore linked in this human nature and  cannot operate apart 
from  their  unity.  Therefore  the intellect  requires  the  facility  of the  senses 
(which relate  directly to the corporeal  element),  although  Thomas  considers 
that both the human senses and the human imagination belong to the "sensitive 
part  of the  'soul'"  which  in  tum makes  direct  use  of the  corporeal  organ. 
Thomas also argues that when anyone tries to understand anything:  "he forms 
phantasms to serve him by way of examples, in order, as it were, to acquire in 
them the intuition for what he is trying to understand." 
11 
12 
"However,  the object which belongs to the intellect  of man,  who 
exists  in  corporeality,  is  the  quiddity  or the  nature  of corporeal 
things  (things of the world).  And through this  nature of sensible 
Ibid. 
"The phantasms" is Thomas Aquinas' term for the objects which appear to 
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55 things  he  also  reaches  out  to  some  knowledge  of non-sensible 
things. " 
What exactly are these non-sensible things?  We may consider Aristotle's two 
major  categories  of Being,  in  this  respect.  The  primary  category  is  the 
individual  existent,  for  example,  the  individual  horse.  And  the  secondary 
category is the universal genus of  horses which would be the 'isness' or quiddity 
of  the group of horses.  In Platonic terms this would represent the 'idea' of  the 
perfect horse, of  which the particular horse is a shadow.  The question always 
arises concerning where this 'idea of horse' exists; does it exist in some distant 
place (focus) of  perfection, such as Plato's 'counter earth',  or does it exist only 
in  the  particular individual  instance,  that  is,  this  particular horse?  In  other 
words is there a separate, essential form?  Thomas denies this.  He states: 
"But  if the  object which belongs  properly to  our intellect  were  a 
separate, essential form,  or if,  as the Platonists assume, the nature of 
sensible things did not subsist in individual things:  then our intellect 
would not always have to  turn to the phantasms when it knows." 
It appears that for Thomas, the 'nature' of sensible things exists and indeed only 
exists in individual things:  "But it belongs to the essence of this nature that it 
exists in a material individual.  Thus it is essential to the nature of  a stone that it 
exists in this stone, essential to the nature of  a horse that it exists in this horse, 
and so forth.  Wherefore, the nature of a stone or of any material thing can also 
be known completely and truly only in as much as it is known as  existing in the 
individual thing." 
We apprehend these individual things through the senses and as Thomas would 
argue, through the imagination.  However it is the intellect that questions, and 
so  gains the knowledge.  To do  so  it  must  'turn to the phantasms'  in  order, 
states Thomas,  to look at  the universal  essence  as  existing  in  the individual 
thing. 13 
In other words, to gain knowledge of  Being in its totality, man must turn to the 
phantasms, (He must be 'Converted to the Phantasm').  It does appear that man 
can  only  gain  knowledge  of universals  in  and  through the  individual  actual 
13  Quotes of  Thomas Aquinas are from the Summa Theologia Bk 1,  article 7, 
question 84 
56 existents;  any  other means  of gaining  this  knowledge  would  belong  to  the 
Angelic  world and  not the one accessible to  human beings.  The world itself 
then (or the things-in-the-world) is  the 'whence' of the metaphysical question, 
which may be defined as the universal question about Being.  The relationship 
of the  categorial  order and  the  metaphysical  order is  that the  former  is  the 
whence of  the latter; as Sheenan states: 
"man must ask all of  his questions in the world, he cannot climb back 
out of  worldly questioning.  To do  so would require the separation, 
as it were, of  his soul and body." 14 
Man's questionability and therefore his knowledge is limited to the realm of  his 
senses,  including his  imagination.  His intellectual powers are limited by  that 
imagination which itself is restricted to the time space continuum:  "man has no 
extra worldly access to beingness, and yet he can question (and thus some how 
know) beingness in its unifying totality". 15 
The question about 'Being in total' is the question which Rahner has  said that 
man cannot tum away from.  He must ask that question if he wants to be at all; 
indeed he  is  summoned to ask it.  Man is  in the very presence of Being in its 
totality  insofar  as  he  finds  himself in  the  world,  and  yet  he  can  only  gain 
knowledge of being in its totality through the individual beings.  There is some 
form of unity of universal and particular found in this line of reasoning which 
sheds light on the epistemological and ontological bivalence of  the two orders: 
"What  is  united  in  this  unity  of knowledge?  Knowledge  of an 
existent in the world in its here and now and knowledge of being in 
its totality.  If  we say that sensation is being with a thing in its here 
and now of  the world, and the intellect is the knowledge of being in 
its totality, we can also say that it is a question of  understanding the 
intrinsic possibility of  the unity of sensation and intellect, the fact of 
which  unity  forms  the  point  of  departure  for  all  our 
considerations. ,,16 
We have arrived at the possibility of a unity of sensation and  intellect  as  the 
epistemic means of  the quest for Being. 
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57 iii)  Questioning - Metaphysical 
We have seen that the whence of the metaphysical question is the world itself 
The question about Being in  its .totality, which is  really 'What is  the Being of 
the beings?' is grounded and has its basis in,  and of, the beings themselves (the 
phantasms).  In the  bivalent  unity  of 'Being  in  General'  and  'the  individual 
beings' we see the content of the dialectic which is  at the centre of Rahner's 
thinking.  As  with all  dialectics,  the  metaphysical  question  necessarily  turns 
back on itself  We must consider the precise nature of  this turning, but first let 
us consider the 'whence' of the question more fully.  In Rahner's development 
of  this 'whence', several elements are uncovered: 
1.  The metaphysical question is an ontological necessity. 
2.  The actual questioning itself, is the whence. 
3.  The nature of  the questioner, is the whence. 
4.  'Nothing' is the whence. 
5.  The world, is the whence. 
Following through the elements of the development; firstly,  in respect of the 
necessity of the metaphysical question,  Rahner argues that man must ask the 
question about being: 
"The question is  ... the only 'must',  the only thing beyond question 
to  which  questioning  man  is  bound,  the  only  circle  in  which  his 
questioning  is  caught  (there  is  always  another  question  which  he 
must  ask,  ad  infinitum)  ...  Man  questions  necessarily.  But  this 
necessity can only be grounded in the fact that being is accessible to 
man at all only as something questionable, that he himself 'is' insofar 
as  he  asks  about being,  that he  himself exists  as  a  question about 
being. "  l7 
Rahner is talking here about the metaphysical question, because man can tum 
away from this  or that question,  but he  cannot tum away from the question 
about being itself (Being in its totality or Being in General), his own being and 
17  Op. Cit. p.57 
58 existence  are  intrinsically  bound  up  with  his  questionability  and  his 
questioningness of  being itself 
"For this reason the proposition stating the necessity of questioning 
in human existence includes in itself its own ontological proposition 
which says;  man exists as the question about being.  In order to be 
. himself he necessarily asks about being in its totality.  This question 
is the 'must' which he himself is and in which being as that which is 
questioned presents and  offers itself,  and  at the same time,  as  that 
which necessarily remains in question, withdraws itself  In the being 
of  the question which man is (so that he needs to question) being as 
that which  is  questioned  both reveals  itself and  at  the  same  time 
conceals itself in its own questionableness." 18 
We see,  then,  the dialectical opposites of Being in general (infinite being) and 
individual  being  (finite  being)  coinciding  in  the  metaphysical  question which 
man must ask,  'to be'.  In the being of the question which is  man's  existence, 
Being in general (which is  synonymous with God) reveals itself  However, it 
remains concealed, even in the actuality of this revelation,  because it remains 
questionable. 
Turning to the second element;  (which is,  that the question is  its own starting 
point  and  therefore  its  own whence.)  Since  we  confront  the  problem  that 
Being in total includes everything at once there is no unquestionable ground to 
serve as a point of  departure: 
"Being  in  its  totality  can  only  be  questioned  as  that  which  again 
constitutes  in  its  turn  every  question  about  it.  The  being  that  is 
questioned  is  at  once  the  being  of the  question  and  of the  one 
questioning.  But where can such  a question begin  since  it  has  no 
point from which to take its departure?,,19 
The only possible answer is that the metaphysical question is itself its own point 
of  departure, and indeed itself the content of  its answer.  However, lying behind 
this construct is the internal logic of 'must' in that the actual point of departure 
of  the metaphysical question is the 'need to ask it'. 
18 
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59 "This  need  to  question  is  the  only  point  of departure  for  the 
metaphysical question that has its foundation in itself  ,,20 
And further: 
"Metaphysics  takes  the  'whence  and  whither'  of its  asking  about 
being in its  totality precisely from this very asking as that prevasive 
'must' which questioning man himself is.  For out of this  'must'  all 
actual  asking  and  questioning  is  stimulated  and  thus  made 
possible. ,,21 
The  (absolute)  need  to  ask the  question  arises  from  the  'must',  and  Rahner 
states that this 'must' is the being of man himself  Man,  as  constituted by the 
creative and gracious delimiting act of God, is constituted around the necessity 
to ask the metaphysical question, that is,  the question about Being itself  It is 
man's essential nature, then,  to ask the question about Being, which means in 
effect that man's attitude is fundamentally and intrinsically set towards infinite 
Being.  He 'must' stand in the face of  Being if he himself is to be,  and he stands 
as a question about Being. 
"Rahner, whose whole theology flows from his anthropology, begins 
with the conviction that all  human beings are essentially oriented to 
the infinite. ,,22 
Our third element follows  naturally from this  point.  It can be  seen that the 
whence of  the metaphysical question is none other than the constituted nature 
of  man himself  The question turns back on the questioner: 
"Insofar  as  in  metaphysics  the  question  about  being  as  a 
transcendental question  consciously turns upon itself,  looks at  and 
questions itself, it reveals itself as a knowledge of  man about his own 
questioning essence; he is already with being in its totality. ,,23 
Since  individual  man,  and  being  in  its  totality,  coincide  in  man's  very 
constitution,  man  himself is  the  only  possible  whence  of the  metaphysical 
question. 
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60 We perhaps  see the Hegelian influence  on Rahner here,  the finite  goes forth 
from the infinite, itself as a part of  the infinite which is its ground of existence, 
and then seeks to return to be re-united with this infinite ground of its being. 
The infinitude and the finitude coincide in the concrete being of  the finitude.  It 
follows then that the finite being is itself the only whence of  the question about 
the infinite being. 
Fourthly, it may be conceded that when man starts out to question everything, 
he starts from nothing.  If  he started from everything he would have no need to 
ask  questions.  He must  come  from  nowhere  and  therefore  makes  his  start 
there.  It follows  that in  some way the whence of his  first  question must be 
'nothing': 
"When man  ventures to  ask  about  everything,  he  starts  out  from 
'nothing'.  And yet this 'nothing' cannot be an empty void which man 
fills arbitrarily according to his own whims ... for he is summoned to 
ask  about  being  in  its  totality.  So,  this  nothing  itself must  have 
imposed upon him the task of  reaching out after being as such. ,,24 
The nothing at the beginning of  man's questioning is not just an empty void, the 
'nothing' itself becomes the need to reach out and encounter Being in its totality 
(in man's questioning).  The 'nothing' itself constitutes the metaphysical 'must', 
which we have seen is the implicit whence of the metaphysical question.  This 
nothing  is  not  in  any  way  determined  by  man,  he  cannot  master  it,  yet  he 
reaches out from it through necessity. 
What we have here is the dialectic of Being and nothing
25
,  man reaches out to 
Being from nothing and only from nothing.  Yet when he finds himself thrown 
into the world he is already something, he is already a being,  as it were, at the 
beginning of his  existence as  'a question about Being and  a questioner about 
Being'.  It follows that this nothing must reach back beyond man's finite being 
into  the infinite  primordial  reality,  which we may  term Being  in  General  or 
God.  In encountering 'nothing' man 'must' necessarily reach out to being in its 
totality,  'nothing'  appears  to  be  the  cause  of man's  questioning  about Being, 
therefore it is the cause of  the Being of  man himself. 
24  Op. Cit. p.61f 
25  This factor corresponds directly with Macquarrie's view. 
61 However it can be immediately conceded that man, in  his being, is not nothing; 
he is a thing in the world.  Therefore whilst in a very real sense man ventures 
out in his questioning activity (concerning being in its totality) from nothing, he 
also  ventures  out from  the world in  which he finds  himself  Therefore the 
world is the actual (concrete) whence of his questionability' which is  our fifth 
element. 
As we have already dealt at some length with the world as the whence of the 
metaphysical  question,  we need  not be further  detained  by  this  point,  apart 
from a final quote from Rahner: 
"Man is  in  the presence of being in  its  totality insofar as  he finds 
himself in the world ... (Thomas's) man dwells on earth and it is not 
given to him to exchange this dwelling place for a heavenly one at 
his own discretion. ,,26 
Returning to the nature of the metaphysical question as  one that 'turns upon 
itself, Rahner states: 
"The metaphysical question, which is  a final  and radical sharpening 
of man's  questioning,  turns upon itself as  such  and  thereby  turns 
upon the  presuppositions  which  are  operative  in  itself  It is  the 
question  turned  consciously  upon  itself  ...  The  metaphysical 
question as transcendental question is  the pervasive question about 
being  itself,  raised  to  conceptual  form.  In  actually  asking  the 
metaphysical  question  man  becomes  aware  of what  he  is  in  the 
ground of  his essence: he who must ask about being. ,,27 
Because we have a dialectical bivalence, we have a perpetual necessary turning 
moment from one pole to the other.  The actual asking of the transcendental 
question is at the same time the moment of  turning in awareness of  the being of 
the  questioner.  This  new  self awareness  is  the  means  and  reality  of the 
transcendence  of the  present  limitedness  therefore  it  is  the  dynamic  of the 
negation of the negation.  We can say that when man by necessity  seriously 
asks the metaphysical question; from the whence of  both the world and nothing 
(together) the answer comes through a revelation of  Being, which produces a 
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62 new and  radical  self awareness  and  understanding in  the  serious  questioner. 
This in every way is a revelation of  paradox. 
With the articulation ofRahner's thinking, in this fundamental respect, we have 
much light shed on the basis of  Macquarrie's theology of  the revelation of  Holy 
Being to man.  Man in-the-world comes to an awareness of nothing which is 
dialectically, at the same moment, a turning in awareness to Being itself, which 
in turn produces a radical new self awareness in man,  who then sees the same 
things in a different way. 
In Rahnerian terms; In finding the whence of the metaphysical question to be 
his  own  nature  and  through  the  dynamic  of the  turn  upon  itself,  man's 
awareness moves through the transition of  that which is implicit and unthematic 
to that which is explicit and thematic.  Man's questioning now becomes explicit 
and  thematic  in  form  and  produces  a  thematization  of human  nature.  This 
transition, in Heideggerian terms, would be that from inauthentic to authentic 
life. 
b)  The Transcendental Spirit 
If the world is  the whence of the metaphysical  question,  as  indeed the very 
nature  of man  as  a  corporeal  being-in-the-world  is  the  whence,  and  all 
knowledge  is  achieved  through  the  sensate  dynamic  of 'conversion  to  the 
phantasm'  (without looking over one's shoulder),  then how can there be any 
real transcendental motion?  Man cannot raise his feet from the ground upon 
which he  is  thrown upon and  must  walk.  He can  leap  upwards,  but he  is 
brought  back  by  an  immediate  force  from  which  he  cannot  escape. 
Transcendence demands a going beyond, in the greatest sense, a going beyond 
the world, to some wholly other realm; from the natural to the supranatural. 
If metaphysics is  a transcendental  activity,  then  some form  of extra worldly 
access  to Being  must  be  required  but  no  such  access  is  available  to  man. 
However, we have again a paradox; if man can question 'Being in its totality' 
then he must know something of it.  And clearly he can question 'Being in its 
totality' therefore he can ask a transcendental question, which means he already 
has  transcendental  knowledge.  Transcendental  knowledge  is  supra  natural, 
63 therefore  man  who  is  a  being-in-the-world  must  be  at  the  same  time  the 
possessor of otherworldly, supra-natural knowledge.  This is rather reminiscent 
of the  Gnostic  concept  of divine  spark.  Sheenan  poses  the  thought  that 
'conversion to the phantasm' may mean looking away from the world to some 
pure realm of spiritual  being  and  then turning back to the phantasm to  put 
together  intellectually  intuited  beingness  with  worldly  things.  But  Rahner 
insists  (Sheenan  says)  that  conversion  to  the  phantasm  means  a  constant 
turnedness to the phantasm with no looking-over-one's-shoulder.  At the same 
time Rahner asserts that metaphysics: 
"transcends everything spatial and temporal, encompasses all  sein as 
such, and reaches the absolute. ,,28 
Rahner is faced with a dilemma which,  as  he states, refutes his  own position. 
He asks: 
"How is  human  knowledge to transcend its own boundary, namely, 
that of the imagination which is  its only intuition,  without a direct 
view beyond the imagination, without an intellectual intuition?  And 
if intellectual intuition means metaphysics,  then the dilemma is  the 
question  about  the  possibility  of metaphysics  founded  upon  the 
imagination  '"  it  (this  question)  has  now  been  defined  as  the 
question  about  the  possibility  of  the  transcendence  of  the 
imagination without intellectual intuition,  a transcendence of such a 
kind that it constitutes the possibility of human intuition on the level 
of the  imagination,  and  has  its  intimation  in  the  limit-idea  of an 
intellectual intuition. ,,29 
What we are concerned with here is the question about the possibility of  human 
knowledge,  including  both  sensorial  and  abstractive  elements,  transcending 
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Op.  Cit.  p.38,  .A.n  'intellectual  intuition'  is  understood  as  the  means  of 
gaining metaphysical (transcendental) knowledge,  quite apart from sense 
intuition, as is 'the conversion to the phantasm'.  Nor is a purely intellectual 
intuition to be confused with imagination, which arises and is a product of 
the sensorial faculty.  An intellectual intuition as being purely spiritual and 
incorporeal (if such a faculty is  possible,  and Rahner concedes that it  is 
not)  is  thought of as  being  the cognitive  facility  whereby  metaphysical 
knowledge is immediately accessible.  We see the primary bivalence, with 
which we are dealing in Rahner's ontology, emerge in the dualism of 'sense' 
and 'intellectual' intuition. 
64 itself  This transcendence is  some dynamic of reaching beyond (excessus) the 
limits of  human intellect, the evidence of  which is that from within these limits 
it can ask the metaphysical question, the whence of  which is the world, but the 
knowledge of which is  of the nature of 'beyond' the limits of the corporeally 
bound intellect in the world.  The limit itself is known only by transcending it, 
but what we are saying is  that the means of cognitive and  therefore spiritual 
transcendence must exist as an integral and indeed intrinsic part of man's own 
constituted (created) nature.  In terms of the bivalence of man's  constitution 
(which is dialectical) he has the facility to transcend the limits within which his 
nature, as a thrown being-in-the-world, exists.  He can go beyond all that he is 
because all  that he is  includes the supranatural facility  to reach beyond;  this 
facility is the 'spirit'.  Rahner means by the term spirit, 'a power which reaches 
out beyond the world and knows the metaphysical'. 
What Rahner is  saying is  that some kind of metaphysics happens naturally in 
man,  this  Rahner  calls  a  metaphysics  of spirit-in-the-world.  This  could  be 
equally  called,  as  Sheenan  suggests,  a  metaphysics  of abstraction-of-esse  in 
conversion to the phantasm.  Man is a free spirit in the world of objects that are 
bodied against him;  this free  spirit  exists in epistemic dynamic by abstracting 
from the objects of its knowledge or questioning,  and being present to itself 
Spirit is this self-presence. 
The dynamic  of knowing the object which  is  questioned  has  essentially two 
elements (as previously stated).  The first element is the conversion, or turning 
towards, the phantasm (the object which appears); this is the primary sensorial 
level whereby man,  the sentient knower,  receives the essential knowledge of 
the phantasm.  In this going out of himself to the corporeal appearance, man is 
absent from  himself  Tpis  is  the animal  level  where man is  at one with the 
material reality before him.  The next stage in the dynamic, is the return of  man 
by abstracting from the phantasm to his own subjective, where he is present-to-
himself  In this  abstractive turn,  man is  free  spirit;  he  comes free  from  the 
object; he transcends it and he judges it therefore he becomes its master. 
It is  in this return to his  own subjective,  from  animal to intellect,  and in his 
complete self presence, that man is a transcendental being; always transcending 
the things of  the world of which he is  a part.  In this way he goes beyond the 
beings of the world but at the same time he  remains  firmly  rooted amongst 
65 them, therefore he is a 'spirit in the world'.  A transcendental spirit in a material, 
time space continuum. 
Man is a spirit who steps back (by abstracting) in order to focus better on the 
material object (whilst remaining with it).  Clearly his judgement of the object 
requires that he  distinguishes  it  by  'comparatio'  (comparison) with  all  of the 
other objects which he knows; and indeed from the basis of his pre-hension or 
pre-concept of  all being.  However, when it comes to metaphysical knowledge, 
(that is, of  Being in its totality or Being in general) he cannot compare, because 
Being in  its  totality cannot be compared with anything  else,  it  is  not  of the 
categorial order.  In this  metaphysical  step back man transcends by  'remotio' 
(negation).30  Man  can  transcend  his  own  being-in-the-world,  he  is  a 
transcendental  spirit  who  remains  free,  this  free  spirit  is  constituted  by 
excessus,  comparatio  and  remotio.  However,  Sheenan  makes  an  excellent 
point of  criticism: 
"Does any arm's length free me from the thing I am holding! ,,31 
3.2 - The Unity of Being and Knowledge 
Aquinas said that: "whatever can be can be known,,32 and Rahner said:  "being is 
being able to be known".  33  We have seen above, that 'Being is questionability' 
and questionability presupposes knowability.  Clearly,  being and  knowing are 
joined in some kind of  intrinsic unity, so much so that, for Rahner, metaphysics 
is  essentially  grounded  in  epistemology.  Indeed  his  'fundamental  ontology' 
finds  its  very  root  in  a  metaphysics  which  is  essentially  an  analysis  and 
expression (indeed exploitation) of ontological and epistemological unity.  We 
propose  that  Rahner's  whole  theology  arises  from  the  three  elements  of 
metaphysics, ontology and epistemology in essential unity.  His metaphysics, as 
we  have  seen,  is  the  dynamic  unity  of ontology  and  epistemology.  His 
30 
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Karl Rahner; The Philosophical  Foundations - Thomas Sheenan, p.190 
Summa Contra Gentiles - Thomas Aquinas,  Bk2:98 (near the end of the 
section) 
Spirit in the World - Karl Rahner, p.67 
66 ontology is  a metaphysical epistemology and his  epistemology a metaphysical 
ontology.  It follows that we must analyse this dynamic unity in order that we 
may see where it arrives. 
3.2.1 - The original unity of 'being' and 'knowing' 
We  begin  with  Rahner's  statement  in  definition  of  being:  "Being  is 
questionability";  and we have  seen that questionability requires  some kind of 
vague, implicit prior knowledge.  It follows that if being is  questionability and 
questionability requires knowledge to be  questionability,  there must  exist  an 
essential unity of  being and knowledge.  Beingness, then, is the act of (seeking 
and gaining) knowledge.  Indeed, being is itself the act of  questioning. 
When  man  questions  'Being  in  its  totality'  he  affirms  the  fundamental 
knowability of being.  This fundamental relationship of being and knowing is 
laid out by Rahner as the essential dynamic of human beingness, these are the 
essential elements of  'spirit'.  Indeed they are the occasion of  the transcendental 
'spirit in the world'.  Therefore being and knowing are a necessary and indeed 
original unity.  Rahner states: 
"They  must  be  of a  single  ongm,  since  the  intellect  and  the 
intelligible  in  act  are  one  (because  otherwise  the  factual  unity  of 
being and knowing in actual knowing could not be made intelligible 
in possibility). ,,34 
Rahner continues to say that knowing does not come upon its object by chance, 
the idea of  knowing 'coming upon' something is a common misconception. 
"Knowing does not come about 'through a  contact of the intellect 
with the intelligible thing', but being and knowing are the same. ,,35 
We have  arrived  at  being  and  knowing  as  a  synonym;  they  are  an  original 
intrinsic and necessary unity which cannot be separated; an intrinsic necessary 
union.  Being and knowing are the same, they are not separate things that come 
34 
35 
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67 together;  they began together.  In  Sheenan's  interpretation:  "beingness  and 
knowing are intrinsically proportioned to each other,,36, he goes on to say that: 
"Intelligibility is a transcendental property of  every being insofar as it 
is; hence it is a transcendental property of  beingness ... Knowability 
is natural, intrinsic and essential to beings.  A beings beingness is its 
questionability  and  therefore  its  knowability,  but  not  as  some 
separate  condition  that  floats  off,  self  sufficient  unto  itself 
Knowability is  the  ability of  beings to be known.  To be at all is to 
be able to be known.  From the side  of knowing,  this means that 
cognition is not a 'bumping against things' not an intentional stretch 
out towards things that are intrinsically separate and different from 
the knower ... Aquinas' many statements about the sameness of  the 
intellect  and  what  it  knows  affirm  precisely  this  transcendental 
correlation  or  intrinsic  proportionality  of  beingness  and 
knowability. ,,37 
How are we to understand this  'transcendental  correlation'.  If the unity of 
being and knowing forms the dynamic of  the transcendental spirit, how are we 
to understand the precise  nature of this transcendence?  The answer lies  in 
Rahner's concept of  'being-present  -to-self. 
3.2.2  Self-Presence or being-present-to-self. 
The abstractive motion in  the epistemic  activity,  whereby the knower (man) 
comes free from the phantasm and returns to self,  is what Rahner calls "being-
present-to-self'.  This is the perfect return from the object, to man's subjective. 
Man's  subjective  (cognitive)  realm  is  his  transcendental  plane,  as  it  were. 
According to Aquinas:  "the intensity of being is  determined by the degree of 
possibility of  being able to be present to itself".  38 
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"Knowing is  thus essentially 'subjectivity',  not a 'being dispersed to 
many',  in which dispersion to objects one could,  in  a metaphysical 
misunderstanding,  see the objectivity of knowledge  ...  knowing is 
the subjectivity of  being itself  ,,39 
Karl Rahner; The Philosophical Foundations - Thomas Sheenan, p.162 
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68 In the abstractive dynamic,  we have the transcendental intelligibility of being. 
This transcendent intelligence is  the free  spirit which is  the essential being of 
man.  Essential being,  then,  is  'being-present-to-self.  This  self-presence is  at 
the same time the total knowledge which man has: 
"Knowing  is  understood  as  the  subjectivity  of being  itself,  as  the 
being-present-to-self of being.  Being  itself is  already  the  original 
unifying  unity  of being  and  knowing,  is  onto-logical;  and  every 
actual unity of  being and knowing in the actualisation of knowledge, 
is  only raised to a higher power that transcendental synthesis which 
being is 'in itself. ,,40 
The transcendental reality of being is  the  synthesis  of 'the  conversion to the 
phantasm' and  'the abstraction,  or perfect return to self.  This living,  dynamic 
synthesis  is  the  existence  of man  in  his  subjective  being.  "Being  is  being-
present-to-self and ... the  known is always the being of  the knower. ,,41 
Being and  k..l1owing  unit in  the being-present-to-self of the knower they form 
the transcendental self presence, which exists in the face of the infinite beyond 
of  Being in its totality (God). 
Sheenan states that Rahner's basic presupposition here is: 
"To be,  means to resist fragmentation and to achieve some relative 
degree to self-unification or simplicity. ,,42 
Clearly this resistance is  the resistance of a plurality of being which would in 
effect  be  self-absence;  man  resists  by  drawing  himself together  in  his  own 
subjective,  which is  the freeing  of himself from  plurality to a perfect unity of 
self presence.  Essentially his being is then a perfect self coincidence which has 
the elements of  knowledge of  the phantasms and self knowledge. 
40 
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43 
"Therefore 'to be'  is,  to some degree, to know oneself,  (and) to be 
known by oneself ... To the degree that a being is it knows itself and 
is k..'1own by itself in a relative unity. ,,43 
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69 This is what is termed 'luminosity of  being', self clarity, transparency of  being to 
oneself and  indeed  to  others.  In  Rahner's  words:  "Being  is  illuminated  in 
itself,44.  Knowability  is,  then,  the  essential  capability of being to grasp  and 
understand  its  own  essence.  "Knowability  belongs  interiorly  and  a-priori,  In 
terms of  the existent being itself to the grasping of  its essence".  45 
Another way  to  think:  of this  being-present-to-oneself is  the  concept  of self 
posseSSIOn: 
"Conversely,  the  knowledge  which  belongs  to  the  concept  of the 
essence of being is the being-present-to-itself of being itself  In its 
original concept knowledge is self possession, and anything which is, 
possesses itself in the measure in which it is being. ,,46 
"All  things  strive  to  return  to  themselves,  want  to  come  to 
themselves,  to  take  possession  of themselves,  because the  having 
being that they desire comes to be in the measure in which they take 
possession of themselves.  All  activities,  from  the sheerly material 
(which is  self-absence) to the innermost life  of the Blessed Trinity, 
are  but  modulations  of this  one  metaphysical  theme,  of the  one 
meaning of  being: self-possession, subjectivity. ,,47 
The  meaning  of being,  then,  is  defined  as  self possession,  which  is  the 
subjective  'being-present-to-self.  Such  being-present-to-self necessitates,  at 
the same moment, the exercise of  the will in self affirmation or rejection; and to 
affirm or reject oneself is  at the same moment to affirm  or reject Being itself 
(God). 
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70 CHAPTER 4 
Revelation in the Theology of 
John Macquarrie 
Revelation,  in  Macquarrie's  view,  is  an  ontological  phenomenon  whereby  a 
certain reality of  Being is disclosed to man.  In a sense revelation is the answer 
to man's quest for Being; through which he  seeks for 'meaning' and 'grace' for 
his life.  However, the revelatory initiative is not man's,  but lies beyond him in 
the  transcendent  reality  of Being  itself.  According  to  Macquarrie  man 
experiences this 'initiative from beyond' in various ways in terms of his  overall 
and essential existence: 
"In so far as it supports and strengthens his existence and helps him 
to overcome its fragmentariness and impotence, he calls it 'grace'.  In 
so  far  as  it  lays  claim  on  him  and  exposes  the  distortions  of his 
existence, it may be called 'Judgement'.  In so far as it brings him  a 
new  understanding  both of himself and  of the wider being  within 
which he has his being (for the understanding of  these is correlative), 
then  it  may  be  called  'revelation'.  The  word  'revelation'  points 
therefore especially to the cognitive element in the experience." 1 
Revelation  is  classed  as  the  cognitive  dimension  in  the  experience  of the 
initiative from beyond.  It appears that man experiences grace, judgement and 
revelation through the transcendent  object of his  faith,  which is  at  the  same 
time the initiative from beyond.  These three factors are essentially subjective 
interpretations  of the  one  holistic  experience,  which  through  categorisation, 
relates to the different elements of  man's ontological quest? 
2 
Principles of Christian  Theology  - John  Macquarrie  Revised  ed.  SCM 
Press 1977, p.84 
It  appears  that  Macquarrie  is  distinguishing  between  experience  and 
revelation as exclusive categories.  He does agree however that revelation 
71 Since  revelation  is  the  cogrunve  element  involved  in  the  expenence  of the 
initiative  from  beyond,  it  follows  that it  is  the primary  source for  theology. 
This Macquarrie asserts: 
"(Revelation) ... is the primary source of theology and (it) is also a 
basic category in theological thinking ... If,  in general terms, we say 
that what is disclosed in revelation is the dimension of  the holy, then, 
in  revelatory  experience  it  is  as  if the  holy  'breaks  in'  and  the 
movement is from beyond man towards man. ,,3 
However,  the  holy  can  not,  or  does  not,  break  m  on  man  m  revelatory 
experience, if man is not previously attuned to receive it.  Such an attunement 
constitutes the human side of revelation.  We have then an apparently two fold 
dynamic which operates simultaneously: the subjective aspect,  in terms of the 
preparation  of man's  awareness  and  the  objective  aspect,  in  terms  of the 
initiative of  the holy. 
4.1 - Dynamic elements of revelation 
We must consider the dynamic of revelation, in Macquarrie's understanding, in 
terms of  both subjective and objective aspects; yet,  since revelation is,  as far as 
man is  concerned,  a  cognitive reality,  we must also  consider the  dynamic  of 
revelation as finding its shape in the dimension of  human epistemology. 
3 
itself is a mode of experience and that there is an element of revelation in 
all experience.  He states:  "one cannot therefore draw a hard and fast line 
between experience and revelation,  but in  practise it  is  desirable to keep 
these formative factors distinct in our theological thinking". - Principles oj 
Christian Theology p.8 See also section 1.3:b below 
Principles ojChristian Theology - John Macquarrie p.7 
72 4.1.1 - Attunement (the human subjective realm) 
a) Existential 
The  human  side  of the  revelatory  situation  anses  from  the  polarities  and 
tensions  of human  existence:  "in  which",  states  Macquarrie,  "possibility  and 
responsibility are cojoined with finitude and death. ,,4 
"Out of this polarity is  generated an  anxiety  (Angst)  ... a concern 
about  existence  itself with  its  potentialities  and  its  precariousness. 
The quest for sense,  coherence, a meaningful pattern, thus takes its 
rise from the very constitution of  existence. ,,5 
The problem is that the tensions and polarities within existence:  "some of  them 
so  sharp  that  man,  as  the bearer of such  existence,  is  almost  tom apart  by 
them,,6,  are  so  difficult  to  hold  in  balance.  Imbalance  leads  to  inauthentic 
selfhood
7  through  the  disorder  of alienation,  falling,  lostness  and  sin.  The 
examples of  the polarities of existence which Macquarrie gives are:  'possibility 
and  facticity',  'rationality  and  irrationality'  and  'responsibility  and  impotency'. 
There is a further polarity which is of a different order,  namely;  'the individual 
and society'. 
Man is aware of  these tensions in his existence because existence is:  "the mode 
of  being in which the existent has its being disclosed to it".8  The disclosure and 
awareness of being  are constitutive of existence itself  We  have the primary 
bivalence  in  human  being  discussed  elsewhere
9  as  the  nature  of human 
existence  whereby  man  not  only  'is'  but  he  is  'aware  that  he  is'.  Such  an 
awareness which takes the form  of the various polarities and tensions,  above, 
results  in  the  shock of being.  The  existent  is  therefore both concerned  and 
responsible, in terms of  the relation he has with himself  Balanced life leads to 
selfhood which of course,  in keeping with the primary existentialist tenet that 
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Selfhood can be taken to mean the state of  'realised human potential' which 
comes through 'authentic life' 
Principles oj  Christian Theology - John Macquarrie p.61 
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73 'existence precedes essence',  is  not ready-made,  but is  always  before  man  as 
something  incomplete.  Existence  is  a  reality  which  is  ever transcending  its 
present limitedness, therefore there is always a lack, or a gap before it, to which 
it reaches out. 
"What  is  given to man  is  an  existence that  stands before different 
possibilities  of  being,  and  among  these  it  must  responsibly 
discriminate  ...  Because  selfhood  is  not  a ready-made  'nature',  or 
collection of properties, but a potentiality that has to be responsibly 
actualised, man can either attain to authentic selfhood or miss it,  and 
so fall below the kind of  being that can properly be called 'existence' 
in the fullest sense." 10 
The  human  spirit  IS  a  transcendent  openness,  which  as  incomplete  or 
unfinished, is always passing beyond its present condition of  existence, in either 
a positive or a negative direction.  There is therefore, according to Macquarrie 
and  the  existential  philosophers,  a  great  weight  of responsibility  on  man's 
shoulders, which he  has by virtue of being thrown into the world.  All  of this 
points towards a profound anxiety in the being of man,  but before coming to 
that anxiety itself let us first  consider briefly the polarities and tensions out of 
which the anxiety arises. 
The  polarity  of 'possibility  and  facti city'  exists  because  of the  freedom  and 
responsibility of man,  as  he  stands before,  and  moves into,  possible ways  of 
being.  Possibility exists because of freedom yet man is not completely free,  he 
is limited by the facti city or givenness of  the particular world in which he exists; 
man's possibilities are limited in that they are related to this  particular world. 
Man's  facticity,  according  to  Macquarrie:  "includes  all  the  'givens'  of any 
particular  existence  -intelligence,  race,  temperament  and  many  other factors 
which no  one chooses for himself'. 11  There are so  many of these elements of 
facticity that man's freedom appears to be almost negligible.  These factors of 
man's finitude cause him great frustration as he seeks to responsibly exercise his 
free choice of  possibilities towards a complete selfhood. 
'Rationality and irrationality' involve the apparent reality that man as  a highly 
rational  being  lives  a  life  which  is  ruled  by  dark  irrational  forces.  This 
10 
11 
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74 irrationality produces an ulterior motive in man's existence which involves him 
in lies, error and deception. 
"While  man's  rationality  seems  to  afford  a  ground  for  the  right 
ordering of life  and for almost unlimited  progress in  improving its 
conditions  and  deepening its  quality,  his  irrationality,  as  we know 
only  too  well,  keeps  breaking  in  and  threatening  to  disrupt  all 
order. ,,12 
Such disorder, which again acts against the positive use of  man's freedom is,  as 
a  great limiting factor upon it, grounds for despair and anguish. 
The  polarity  of 'responsibility  and  impotency'  is  clearly  of the  same  order. 
Responsibility  pertains  to  the  dynamic  of the  disclosedness  of Being  and 
according  to  Macquarrie:  "The  mode  of disclosure  which  has  to  do  most 
closely with responsibility is conscience ... the name 'conscience' implies a kind 
of synoptic self-understanding, the selfs own awareness of how it measures up 
to  itself,  that  is  to  say,  how  far  it  is  failing  or  succeeding  in  bringing  to 
actualisation its own potentialities for being."  13 
Macquarrie goes on to say that: 
"It is well known that while the summons of  conscience may be clear 
enough,  the will  to  obey  this  summons  may  be too  weak.  We 
recognise responsibility and even the 'oughtness' of a situation,  yet 
we cannot bring ourselves to do what is demanded."  14 
We have to face up to this impotence, which seems to make no sense of moral 
values, and as Macquarrie states: "challenges the value of  any aspiration" .15 
Finally,  there  is  the  polarity of the  'individual  and  society'.  As  Macquarrie 
states: "No human being exists in isolation,,16; they are social beings which must 
exist in community.  Macquarrie uses the examples of sexuality and language, 
to demonstrate this fact,  he also  cites Ludwig Feuerbach:  "where there is  no 
12  Op. Cit. p.63 
13  Ibid. 
14  Ibid. 
15  Op. Cit. p.64 
16  Op. Cit. p.66 
75 thou,  there is  no  1,,17  However,  whilst  sociability  appears to be  intrinsic  to 
human existence every existence is  unique:  "every human being looks out on 
the world from the point of  view of  a particular ego and constitutes, as it were, 
a microcosm. ,,18 
The individual has both the intrinsic need for community and for autonomy and 
privacy,  to be  an  individual.  The dialectical tension exists in that neither the 
individual (as we have seen) nor the community,  is  yet perfect.  Therefore the 
tension between individual and community appears to be (in its present form) 
destructive  in  its  actualisation.  Macquarrie  cites  Reinhold  Niebuhr:  "The 
community is the frustration as well as the realisation of individual life." 19  Yet 
Macquarrie goes  on to  say:  "The  attainment  of selfhood  in  the individual  is 
related to the achievement of  authentic community in society. ,,20 
If  we take all of these polarities and tensions together we might well arrive at 
the position that man's existence with its finite possibility,  is  self-contradictory 
and therefore absurd.  Macquarrie cites  Sartre's famous  phrase in this respect 
'man is a useless passion': 
"Man  in  Sartre's famous  phrase  is  'a  useless  passion',  for  his  very 
existence  is  such  as  to  make  nonsense  of his  aspirations  and 
potentialities.  And indeed we have still to add the final touch to the 
picture  - death.  This  existence  of man,  an  existence  that  is 
throughout subject to the tensions between its opposing poles,  will 
terminate in any case in death, and this looks like triumph of  finitude 
and negativity ...  An  existence of contradictions, coming finally to 
nothing in death - this is an absurdity. ,,21 
Such absurdity would appear to be irrefutable, yet a strange paradox is evident 
in  all  human  life,  which  in  fact  is  in  the  same  dialectical  form  as  the  other 
polarities, this is the polarity of 'anxiety and hope'.  It appears that hope exists 
in  proportion  to  anxiety;  it  is  intrinsically,  dialectically  attached  to  anxiety, 
therefore it cannot be stifled or eradicated.  Human life is lived in hope, in the 
face  of negativity and  absurdity.  Anxiety  does  not  cancel  out hope,  nor,  of 
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76 course,  does  hope  cancel  out  anxiety,  the  context  of life  IS  therefore  the 
synthesis of  these two: 
"Hope and  anxiety may alternate almost like  the perceptions of an 
ambiguous  figure  in  a  textbook  of psychology.  The  twentieth 
century has seen many oscillations between hope and anxiety - even 
between  a brash unthinking  optimism which  lacks  the  humility  of 
true hope to an apocalyptic despair that has nothing of the subtlety 
of  ontological anxiety.  ,,22 
Both of these 'affective states' are seen to be fundamental to human existence, 
therefore the questions which are raised by the synthesis tension are profound 
and  essential to  the  human  quest  for  Being.  It  seems  clear,  as  Macquarrie 
suggests,  that  only  a  dialectical  interpretation  can  be  adequate  to  the 
complexity of  the phenomenon.  As we deal with 'hope' at some length, under 
the appropriate heading of  'faith' in  chapter 7,  it remains to consider 'anxiety' at 
this point. 
i)  Anxiety 
Macquarrie  has  summed  up,  in  existential  categories  and  conceptuality,  the 
human condition in its reality; such a brilliant treatment of  the reality of human 
existence, demonstrates, at least in this area, the suitability and appropriateness 
of existential philosophy as  a theological medium.  Great light is  shed  on the 
true and essential nature of human being,  as  existing in a state of disorder and 
'fallenness,.23  Such a reality leads to the ultimate category of 'hope',  which is 
essentially of  the nature of 'faith' and if man is to avoid the debilitating despair 
of anxiety,  hope and faith take on the significance of necessity.  Macquarrie's 
analysis, is, in effect, a very powerful apologetic basis for the rise and existence 
of 'religion'  as  an  authentic  and  necessary  reality  and  medium  of human 
salvation.  The human malady or 'lostness' is disclosed to human consciousness 
through the affective  state of 'anxiety',  therefore in  the  context of a real  and 
living 'hope' or 'faith', anxiety is in fact a positive phenomenon.  Both hope, and 
anxiety  can  be  seen to be fundamentally  of the  same  relation;  that  is  of the 
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77 fallen human state, which we may term 'inauthentic life',  and the possibility of 
realising the full  human potential in God, which we may term both 'selfhood' 
and 'authentic life': 
"Both anxiety and hope seem to be very deeply rooted in the being 
of man.  Paul Ricoeur suggests that these seemingly contradictory 
moods might be understood as two ways of experiencing the same 
relation.  Anxiety is the sense of difference between the finite being 
and  the  mysterious  totality  in  which  he  has,  so  it  seems,  an 
insignificant place; hope and joy arise from the sense of  belonging to 
that totality and having some affinity with it. ,,24 
Anxiety  is  understood  as  a  'mood'  or in  Heideggerian  terms,  an  'affective 
state,.25  A mood is  a mode of awareness, therefore anxiety is  not understood 
primarily as  a  subjective emotion, but as a  mode of awareness;  as a  concern 
about  existence  itself,  in  the  face  of  its  apparent  absurdity  and  its 
precariousness.  Anxiety gives rise to the quest for sense or meaning to it all; 
for coherence and purposiveness.  To the quest for sense is added the quest for 
grace,  because  of  the  awareness  of  the  disorder  in  existence  and  the 
corresponding guilt which goes with it. 
We  have  proposed  that  anxiety  is  a  disclosure  of the  disorder  in  human 
existence but if  we seek to reach  deeper into the essential nature of the mood 
of  anxiety, by asking the question, 'essentially what is anxiety an awareness of?' 
Macquarries  answer  is:  "Awareness  of nothing! ,,26  or  more  accurately  put 
'awareness of  nullity'.  Macquarrie expands on precisely what he means by such 
an awareness: 
24 
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"What is intended is the awareness of  the precariousness of  existence 
which at any time may lapse into  nothing.  It may cease to be in 
death and it fails to be in guilt.  We become aware of a nullity that 
enters into the very way in which we are constituted.  ,,27 
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78 Essentially  we  are  anxIOus  about  ceasmg  to  be,  and  the  awareness  of the 
possibility and indeed inevitability,  through death, of ceasing to be enters into 
our existence as an intrinsic factor of existence itself  Tillich uses the term of 
'nonbeing' for nullity, although he does state that finite being faces the threat of 
'nothingness' yet anxiety, according to Tillich,  reveals the ontological reality of 
nonbeing.  Concerning the  entry of the  nullity  into  the very  constitution  of 
human being,  nonbeing enters into the whole of man's being because anxiety 
permeates  the  whole  of his  being,  indeed  "it  shapes  soul  and  body  and 
determines spiritual life". 28 
Macquarrie  steps further than the immediate  human  constitution in  claiming 
that the mood of anxiety brings an awareness of the external world as sinking 
to nothing: 
"The world too sinks to nothing,  it gets stripped of the values and 
meanings  that  we  normally  assign  to  the  things  and  events  that 
belong within it,  and it becomes indeterminate, characterised by the 
same kind of  emptiness and nullity that we know in ourselves. ,,29 
But surely anxiety,  as  a  mood  of such  profound intensity,  is  experienced by 
only  a  very  few  persons!  Macquarrie's  view,  in  this  respect,  is  that  this 
intensity of  anxiety, and therefore the revelation of  nothingness, is not common 
because man does his utmost to escape from falling into it: 
"we  can  learn  as  well  from  psychologists  and  anthropologists  as 
from  existentialist philosophers about the devices and  illusions that 
we employ to tranquillise our fundamental anxiety in the face of our 
radical  finitude  and  transience.  Yet  I  believe  that  the  mood  is 
universal in the sense that at one time or another it catches up with 
almost all of  us. ,,30 
Heidegger has no  reservations as to the universality of the mood of Angst,  he 
considers that man is  most essentially 'Care'  existing in  the temporal  state of 
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79 'concern',  care  IS  ontologically  earlier  than  any  other  aspect  of  man's 
existence.
31 
Angst then, is the  fundamental determinant in our mood or state-of-mind, and 
our state-of-mind is our being-attuned. 
According  to  Macquarrie,  man  is  attuned  through  the  mood  of anxiety  to 
receive  revelation  of Holy  Being.  This  attunement  is  man's  predisposition 
whereby he  is  able  to recognise  holy  being's  approach to  him.  Attunement 
therefore  produces  the  facility  of recognition,  which  is  the  character of the 
awareness of anxiety.  The capacity of recognition is therefore the human side 
of the  dynamic  of revelation.  There is,  then,  a continuity which leads  from 
anxiety to the revelation of the truth of Being, which Macquarrie claims:  "was 
well seen by those Old Testament writers who declared the fear of the lord to 
be the beginning of  wisdom or knowledge. ,,32 
b)  Ontological 
In the mood of intense anxiety man becomes aware of 'nothing';  he  becomes 
aware of  this nullity in himself and in all of  the things of  the world in which he 
lives.  Everything is perceived as valueless and meaningless.  The affective state 
of anxiety produces a psychological condition of nihilism and the awareness of 
the profound  and  primordial  reality  of nonbeing.  Indeed,  anxiety's  nature  is 
rooted in nonbeing itself and  it  could be argued that the various polarities of 
existence, which lead the mind to consider that human life is absurd, themselves 
arise  and  are  in  relational  union  with  the  primary  dialectic  of 'Being  and 
nothing,.33 
When an individual ceases to flee,  as Heidegger would say,  from the reality of 
being with its polarities and tensions and indeed frustrations,  and faces his own 
being,  he  enters the realm of the ultimate whereby he  becomes aware of the 
31 
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The discussion on Heidegger's understanding of  moods (affective states) in 
Chapter 2,  is most enlightening in respect of Macquarrie's thinking in this 
area. 
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80 meaninglessness and futility of  the beings in the world which exist for their own 
sake,  seeking meaning and value in terms of themselves alone.  He comes to a 
nihilistic perspective where the only reality which has integrity is 'nothingness'. 
In the anxious mode of awareness everything sinks to nothing.  Delusion is  at 
an end and there is  no  point to anything.  Perhaps this place of the coming to 
nothing could be described as  radical and total cynicism.  Or perhaps it could 
be described as the reality of  the disorder of  fallen existence whereby man seeks 
meaning,  satisfaction and  realisation in  terms of himself and  his  finite world, 
rather than  in  and  through  God.  He  seeks  the  fulfilment  of his  person  or 
'selfhood' in and through the 'love of  self and not the love of  the other in God.
34 
In this respect Macquarrie states: 
"Selfhood is attained only in so far as the existent is prepared to look 
beyond the  limits  of his  own  self for the master concern that  can 
create such a stable and unified existence.  He must be prepared to 
accept the factical  aspects of his  existence,  his  finitude,  transience, 
morality, and take these up into the potentiality which he projects for 
himself into the future.  This means in effect that by looking beyond 
himself, or as we may say,  dying to himself, he becomes himself ,,35 
Macquarrie goes on to quote the New Testament in  respect  of this  paradox: 
"who ever will save his life will lose it";  "whoever loses his life for my sake and 
the gospel's will save it." (Mark 8:35) And:  "What does a man gain by winning 
the whole world at the cost of his true self' (Mark 8:36).  Perhaps we could 
describe the apparent evil of  nothingness, in this respect, as self seeking and self 
love.  In Hegelian terms, the finite seeking realisation in the finitude itself rather 
than  in  the  infinitude,  from  which  it  came  and  has  its  meaning  and  very 
.  36  eXIstence. 
But if  man, through the mood of  anxiety, sinks to an awareness of  his existence 
and the world's existence as 'nothingness' and he experiences the effects of the 
nullity in his own being; and indeed he is aware of  his coming nonbeing through 
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This  develops  to  idolatry  which  Macquarrie  considers  to  be  the  very 
essence of  sin 
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81 his death which he cannot avoid, would he not be completely demotivated and 
stultified in respect of  his future existence?  Would he not cease to exist in the 
existential understanding of the term?  Macquarrie states:  "If death shows up 
the  futility  of our concerns,  does  it  not  stultify  them  all?  ...  every  human 
aspiration is devalued so that, as Sartre goes so far as to suggest, the life of  the 
solitary drunk and the great statesman are equally pointless?,,37 
The answer is  that man has to come to the recognition that he has his  being 
within the wider context of  a 'wider Being': 
"Human existence can make sense if this wider being supports and 
supplements the meagre  heritage  of our finite  being  ...  To  adapt 
words of St. Augustine, human existence makes sense if  being grants 
what it commands, that is  to say,  if there are resources beyond our 
human resources to help us fulfil  the claims that our very existence 
'8  lays upon us. ,,-, 
At this point we draw near to the Schleiermachrian maxim of 'utter dependence 
upon God'; such a one who comes to this total dependence has been converted 
from  'sin  consciousness'  to  'God  consciousness'.  It  seems  reasonable  to 
consider that the very real phenomenon that Macquarrie has been describing is 
in fact none other than 'religious conversion' through which the man or woman 
of unfaith has become a man or woman of faith.  Macquarrie agrees that the 
new attitude which man who has come to nothing, must take up is 'faith':  "The 
attitude described is what the religious man calls 'faith'.  It is  obvious that faith 
is not a mere belief but an existential attitude" .39 
i)  Being and nothing 
The awareness of  the nothingness of  the finitude in man's own being and in the 
world is in the same moment the awareness of a 'wider being'; this wider being 
may  be termed Being-in-total,  Being-in-general,  Being-itself or Holy  Being. 
The internal logic of  this psychology is that the concept of nonbeing, nullity or 
nothingness  can  not  exist  without  the  concept  of Being.  Both Being  and 
37 
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82 nothingness, as already discussed  briefly, in respect of  Paul Tillich's thinking in 
Chapter two exist  in  necessary dialectical  relation to  one  another.  Being is 
itself permeated or indwelt with nonbeing as  an essential element of its  own 
reality.  Existence of  the beings could be interpreted as a living synthesis of  the 
tensions between the apparently contradictory opposite poles.  It follows that if 
man becomes aware of the ultimate of the nothingness he  must also  become 
aware of the ultimate of Being itself  The mood of anxiety brings him to an 
awareness of the nothingness,  and  so  attuned, Being itself is  revealed to him. 
Macquarrie states: 
"What is  it then that confronts us and reveals itself to us when we 
have become aware of the nothingness of ourselves and our world? 
The answer is:  Being.  It is  against the foil  of nothing that for the 
first  time  our eyes  are  opened  to  the  wonder of being,  and  this 
happens with the force of  revelation. ,,40 
For the  first  time  man  recognises  and  is  aware  of Being  itself,  which  was 
around  him  all  the time,  but went unnoticed.  The Being that is  revealed  is 
different  from  the beings:  "It  is  different  from  any  particular  being  or any 
property, yet we are aware of it as more beingful,  so  to speak,  than anything 
else" .41  Being does not fall  under any of the everyday categories, it cannot be 
grasped conceptually, it transcends the ordinary mundane reality.  Nonetheless 
it becomes present and manifest to the attuned awareness, in  and through the 
ordinary beings which take on new and fresh  symbolic value.  It is  clear that 
Macquarrie equates the Being which is revealed with God, although only those 
of  a religious attitude would call it God.  In respect of  this religious disposition 
Macquarrie suggests that Being is called 'Holy Being', and Holy Being can only 
be God Himself 
40 
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83 4.1.2 - The Initiative of Holy Being 
(The objective element in revelation) 
We have seen that, according to Macquarrie, the human subjective is attuned to 
receive the revelation of  Holy Being through the affective state of anxiety (and 
no  doubt  this  is  the  experience  of many).  Through  this  psychological  and 
emotional attunement man receives the capacity to recognise Being, therefore 
the  awareness  of nothing  is  at  the  same  time  the  recognition  of Being. 
However, there is  another dynamic  at work in this revelatory experience,  and 
that is the objective initiative of Holy Being in revealing itself (or Himself) to 
attuned man.  The  quest for  sense  and  grace on man's  part  is  matched by  a 
quest for man:  "a quest that is initiated outside of man and remains beyond his 
control" .  42  We  must  seek  to  spell  out,  as  much  as  is  possible,  the  precise 
nature of this Holy Being which is  on a quest for man and  so  reveals itself to 
him. 
a)  Mysterium Tremendum et Fascinans 
Macquarrie  states:  "The  revelatory  approach  of being  is  nowhere  better 
described  than in  the  classic  analysis  of Rudolf Otto,,43;  Macquarrie  adopts 
Otto's  analysis  which  is  in  terms  of the  mysterium  tremendum  et  fascinans, 
which is the mystery which is at once overwhelming and fascinating. 
Otto's term 'creature-feeling', which  Macquarrie considers the equivalent of  the 
mood of anxiety, becomes awe in the presence of  the holy.  Essentially what is 
being described by the mysterium tremendum et fascinans,  is the relationship of 
the numinous presence of 'the holy',  as Otto refers to it,  and the reaction in the 
being of  man.  We have both elements, subjective and objective, present in this 
experience.  There is the drawing close of the holy in numinous presence, and 
the reaction of 'creature-feeling' in  awe  and  fascination,  in  the  consciousness 
and being of  man.  Macquarrie states : 
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84 "The  'mysterium'  refers  to  the  incomprehensible  depth  of  the 
numinous  presence,  which  does  not  fall  under  the  ordinary 
categories of thought but is  other than  the  familiar  beings  of the 
world.  The 'tremendum' stresses the otherness of  holy being as over 
against the nullity and transience of our own limited being; it points 
to the transcendence of being.  The  'fascinans'  points to what we 
have already called the 'grace' of being which has unveiled itself so 
that we understand that it  gives itself to us,  that it is  the source of 
our being and strengthens our being with its presence. ,,44 
We have here the painting of a picture of revelation in terms of a mysterious 
numinous  presence,  through  which  man  receives  a  holistic,  revelatory 
experience; he receives an experience in his  own being through the revelatory 
awareness  of  the  numinous  presence  of  Being  itself  This  revelation 
strengthens our own being in this 'giving' of  Being to our awareness and in the 
realisation that the meaning  and  purpose to  existence  can  only  be  found  in 
terms of  this 'wider Being'.  The key to the approach of  holy Being, by its own 
initiative, is the concept of  givenness, which is the content of grace.  Being is a 
given reality and according to Macquarrie, as we have seen, Being (or God) is 
'letting-be'; Holy Being, through and in grace, lets-be all that is.  However, to 
gain a further insight  into  Macquarrie's understanding of the nature  of Holy 
Being who lets-be we must turn to Otto's analysis.  Our warrant to do  so  is 
Macquarrie's whole hearted endorsement and adoption of  Otto's thinking in this 
respect. 
i) Rudolf Otto's analysis 
Otto's category for 'Holy being', or more accurately 'the holy', is 'the numinous'. 
The numinous is understood as objective in that it is  a category of value,  and 
subjective in that it is a state of  mind: 
44 
"I shall speak then of  a unique 'numinous' category of  value and of a 
definitely 'numinous' state of mind,  which is  always found wherever 
the category is applied.  The mental state is perfectly 'sui generis' and 
irreducible to any other;  and therefore, like  every absolute primary 
Op. Cit. p.87 
85 and elementary datum,  while it admits of being discussed,  it  cannot 
be strictly defined. ,,45 
Because  the  objective  reality  of the  nummous  can  not  be  defined,  Otto's 
concern is to discuss the corresponding human feeling in the experience of  the 
nummous  presence.  Schleiermacher  called  this  particular  phenomenon  'a 
feeling  of dependence'  but  Otto  prefers  the  term  'creature-feeling'.  He 
considers  that  Schleiermacher  made  an  important  discovery.  However,  he 
criticises him in that:  "the feeling or emotion which he really has in mind ... is 
in its specific quality not a 'feeling of dependence' in the 'natural' sense of the 
word.  As such, other domains of life and other regions of experience than the 
religious  occasion  the  feeling,  as  a  sense  of personal  insufficiency  and 
impotence,  a  consciousness  of  being  determined  by  circumstances  and 
environment. ,,46 
The feeling of which Schleiermacher wrote is analogous to these non-religious 
states of mind,  therefore its nature may be elucidated by them.  Otto's point is 
that the feeling  is  in  fact  qualitatively different from  such analogous states of 
mind;  Schleiermacher does recognise a difference of degree in this respect but 
not an intrinsic qualitative difference, which Otto demands as being the case. 
In  describing  the  precise  feeling  which  Otto  means,  he  cites  the  words  of 
Abraham in Gen 18:27:  "Behold now, I  have taken upon me  to speak to the 
Lord,  which  am but dust  and  ashes".
47  This  is  more than just a  feeling  of 
dependence; Otto calls it 'creature-consciousness' or 'creature-feeling'.  This "is 
the emotion of a creature abased and overwhelmed by its own nothingness in 
contrast to that which is supreme above all creatures"  .48  Creature-feeling, then, 
is  expressed  as  lithe  note  of self  abasement  into  nothingness  before  an 
overpowering, absolute might of some kind  ".49  Schleiermacher's understanding 
is of this emotional state as a subjective reality without an  objective element, 
whereas for Otto: 
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86 "The  'creature-feeling'  is  itself a  first  subjective  concomitant  and 
effect of another feeling-element,  which casts it  like a shadow,  but 
which in itself indubitably has immediate and primary reference to an 
object outside the self.  Now this object is just what we have already 
spoken of  as 'the numinous'. ,,50 
Otto goes on to describe this numinous,  objective something else,  which is  a 
supreme, overpowering absolute might, in terms of  a 'mysterium tremendum'. 
i) 1 - The idea of'tremendum' 
Essentially  Otto's  analysis  is  concerned  with  the  objective  reality  of the 
numinous as it is reflected in the human mind in terms of  feeling.  The unity of 
cognitive and conative faculties is presupposed; the numinous "grips or stirs the 
human mind with this and that determinate affective state".51  Clearly we have 
an  epiphenominal  situation whereby the mind  is  controlled by  the  emotional 
state and the emotional state is  determined by the presence of the numinous. 
Otto's task is  to find  the terms whereby these affective states,  and indeed the 
numinous presence, can in some way be described.  The most fundamental and 
profound  element  in  strong  and  sincere  religious  emotion  can  only  be 
expressed, claims Otto, by the term 'mysterium tremendum'.  Perhaps we could 
use the English equivalent of an 'awful mystery'  or 'a mystery which is  awful' 
for Otto's term; the element of 'awfulness' relates to the fundamental character 
of  the tremendum. 
The noun of  tremendum is tremor, which is the natural emotion of  fear,  but the 
emotional  response  to the  numinous  is  distinct  from  fear  in  that  it  is  more 
profound.  Otto  refers  to  the Hebrew  term  'hiqdish'  (hallow)  as  a  suitable 
descriptive  term.  To  hallow  something is  to  keep  it  holy  in  the heart,  this 
means "to mark it off by a feeling of peculiar dread, not to be mistaken for any 
ordinary dread".52  The parallel expression for this term, in the Old Testament, 
is 'the emat of  Yahweh' (the fear of God).  Macquarrie too uses this term as the 
human response to the revelatory  approach  of Holy  Being;  he  uses  it  in  its 
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87 expanded form,  that is  "the fear of God is  the beginning of wisdom".  53  This 
fear can be described as dread or awe or awfulness.  The emphasis here is  on 
the unnaturalness of this awe;  it is  a supernatural, unique experience, brought 
about by the objective presence of the numinous,  but only to those who are 
predisposed mentally to receive it.  The experience "is only possible to a being 
in  whom  has  been  awakened  a  mental  predisposition,  unique  in  kind  and 
different in a definite way from any natural faculty". 54 
Otto also refers to the objective element as  'the orge (wrath) of Yahweh',  he 
says of  this: 
"Anyone who is  accustomed to think of deity  only by its rational 
attributes must  see in  this 'wrath'  mere caprice  and wilful  passion. 
But  such  a  view  would  have  been  emphatically  rejected  by  the 
religious men of  the Old covenant, for to them the Wrath of  God, so 
far  from  being a  diminution  of his  Godhead,  appears  as  a  natural 
expression  of  it,  an  element  of  holiness  itself  and  a  quite 
indispensable one. ,,55 
"'Wrath'  here  is  the  'ideogram'  of a  unique  emotional  moment  in 
religious experience, a moment whose singularly daunting and awe-
inspiring character must be gravely disturbing to those persons who 
win recognise nothing in the divine nature but goodness, gentleness, 
love  and  a  sort  of confidential  intimacy,  in  a  word,  only  those 
aspects of  God which turn towards the world of  men. ,,56 
"Something supra-rational throbs and gleams, palpable and visible, in 
the 'wrath of God', prompting to a sense of 'terror' that no  'natural' 
anger can arouse. ,,57 
The  element  of  awfulness  is  summed  up  in  the  phrase  'the  absolute 
unapproachableness  of  God'.  To  this  Otto  adds  the  element  of 
'overpoweringness' (majestas).  This is  the element of power and might which 
Otto sums up  in the term 'majesty',  he  states:  "the  'tremendum'  may  then be 
rendered more adequately 'tremenda majestas' or 'awful majesty,.58 
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88 "It is  especially  in  relation to this  element  of majesty  or absolute 
overpoweringness that  the  creature-consciousness  ...  comes  upon 
the scene as a sort of shadow or subjective reflection of it.  Thus in 
contrast  to  'the  overpowering'  of which  we  are  conscious  as  an 
object  over  against  the  self,  there  is  a  feeling  of  one's  own 
abasement, of  being but 'dust and ashes' and nothingness. ,,59 
In the term 'majesty' we have both the idea of  the annihilation of  self and,  at the 
same  time,  the  transcendence  of God  as  the  sole  and  entire  reality.  A 
confrontation with the transcendent reality in  the numinous is  a revelation of 
the  delusion  of selfhood,  a  seeing  of the  self as  a  nullity;  this  produces  an 
attitude of self-depreciation and  rejection of the delusion.  We  have  here the 
idea  of the  'death  of self  and  the  living  for  God  which  is  so  prominent  in 
Pauline theology. 
Finally there is the element of  'energy' in the 'tremendum' which Otto also refers 
to as 'urgency'.  Perhaps here more than other places the condemnation of the 
philosophers,  concerning  descriptive  terms  for  God  as  being  mere 
anthropomorphisms,  is  brought  to  bear.  However,  Otto  claims  that  this 
element is  a genuine aspect of the divine nature.  The idea of 'the living  God' 
presupposes  energy;  energy  is  the  urgent,  active,  compelling  and  vigorous 
aspect of life itself  Indeed love requires energy as  does wrath, therefore it is 
difficult to think of  the presence of  the numinous in awful majesty without also 
considering that in the great unapproachable, transcendent power, there is  not 
also essential and absolute energy. 
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i) 2 - The idea of 'Mysterium' 
"Taken in the religious sense that which is 'mysterious' is - to give it 
perhaps the most striking expression - the 'wholly other' that which 
is  quite  beyond  the  sphere  of the  usual,  the  intelligible  and  the 
familiar,  which therefore falls  quite outside the limits  of the 'canny' 
and  is  contrasted with it,  filling  the  mind  with  blank  wonder  and 
astonishment. ,,60 
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89 The  'mysterium'  is  the  'wholly  other',  and  smce  the  wholly  other  is  a 
transcendent reality which is beyond the sphere of man's perception and indeed 
of his world altogether, it is  quite incomprehensible to him.  Man can neither 
comprehend nor apprehend  it.  The  question is,  if the  mysterium  is  'wholly 
other'  and  beyond  man's  understanding  and  imagination,  just how does  the 
feeling of  ,  wholly other' in the numinous consciousness grip the mind? 
Indeed it is  quite beyond the mind!  According to Otto the numinous object -
the wholly other - is contrasted with ordinary experience, and it is the nature of 
the contrast that grips the mind.  In referring to Mysticism, Otto states: 
"Mysticism  continues  to  its  extreme  point  this  contrasting  of the 
numinous  object (the numen),  as  the  'wholly  other',  with  ordinary 
experience.  Not content with contrasting it with all that is of  nature 
or this world, Mysticism concludes by contrasting it with Being itself 
and all that 'is', and finally actually calls it 'that which is nothing"'.  61 
It follows that in  contrast to ordinary being,  Being-itself or God,  is  'nothing'. 
"By this 'nothing' is meant not only that of  which nothing can be predicated, but 
that which is absolutely and intrinsically other than and opposite of everything 
that is and can be thought" .62 
i) 3 - The idea of 'Fascinans' 
Whilst the element of  awfulness could be said to represent Judgement' in all its 
daunting  unapproachableness,  the  element  of fascination  represents  'grace'. 
The mysterium, tremendum, fascinans is therefore seen as existing in dialectical 
tension.  The qualitative content of  the numinous experience is at the same time 
awesome and daunting and attractive and fascinating.  Otto states that:  "These 
two  qualities,  the  daunting  and  the  fascinating  now  combine  in  a  strange 
6'  harmony of  contrasts ".  .) 
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90 The person who trembles before the awesomeness and dread of the numinous 
has at the same time the irresistible impulse to turn towards it and claim it as his 
own.  Otto states: 
"The 'mystery'  is  for him  not merely  something to be wondered at 
but  something  that  entrances  him;  and  besides  that  in  it  which 
bewilders and  confounds,  he feels  a something that  captivates and 
transports him with a strange ravishment,  rising  often enough to a 
pitch of  dizzy intoxication. ,,64 
We are talking here of  the state of  bliss and beatitude, which Otto claims to be 
non-rational elements.  The rational ideas which correspond are listed as:  love, 
mercy, pity and comfort.  These Otto considers to be "the natural elements of 
the physical  life."  He goes  on to  say  that  "important  as  these  are  for  the 
experience of  religious bliss or felicity, they do not by any means exhaust it".  65 
"Just  as  'Wrath'  taken in  a purely rational  or purely  ethical  sense, 
does not exhaust that profound element of  awfulness which is locked 
in the mystery of deity,  so  neither does  'graciousness'  exhaust the 
profound  element  of wonderfulness  and  rapture which  lies  in  the 
mysterious beatific experience of  deity. ,,66 
Clearly  the  element  of  fascination,  as  opposite  pole  to  awfulness  and 
judgement,  has  the essential  nature of 'grace'  and  salvation; It relates to the 
forgiveness  and  salvation of human beings.  Otto  states:  "it  is  a bliss  which 
embraces  all  of those blessings that  are  indicated  or suggested in  a  positive 
fashion  by  any  'doctrine  of salvation"'.  67  In  respect  of this  salvation  Otto 
quotes: 
Eye hath not seen,  nor ear heard,  neither have entered into the heart of man, 
the things which God hath prepared for those that love him."  (1  Cor 2:9)  This 
is  clearly  a  salvific  blessing  which  is  beyond  the  conception  of the  human 
intellect, "this", states Otto, "brings the peace that passes understanding": 
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"Mere love, mere trust, for all the glory and happiness they bring, do 
not  explain  to  us  that  moment  of rapture  that  breathes  in  our 
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91 tenderest and most heart-felt hymns of  salvation ... This is where the 
living 'something more' of the 'fascinans',  the element of fascination 
is  to  be found.  It  lives  no  less  in  those  tense  extollings  of the 
blessings of  salvation".  68 
Clearly the  element  of 'fascination'  is  the  'saving  grace'  of God;  seen in  the 
extreme this would be something like the 'beatific vision'. 
4.1.3 - The Two Side Dynamic of Revelation, 
in Particular Christian Perspective. 
In his  discussion under the heading "Entry into the Christian life",  Macquarrie 
discusses  four  stages  which  clearly  correspond  to  the  general,  two  sided 
revelation  dynamic.  It  is  both  helpful  and  enlightening  to  give  some 
consideration to this example of a particular instance of  the apparently general 
phenomenon, at this stage. 
a)  The human side 
The two stages which correspond to the human side of  the general dynamic of 
revelation,  in  the  Christian  instance  of it,  are:  i)  Conviction  of sin,  and  ii) 
Repentance. 
i) Conviction of sin 
Macquarrie deals  with the  awareness of sin,  (as  already  seen  above)  in  two 
specific  places  apart  from  this  one.  In  one  place  sin  is  seen  in  general 
perspective as a 'natural' disorder of existence
69  and in another place it is very 
powerfully  described,  in  relation  to  God  and  creation,  as  being  basically 
idolatry.  70  Since Macquarrie has  dealt with the  nature  and  reality of sin  so 
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92 fully,  in the above two places,  he can now proceed, unhindered, to discuss the 
conviction of  sin, in a Christian context. 
"Conviction of sin"  is understood by Macquarrie to be primarily a work of the 
Holy Spirit, he states: 
"now sin is to be seen in its full  dimension, when the Spirit convicts 
us of sin in the light of what is  revealed in the person and work of 
Christ. ,,71 
"An  act  of grace,  we  have  seen,  is  at  the  same  time  an  act  of 
judgement.  The work of Christ is  a saving work that lights up  and 
indeed brings us to Being, christhood, and selfhood; but inevitably at 
the same time it reveals how far away we are from these, and indeed 
how we reject them, as Christ was rejected.  In making unhidden the 
disclosure of existence  and Being in  Christ,  the Holy  Spirit makes 
unhidden the disclosure of the  depth of human  sinfulness in  a way 
that goes beyond any previous awareness that we may  have had of 
it. ,,72 
Macquarrie sees that in the presence of Christ and His revelation,  the general 
awareness of sin,  which is  a universal unease,  intensifies to the point that the 
burden of sin becomes intolerable.  We see that the presence of Christ produces 
at the same moment a profound conviction of sin.  This is a direct parallel with 
the presence of holy Being,  at the same time  producing the awareness of the 
nothingness of  self and the world.  It is the Spirit, however, who intensifies and 
heightens man's natural awareness to the point of conviction, yet this initiative 
of  the Spirit is not imposed on man from outside: 
"Man's conscience, his critical self awareness is sharpened and made 
more  perceptive,  so  that  he  becomes  aware  in  a new way  of the 
distance which separates his actual existence from the fulfilling of  his 
potentialities in  true selfhood;  but this is  no  violation of his  being, 
but the raising of  it to a higher leveL" 73 
The two sides  of the dynamic  of revelation are  clearly  seen  in  this  particular 
instance, and again the divine initiative does not overwhelm the human side. 
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93 ii) Repentance 
Repentance,  which according to Macquarrie (and Martin Buber) is  "a turning 
of the  whole  person,,74  from  sinful  existence  to  God,  is  intrinsic  to  the 
'conviction of  sin': 
"Repentance is already implied in conviction of sin,  for to be aware 
of sin is to be dissatisfied with oneself, and so to be already seeking 
to tum away from where one actually is  ...  Conviction of sin  by 
itself might lead to despair rather than to repentance, were it not that 
the  very  revelation  that  convinces  of sin  also  offers  promise  of 
reconciliation - that grace and judgement belong equiprimordally to 
the same event.  Likewise the 'turning away' of repentance, which is 
turning  away from  sin  and  thus from  idols,  is  at  the  same  time  a 
'turning  toward',  a  turning  toward  God  or Being,  who  had  been 
forgotten in the preoccupation with the beings. ,,75 
Repentance, then, is both an essential element insalvation and an integral aspect 
of  the revelatory encounter with God or Holy Being. 
b)  The divine side 
The  two  stages  which  correspond with  the  initiative  of Holy  Being,  in  the 
revelatory dynamic are; i) Election, and ii) Justification. 
i)  Election 
Macquarrie prefers the term 'choosing' rather than election,  as it follows from 
Jesus' words to His disciples,  "You did  not choose me,  but I  chose you"  On 
15: 16),  however,  he  states:  "The doctrine of election is  one of the strongest 
expressions ofthe divine initiative in the process of  salvation".  76 
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94 "Through the revelation in Christ, man knows himself to be chosen, 
and chosen to be.  He is  called out of nothing into existence into a 
reconciled existence, eventually called to have his being in God. ,,77 
Macquarrie, here more than anywhere, makes it quite plain that the initiative in 
revelation  and  indeed in  salvation  is  wholly  God's.  The  human  side  is  not 
wholly passive, however, as man must respond to God's call. 
ii) Justification 
Macquarrie is  not very happy with the term Justification',  which he claims is 
only one element in the Christian experience of  reconciliation. He states: 
"What is  trying to find  expression in the doctrine of  justification is 
the  experience  of being  accepted  by  Being,  of emerging  from 
lostness and alienation into a right relation with Being.  Thus another 
model  used  to describe  what happens  is  forgiveness,  which takes 
place  when  a  cause  of estrangement  between  two  persons  is 
overcome through the initiative of one of them, and a good relation 
restored. ,,78 
Justification  is  already  implicit  in  election,  and  follows  necessarily  from  it. 
Indeed the whole thrust of the Protestant  stress  on justification is  that it  is 
entirely  a  work  of God  through  the  initiative  of divine  grace.  This  far 
Macquarrie goes along with the traditional Protestant doctrine.  Justification, 
then, is evidence again of  the initiative from beyond man. 
4.1.4  Epistemological Aspect 
a) Cognitive verses conative; and modes of thinking and knowing 
Primordial revelation, according to Macquarrie, takes place in the context of  an 
encounter between certain,  suitably attuned individuals and Holy Being.  The 
two necessary aspects of the encounter are the predisposition of the individual 
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95 towards Holy Being through the mood of anxiety and the numenous presence 
of Holy Being in  'awful majesty'.  Revelation conceived of in this way is  not 
primarily a cognitive experience but rather a conative experience whereby the 
Holy is present in a complex of feelings and emotions.  The cognitive element 
follows  on from  the  emotional  experience  as  an  interpretative  activity.  The 
cognitive is a result of the conative; revelation is not primarily given in words 
or propositions yet we require words and propositions to articulate it.  Indeed 
the words and propositions through which the particular revelation is expressed 
is the arising 'theology'.  It must be conceded that revelation is,  and has to do 
with, knowledge; it is a 'knowledge event'.  Indeed, new knowledge of  anything 
is a revelation to the one who gains it.  Macquarrie states: "Revelation suggests 
some kind of unveiling,  whereby what has been hitherto  concealed from us is 
now  opened  Up".79  Otherwise  put,  what  was  previously  unknown  is  now 
known.  In respect of the revelations  or discoveries  of empirical  science,  we 
could say that revelation corresponds merely to the ordinary way of knowing. 
However,  we  are  concerned  with the  revelation  of the  transcendent  'wholly 
other', to which the category of ordinary knowledge does not apply.  We can 
say  that  revelation  'must'  correspond  to  some  form  of human  knowledge, 
because even Macquarrie's understanding of revelation confronts the cognitive 
consciousness  as  something  which  is  essentially  (in  terms  of its  very  own 
nature) knowable.  If the revelatory experience is  not knowable,  in respect of 
the  human  epistemic  sphere,  then  it  is  not  a  revelatory  experience,  because 
nothing has been unveiled to the human perception.  This poses a problem to 
Macquarrie  which  he  seeks  to  resolve  by  finding  a  corresponding  form  of 
human  knowing  and  thinking.  His  essential  concern,  however,  is  not  the 
resolution of  the problem as outlined here, which he does not appear to address 
directly, but as to the trustworthiness of  the revelatory encounter in the face of 
the possibility of  it being illusory: 
79 
"The  revelatory  experience  is  not  self authenticating  and  may  be 
illusion. " 
"Its trustworthiness would be supported if we found that it is not an 
experience utterly mysterious  and  isolated,  and  if we were able  to 
find  something like parallels and  connections in  our more mundane 
experience or in the accounts of knowing and thinking that we find 
in  secular philosophers.  It is  true that there must be a uniqueness 
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96 about revealed knowledge that sets a great difference between it and 
our  everyday  knowledge  . . .  I  do  not  want  to  minimise  this 
difference.  Nevertheless, it would be a still greater error to think of 
revealed  knowledge  as  completely  unrelated  to  the  more  familiar 
modes of  knowing. ,,80 
Macquarrie is concerned, then, with an epistemology of  revelation, whereby the 
gap  between transcendence  and  immanence is  bridged.  The  epistemological 
schema, which Macquarrie proposes, is as he declares, largely taken over from 
Heidegger.  It has  three principal  elements  (ways  of thinking  and  knowing), 
two of  which apply in some way to the 'knowledge' of  revelation: 
1.  Calculative thinking - Knowledge of  a subject/object pattern. 
2.  Existential thinking - Knowledge of  a subject/subject pattern. 
3.  Primordial or essential thinking - Knowledge of  an object/subject pattern. 
'Calculative thinking' - This is the commonest mode of thinking in which what 
we think  about  is  an  object  which  stands  over  against  us.  Our thinking  is 
directed towards handling,  using,  manipulating the object and incorporating it 
within our instrumental world.  Technology is  the most sophisticated form of 
this type of thinking.  The knowledge corresponding to calculative thinking is 
objective  knowledge  in  which  we  transcend  the  known  object,  indeed  we 
subject  and  master  it;  the  knower  is  completely  active  and  the  object 
completely passive. 
'Existential thinking' - This kind of thinking is  proper to personal being; it is  a 
'thinking  into'  the  existence  of  the  other  subject,  therefore  it  is  not 
subject/object but subject/subject thinking.  The  corresponding knowledge to 
this mode of  thinking is 'personal knowledge', perhaps of an 'I/Thou' character. 
Macquarrie states that:  "'thinking into' is possible because of the common kind 
of  being on both sides" and "this kind of  thinking can become theoretical where 
the practical  solicitude  or interest  has  been  dimmed  down". 81  However,  an 
existential thinking proceeds on the basis of participation in  existence.  A key 
aspect or case of  existential thinking is 'Repetitive Thinking': 
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97 "The  expression  'repetition'  is  to  be  understood  as  meaning  much 
more than a mere  mechanical  going  over again.  It implies  rather 
going into  some  experience that has  been  handed  down in  such  a 
way that it is,  so  to speak,  brought into the present and its insights 
and  possibilities  made  alive  again.  This  can  happen  with  an 
historical happening.  ... If we are to understand it,  we must think 
into it, and so think again with the agent. ,,82 
'Primordial thinking' - In this mode of  thinking 'I' am transcended and mastered 
and known myself; I become subjected to that which is known: 
"This primordial thinking  ... waits and listens.  Heidegger can even 
talk  of it  as  an  'occurrence  of being'  (such  an  occurrence  is 
fundamental  to  Macquarrie's  understanding  of revelation)  or as  a 
thinking  that  'answers  to  the  demands  of being'.  This  primordial 
thinking is a philosophical thinking, but it  is  described as  a thinking 
which responds to the address of being,  and  is  explicitly  compared 
both to the insights of religion and to those of poetry.  This kind of 
philosophical  thinking,  then,  provides  a  kind  of paradigm  for  the 
understanding  of what  is  meant  by  'revelation'  and  shows  where 
revelation  is  to  be  located  in  the  range  of  man's  cognitive 
experience. ,,83 
In this kind of  thinking, it is the knowledge that masters the thinker.  Indeed the 
initiative  passes to it  as  it  seizes the thinker (and therefore the knower)  and 
impresses itselfupon him.  Macquarrie states: 
"What  is  known  is  not  another being,  but  rather being  itself,  the 
being which communicates itself through all the particular beings by 
which it is present, by which it manifests itself, and not least through 
the depth of  our own being. ,,84 
The knowledge which corresponds to this type of thinking  has,  according to 
Macquarrie,  a gift-like  character.  This,  he  claims,  is  the  nature  of revealed 
knowledge.  With  this  gift-like  capacity  the  knowers  are  passive  and  the 
knowledge is active or,  more properly, Being which reveals itself is the active 
party in revelation. 
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98 Clearly Macquarrie is advocating that primordial thinking and knowledge is the 
kind  of thinking  and  knowledge  that  is  involved  in  (primordial  or classical) 
revelation.  It must be said however that only a very few are recipients of such 
revelation, the vast majority receive revelation of  Holy Being through repetitive 
thinking which is essentially existential thinking and knowledge: 
"Here let it be said that presumably a genuine primordial thinking or 
a primordial experience of  revelation of  being is rare.  For most of  us 
there can  only be repetitive thinking that follows  in  the course of 
some  classic  experience  of the  holy,  as  the  experience  has  come 
down to us in  concrete symbolism,  and as  it  has  subsequently been 
lit  up  further  by  generations  of thought  and  experience  in  the 
community offaith which it founded. ,,85 
b)  The epistemological significance of 'moods' 
We have said above, that revelation, in Macquarrie's view, is primarily conative 
and not cognitive.  In the revelatory situation we are concerned with' feelings' 
and not, primarily, thoughts.  From Otto's analysis,  which is fully  endorsed by 
Macquarrie, we find  ourselves involved in  a Schleiermacherian scenario,  with 
only  two  fundamental  differences.  86  The  question  Macquarrie  faces  in  this 
respect is twofold: i) Precisely how are feelings revelatory? and ii) Can feelings 
be considered to be a trustworthy medium of  revelation? 
i)  Precisely how are 'feelings' revelatory? 
Revelatory  knowledge,  to  Macquarrie,  is  essentially  to  be  understood  as 
'awareness of  Being'.  The character of  this knowledge is, then, 'awareness', and 
awareness  as  a  mode  of knowing  is  not  singularly,  nor primarily,  cognitive. 
Rather,  it  is  an  holistic  facility,  drawing,  not  necessarily  equally,  from  the 
conitive, cognative and volative elements of  man's existence.  Maquarrie states: 
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"Whereas  our knowledge  of particular beings  comes  through  our 
perceiving them and through the intellectual appropriation of  what is 
given in perception, our knowledge or awareness of  being (if indeed 
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99 we have any) is more broadly based.  It arises out of the total range 
of our  existence  in  the  world,  and  not  out  of perception  and 
intellection alone.  It is only through our total experience of  being in 
the world that we reach an understanding of being .... Being,  then, 
gets  disclosed  in  existing.  But  existing  is  not just beholding  or 
contemplating or perceiving for it  is  also  concern and  involvement 
and participation.  Feeling is  always a constituent factor in existing. 
At  any  given time  feeling,  understanding,  and  willing  - or,  if one 
prefers  a  more  latinized  terminology,  affection,  cognition  and 
volition - are all together in existing. ,,87 
Macquarrie is saying that feeling and understanding must be taken together as a 
unity, there can be no sharp distinction between the two.  Further, affective and 
conative experience has its own understanding.  We have here a kind of 'inner 
feeling'  understanding,  which  could  be  perhaps  better  termed  'intuition'  or 
something  of that  order.  This  understanding  is  clearly  a  product  of the 
'affective  state'  or 'mood'  of the existent,  and  it  is  claimed  that awareness of 
Being  arises  from  the  particular  mood  of anxiety.  But what  precisely  is  a 
mood? 
"A mood is  something  like  an  attunement  to the  environment,  an 
awareness and response to the total life situation in which one finds 
oneself and  in  which  one  participates.  No  amount  of objective 
perceiving could ever disclose that of  which we become aware in the 
mood.  Yet the mood does not show us anything that does not show 
up  in  perceiving.  It simply  lets us be aware of the situation as  a 
whole and permits us to notice dimensions of that situation which 
are  disclosed  to  a  participant  but  may  be  veiled  to  a  mere 
beholder. ,,88 
Feelings, through moods, are therefore described as special means of awareness 
and response and therefore disclosure to the human consciousness, of the life 
situation in which one finds oneself  The mood of  anxiety is disclosive of  Being 
itself, in contrast with nothingness. 
It can be readily  conceded that a particular mood renders  one more acutely 
aware of particular facets of one's immediate environment, which stand out as 
conducive  to  the  mood.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  such  affective  states 
prepare the subjective consciousness to see the same things in a different way, 
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100 through the particular frame of  the mood.  Indeed, a mood could be considered 
to be  a different  angle  on the world,  which is  no  doubt  profound  enough in 
itself.  But can it be tenably claimed to be revelation?  As far as we are aware, 
nowhere does Macquarrie claim that moods are themselves revelation.  What 
he does argue is that a mood (and here we have in mind the mood of  anxiety) is 
one  side  (the  human  side)  of the  revelatory  experience.  The  other  side  is 
overwhelmingly the greater in that it consists in the content of the initiative of 
Holy Being or God.  The mood is merely the preparation (albeit necessary) of 
the  human  subjective,  in  order that  he,  being  brought  into  phase  with  the 
dimension of  revelation, can recognise Holy Being's approach. 
As  already  described,  we  have  a  two  stage  dynamic  of  revelation,  in 
Macquarrie's doctrine:  1) The preparation of  the vessel which has to receive the 
(sui generis) self revelation of  Holy Being; and 2) The approach of  Holy Being 
in revelatory encounter with the prepared vessel (the image of a vessel is  my 
own).  The  preparation of the human  subjective  could,  not  unreasonably,  be 
termed 'a coming to humility'.  Concerning creature-consciousness, Otto states: 
"There is a feeling of one's own abasement, of being 'dust ashes' and 
nothingness.  And  this  forms  the  numinous  raw  material  for  the 
feeling of  religious humility. ,,89 
Macquarrie's category of 'conviction of sin'  (as above) involves humility at its 
very root.  Indeed,  all that Macquarrie discusses about this category could be 
said to fill  out the content of  the nature of humility.  The process of coming to 
awareness of one's own nothingness must be of  the very essence of humility,  it 
is a coming down to see the true reality in sharp focus.  And yet such a motion 
is  not in  any  way destructive (apart from  destruction of delusion)  but rather 
highly  creative.  There  can be no  doubt that  humility  is  a very  real,  healthy, 
affective  state,  which  is  at  the  same  time  the  efficacious  medium  of seeing 
things in a different way as they really are, in depth. 
Humility as the creative, root product of  the mood of anxiety is,  in our view, a 
powerful preparation of  the human disposition in respect of openness to Being. 
Through humility the gates of egoism are closed and at the same moment the 
gates to God are opened.  Macquarrie's further category of 'repentance' can be 
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101 seen to bear a close relation with humility.  In humility,  man is  able to behold 
his nothingness and at the same time he is free to behold the awe and majesty 
of  Holy Being or God.  Repentance must follow the conviction of nothingness 
and  sinfulness,  as  Macquarrie  argues.  Repentance  is  understood  as  the 
dialectical opposite of despair, therefore it is a profoundly positive and creative 
condition.  Repentance is the dynamic of  turning away from self and inauthentic 
life  and  turning towards God  and  authentic  possibilities.  Indeed  repentance 
itself could be understood to be a mode of awareness of Being,  whereby all 
traces of  alienation are removed and there is a bright hope. 
Humility and repentance come together in the union of contrition. We contend 
that if the quest for  meaning  and  the  quest for  grace are  sincerely  followed 
through,  the  point  of  contrition  comes  as  the  critical  juncture  to  the 
disillusioned sojourners.  This place of  nothingness, where the absurdity, nullity 
and guilt of  human existence come together in profound crisis,  produces either 
a profound though hopeless  despair,  or the humility and repentance of a real 
and essential contrition whose end is joy.  Our proposal is that the disposition 
of 'deep  contrition'  is  the  coincident  point  of human being  and  Holy Being. 
Therefore 'contrition' is the only receptive state, to which the self-revelation of 
Holy Being is immediately, and absolutely effectively, addressed. 
It can be conceded that contrition is not principally a cognitive state but rather 
a holistic state of  being, therefore the term 'feeling' would be more appropriate 
than 'thought' in  describing its centre and nature.  As a coincident point 'real 
contrition' takes one into the immediate presence of God,  and therefore it can 
be seen to be one side of God's self-revelation.  This state of nothingness and 
its  positive  product  of contrition is  not  in  itself revelation,  it  is  rather  the 
necessary  pre-requisite  on the  human  side  of the  coin;  the  other  side  being 
infinitely  greater.  Revelation  is  always  an  object/subject  affair,  with  the 
initiative being that of  Holy Being's from start to finish - it cannot be produced 
by human effort of  any degree. 
ii)  Can feelings be taken to be a trustworthy medium of revelation? 
Macquarrie has conceded that the revelatory knowledge, which is the result of 
the encounter with Holy Being,  is  not self-authenticating and may be illusory. 
102 It must follow  that if it  is  illusory  at  least  on  some  occaSIOns,  the  religions 
which are founded on the illusory primordial revelations are not based on the 
truth and  are  therefore  inauthentic.  Further,  revelation  based  on  subjective 
feelings in this way is  almost impossible to test for validity.  Truth claims are 
made  but  cannot  be  tested  because  testing,  of its  own  nature,  is  a  purely 
objective  facility.  This  problem  could  perhaps  be  stated  as  the  central 
apologetic problem of all religions who make particular truth claims in support 
of  their own authenticity and integrity. 
Macquarrie's  solution  is  to  find  a  philosophical  basis  for  the  religious 
experience, and thereby render it more respectable,  and less likely to be taken 
as untrustworthy.  He sets the revelatory encounter,  as  he understands it,  in a 
philosophical epistemological frame borrowed from Heidegger
90
,  and locates it 
within that context as corresponding to a particular aspect,  namely 'Primordial 
thinking'.  Respectability  is  now  equated  with  the  respectability  of this 
particular philosophical view point.  However,  since there is  no  essential link 
between the phenomenon of the revelatory encounter with Holy Being and a 
particular  style  of philosophical  thought,  the  trustworthiness  of the  claimed 
revelatory method remains highly vulnerable.  Macquarrie is of course aware of 
this, and argues from the general, common experience of men.  His claim is for 
a  common  or  general  pattern  which  has  an  existential  line  from  man's 
metaphysical  questioning  to  the  encounter with  Being,  and  in  terms  of this 
accepted pattern there is apparent, internal and intelligible logic. 
"We  can  I  believe  trace  something  like  a  coherent  pattern  of 
experience that leads from man's questioning of  his own existence to 
the  religious  confrontation  with  holy  Being;  and  this  experience 
brings  itself to  expression  in  a  way  of thinking  that  has  its  own 
defensible and intelligible logic. ,,91 
The  degree  of coherence  of the  pattern,  if accepted,  would  determine  the 
defensibility  of the  particular  logic,  which  must  remain  internal  and  special 
rather  than  universally  objective  and  therefore  generally  verifiable.  Such  a 
vague and obscure mode of revelation (without words) which is dependent on 
particular  hermeneutic  activity  in  terms  of the  most  immediate  existential 
symbols  (which  remains  wholly  a  subjective  affair,  becoming  objective  only 
90 
91 
This of  course is the basis of  his whole existential-theological method. 
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103 secondarily  in  the  rituals  doctrine  and  theology  of the  preceding,  particular 
religion) must in the final  analysis be deemed a 'private affair'.  Such a mode of 
revelation  stands  in  direct  contrast  to  the  mode  of revelation  of the  logos, 
which since it is  in the medium of human language cannot, by definition,  be a 
private matter.  The revelatory encounter which Macquarrie describes, which is 
no doubt in itself a real form of revelation, is unverifiable and therefore may be 
false and inauthentic. 
4.2 The General Nature of Revelation 
If  we draw together the dynamic elements of revelation, as discussed, we have 
a fair outline of its nature,  as  understood by Macquarrie.  The 'primordial'  or 
'classical' revelation, which we have described,  as  received by only a very few 
(who  go  on  to  found  religions  based  on  the  revelation),  is  understood  by 
Macquarrie to be a very variable experience.  Yet, Macquarrie claims that there 
is a similar pattern to all such revelations of  Holy Being: 
"A  perfectly definite  pattern runs through them  all,  and  this  basic 
pattern of revelation seems to be common to all the religions of the 
world.  It can be clearly seen in  such widely separated examples as 
the revelation granted to Moses in the desert, to the Gnostic writer 
who  receives  the  gospel of Pomanders,  to  Arjuna  who  receives  a 
theophany of  the god Krishna, and in numerous other cases. ,,92 
We  have  then  a  universality  of revelationary  encounter,  in  respect  of the 
apparently universal  constant  and  common  pattern.  Macquarrie  summarises 
this pattern as: 
92 
93 
"a mood of meditation or pre-occupation; the sudden in-breaking of 
the holy presence, often symbolised by the shining of a light; a mood 
of self-abasement  (sometimes  terror,  sometimes  consciousness  of 
sin,  sometimes  even  doubt of the reality  of the experience)  in  the 
face of  the holy;  a more definite disclosure of the Holy,  perhaps the 
disclosure of a name or of a purpose or of a truth ... the sense of 
being commissioned by the holy to a definite task or way of  life. ,,93 
Op.  Cit. pp 7-8 
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104 The  encounters or experiences,  as  Macquarrie understands them,  are  always 
however  some  particular  focus  of the  presence  and  manifestation  of the 
'numinous',  as  already  described  above.  The  question  is:  is  the  numinous 
presence passively around  everywhere,  but simply unrecognised by men who 
are not attuned?  Or does Holy Being remove from its transcendent realm,  to 
enter the mundane reality of  the encounter in terms of the personal history, of 
the particular recipient? 
a) Personal event versus recognition 
When we talk about initiative we imply intentionality.  Intentionality,  in tum, 
implies personal, intelligent design, and if  the intention is carried out there must 
be some form of positive action.  Action is of the nature of event, therefore if 
intentionality is involved through some initiative which constitutes an event, in 
this  instance  the  event  of encounter,  there  requires  to  be  some  form  of 
objective (personal) action.  Macquarrie is  characteristically vague concerning 
the 'personal event' nature of  Holy Being in the revelatory encounter.  He does, 
however, insist that the encounter involves the inbreaking of  the Holy presence 
by its own initiative,  quite apart from man.  This concept is  reinforced by the 
use of the terms 'election'  and  'choosing',  in  respect of the Christian religion 
(see  above).  Such  an  inbreaking  must  necessarily  be  of the  nature  of the 
transcendence  of God  acting  through  'personal  event'  in  terms  of human 
history.  Yet Macquarrie remains 'seriously ambiguous' in his treatment of this 
aspect.  Concerning this objective initiative, Macquarrie states: 
"What is distinctive in the religious use of  the word 'revelation' is the 
thought that in  this  process,  the  initiative  lies  with  that  which  is 
known.  We  do  not  bring  it  into  light  or  strip  away  what  is 
concealing it ... but rather that which is known comes into the light, 
or better still,  provides the light by which it is  known and by which 
we in tum know ourselves. ,,94 
We see the ambiguity here in that Macquarrie makes no definite statement as to 
his position rather he pre-sets the statement by the words 'the religious use of 
94  Op. Cit. p.86 
105 the word ... is  the thought that'.  We are left with the vagueness that this is 
(merely) a religious thought, and not necessarily an objective reality.  Similarly: 
"This  mood  can  be  said  to  constitute  our  capacity  for  receiving 
revelation.  It  predisposes  us  to  recognise  the  approach  of Holy 
Being.  In other words I am asserting a continuity between the quest 
for  sense  and  grace  that  arises  out  of man's  existence,  and  the 
directionally opposite 'quest for man' to which experiences of grace 
and revelation bear witness,  a quest that is  initiated outside of man 
and remains outside his control. ,,95 
The ambiguity exists in the precise nature of  the continuity, and in the facility of 
'recognition', the directionally opposite quest is  a little too close to the human 
quest itself  It could appear that the directionally opposite objective quest, is 
no  more  than the  product  of the  quest  which  arises  by  itself,  out of man's 
existence. 
Indeed, there is  some evidence to suggest that the revelatory encounter takes 
place  entirely  in  the  recipient's  subjective  realm,  whereby  'recognition' 
constitutes revelation. 
Perhaps  Macquarrie's  most  direct  statement  In respect  of God's  activity  In 
revelation is: 
"Our knowledge of facts  in the world is  gained by  our own active 
discovery  of them,  but  since  God  is  himself the  supremely  active 
principle, he does not await our discovery but presents and manifests 
himself in an active manner. ,,96 
God is  seen here as  an  active  principle  rather than an  active Being.  We do 
however  have  the  assertion  that  Holy  Being  is,  in  some  mode,  active  as  a 
principle.  The mode of activity is seen elsewhere
97 as the divine 'letting-be' and 
of the nature of the 'becomingness'  of being.  The  ambiguity  lies  in  whether 
God is  to be thought of as  'Being' generally and universally active at  all  times 
and in every place, or sometimes specially and 'personally' active at a particular 
location and at a particular time. 
95 
96 
97 
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106 i) Evidence for 'recognition' 
"Being is all the time around us, but for the most part it does not get 
noticed. ,,98 
If Being or Holy Being is  all  the time around us,  then no  special initiative in 
respect of  a revelatory event is required.  Indeed it is difficult to see where the 
facility of initiative comes to bear, unless we are talking about God's initiative 
in the original creative happening.  What is  implied in the above statement is 
that  the  revelatory  encounter  is  by  nature  no  more  than  a  'noticing'  or 
recognising of  that which is already there. 
Recognition,  then,  becomes the essential mode of revelation,  the elements of 
unveiling  and  disclosure  are  summed  up  in  the  recognition  dynamic. 
Recognition in effect constitutes the seeing of  the same things 'for the first time' 
in  'depth',  therefore they are  seen in  a  new way.  The  depth  dimension
99  of 
Being itself, is now seen, or recognised in the beings.  Macquarrie states: 
"In  the  account  of revelation  given  here,  it  is  assumed  that  the 
person who receives the revelation sees and hears no more than any 
other person in the situation might see and hear.  What is revealed is 
'not' another being,  over and  above those that can be perceived by 
anyone.  Rather,  one  should say that the  person who  receives the 
revelation sees the same things in a different way.  We might say that 
he sees them in depth. ..  Perhaps we should say then that he notices 
features of  the situation that would otherwise escape notice, as if he 
saw an extra dimension in it. ,,100 
It could be argued that it is the 'immanence' of  Being or God that is revealed in 
this encounter of  recognition, as present and manifest in 'the beings' of  creation, 
and not God in His transcendent wholly otherness.  If  this be the case then the 
type of revelation that Macquarrie advocates is in fact 'creational revelation' or 
(,natural revelation'), and apparently not 'historical revelation'.  We are arguing 
in this thesis,  that this is  in  fact the case,  and that the whole of Macquarrie's 
98 
99 
Op. Cit. p.87 
Discussed in chapter 2 
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107 existential and ontological theology is built (most brilliantly)  on creational or 
general revelation. 
b)  General versus particular 
It  does  appear  that  Macquarrie's  concept  of revelation  is  essentially  of 
universal,  creational revelation.  Its universality lies in its universal availability 
rather than universal  reception and  application.  It seems  from Macquarrie's 
discussion that those who have been attuned by the mood of anxiety and are 
thereby prepared to receive the revelation  of Being  automatically receive it. 
Holy Being  is  apparently  evoked  by  this  predisposition  to  present  itself in 
revelatory encounter, but there is  no  apparent idea of particular and personal 
action involved here.  Rather, the dynamic involved appears to be merely that 
of the recognition of Being in the beings,  by the attuned one.  The nature of 
this recognition dynamic is essentially the awakening or dawning of this one's 
awareness of Being - itself,  in sharp contrast to his  own nothingness.  There 
can be no doubt that such a dynamic is a powerful revelatory medium in respect 
of the immanence of Being (or God) in creation.  Such a mode of revelation, 
however,  which is  encountered as  the numinous  presence of Being,  remains 
necessarily vague  and  obscure.  Such obscurity is  typical  of the ontological 
mysticism which accompanies the method of  phenomenological description. 
i) General (universal) 
In respect of  the generality of  revelation Macquarrie states: 
"There are objections to the expression 'general revelation' because 
of its  abstractness.  The  knowledge  of God  comes  always  in 
particular  concrete  revelations.  However,  the  notion  of 'general 
revelation' is justified in so far as it seeks to express the claims both 
of 'natural' and 'revealed' theology, and in so far as it is  understood 
not  as  a  body  of highly  abstract  truth  common  to  all  particular 
revelations but rather the universal possibility of revelation, which is 
in turn the condition that there may be any particular occasions of 
revelation whatsoever.  ,,101 
101  Op. Cit, p.53 
108 The serious ambiguity here lies in the blurring of  the distinction between natural 
and  revealed theology.  It is  usually understood that 'natural' theology is  the 
product of 'natural revelation'  (general revelation in  nature and  creation)  and 
'revealed theology'  is  the product of special  revelation in  human  history,  for 
example  the  Old  Testament  theophanies,  dreams,  visions  etc.  and  the  New 
Testament revelation through the incarnation of God  in  the  person of Jesus 
Christ. 
Coupled with the desire to do  away with the distinction between 'natural' and 
'revealed' (which is in itself very revealing of  Macquarrie's true position) is the 
understanding  that  revelation  is  a  'universal  possibility'  and  that  this  very 
universality is the condition of any and all  occasions of revelation whatsoever. 
In terms of  Macquarrie's proposal for what he terms a "new style philosophical 
theology"  and  its  differences  with  the  "old  style  natural  theology",  (and  of 
course his proposal is for an existential theology), he states: 
"(this) means the virtual abandonment of  the old distinction between 
'natural' and 'revealed' knowledge of God, for the appeal is going to 
be for  a general  possibility  of revelation  (this  expression  is  to  be 
preferred to 'general revelation'). ,,102 
And further in respect of  this general possibility he states: 
"Let us remember that one can hardly speak of a 'general' revelation, 
though there is a universal possibility of  revelation. ,,103 
The  universal  possibility  of revelation  demands  the  universal  availability  of 
revelation,  and the reason that Macquarrie states that we can hardly talk of a 
general revelation is that it  is  clearly not generally received by  all  men.  The 
reason  that  it  is  not  generally  received  is  that  most  hide  from  it  in  some 
sophisticated delusion through which they maintain their inauthentic life in what 
Heidegger calls 'averageness' and 'idle talk'. 104 
102  Op.  Cit. p.57 
103  Op. Cit. p.89 
104  'averageness' is one ofHeidegger's terms for sin and inauthentic life This is 
seen in  the context of 'idle  talk'  in  Being and Time  pp.210-214,  and  in 
many other places in this work 
109 Considering  the  'general  possibility'  (or  availability)  of revelation  as  the 
condition for revelation itself, the universality of  revelation is clearly seen as the 
necessary condition for any  occasion of revelation whatsoever.  This general 
condition  is  comparable  with  Rahner's  condition  for  the  possibility  of any 
human  knowledge,  which  is  that  we  must  have  a  total,  though  implicit, 
knowledge of all being before we can have any item of explicit knowledge of 
being,  this  includes  scientific  empirical  knowledge. 105  In  both  cases  the 
knowledge (revelation)  is  already available in  creation;  all  that is  required to 
receive it,  is to recognise it and think explicitly and thematically about it.  This 
generality points towards 'creational revelation'  no  matter how the edges are 
blurred. 
ii)  Particular (special) 
Macquarrie  states  quite  clearly  that  this  general  possibility  of revelation 
becomes actual  only in  concrete particular instances.  It is  hard  to  see  how 
there  could be  any  other possibility,  the  only  one being  the  possibility  that 
everyone  in  the  world,  at  the  same  time  and  in  precisely  the  same 
circumstances,  received this generally available revelation through attunement 
and recognition! 
This particularity, then, does not in any way detract or oppose the universality 
and generality of Macquarries mode and type of revelation.  The particularity 
merely  relates to the  precise  circumstances  and  situation  of the individual's 
appropriation of this universal revelation.  The particularity extends of course 
through hermeneutic activity in respect of  the immediately available (existential 
symbols),  to  particular  theologies  and  particular  religions.  We  see  this 
universal particularity, if  we may so call it, in Macquarrie's statement in respect 
of  Karl Barth's demand for the particular 'exclusively'.  He states: 
"This  insistence  on  concreteness  and  particularity  is  acceptable, 
provided it is not arbitrarily restricted to the biblical revelation.  The 
examples  of revelation given  earlier in  this  book have  been quite 
concrete  - Moses  at  the  burning  bush,  the  the  ophanies  of 
105  See Chapter 5 
110 Pomanders and Krishna, the recognition of Jesus by the disciples as 
the Messiah. ,,106 
What  Macquarrie is  saying  is  that  there is  a  general  structure of revelation 
which finds  expression in  particular instances
107
;  this  is  no  more than  saying 
that the universal and essentially constant revelation of  Being is appropriated in 
particular  situations  involving  particular  individuals.  The  only  constant  and 
generally possible or available revelation is the revelation of the immanence of 
God in and through creation - this is properly 'creational revelation' - a rose by 
any other name is still a rose. 
c)  Historical revelation 
As  our  contention  IS  that  there  is  a  clear  distinction  between  'creational 
revelation' and 'historical revelation' it follows that we must offer a definition of 
the  precise  difference. - Creational  revelation,  as  stated  in  Chapter  1,  is  the 
revelation of the immanence of God as implicitly expressed in and through the 
beings  and  existents  of creation,  including  both human  beings  and  what  we 
term 'nature'.  The only dynamic involved in this revelation on God's side was 
the moment of  the act of  creation itself, which we will consider as happening 'in 
the beginning'.  The dynamic on the human side is that of  the recognition of  the 
immanence of God 'in' creation.  Historical revelation, as stated in Chapter 1, is 
the inbreaking of  the transcendence of God into human history.  This is always 
necessarily particular and special and not universal in any understanding of  the 
term.  The supreme example of  historical revelation was the incarnation of God 
in the person of Jesus Christ.  In Christ the transcendence of God broke into 
the world and its history.  The revelation of  '  God with us' took the form of  both 
event and logos.  The difference can be seen,  if our definitions are correct, to 
106  Principles  of Christian  Theology  - John  Macquarrie  p.89  - In  our 
understanding,  the recognition of the  disciples  was of Christ's  deity,  cpo 
Thomas's declaration:  "My Lord and My God"  Jn 20:28.  It is  true that 
Peter's confession at Caesarea Philippi:  "You are the Christ, the Son of  the 
living  God"  Mat 16:16,  refers,  no  doubt,  to Jesus as  Messiah - it is  clear 
however that Christ is no ordinary son; He is above the prophet Elijah, the 
prophet Jeremiah and  John the Baptist - hence the  contrast;  'Son'  of the 
living God. 
107  See also Principles of  Christian Theology - John Macquarrie, p.177, for a 
summary statement of  the relationship between general and particular. 
III be  essentially  that  of the  immanence  and  the  transcendence  of God.  The 
immanence of God in creation necessitates no further act of God,  merely the 
recognition of Being in the beings by those who are adequately attuned.  The 
transcendence of God as inbreaking human history at  a specific time and place 
necessitates,  on the  other  hand,  the  personal  activity  of God  as  expressed 
through various modes but  rarely, if  ever, apart from the logos. 
Again our view is that Macquarrie's outline and description of revelation which 
is  generally  possible  and  available,  yet  is  experienced  in  particular  concrete 
ways,  is essentially that of 'creational revelation'.  This he terms 'primordial' or 
'classical'  revelation  and  clearly  such  a  revelation  when  appropriated  has  an 
immediate  historical  dimension  in  respect  of  the  particularity  of  the 
appropriation.  This historical dimension finds extension through the particular 
religious eventuality which follows as the product of primordial revelations to 
those who  become the founders  of such  religions  (based  on their  particular 
interpretation of the experience).  Our contention here is  that such historical 
extension of  primordial revelation is not properly speaking historical revelation. 
Ambiguity  is  introduced  by  the  claim  that  the  historical  experience  of 
'recognition'  and  'appropriation'  is  itself the historical  revelation of Being.  It 
appears  that  Macquarrie's  agenda  is  in  some  way  to  merge  both  natural 
theology and revealed theology, into one and similarly to merge both creational 
or natural revelation and historical revelation. 
In the context of  the Christian faith we find the basis for Macquarrie's merging 
of  'creational'  and  'historical'  revelation.  He  argues  that  'creation', 
'reconciliation'  and  'consummation'  are  a  fundamental  unity  and  not  three 
separate acts.  They are the one movement: 
"Creation, reconciliation and consummation are not three successive 
activities of God ... The three indeed are represented successively in 
the  narrative  presentation  of the  Christian  faith,  but  theologically 
they must be seen as three moments in  God's great unitary action. 
Creation, reconciliation and consummation are not separate acts but 
only distinguishable aspects of one awe-inspiring movement of God 
...  his  love or letting-be,  whereby he  confers,  sustains  and  perfects 
the being of  the creatures. ,,108 
108  Op. Cit. p.269 
112 If these three  movements  are  considered  to  be  different  aspects  of the  one 
primordial  activity then  Macquarrie's  doctrine  of revelation  is  given full  and 
convenient facility.  If creation and  recreation are  essentially the  one reality, 
with recreation built in to creation as  it were,  there are no  grounds to seek a 
further  revelation  than  that  already  immanent  and  intrinsic  to  creation. 
Salvation becomes  a matter of coming to  awareness  of the  depth  dimension 
implicit in creation.  Indeed: 
"God's saving activity is universal.  It is as wide as creation because 
creating and reconciling are not separate activities but moments of 
h  "  ,,109  t  e same actIvIty. 
Whilst there are many differences between Rudolf Bultmann's and Macquarrie's 
understanding of revelation (for example 'revelation' according to Bultmann 'is' 
Jesus Christ), Bultmann is similar in respect of  the present issue in that:  "There 
is no other light shining in Jesus than has already shined in creation and the law. 
Man  should  always  have  understood himself in  the face  of the revelation  of 
creation  and  the  law. ,,1l0  And  further  Macquarrie  adopts  Justin  Martyr's 
teaching that the logos had always been in the world and that in this same logos 
"every race of  men were partakers."lll  He concedes that: 
"It is true that at a given time in history the Logos had been made 
flesh in Jesus of  Nazareth. ,,112 
But even so there was no added activity of reconciliation going on.  "Rather, it 
is the case that at a given time their was a new and  decisive revelation of an 
activity that had always been going on,  an  activity that is  equiprimordial with 
creation itself"  113 
The historical revelation of  the incarnation is marginalised in this way; but just 
what constitutes 'primordial revelation' in the case of Christianity?  Macquarrie 
argues that the many revelations of  Holy Being, before Christ, pointed towards 
109  Op. Cit. p.270 
110  Existence and Faith - Rudolf Bultmann, Collins Fontana Library,  Trans.  S 
Ogden, 1964,  p.100 Cpo  also p.96f 
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112  Ibid. 
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113 the hope of a decisive event in which God would come to his people openly 
and in fullness. 
"The New Testament  claims  that this  climax  of God's  reconciling 
work did come with the historical revelation in Jesus Christ.  'When 
the  time  had  fully  come,  God  sent  forth  his  son'.  This,  for 
Christianity, is the 'classic' or 'primordial' revelation. ,,114 
And here we see the complete merging into  one of primordial and  historical 
revelation.  The coming of Christ is  conceded by Macquarrie to be historical 
revelation  but  it  is  at  the  same  time  the  primordial  revelation  upon  which 
Christianity is founded.  This of course effectively means that it was not Christ 
who founded Christianity,  as He is Himself the primordial revelation,  rather it 
must have been the disciples, as they received this revelation. 
The term 'the fullness of  time' points to an historical basis of  revelation, indeed 
Macquarrie states: 
"The fullness  of time is  seen as  a  critical moment of history when 
God's reconciling work moves out into the open and takes  a new 
and decisive leap forward toward building up that commonwealth of 
beings which would realise the potentialities of  the creation. ,,115 
Macquarrie  nonetheless  still  manages  to  hold  the  two  types  of revelation 
together  in  that  he  declares  Christ  to  be  an  'historical  symbol';  historical 
symbols he finds to be particularly appropriate as expressions of  Being because 
in them there is both an ontological and an existential element. 
"The historical  symbol  has  also  an  ontological import,  if history is 
through and through existential, that is to say, if  it has to do not with 
mere happening but with existence in its acting, becoming and being, 
then The theme of history is personal being. the historical symbol is 
a personal symbol ... we have already seen that personal being is the 
most appropriate symbol for Being itself"  116 
We see then that the historical revelation of the incarnation is  submerged as  a 
symbol  of primordial revelation.  It does  appear that Macquarrie has  built  a 
114  Op. cit. p.270 
115  Op. Cit. p.271 
116  Op. Cit. p.272 
114 watertight case which nothing can count against.  He at least concedes to the 
superiority of  the historical symbol: 
"The historical symbol is an existential-ontological one, presenting in 
a  remarkable  combination  the  revelation  of both  existence  and 
Being."ll7 
4.3 The Effects of  Revelation 
The effects of  revelation are primarily that the one who receives the primordial 
revelation, attains to a new understanding of  both himself and the world, and in 
this  new understanding which finds  its  content  in  respect  of the immediate 
existential  symbols  of the  experience,  and  its  theology,  in  respect  of the 
interpretation of  the encounter in terms of  these symbols, he goes on to found a 
world religion.  The followers of this religion, who themselves did not receive 
the  primordial  revelation,  receive  it  throughout  the  process  of 'repetitive 
thinking'1l4  whereby they tum back to the original revelation, through the holy 
scriptures  which  are written at  some  point.  Through the  contemplation  of 
repetitive  thinking  they  re-live  the  primordial  revelation,  receiving  it  for 
themselves. 
Through either primordial or secondary revelation by  repetitive thinking,  the 
recipients  are  translated  from  inauthentic  to  authentic  life  which  for 
Macquarrie, Heidegger (and Bultmann) is  salvation.  Through the process of 
authentic life  men and women achieve their full  potential and  arrive  at what 
Macquarrie terms  'selfhood'.  Revelation,  then,  is  essentially  a  soteriological 
reality although the element of  judgement remains for those who do not accept 
the truth of  what has been revealed to them. 
117  Ibid. 
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Revelation in the Theology of 
Karl Rahner 
Rahner's  primary  presupposition  is  that  the  sovereIgn,  living  and  free  God 
reveals Himself to man in and through human words, and at a specific time and 
place  in  human  history.  The  proper  seat  of that  revelation  is  the  Roman 
Catholic  church.  Revelation,  then,  is  God's  business,  man  can  in  no  way 
produce it.  However, man's duty is to prepare himself for a possible revelation 
from God which mayor may not be given.  This he must do by the reflective 
discipline of  the Philosophy of  Religion, which Rahner calls the:  IIFundamental-
theological anthropology."  1 
Rahner does not break the self-revelation of God down under two elements 
that  is;  God's  side  and  man's  side,  as  does  Macquarrie.  However,  it  is 
convenient to analyse Rahner's position in terms of this dualism,  therefore we 
shall structure our study in respect of God's side as the free revealer, and man's 
side as the free receiver.  As with Macquarrie, Rahner's theology of revelation 
is essentially ontological, it has primarily to do with the coincident reality of  the 
Being of God and the being of man,  and the precise relation between the two. 
Man's concern in revelation,  however, is  in respect of his  own being and his -
be all and end all - in the world; revelation is wholly a cognitive reality in terms 
of  the precise quality of  his consciousness. 
Hearers of the  Word - Karl Rahner Revised J B  Metz.  Trans.  R  Walls. 
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116 5.1 - Revelation from God's point ofview.
2 
Rahner considers that the revelation of God, from God's side,  is theology.  He 
states: 
"In  its  original  nature  theology  is  not  some  kind  of science,  the 
constitution of which is  created by man himself.  In its  origin it  is 
always the self-illuminating hearing of  the revelation of  God Himself, 
which proceeds from God's free  decree, through his  own word.  In 
the primary sense theology ... is the totality of  divine speech. ,,3 
Theology, then, is the heard word of  God.  It must be said here that the context 
of  this quote is a discussion on the relationship of  theology and the philosophy 
of  religion.  The philosophy of  religion is seen by Rahner as representing man's 
side  of revelation but theology is  itself revealed  of God.  This word of God 
addressed by God to man,  albeit in human language, is the result of God's free 
will  and grace.  Theology rests on God's free  revelation,  but it takes place in 
the hearing of  man, yet that hearing is of  God's word itself  So God speaks and 
man hears; if either element is missing we do not have revelation.  Our enquiry 
must now consider the how,  what and  where of God's  speech itself.  In the 
primary respect, God's revelation is a communication of  His essential Being, to 
and  in  the  being  of man,  who  himself  emerged  from  the  Being  of God; 
therefore revelation takes place in the primary unity of creator and creation.  In 
that sense it can be said to be 'natural', and it is certainly 'creational'.  As such it 
is always expressed indirectly through the symbols of man's essential being and 
having-being.  In other words God reveals Himself through the things of the 
created World which man is,  is in,  and is  bodied against.  However, it is  clear 
that Rahner holds revelation to be the free  disclosure of God who is high and 
exalted  above  the  world,  in  other words  a  wholly  other  transcendent  God. 
Indeed,  he  dispels  any  suggestion  of  pantheism  in  respect  of  his 
'anthropological theology'  and  states very  clearly that  "the revelation of God 
cannot be given a foundation by man,  neither in its actuality or necessity nor in 
its inner essence. ,,4  Revelation,  which is  a genuine theology,  is  the  message 
from God which confronts man as an external word.  Rahner is quite explicitly 
2 
3 
4 
This  heading  is  somewhat  misleading  as  Rahner's  methodology  IS 
anthropocentric. 
Hearers of  the Word - Karl Raher, p.8 
See Hearers of  the Word p.9f, for a discussion of  this point. 
117 stating that revelation follows a path from  above to below and not vice versa. 
This  factor  can  be  quite  easily  lost  sight  of when  we  come  to  discuss  the 
concretisation of  revelation in terms of  man's transcendental openness. 
Whilst it is (even if somewhat sparsely) demonstrated in Rahner's writings that 
revelation follows a downward path,  it is  still man who is  enquiring about this 
revelation  from  God.  It is  man  who  is  asking  the  metaphysical  questions, 
therefore man stands before the 'possibility' of God's free revelation to him.  He 
cannot,  however,  by any  effort of his  own turn the possibility into  actuality. 
5 
The possibility of  revelation is two sided; the first being that God freely acts in 
self disclosure,  by  speaking to man.  The  second is  that God  remains  silent. 
However  if God  chooses  to  remain  silent,  the  very  silence  is  a  form  of 
revelation to man, as he stands before it.
6 
The free self disclosure of God is  the presupposition of the being of man as  a 
finite  spirit,  it takes place (if it takes place) in terms of man's  constitution and 
nature as spirit (luminous being).  In the primary instance God reveals Himself 
in and through the delimitation of  finite spirits.
7  In the delimitation dynamic the 
nature of God  is  revealed  as  the  interior,  necessary  reality  of the  delimited 
being.  Through this free act of  delimitation offinite spirits: 
"The personality of God is  displayed  as  the self disclosure of absolute being 
before human  transcendence. ,,8  This  appears  in  man's  consciousness  as  the 
question mark associated with all being. 
5 
6 
7 
8 
The term 'possibility' is  often used by Rahner.  More often than not,  the 
whole thrust of his  argument is to establish the 'possibility' of something! 
For example;  his  argument in respect of universal salvation is  not that all 
men 'will' be saved, but that it must be 'possible' that all men may be saved. 
It is  understood  that,  if man  stands  ever  and  obedient  before  an  all 
sovereign and  powerful  God,  he  will  interpret  the  silence  as  a form  or 
mode  of revelation.  However,  it  appears  from  the  nature  of Rahner's 
epistemology that the silence might well be simply the revelation intrinsic 
to the  primary  delimitation  of man's  being  - in  other words:  'creational 
revelation' . 
Rahner's use of  the term 'delimitation' is synonymous with 'creation'. 
Hearers of  the Word - Karl Rahner, p.89 
118 5.1.1 The concept of 'delimitation' 
All  delimitation, whether human or divine,  comes about through intentionality 
as  an  act of free  will.  Indeed delimitation by its very nature is  also  an  act of 
love (discussed below).  Will,  acting through love,  is  the only reason for the 
delimitation act: 
"In  the  absolute  delimitation  of an  accidental  as  absolute  we 
experience will.  Such a delimitation must be more than merely static 
insight.  It must be will, for pure comprehension as such can find the 
basis  of this  delimitation  only  in  the  object itself  An  accident  as 
such however, provides no  reason within its own 'thisness' to affirm 
it absolutely.  Were its mere occurrence itself to be regarded as the 
reason of  the absolute delimitation of  its 'thisness', then this existence 
would be posited as necessary.  For only  such  an  existence can be 
the reason for an out and out affirmation.  This existence would then 
be the necessary existence of an  accident which is  a contradiction. 
Thus the  delimitation  of an  accident  does  not  find  the  reason for 
itself unequivocally from the thing delimited as such.  Will, however, 
is  such a reason.  The necessary absolute delimitation which posits 
existence in contrast to its accidentally is therefore will. ,,9 
Knowledge and being are equated in Rahner.  Therefore the will  is understood 
as  an  inner factor  of knowledge,  it  is  knowledge itself which  is  the  primary 
factor  in  the  delimitation  of accidental  finite  spirits.  The  inner  factor  of 
knowledge which opens up  being for  existence is,  however,  effected by will. 
Knowledge,  as  the luminosity  of being,  is  not  nullified  by  the  act  of will  in 
delimitation but indeed  affirmed.  This  necessary  and  absolute  affirmation  of 
'knowledge  and  will'  takes place  at  the  very  foundation  of human  existence 
where in  the  same  moment  the  luminosity  of 'Being  in  general'  is  affirmed. 
Being  in  general,  which  is  not  to  be  thought  of in  any  way  as  the  total 
aggregate of all  beings,  but rather that  essential  unity which underlies  all  of 
being;  such a unity is loosely referred to in Rahner's theology as  the Being of 
God Himself  10 
9 
10 
Op. Cit. p.86f, For a full discussion of 'delimitation' see pp.86-93. 
What is being said here is  that all  of being is  self-luminous and therefore 
open to being known.  All beings including God are knowable,  and  since 
the Being of God and the being of man coincide in this luminosity, man is 
free,  by  the exercise of his  will,  to  affirm  or deny this  condition for the 
possibility of his knowledge of God.  It can be seen that if man affirms his 
own being, he at the same time affirms God's being and vice versa. 
119 In terms of free will acting through intentionality,  the essential Being of God 
and the essential being of man coincide in the knowledge or luminosity of (all) 
Being. 
The inner condition of  this luminosity is man's will with regard to himself  This 
appears  to  him  as  the  condition  for  the  possibility,  and  necessity,  of the 
question about Being which  he  must  ask,  and  thus  as  the  condition for  the 
possibility  for  the  question  about  Being  in  generaL  The  logic  of this 
coincidence of God and man in  terms of the luminosity of Being is  that God 
can be known by man as  an immediate facility of his  (man's)  delimitation as  a 
finite spirit.  The very nature of  the finite spirit is that it exists in the knowledge 
and Being of God Himself, therefore knowledge of God is a necessary function 
of  man's own essential nature.  In this way it can be seen that man's ontology is 
essentially  epistemic  in  respect  of God  and  therefore  knowledge  of man  is 
essentially knowledge of  God. 
Similarly, in terms of man's will to affirm self; the affirmation of self is at same 
time, necessarily, the affirmation of  God. 
According to Rahner, then, man has the inherent capacity in terms of his  own 
essential  constitution,  to  know  everything  there  is  to  know  about  God.  In 
other words God is  self-luminous to man in terms of man's own luminosity of 
being.  Elucidating  this  point  further  in  terms  of delimitation;  God  in  free 
autonomous power delimits the finite in His act of Creation; this is the primary 
or first  delimitation.  In  delimitation  God  reaches  out  to  the  finite  spirits. 
Clearly He does that by standing in contradistinction from the finite,  thus when 
finite  intellect  knows  Him,  such  knowledge  is  based  upon  His  own  free 
delimitation.  The free  delimitation of God  is  passed  on  to man  as  his  own 
constituted  reality,  his  essential  being,  and  the  source  and  content  of his 
essential knowledge (which in turn becomes the condition for the possibility of 
all  other  human  knowledge).  The  very  essential  nature  and  form  of the 
delimitation is the essential nature and form of man's being.  In the dynamic of 
delimitation  God's  free  will  translates to man's  free  will.  Rahner  makes  the 
point that because of this delimitation of the absolute Being (God), man's will 
corresponds to God's will and therefore man must necessarily affirm God as the 
reason  and  cause  of everything.  If,  through  the  negative  exercise  of his 
120 freedom,  he  denies  and  rejects  God,  he  denies  his  own  essential  being. 
However,  if through faith  he  affirms  his  reality  in  God,  he  is  upheld  by the 
power of  God whilst remaining free, as God is free: 
"Man, then in his necessary absolute attitude to his  contingency (an 
attitude wpich confirms the luminosity of his being) affirms  himself 
as  the free  deliberate  delimiting  of God.  He knows himself to be 
supported by the free  power of God.  This  implies  that in  the last 
analysis  he  does  not face  the absolute being  of God  (the ultimate 
horizon  of his  cognitive  advance)  as  an  immovable  ideal  which, 
'semper quiescens',  must always  stand open to his  assault,  but as  a 
free autonomous power."  11 
Man's will,  freedom  and  power,  and  his  capacity to know and  be known,  is 
born in the delimitation of his  person by the person of God.  More generally, 
man emerges from God's absolute and infinite knowledge and consciousness as 
a derivative finite  extension of this knowledge and consciousness;  in this way 
God is the Father of  the finite spirits.
12  In a sense, then, man is the knowledge 
of God on earth.  It is interesting to think of  the Biblical motif of  the 'image of 
God' in this respect; 'man',  created in the image of God, mirrors God on earth. 
Indeed,  man,  by virtue of his  creation in  this unity,  'is'  God on earth,  and  as 
such must go forth and exploit it. 
It is  always  understood that  in  Rahner,  as  in  Aquinas,  man  knows  God  by 
analogy, because his  own being bears direct analogy to God's being.  (Therein 
leaving space for the dimension of  faith in respect of  the unity, or restoration of 
unity,  with  God).  In this  essential  knowledge,  man  knows  that  God  is  the 
reason and cause of all  being,  including himself;  he also  knows that he  is  not 
himself God.  Unless  God  stands in  contradistinction to the finite,  however, 
man  could  not  exist  as  the  essential  (bi-valent)  being  he  now  is.  In  other 
words, if God is not distinct from and transcendent to His creation, man would 
not be man;  but neither would man be man if his  being was not in  some way 
intrinsically  coincident,  continuous  and  indeed  analogous  with  God's  Being. 
The nature and power of  this coincidence as understood by Rahner demands, of 
course,  that  there  can  be  no  such  thing  as  an  atheist  (in  the  real  sense). 
Because the coincidence of God and man occurs in God's and man's luminosity 
11 
12 
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121 of being (which is  the  realm  of the  open  and  fully  accessible  'knowledge'  of 
Being)  man,  who  stands  in  the  openness  of being  as  open  to  Being,  must 
necessarily (at least implicitly)  affirm the existence  and  reality of God.  This 
openness to Being constitutes man's infinite capacity for knowledge of  Being in 
general.  Indeed, according to Rahner,  man already possesses, by virtue of his 
delimitation,  a total implicit (non thematic and vague) knowledge of all being; 
this Rahner calls the 'pre-concept'.  The pre-concept is the necessary condition 
for the possibility of  any human knowledge whatsoever. 
God has revealed Himself in  respect of His power, His freedom,  His will  and 
His love (in terms of the precise nature of His intentionality) in His delimiting 
of  the finite spirits (human beings): 
"As  a  spirit,  and  as  such  a  knowing  absolute  being,  man  stands 
distinct from this absolute being who is a free autonomous powerful 
person.  This countenance of God is  not an attribute resulting from 
the retrospective fitting  out of absolute being with human features. 
The personality of  God is displayed in the self disclosure of absolute 
being before human transcendence ... the cognitive encounter with a 
free person who thus subsists in Himself alone is  such to allow the 
known  to  remain  unknown.  On  account  of freedom  a  person  is 
disclosed  ultimately  only  through the  deliberate  act  of the  person 
himself who  is  to be  k110wn  ...  Insofar as  the  free  delimitation of 
God  determines  his  personal  relationship  to  us,  the  knowledge  of 
this relationship is always dependent upon his own free purpose".  13 
Since  God  remains  hidden  in  His  primordial  revelation  of Himself in  the 
primary delimitation of man as a finite spirit, further (secondary and historical) 
self revelation of God, who in primordial revelation is the 'known who remains 
unknown'  is  sought  by  man.  Indeed,  man's  whole  disposition  is  that  of a 
listener for  God's  word  of revelation  in  his  personal  history.  Through  the 
creational  revelation of man's  constitution  as  a  delimited  spirit  he  is  able  to 
recognise and receive the word of  God in secondary, historical revelation.  Man 
stands  constantly  and  fundamentally  before  a  God  of revelation.  A  God 
moreover, says Rahner, who acts in history.  So it is possible that God will and 
does proceed to reveal Himself in a way other than that which occurred in the 
free delimitation of  man. 
13  Op. Cit. p.89 
122 The creation dynamic did not,  and does not, exhaust God's free possibilities in 
respect ofRis creatures: 
"God must  still  posses free  scope for his  free  action towards his 
creatures, for this is the condition of any free delimitation at all,  and 
of  its recognition by the one who is limited ... on the other side too, 
the creature must still have room for material knowledge of such a 
fresh act of God towards it.  In a word there must still be an object 
of  a further free act as the object of a cognition that is not yet at an 
end".14 
Rahner  is  saymg  that  everything  is  not  fully  worked  out  concerning  the 
relationship of God and man in the primary delimitation.  Indeed this first free 
delimitation  of the finite  and  accidental  includes  within  it  the  fact  that  the 
further act of God in respect of the (still limited)  creatures,  cannot be simply 
the consequence or continuum of  the first delimitation.  The contingency of  the 
primary delimited finite  condition already implies changeability,  so  there must 
be the real possibility of a 'fresh free will of  God'.  15  It does appear that Rahner 
is saying that God may continue to delimit the finite and accidental creation in a 
quite novel way, not necessarily continuous with the primary delimitation.  We 
see  in  this  factor  the  introduction  of the  element  of serious  ambiguity  in 
Rahner's argument.  It is  clear from the bulk of Rahner's  argument that any 
secondary  revelation  must  necessarily  be  continuous  with  the  primary 
delimitation,  and therefore the essential  nature of man as  constituted by that 
delimitation.  This  ambiguity  develops  into  a  major  problem  in  respect  of 
Rahner's theological  development (which he  explicitly  addresses16).  What is 
clear  at  this  point  is  that Rahner claims  that  a  secondary  delimitation  must 
necessarily be continuous with primary delimitation.  Yet at  the same time it 
must be fresh and novel and therefore discontinuous with primary delimitation. 
This ambiguity is essentially in respect of the precise relationship of creational 
and historical revelation.  The nature of  the intrinsic problem which inheres this 
relationship is  seen in this light.  On the one hand,  further delimitation which 
bears  no  principle  of continuity  with  the  primary  delimitation  (creational 
revelation)  would  necessarily  translate  human  being  to  some  other type  of 
14 
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123 being (albeit more advanced).  Secondary delimitation which is  relevant to the 
being  of man  as  man  must  be graspable  by  him  in  terms  of his  sphere  of 
perception (which of course undergoes the widening of a delimitation through 
the grasping process).  It seems reasonable that an historical revelation of the 
essential  Being  and  personhood  of God  would  be  commensurate  with  the 
profound answers to man's metaphysical questions; the main thrust of  Rahner's 
position  advocates  this.  Indeed  consistency  is  maintained  in  respect  of the 
'questions'  as  representative  of primary  delimitation  and  the  'answers'  as 
representative  of  secondary  delimitation.  The  questions,  then,  as  the 
expression  of the  nature  of primary  delimitation,  could  be  seen  to  be  the 
whence,  on the human  side,  of secondary  delimitation  which  comes  in  and 
through the answers. 
On the  other hand  if the  principle  of continuity  is  so  strong as  to virtually 
require  that  the  secondary  delimitation  be  identical  with  the  primary 
delimitation  then  historical  revelation,  as  merged  completely  with  creational 
revelation,  is  a contradiction in terms.  And further,  God is not free to act in 
some new and fresh way in respect of  world history nor indeed Heilsgeschichte. 
If both the  elements  of novelty  and  continuity  are  to be  maintained  in  full 
power, it must be conceded that ambiguity is inevitable.  Such ambiguity is seen 
in  the  paradox  of faith  itself  Yet  the  superlative  example  is  that  of the 
incarnation  in  which  we  see  something  radically  new  in  respect  of human 
history, which is continuous and consistent with the corporeality of  the primary 
delimitation of human being.  At  this  point we have  arrived  at  the  essential 
nature of  the concept of 'miracle'.  The term miracle best expresses the precise 
nature of the relationship  of primary and secondary delimitation in respect of 
creational and historical revelation.  If miracle is understood as the inbreaking 
of the wholly other into human history,  in  such a way as to address essential 
human being and existence, then it must necessarily be ambiguous in nature and 
character. 
The  historical  revelation  of the  incarnation  concentrates  the  meamng  of 
secondary delimitation in terms of  man's fulfilment.  At the same time of course 
man's fulfilment relates directly to his primary delimitation as the whence of  this 
fulfilment.  Rahner makes reference to the aspect of fulfilment  in  respect of 
man's unfulfilled transcendency in his  primary delimited  constitution:  "To the 
124 extent that man in  his  absolute,  not yet finally  fulfilled  transcendency,  stands 
before the free  God,  he  stands in his  primary ontological questioning,  as the 
excellence of his essential constitution.  He stands before the possibility of the 
free  action  of God  upon  him,  thus  before  the  God  of a  possible  material 
revelation. ,,17 
This secures the view of  a further delimitation (in terms of  historical revelation) 
in respect of  man's fulfilment,  as an external material reality outside of his  own 
power, and indeed as something radically new and even original: 
"To  the  extent  that  every  free  act  is  always  original,  a  once-for-all  thing 
incalculable in terms of all that is  'external', such a revelation is  not simply the 
continuance  of a  disclosure  of being  which  has  already  begun,  even  if this 
disclosure has begun tentatively and  along  an  unambiguous  direction in  man 
with his natural knowledge of God.  It is  not simply a continuance even if this 
natural knowledge of God is  correctly understood and perfected only when it 
constantly knows itself to be referred back to the sovereign freedom of God 
and  immersed  within  that  freedom." 18  The  principle  of ambiguity  remains 
however in respect of the terms '(man stands in) the excellence of his essential 
constitution' and 'not 'simply' a continuance'.  The aspect of continuity in some 
way and to some degree is  retained,  whilst  at the same time the out and out 
novelty is  asserted.  The (secondary)  "disclosure of being which has  already 
began"  is  entirely novel,  and is  not continuous with man's  'natural' knowledge 
of God in and through the primary delimitation of his  (man's) being.  Yet the 
principle of continuity is clearly seen in the logic of the fulfilment dynamic and 
in terms of  the coincidentality of  man and God. 
In any  event man  is  not  simply  placed  before  the  Being  of God  as  semper 
quiescens,  but before that God who  may  possibly  still  undertake free  action 
towards him.  Clearly man has the cognitive capacity for such novel and fresh 
further knowledge in respect of  his primary delimitation. 
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125 What this means is that man, in his transcendence
19
,  stands before a God who is 
a mysterium inperscrutabile, whose ways are unfathomable and whose decrees 
are  incalculable;  yet  at  the  same  time  man's  transcendence  is  towards  an 
intrinsically luminous Being, who is completely knowable.  Man is open to this 
infinite knowledge of  being.  The most essential element ofthe first delimitation 
of  the finite accident, which is man, is that he is a listener of  God's word to him. 
Man is essentially a hearer of  God.  His proper activity is to listen for a possible 
further revelation of God.  His duty is to prepare himself for such a possibility. 
He is  the  'potentia  oboedientialis'  for  a  supernatural  revelation  which  must 
come in terms of  his history. 
The  revelation  'must'  come  because,  if the  moment  of standing  before  God 
coincides with the moment of a possible revelation of God, then some sort of 
revelation must in fact take place.  That is  to say,  there are two possibilities 
from this coincidence: one, God speaks and two, God is silent.  These are both 
forms  of revelation.  Man always  essentially hears  God's  speaking  or God's 
silence.  If this were not so  man would not be spirit;  the nature of spirit is  to 
hear also the silence of  the one Living Free Spirit, who is God.  Man, as spirit 
who  has  proceeded from  the Living  Free  Spirit,  by  virtue  of his  creaturely, 
ontological  constitution,  is  disposed  towards  and  can  never  be  indifferent 
towards a revelation which proceeds from the living God, either in speaking or 
in silence.  So  in virtue of his  nature as  spirit man constantly and  essentially 
hears some form of  revelation from God (ifhe listens). 
Rahner is  essentially  saying  in  this  respect that both God  and  man  are  free 
persons (man by virtue of the nature of the primary delimitation of the finite 
spirit) and:  "whoever stands as one free person before another discloses himself 
. ..  precisely as the one who desires to be in the eyes of the other,  either the 
hidden or the revealed" .  20 
It emerges that the underlying and  essential factor in  this  revelatory dynamic 
(primary and secondary) is 'Freedom'.  Freedom is the ground and purpose of 
delimitation.  Freedom appears to be  directly  proportional to the  degree  of 
delimitation,  as  the  concept  and  reality  of limitation  relates  directly  to  the 
19 
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What is  meant by man's transcendence is  man's transcendental experience 
whereby he reaches beyond his present knowledge and being. 
Hearers of  the Word - Karl Rahner, p.92, see also note 4, p.93 
126 concept and reality of  freedom.  It is the Free Being who, in some part, passes 
on the quality and reality of  His freedom as person in the very act of delimiting 
the  finite  accidental  spirits  whom  we  call  mankind.  Delimited  man,  then, 
possesses the same essential freedom of  spirit- person as God.  A necessary and 
fundamental factor in this freedom is  the continuing delimiting  activity of the 
'One absolutely Free Spirit' upon His primary Creation.  The reason and cause 
of  this great programme is the very nature of the absolute 'Free Person', which 
is  'Free Love'  or 'Love  in  Freedom'  flowing  by  'Free Will',  to  all  and  every 
sphere of  infinity. 
The nature of freedom, then, is love;  love serves through delimiting activity to 
the extent of its power, if its power is  infinite then there is  potentially infinite 
delimitation.  Freedom is the true and real ontological ground of  the delimiting 
activity,  yet,  apart  from  the  necessary  freedom  of  God,  by  its  very 
processionary nature freedom  is  and  must  always  be  contingent.  Man then 
exists  as  a contingent  being  and  he  must  affirm  that he  exists  as  such in  an 
intelligible world whose ground is the infinite intelligibility of  being. 21 
"man  has  proceeded from  God through an  act  of creative freedom  ...  Thus 
when man affirms his own contingency he implicitly affirms that his ontological 
ground is a person whose creative relation to the world has its source in an act 
of freedom. 1122  God  as  this  Free Being  is  capable  of disclosing  his  hidden 
riches,  the  very  deep  riches  of His  Being,  in  further  historical  revelation, 
through His Word.  This Word of secondary disclosure is clearly addressed to 
man as constituted by the primary delimitationary act.  As much has been said 
about this primary delimitation as  'creational revelation',  it  remains to discuss 
more  fully  the  element  of secondary  delimitation  in  and  through  'historical 
revelation'.  Since we have seen that the relationship between the two types of 
revelation is ambiguous, we shall discuss the act of secondary revelation under 
the heading of  'The historical aspect'. 
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We  are  interacting  here  with  Gerald  McCool's  brief treatment  of the 
subject in A Rahner Reader, p.22 
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127 5.1.2 The historical aspect of God's self revelation 
We have seen that there is  an initial and fundamental  self revelation of God in 
His  first  delimiting  action  (Creation).  This  revelation  now  inheres  all  of 
Creation as its inner reality and logic.  The transfer of freedom from  God to 
man  in  the  creation  act  constitutes  man's  essential  being  as  a  free  spirit 
(although finite and in this sense limited).  The primary nature of  spirit being, is 
knowledge, therefore spirit is luminous in that as an existent being it is capable 
of knowing  absolutely  and  being  known  absolutely;  it  is  in  a  sense  'see 
through'?3  Further,  since  the  cognitive  (noetic)  structure  of finite  spirit  is 
constituted through  primary  delimitation  it  has  an  a-priori  pre-conceptuality 
whereby it  already possesses,  as  a fundamental  aspect  of its  being,  a kind  of 
empty  pre-knowledge  of the  totality  of existent  beings  both  mundane  and 
supra-mundane?4  It therefore perpetually stands in the face of  this totality and 
generality  of being,  listening  for  a  possible  further  revelation  which  will 
produce both meaning and fulfilment in respect of  its being and existence. 
It has  already been said that this  pre-concept (the grasp  of being in  general, 
which of  course relates directly to God) is the necessary cognitive condition for 
the possibility of all  further human knowledge.  We  might  call  this further a-
posteriori knowledge,  historical knowledge or knowledge from within human 
history;  however,  we have  seen that man's  fulfilment  depends upon a further 
self-revelation of God which will address him (man) in terms of and within his 
own history.  This historical revelation is radically new and fresh as the product 
of a further free act of God inbreaking human history, therefore it is not simply 
continuous with the a-posteriori process of  natural knowledge, in respect of  the 
pre-concept. 
We have seen that according to Rahner man's whole duty is to be an obedient 
potency for this further revelation of  God in his (man's) personal history.  Man's 
absolute  fulfilment  and  self  realisation  depend  on  this  act  of  secondary 
delimitation through historical revelation,  which  God mayor may  not effect. 
From God's side this givenness  of historical revelation is  what we call  'grace' 
although  clearly  God's  grace was  also  the  essential  element  of creation;  the 
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Discussed  in  sec  2.4a,  cpo  also  Plato's  concept  of  anemneSlS  and 
Bultmann's concept of  pre-knowledge in this respect. 
128 continuity of grace is  understood if creation and  re-creation are taken as  an 
essential unity  (perhaps we could distinguish between primary and  secondary 
grace in referring to the former as 'universal grace' and the latter as 'special or 
particular grace').  The nature of  this unity, if  indeed such a unity exists,  can be 
taken  as  a  mode  of expression  of the  relationship  between  creational  and 
historical revelation.  Whilst  creation is  intrinsic to,  and  therefore continuous 
with,  re-creation,  the  dynamic  of  re-creation  requires  the  secondary 
delimitation which is the product of  historical revelation and nothing else. 
a) The nature of historical revelation 
Ifunderstood as an essential unity, creational and historical revelation could be 
seen  to  correspond  to  the  duality  of man's  bivalent  nature,  particularly  in 
respect of  his being and his having-being.  Creational revelation corresponds to 
and  addresses  man's  being,  and  historical  revelation  corresponds  to  and 
addresses  man's  having-being.  The  analogy  of being  and  having-being  is 
discussed in section 2.3
25
,  we are concerned here with Rahner's understanding 
of  the relationship of the supra-mundane mode of having-being (God) and the 
mundane  mode  of having-being  which  pertains  to  all  appearances  of being 
including  man.  These  distinct  modes  could  be  rightly  described  as  God's 
history  and  man's  history.  God's  free  activity  is  his  historicity  and  man's 
existence as a free spirit who encounters the beings which appear to him,  is his 
historicity.  The beings which appear in the mundane realm reveal themselves 
as a necessary part of their being; this follows from the original unity of being 
and knowing which is  the nature of the luminosity of being.  In the mundane 
realm, then, man has all of  the beings which appear revealed to him through the 
a-posteriori process which  constitutes his  own mundane personal history.  In 
this  way  it  can  be  seen  that  man's  existence  is  necessarily  epistemic  and 
therefore revelatory.  This revelation, which may be termed 'mundane historical 
revelation',  is  really the a-posteriori  process of acquiring  and  growing in  the 
creational revelation,  implicit  and  intrinsic to the beings which  appear.  This 
process  of mundane  historical  revelation  in  terms  of the  individual  man's 
personal history, is  appropriated through man's free  activity of participation in 
being. 
25  For Rahner's discussion of  'having-being' see Hearers of  the Word,  p.45ff 
129 The  modes  of having-being  exist  in  two  realities  then,  mundane  and  supra 
mundane.  Clearly,  the  mundane  finite  reality  is  the  place  of general  and 
universally  available  creational  revelation.  As  the  beings  appear  they  are 
known as  they are in  themselves  in  and through the historical motion of the 
having-beings.  Implicit  in  the  being-present-to-self  of the  beings  is  the 
knowledge of God Himself, who is the supra mundane,  absolute having-being; 
but this is a knowledge limited by the finitude of  the primary delimitation.  Our 
concern here however is with the historical aspect, or the having-being, of  both 
God  and  man,  and  the  relationship  of these  mandane  and  supra  mundane 
historicities.  It is  helpful  to  look further into  Rahner's  understanding of the 
nature of  history and historicity. 
i) The nature of 'history' 
Rahner states: 
"Man is historical insofar as he is the one who acts in a freedom that 
originates in his transcendence with respect to God, that is according 
to  the  determination  of  his  relationship  with  the  absolute. 
Obviously,  this factor belongs essentially to the historicity of man. 
Genuine historicity is there only where we find  the uniqueness and 
unpredictability of  freedom. ,,26 
The  essential  element  in  history then is  freedom  and  history  is  free  activity, 
unique and unpredictable.  As far as man is concerned this quality of  freedom is 
determined  in  terms  of man's  relationship  with  God  and  his  transcendental 
motion towards God.  It seems clear then that nature has no history, because it 
is  not free  in  this  way.  Indeed,  its  activity  is  by  necessity to  an  apparently 
universal  law.  Nature is  predictable  it  does  not  transcend  itself but  has  its 
'isness'  as  a  consequence  of the  primary  delimitation  (to  whatever  degree) 
which in this case is termed by Rahner the initial configuration.  History does 
not appear in  respect  of nature nor indeed  of the  'isness'  of being  itself,  but 
rather with the beingness  or having-being  of human  beings.  For history we 
need freedom: 
26  Op.  Cit. p.133 
130 IlHistoricality  is  found  only  where the  intelligible  acts  of freedom 
necessarily  extend  in  space  and  time,  that  is  where  they  require 
space-time  in  order  to  become  themselves.  It  is  this  sort  of 
historicity  which  appears  in  man  in  virtue  of  his  essential 
constitution.  This is the historicity of a free person who subsists in 
himself. ..  Man is an historical creature. 1127 
The  second  element  of the  nature  of history  is  personhood;  history  IS  the 
activity of  free persons.  It is therefore free and it is personaL  Again: 
"Historicity  is  found  only  where  the  act  of freedom  spreads  out 
within the context offree persons in their diversity. 1128 
The same maxim applies to the supra mundane which is  God's history or the 
mode of God's having-being.  This is God's absolutely free activity which could 
be stated as the basis of  all history and all delimitation: 
"When he is known as the existent thing with absolute 'having being', 
God stands before man as the only one who acts freely,  who has not 
yet  exhausted  the  possibilities  of his  freedom  towards  finite  man 
throughout the free delimitation of  his finite thing.  But free action is 
in  an  essential  sense  historical  action.  An  initial  general  and 
metaphysical understanding of  history shows it always to exist where 
free delimitation exists.  It is  a happening which cannot be deduced 
and  calculated from  a general  preceding  cause.  Such  a free  non-
derivable happening is  always a unique,  unrepeatable something, to 
be understood in terms of itself alone ... An historical event stands 
in contrast to a datum of  natural scientific knowledge ... Thus, from 
God's angle revelation displays itself as an historical phenomenon. ,,29 
Revelation,  beyond  the  creational  revelation  of the  primary  delimitation,  IS 
quite  clearly  historical  in  nature,  indeed  it  is  of the  essence  of history  itself 
because it  is  a free  act  of a personal God.  However,  the distinction  (which 
appears to be absolute) between supra mundane history and mundane,  human 
history, gives rise to the question of the nature of the connection between the 
two.  Rahner poses this question as: where is the place of a possible (historical) 
revelation of God?  "We  are seeking to find  the place of encounter between 
man  and  the  God  who  may  possibly  reveal  himself  This  place  is  the 
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131 transcendence  of  man  in  its  specifically  human  character. ,,3D  Man's 
transcendence  is  his  free  motion  towards  God,  therefore  it  is  properly  and 
positively his  having-being or his  history.  The historical revelatory encounter 
takes place, then, in human history. 
ii) Revelation as the relationship between God's history and man's 
history 
Human history is the locale of a possible revelation from God: 
"When we say that revelation is  an  historical  process because it  is 
the locale of any  possible revelation we do  not mean history in the 
general metaphysical sense but in the sense of human history.  What 
human history is  will  not be simply  defined,  but will  appear out of 
the demonstration of man's  historical  character in  the midst  of his 
transcendence.  The historical character of man ... is  to be grasped 
as a part of  man's basic constitution. ,,31 
The  secondary revelation of God which is,  as  God's free  act,  fresh  and  new, 
takes  place  in  terms  of the  constitution  of man,  in  his  personal  history. 
Revelation,  then,  is  properly  seen  as  the  synthesis  of God's  history  (supra 
mundane)  and  man's  history  (mundane)  as  it  takes  place  in  human 
consciousness; as it seeks to transcend itself as  a cognitive epistemic receiver. 
We have,  then,  the presentation of the supra mundane to the mundane in  an 
individual human history.  God's absolute having-being and man's finite having-
being coincide in  historical  synthesis,  but precisely what is  the vehicle of this 
coincidence?  Clearly  the vehicle  or medium  of the  supra mundane  and  the 
mundane  modes  of history would  require  to  be  common to  both  distinctive 
realities.  Rahner's answer: 
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"a  supra-mundane existent thing  can be presented to  a finite  spirit 
through the word.  (By word) we now mean the conceptual symbol 
of  the spirit directly applied to this (finite) thing ... The human word 
insofar as it always bears a reference to an appearance, hence can be 
the mode of revelation of each existent thing.  Insofar as the human 
word  as  a bearer of a  concept  gained  through the  negation  of a 
Op. Cit. p.120 
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132 supra-mundane existent thing is heard as spoken by God, it is able to 
reveal the existence and inner possibility of  such an existent thing. ,,32 
Supra-mundane  existence  is  accessible  to  mundane  existence  through  the 
human  word,  the  supra-mundane  non  appearing  reality  appears,  in  the 
appearance of the word.  The supernatural modes of having-being which are 
normally beyond the world of the appearances become accessible  and indeed 
definable through the negation of  the limit in and through the word. 
"Through  the  negation  of the  limit  of any  such  particular  and 
immediately accessible 'having being' and through the removal of  the 
upper limit  in  the  direction  of the  absolute  being  of God,  supra-
mundane things can be defined at least negatively. ,,33 
iii) The human 'word'; as the coincident point of the supra-mundane 
and the mundane, and therefore the vehicle of historical revelation 
"All  existent  things  are  fundamentally  definable  in  terms  of the 
sphere  of appearance.  This  definition  can  only  be  achieved  by 
negation.  This definition does not mean that man can achieve it  on 
his own in such a way that all things can be known by man in their 
inner possibility or even in their actual existence.  On the other hand 
it has already been established that a supra mundane existent thing, 
cannot be in  itself a receptive cognition,  a supra-mundane existent 
thing can be presented to the finite spirit through the word. ,,34 
The word is  the only possible place for the negation of the limit which is  set 
before man as the horizon of his  knowledge,  therefore it  is  the only possible 
medium of the revelation of the supernatural to the finitude.  The word is  the 
place of the only  coincidence of the two  realities,  it  is  essentially  consistent 
with primary revelation inherent within creation. 
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"The  whole  of  supra-mundane  existence  is  capable  of 
comprehension in the word.  For on the one hand the word does not 
represent the existent thing in  itself,  and on the other,  through the 
negation which it  is  able  to bear,  it  has  the possibility of defining 
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133 even those existent things which are outside appearance, in terms of 
'5  appearance.  ,,~ 
The human word, then, has the capacity to bear the weight of God's revelation; 
it is the vehicle of  revelation of  the supernatural or, as Rahner puts it, it has the 
capacity to be the mode of  revelation of  every existent thing: 
"The  human  word,  insofar  as  it  always  bears  a  reference  to  an 
appearance,  hence,  can be the mode of revelation of each existent 
thing.  Insofar as  the human word as  a bearer of a concept gained 
through the negation of a supra-mundane existent thing is heard, as 
spoken by God, it is able to reveal the existence and inner possibility 
of such a thing. ,,36 
The human word as inhered and spoken by God becomes both the bearer of  the 
supernatural  and  the  means  of opening  it  up  to  man.  The  human  word  is 
suitable  because  it  has  the  capacity  of revealing  the  inner  possibility  of the 
appearances and it can bear the negation, which is itself the very dynamic of  the 
disclosure  of the  supra-mundane  to  the  mundane.  In  and  through  the 
appearance of the human word,  as  spoken by  God,  God freely  enters human 
history and in  so  doing encounters man in revelatory encounter.  This entry is 
always at a specific point in space and time to a particular individual.  As to the 
aspect of  this individuality, Rahner states: 
"There  is  no  difficulty  in  principle  ansmg  from  man's  having  to 
reckon with the possibility that such a revelation might not occur in 
every  individual  history  of each  man,  but  only  in  the  history  of 
special  individuals.  It  makes  no  essential  difference  in  these 
circumstances whether he  (man)  has  to refer to a point in  his  own 
history or to a point in that of some other man - it is only necessary 
that he  is  able to recognise that a true revelation has been given at 
this point in human history. ,,37 
What is  clear is  that historical revelation of this nature is  always  special,  to a 
particular  individual  at  a  particular  place  and  time,  and  never  general  or 
universal.  For Rahner there is no  possibility of any other means of revelation. 
A different means of revelation would require to annul the already established 
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134 structure of human knowledge, which is a unity of spiritual transcendence and 
sensible appearance. As long as man remains within the limits of  the ontological 
structure, as Rahner understands it,  any other possible kind of revelatory mode 
would require to be translated into the mode (i.e. the word) which is consistent 
with this essential structure, if that revelation is to determine his normal being 
and  acting.  In  short,  as  far  as  Rahner  is  concerned,  revelation  must  be 
contained in human speech. 
iv) Summary 
Through the 'negation' the supra-mundane enters the mundane human history in 
the word and at a particular time and place.  Human ontology demands that this 
is so.  The negation takes place in the liminal (transcendent) experience of  man. 
So  we  have  a  relation  between  transcendence  and  historicity  which  has  its 
appearance in the human word.  Appearance is  that which man encounters in 
the course of  history.  Appearance ordinarily denotes the whole intra-mundane 
existence,  not  only  the  objects  directly  open  to  sense  perception,  but  man 
himself in  all  his being and action.  .And  supra-ordinarily by negation,  through 
that historical appearance which we call word: 
"This  word  is  in  tum  itself the  synthesis  of an  intra-mundane, 
historical objectivity and a transcendental negation. ,,38 
As such it is the locus of  a possible revelation. 
F  or  man  to  grasp  or receive  this  possible  historical  revelation  he  must  be 
capable of transcending himself,  man therefore is  both finite  and  limited  and 
absolutely  transcendent  and  delimited.  This  absolute  transcendence  comes 
about by  God's initiative.  By His free act He further delimits man.  This free 
act  of delimitation takes  place  in  the  'receptive  place that is  a human being' 
therefore the free act of  revelation is already historical in itself 
It  is  important  to  grasp  that the very  revelation  of God  takes  place  in  the 
human cognition and not in a pre-history of  God Himself  The first delimitation 
did occur, as it were, in a pre-history (in respect of  human history).  It occurred 
only  as  a  factor  of God's  own  history  therefore  it  took  place  in  God. 
38  Op. Cit. p.86 
135 Secondary delimitation takes place in  man,  and  since man,  by virtue of being 
'spirit' is an historical being, secondary revelation must by necessity be historical 
in nature. 
Rahner argues  that the  divine  historicity  occupies  a  specific  place  in  human 
history.  The divine historicity impinges upon the human historical process at a 
precise point in time and  space.  This specifies the very nature of the 'how' of 
God's further self revelation to the first  delimitation (created finite  spirit).  It 
follows  that  the  creature  must  tum towards  that  point  if he  is  to  hear  the 
revelation.  Since,  in our opinion, there is no  such thing as future history, then 
man  must  always  tum back.  This  turning towards  (or back)  constitutes the 
inner nature of  the dynamic of a possible revelation from the human side.  (It is 
tempting  to  consider that this  turning  is  in  fact  none  other than the  act  of 
repentance.)  Free revelation must appear at a given point, if it is not to snatch 
man up out of  his normal mode of  being.  There may be a sense (and surely is) 
that man  is  radically  changed by  a revelation  of God to him  in  his  personal 
history, but that radicality remains within the bounds of humanity.  If anything, 
it  could be  argued,  man through becoming aware of his  relation to God in  a 
new  and  powerful  way  at  the  same  time  becomes  acutely  aware  of his 
creaturehood and in so doing becomes 'more' radically human. 
If man has to tum back to history to encounter a revelation from  God,  and in 
view of the reality that revelation is  given to  special individuals  only,  does it 
follow  that  man  ought  to  engage  in  a  factual  investigation  of history  to 
ascertain if a revelation has been given?  And if this is  so  then why does man 
have  to  reckon  with  a  possible  revelation  from  God  in  his  own  personal 
history?  Rahner is  saying that man,  by virtue of his  human constitution as  a 
finite  spirit 'must' listen for a possible revelation, within his  own history.  It is 
not essentially a question of any  external  search but rather a question of the 
essential constitution of man.  Man is  primarily an  historical creature in terms 
of his  transcendent  openness  to  Being  in  general;  in  order to  stand  before 
being,  man  must tum to the  appearances,  this  turning  is  an  historical  act  in 
respect  of  an  historical  reality  with  man's  own  history  being  itself  an 
appearance,  as  is  the  whole  history  of mankind.  Since  man's  historicality 
constitutes the basis of  his spirituality39: 
39  Following from Aquinas's concept of "conversion to the phantasm" which 
Rahner adopts.  See Spirit in the World pp. 237-379 
136 "Turning towards history is thus not an attitude for man to adopt as 
he  pleases,  but  is  imposed  upon  man  by  his  specifically  human 
spirituality. ,,40 
Indeed,  Rahner  argues  that  any  consciOUS  breaking  away  from  his  history 
would in fact  constitute a contradiction of man's  essential  nature.  The very 
essence  of human  cognition,  then,  is  turning  towards  appearance;  therefore 
man,  in  being  conscious,  constantly  corroborates  the  turning  towards 
something  which  is  basically  historicaL  To  be  spirit,  man  is  fundamentally 
oriented towards his own history and the history of humanity in general which 
in turn is oriented towards a possible revelation of  God. 
A more difficult problem is: just how is man to recognise a human word spoken 
in  history,  as  the  speech  of the  supernatural  God?  The  negation  which 
transforms the mundane into the supra-mundane must demonstrate itself to be 
objectively valid;  this  must  not  be  left  to an  arbitrary  definition by  man.  In 
other words it  is  a part of God's initiative to make  this  distinction  clear.  It 
follows then that there must be some kind of qualitative difference in respect of 
the human word  as  used  as  the vehicle  of the  self revelation  of God.  The 
difference  is  that the  human  words  used  in  revelation  are  at  the  same  time 
God's words as He speaks in and through them, therefore they are qualitatively 
different to human words which God does not (in His free  activity)  speak in 
and through.  What is  actually said,  by God,  in human words is  radically new 
and fresh and clearly discernible as being of  a transcendent quality. 
5.2 Revelation from man's point of view 
In discussing  God's side  of revelation we have  already  covered much of the 
ground of revelation from  man's  side.  We have  also  necessarily  overlapped 
Chapter  3  - Rahner's  epistemological  ontology,  and  we  must  necessarily 
continue to  do  so,  but from  a  different  angle.  We are  concerned here with 
what Rahner calls the openness of  being and the openness of  man.  The subject 
of openness subdivides as the luminosity of being, the analogy of 'having being' 
40  Hearers of  the Word - Karl Rahner, p.160 
137 (already in part discussed),  and man as  spirit.  Concerning 'openness', Rahner 
states that his task is to demonstrate that the positive openness for a revelation 
which God may possibly give is part of  the essential constitution of  man.  Man's 
essential being requires that he must listen for the message of God in terms of 
his (man's) personal history.  Indeed man, whose whole duty is to be a 'potentia 
oboedientialis'  for  a  further  revelation from  God is  wholly  oriented  towards 
God  who  is  the  inner  meaning  of his  historical  existence,  and  the  only 
possibility for the world.  The only possible alternative to this is that God is the 
sheer  contradiction of man  and  his  world  (therefore those who  claim  to  be 
atheists must deal with God as the sheer contradiction). 
The immediate task for Rahner is to arrive at a metaphysical analytic of man as 
one who has the capacity to hear a revelation.  The nature of this capacity not 
only spells  out for us man's  side of revelation,  it  also  spells  out the essential 
being of  man as a spirit, constituted by primary delimitation, whose dynamic of 
life  is  the necessary listening for God's word of revelation in  human history. 
This  ontological nature is  such that man already has  a pre-concept or vague 
pre-knowledge  of what  he  is  listening  for,  therefore  he  has  the  ability  to 
recognise it if and when it appears. 
5.2.1 The Capacity to hear 
Because of man's essential constitution, he has the capability to hear a possible 
revelation  from  God.  Indeed  the  listening  for  such  a  revelation,  or  the 
discerning  of the silence  if a positive revelation is  not given,  constitutes the 
basis  of man's  life.  Therefore  an  analytic  of man's  capacity to  hear such  a 
revelation is  no  more than an analytic of man's essential being.  We shall  see 
that in Rahner,  knowledge and being are equated,  therefore such an  analytic 
must be of an  epistemological nature.  We have already seen from  chapter 3 
that for Rahner, epistemology and ontology are an essential unity. 
We are  primarily  concerned then,  with the  nature of man's  knowing  ability. 
How does man know?  What is  mans knowledge?  How does his  knowledge 
relate to the rest of his being and existence?  What is the beginning and end of 
this  knowledge?  and  so  forth.  We  can  say  that  every  existent  thing  is  a 
138 category of knowledge and that there are two primary categories, which are: 
mundane knowledge and supra-mundane knowledge.  These two categories are 
essentially related in  an  essential unity,  indeed,  supra-mundane knowledge is 
the  necessary  condition  for  the  possibility  of mundane  knowledge.  The 
epistemological starting point is man's necessity to ask metaphysical questions, 
this compulsion to ask questions is the basis of  the anthropological orientation 
in  Rahner's theology.  Man is  compelled to seek knowledge of the essential 
being  of the  things  which  appear to  him,  that  is  his  science,  and  he  seeks 
knowledge of  the essential being of  the supra-mundane things; for this he must 
listen for a possible revelation (and he is compelled to do so even if by various 
devices he tries to resolve the compulsion). 
The dualistic nature of  these two primary categories of  knowledge corresponds 
to  the  bivalent  nature  of man's  consciousness  as  he  asks  the  metaphysical 
question.  The metaphysical question is about individual existent beings and it is 
about Being in general.  The former concerns the appearances and the later is 
about  God,  (Being  in  general,  or more  accurately,  'absolute  having-being'). 
Another way of stating the phenomenon of man's desire for knowledge is that; 
man wants to know what everything is in the unity in which all is presented to 
him.  In this  we  have  both the  particular  and  the  general  aspects.  Being  in 
general has not to be thought of as the aggregate of all  existent beings but the 
unity, or one, in which all have their being.
41  As has already been said, Rahner 
argues that our (universal) pre-concept or pre-knowledge of Being in general, 
which all human beings posses, is the necessary condition for the possibility of 
all other human knowledge. 
a) The nature of the metaphysical question in respect of man's 
capacity to hear 
With respect to man's capacity to hear, we are more concerned with the nature 
and  direction  of the  answer  to  the  metaphysical  question  rather  than  the 
question itself.  Rahner asks:  "What is the principle of  a possible answer?" 
And he states: 
41  It is interesting to compare Plotinus's concept of  'the One and the Many' in 
this respect.  Macquarrie refers to this in In search of  Deity p.62 
139 "The source of  the answer must not reside within the question if  it is 
to be the foundation upon which the answer can take its stand. ,,42 
What is the source then?  If  a question is real it calls for a precise and particular 
answer,  such  a  question  always  brings  with  it  a  certain  background,  an 
unambiguous foundation on which it  is  set,  and from which the answer must 
proceed.  But where is the general question of  metaphysics to find its answer? 
"From whence  then  is  the  principle  of an  answer  to  the  general 
question about being to be taken when it calls absolutely everything 
into  question including  itself?  ...  There  cannot be any  other place 
than the question itself the point of departure must therefore be the 
question. ,,43 
And the question is:  "What is  the being of that which is  itself?"  This is  the 
question which is  necessarily  asked by man.  This  question therefore is  the 
proper and indeed only point of departure of  metaphysics.  The question about 
being itself is  the only  self-sufficient  starting point because it  has  actual  and 
necessary existence in the enquiring mind of  man.  This question belongs to the 
essential being of man it is  a part of his  essential constitution.  Therefore he 
must perpetually ask it.  The specific questions which arise from this one, when 
answered, always leave another question in their place; to this there is no end. 
We have  an infinite  series of questions,  and  correspondingly man's  cognitive 
faculty is of  infinite receptive capacity. 
But what of  the unity of  'Being in general'? 
42 
43 
44 
"Every statement is  a  statement about some specific  existent thing 
and is made against a background of a  previous,  although implicit 
knowledge  of being  in  general.  ...  Every  true  proposition,  every 
judgement, and every deliberate act, is not just the synthesis of two 
concepts along with the claim that the synthesis is legitimate, but the 
reference of  such mental synthesis to a 'thing in itself which validates 
it and the objective synthesis which it  occupies.  This opening up of 
the place  of a  thing-in-itself is  nothing  other than the  antecedent 
knowledge of being in general. ,,44 
Hearers ojthe Word - Karl Rahner, p.64 
Ibid 
Op. Cit. p.35 
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condition for the possibility of the knowledge of any thing-in-itself  We can 
only know a thing-in-itself against the background of, and from within the unity 
of,  a  pre  knowledge  (however vague  or empty)  of Being  itself  Therefore 
every  question  is  an  enquiry  from  and  in  and  essentially  about  'Being  in 
general', and analogically (as itself) of  the things which exist.  All knowledge of 
the things which have existence is by analogy to an implicit knowledge of  Being 
in general. 
At this point it does appear that all  human knowledge is  a revelation of God 
and that all that man need do to gain explicit knowledge of  the essential Being 
of God,  is  follow  the  route  of the  enquiry  along  the  lines  of this  or  that 
particular science.  But it  must be borne in  mind  that scientific knowledge of 
the existent things which appear bears only analogy (albeit direct) to the being 
of God therefore there can be no  epistemological certainty.45  Further, Rahner 
is  adamant that no  amount of human effort could produce a revelation of the 
essential Being of God,  this is  given to man (or it  may  not be)  only through 
God's free act of revelation in man's history.  This problem is  discussed more 
fully in chapter 6. 
In  summary,  the  source  of man's  hearing  capacity  IS  his  own  delimited 
constitution as formed in the creative act of God.  His capacity to hear, which 
is basically his capacity to know, is bivalent in nature in terms of the mundane 
reality of the beings which appear and the supra mundane reality within which 
the things that appear have their essential being.  This bivalence is seen in terms 
of  the will of  man in respect of  self affirmation.  Self affirmation, because of  the 
bivalent  nature  of man  as  a  finite  spirit,  is  necessarily,  at  the  same  time, 
affirmation of God.  The whence of  the metaphysical quest as actualised in the 
asking of  the metaphysical question, is the question itself  The principle of  the 
answer is to be found in the question and the question itself is the only point of 
departure. 
45  The necessary element of  faith is required, in gaining a knowledge of God 
from the appearences.  For a discussion of  Rahner's understanding of faith 
see chapter 7 sec 1.3 
141 5.2.2 The equation of 'being and knowing' (luminosity of being) 
We are working towards a general ontology of man in terms of  man's essential 
cognitive  structure  as  continuous,  in  some  essential  way,  with  the  essential 
Being of God.  Therefore man,  in respect of his  essential constitution, already 
has a kind of implicit knowledge of God.  Otherwise put, if he knows himself 
he knows God, and to the degree he knows himself, he knows God.  Further, if 
man  has  some  kind  of continuity  of being  with  God  in  respect  of his 
epistemology then he has,  as it were, a kind of  built-in capacity to hear God; if 
and when God reveals Himself in man's personal history. 
Without covering the same ground as chapter 3,  we must now consider further 
the nature  of man's  being  in  respect  of man's  epistemology.  This  involves, 
basically,  a study of what Rahner means by  'man as  a spirit'.  We are seeking 
here to outline Rahner's answer to the questions:  What does it mean that man 
is spirit? and What is the nature of this spirit?  The answers to these questions 
should fill  out for us Rahner's general ontology of man,  which runs along the 
lines of  a metaphysical anthropology. 
Let us consider the first proposition of  this subject: 
"The  nature  of being  is  knowing  and  being  known  in  an  original 
unity,  which  we  would  like  to  designate  'being-present-to-self 
(integrity)  of the luminosity  (subjective understanding of being)  of 
the being of  that which already exists. ,,46 
We see two things here,  1 - Being and knowing form an original unity, and 2 -
This  proposition  necessitates  an  ontological  difference  between  being  and 
existence.  Existence and being are not the same.  Being is understood as the 
'quiddity'  (thisness)  of the  existent  thing,  and  existence  as  the  'beingness'  or 
having-being,  of the thing that exists.  We  deal under this heading with  1 and 
under the next with 2. 
46  Hearers of  the Word - Karl Rahner, p.37 
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being and knowing are the same thing.  Being is  self luminous,  therefore it is 
knowable to others.  Rahner says that a thing which is  essentially unknowable 
in  its  being  is  a  contradiction.  There  must  therefore  be  a  fundamental 
knowability of all  existent things.  This  fundamental  knowability  as  we have 
seen is  placed within the essential being of the thing which is;  in  other words 
the being of  that which is,  is knowability.  A thing which is,  and the object of a 
possible cognition are one and the same thing.  Everything which is,  possesses 
in its own right,  and by virtue of its being,  an  interior reference to a possible 
cognition, and so, to a possible knowing subject. 
"The  knowability  is  affirmed  as  the  ontological  definition,  in  the 
thing which is itself . .. but if this interior reference of every existent 
thing to a possible cognition, is an a-priori and necessary proposition 
it can only be so because the being of  that which is and the knowing 
of it,  form  an  original unity...  This  is  to affirm  nothing  less  than 
b  .  h  .  kn  .  ,,47  emg, as suc  , IS  owmg. 
The original unity of  being and knowing means that the cognitive reference to 
itself  is  part  of the  being  of that  which  actually  is,  and  conversely  the 
knowledge which belongs to the concept of  the essence of  being is the, being-
present-to-itself of  the being which actually is.  Ifwe can say that in its original 
concept knowledge is self possession then anything which is,  possesses itself in 
the measure in which it has being. 
Rahner  calls  this  original  unity  of being  and  knowing,  the  conscious  being-
present-to-itself of being.  In  other words,  the being  of that  existent  being 
which  is  self illuminating  being  is  illuminated  by  it  self  Knowability  then, 
belongs  interiorly  and  a-priori,  in  terms  of the  existing  being  itself,  to  the 
grasping  of its  essence.  In this  way it  declares  explicitly  the horizon of its 
luminosity. 
For Thomas Aquinas, knowability,  as the being of the thing which is,  belongs 
to the basic constitution of  every thing which is.  Being and knowing are  'unius 
generis' they arise from a single unified root.
48  For Rahner, being is knowing in 
itself and  knowing  is  being-present-to-itself of the  being  of a  thing.  This 
47  Op.  Cit. p.39 
48  See Op. Cit. pAl 
143 reflection back into itself, which is a being's subjectivity is necessarily contained 
in  its  essential  constitution.  Knowledge  then,  is  a  coming  to  oneself or a 
turning to oneself and this turning is  itself spirit.  We  discuss the ontological 
difference between being and  existence under the next heading of 'Being and 
Having-being' . 
5.2.3 Being and Having-being. (The analogy of having-being) 
Rahner uses the term 'having-being' to formulate the concept of analogia entis. 
His thinking is that this analogy manifests itself in the sheer analogical manner 
in  which  each  and  every thing which is,  returns to itself,  can  be  present-to-
itself,  and  therefore is  a 'having  being'.  This  'having-being'  represents  man's 
existence,  man's  existence then is  a cognitive  activity  of returning to himself 
and  possessing himself,  of being consciously cognisant of his  being,  in being-
present-to  himself  This  is  his  beingness  as  differentiated  from  his  essential 
being. 
But just what is it that is analogical? 
"It  is  not  being  that  is  analogical,  but  rather  the  rising  of the 
difference  between being  and  existent  in  their relationship  to  each 
other - in their self clarification - in the cognition of  being, and in this 
sense  in  the  having  being  of the  existent  ...  F  or  being  is  not 
something  next  to  or  above  the  existent,  but  the  existent  as 
relationship to itself as the state of self clarification ... and as unity 
of  cognition and recognition. ,,49 
We can gain a valuable insight into this concept by again referring to Aquinas: 
49 
"All  things  strive  to  return  to  themselves,  want  to  come  to 
themselves, take possession of  themselves, because the having being 
which they desire  comes to be in  the measure  in  which they  take 
possession of  themselves.  All activities, from the sheerly material to 
the innermost life of the Blessed Trinity are but modulations of this 
one  metaphysical  theme,  of  the  one  meaning  of  being;  self 
possession, subjectivity ... 'self possession' however is itself realised 
through a  double  phase;  a flowing  outwards,  an  emanation.  (An 
Op.  Cit. p.47 note 1 
144 eXposItIon  of  its  own  essence  from  its  own  cause.)  And  a 
withdrawing into itself of  this essence. ,,50 
The having-being, then,  is this two phase activity of emanating and returning. 
That  is  what  beingness  consists  of,  the  precise  quality  of this  beingness, 
however, remains to be discussed.  I must be said here that having-being is  an 
unfixed,  variable  quantity,  there  are  degrees  of having-being,  the  degree 
depending upon the ability of  the existent thing to tum back on itself  That is; 
in the degree in which it is  possible to reflect in  itself and  to be illumined by 
itself  There  are  grades  of being,  so  not  everything  is  in  the  same  sense  a 
'having-being': 
"The only thing which is  an  absolute 'having-being'  ...  is  the pure 
being,  in  which  the  connotation  of the  concept  of being  itself is 
perfectly realised. ,,51 
Clearly this is  the having-being of God.  God therefore is  the existent of the 
absolute 'having-being' and therefore pure self clarification.  In God's case we 
have  absolute  identity  where  no  further  questioning  is  possible.  God  is 
therefore absolute spirit, man on the other hand not only asks questions about 
being but is  in  doubt about it  (both of these factors being a part of his  basic 
constitution).  Therefore  man  is  not  absolute  consciousness  but  finite  spirit. 
The finite  spirit of man however can now be seen to be continuous with the 
infinite,  absolute  spirit,  of God.  The  nature  of the  finitude  of man's  spirit 
emerges  out of his  need to enquire  about Being  and  this,  along  with man's 
having-being, is the foundation of a possible revelation by God.  Revelation is 
the disclosure of  the absolute to the finite spirit. 
If  revelation is the disclosure of  the absolute spirit to the finite spirit, then, says 
Rahner, "two things are presupposed": 
1 
50 
51 
52 
"That all that is can fundamentally be turned into a true speech, into 
an information addressed to the mind.  Only on this condition can the 
possibility of  imparting facts that are hidden in God, be considered at 
all. ,,52 
Op.  Cit. p.47, see Summa Contra Gentiles 4.11 - Thomas Aquinas. 
Op.  Cit.  p.50 
Op.  Cit. p.51 
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by virtue of  its own nature, by the word. 
2 
"Only if  the being of  that which is,  is 'logos', from the very start, can 
the incarnate logos utter in words, what lies hidden in the depth of 
God.,,53 
"Man must  possess  an  openness for  the  self-utterance  of the  one 
who possesses being absolutely through the luminous word.  This 
openness is the a-priori presupposition for the possibility of hearing 
such a word. ,,54 
If man is  to hear the word of God in  revelation he  must  not only  have the 
capacity to hear but also he must be open to the possibility of  hearing.  Further, 
this openness must be a part of  man's essential constitution.  Indeed we will see 
that this openness sums up what we mean by 'man as spirit'. 
5.2.4 The Openness of Being (Man as spirit) 
If  we were to ask the little question; What is man?  Rahner's answer would be 
"man is absolute openness to being in general".55  Otherwise put 'man is spirit'. 
This finite spirit consists of openness to infinite and absolute spirit, and it is  in 
some way continuous with it.  This  openness is  man's transcendentality with 
regard to Being in general.  Transcendentality, then, is the basic constitution of 
the being of man as  spirit.  What then is  its  nature?  Its nature is  essentially 
epistemological.  Because  man  is  a  transcendental  spirit  he  must  ask  the 
metaphysical question:  What is the being of that which is,  specifically and in 
general?  This is a necessary question to man.  The answer is found within the 
question,  and  again man must affirm this  answer with equal  necessity.  The 
knowledge of Being in general is  given then, with the question related to that 
human thought, speech and action, which make up man's existence in general. 
53 
54 
55 
Ibid 
Op. Cit. p.S3 
Ibid. 
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pre-concept. 
a) The pre-concept 
"The  pre-concept  is  a  capacity  of dynamic  self movement  of the 
spirit given a priori with human nature, directed towards all possible 
objects. "55 
It is  interesting that the pre-concept,  which  clearly relates to a universal pre-
knowledge of  all that is, is described as a capacity of  movement, it is a dynamic 
reality.  This  movement  is  by  necessity  directed  to  the  things  around  man 
including  his  own body (which Rahner terms 'the  corporeal organ').  Rahner 
states: 
"It is  a movement  in  which the  particular  object  is  grasped as  an 
individual  factor  of  this  movement  towards  a  goal,  and  so 
consciously  grasped  in  a  preview  of this  absolute  breadth  of the 
knowable. ,,56 
In other words the particular is  recognised within the general,  or as  Rahner 
puts it through the pre-concept the particular is  recognised under the horizon 
of  the absolute idea of  knowledge.  The pre-concept is set within the conscious 
sphere of the totality of knowable things.  The nature of the  capacity of the 
movement  is  the  conscious  opening  up  of the  horizon  within  which  the 
particular object becomes known.  It is  the  disclosure of the breadth of the 
knowable,  within which  and  through which the  particular  can  be  recognised 
and therefore known. 
By defining  more exactly the breadth of this  horizon,  which the pre-concept 
opens up  and  into  which  it  sets  the particular  object  of knowledge,  Rahner 
describes the essence ofthe pre-concept more precisely.  He says that although 
the preconcept is conscious it is not in itself an act of cognition, but a factor in 
an act of cognition, which is  specifically  directed towards a particular object. 
However, the pre-concept must be described as knowledge per se,  even if it is 
only  a  condition  for  the  possibility  of knowledge.  The  object  of the  pre-
56  Op. Cit. p.59 
147 concept  is  Being,  and  thus  the  totality  of the  possible  objects  of human 
knowledge.  The object then is a totality, indeed it is the absolute totality of all 
possible objects of  knowledge, this is what forms the horizon within which the 
particular object is grasped. But what is  the precise nature of this wholeness? 
Well,  it  is  the totality of Being,  or Being in  general,  this is  not an  aggregate 
totality but a unity of  being.  The horizon is a horizon of  Being in genera1.  This 
is  what  fills  out  the  capacity  for  the  cognitive  motion  involved  in  human 
knowledge.  We  are  able  to  grasp  the  knowledge  of the  particular  object 
because of  the capacity of  a total knowledge of  the universal or genera1. 
But the pre-concept is  a capacity of dynamic  self movement,  it  follows  now 
that we must consider the precise nature of  this movement. 
b) The dynamic self-movement 
The  movement  is  two  way,  man  reaches  out to  grasp  the  particular  object 
bodied over and against him in the world, but in  so  doing he returns perfectly 
to  himself.  We will  call  these two  elements  of the  motion;  judgement  and 
abstraction, respectively. 
i) Judgement 
Man is already in a world of  things.  External objects make up his environment 
which  he  gains  experience  of by  sensation.  Man  feels,  as  it  were,  his 
environment but he does not only know it in this way, he also judges it,  and in 
judging it  he  constitutes  it  for  the first  time  as  a  world.  In this  way  man 
differentiates himself in thought and deed from the things he uses.  Man is the 
subject  that  stands  over  against  the  object.  Man  does  not  just  come  into 
cognitive contact with the things, his knowing is not a becoming one with them 
in  a neutral  centre between subject and  object;  in judgement he  distinguishes 
himself from them. 
In the comprehending and reaching out to the things,  man as  subject,  returns 
completely  to  himself,  as  that  which  is  differentiated  from  that  which  he 
reached out to grasp.  That is the world.  The faculty of  judgement is the means 
148 whereby man transcends the things and  returns to himself as  subject.  In this 
way man's experience through sense becomes objective knowledge in thought. 
St Thomas calls this return to oneself as subject, in a selfluminous antithesis of 
the sensible  experienced object the 'reditio  completa subjecti  in  seipsum'.  In 
this perfect return to itself, Thomas sees the distinctive attribute of  the spirit in 
contrast  to  all  that  is  non  spiritual.  In  this  way  man  subsists  and  this 
subsistence  manifests  itself in  all  human  events,  it  displays  itself in  every 
judgement, for in every judgement there takes place the reference of a known 
something to an object. 
"And in so far as every judgement presents a claim to truth, it has in 
mind,  as  the  object  of its  predication,  something  that  is  itself 
independent of  the passing of  judgement.  It has in mind the object in 
its  in-its-selfness  ...  in  so  doing  the  one  who  judges  sets  up  the 
object  of his  judgement,  and  thus  differentiating  himself from  the 
object,  places  himself apart  from  it  ...  in  this  way  the  one  who 
judges comprehends himself in this separation from the object of his 
judgement. ..  in  every  judgement  he  comprehends  himself  as  a 
subject that subsists in itself  ,,57 
Rahner is  saying that man's  awareness  of himself and  of being,  specific  and 
general,  comes about in  the cognitive  activity of making judgements.  Man's 
knowledge must however begin with  sense  experience  and  move through an 
abstraction  of the  concept  from  the  particular  object,  culminating  in  the 
objective  affirmation  of the judgement.  This  objective  affirmation  sets  the 
objects of sense experience over against him  in the realm  of being.  Through 
this means man grasps his own independent reality. 
This  is  what  it  means  that  man  is  spirit  and  as  such  a  union  of being  and 
knowing.  But he  is  not  pure  spirit  because his  knowledge  must begin with 
sensation.  He is  a  discursive  knower who  must  progressively  increase  his 
knowledge of himself and  being through the process of the  ongoing enquiry. 
Man  must  carry  on  asking  questions  and  because  his  thought  is  always 
expressed  in  judgements,  and  he  must  always  be  thinking  something  about 
something, this is the basis of  mans subsistence.  To be spirit man requires to be 
free  and  freedom  is  a-priori  conceivable  only  when  the  actor  occupies  a 
position which is  independent of that upon which he  acts;  it  can be  seen that 
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149 man is free because by accomplishing the perfect return to himself through his 
thought judgement, man is able to act freely on the object of his judgement as 
one who is freer than it. 
"The fact that man is able to act freely upon the things in his world is 
a  pointer  to  this  conscious  subsisting-in-himself  of man  in  his 
cognitive activity. ,,58 
The  other  side  of this  conscious  subsisting-in-itself of the  knowing  human 
subject is the taking hold of  the particular in concepts.  The particular which is 
presented ultimately through the senses is brought to the level of concept.  This 
comprehension or grasping of the particular as  a concept is always against the 
background of a general concept.  It is to a general concept that thought and 
action are directed: 
"Precisely by knowing something about something, by being able to 
apply its general concept to an  object present, the one who  knows 
conceptually separates himself from this object present as  from his 
object.  He thus attains his conscious subsisting in himself ,,59 
This  applying of the general  concept to the particular is  stated by  Rahner as 
grasping  the  universal  in  the  particular,  and  in  Thomist  epistemology  this 
process is called the abstraction. 
ii) The Abstraction 
"By  abstraction  the  universal  is  grasped  in  the  particular,  in  the 
individual case whereby a condition of possibility of judgement and 
thus the possibility of  conscious subsisting-in-oneself is provided. ,,60 
Abstraction is  to do  with detachability,  it is  to do  with loosening away from. 
Rahner  says  that  abstraction  is  the  recognition  of this  detachability  of the 
'thisness' that is  given in the sense perception.  The abstraction does not then 
belong  to  the  essence  of the  particular  thing  which  is  realised  as  just this 
particular  and  no  other.  The  abstraction  is  the  recognition  of the  non-
58 
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150 restriction  of the  'thisness'  that  is  given  in  the  particular.  The  'thisness'  is 
grasped as a determination which fundamentally extends farther than just to this 
particular case in which it appears through the senses. 
It must  be  said,  however,  that  the  grasping  of the  non-restriction  of the 
definition  of the thisness  takes place  by its  restriction through the  particular 
thing.  The non-restriction is grasped in the restriction, as such, of  the 'thisness' 
of the particular thing.  Therefore a limit  is  experienced when the 'thisness' is 
experienced as  an obstacle to  any  advance beyond itself.  The non-restriction 
then,  must  have  the  capacity  to  go  beyond  this  limit.  A  'more  than'  the 
particular 'thisness' must be recognised: 
"The restriction of the  quiddity  (thisness)  experienced through the 
senses  becomes  known  in  the  reaching  out  act  whereby  the 
individual  sense  object  is  seen,  prior to  this  grasping,  to  be  more 
than just this particular thing. ,,61 
"This more obviously cannot be an individual object of  the same sort 
as  the one the abstraction of which is  supposed to have  made this 
more possible ... this more can only be that being already mentioned 
as  the  fundamental  cause  of  possible  objects  and  of  their 
encounter. ,,62 
The  'more'  relates  to  the  openmg  up  of the  absolute  breadth  of possible 
objectivity.  It relates  to  being  in  general.  The  pre-concept  of being  is  the 
process of reaching out to grasp the 'more'.  In each particular cognition the 
preconcept is the capacity of  reaching out beyond the particular object and thus 
the means of  grasping it in both its limitation and with reference to the totality 
of  all other possible objects: 
61 
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"This  is  because consciousness,  by  being  close to the particular in 
order to know it,  always reaches out beyond the particular as  such. 
The pre-concept is  the condition for the possibility of the universal 
concept,  of  abstraction  which  in  turn  makes  possible  the 
objectification  of the  datum  of the  sense  perception  and  so  of 
conscious subsisting-in-oneself. ,,63 
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151 These are the terms of man's openness to Being and to Being in general.  By 
the means of  judgement and abstraction in terms of the pre-concept man is  a 
transcendental spirit continuous with the absolute spirit.  This is an ontological 
reality  which  involves  both  corporeal  and  incorporeal  elements  in  its 
epistemological basis.  There is very clearly a bivalence in respect of  body and 
mind.  There  are  really  three levels  of knowledge  involved,  firstly  the  pre-
concept, which is the condition for the possibility of the other two, which are 
sensation or perception (knowledge through the senses) and by the process of 
judgement and abstraction, intellectual or spiritual knowledge. 
If we now examine the openness of man further by enquiring into the precise 
nature of this 'more than' we find  that from man's point of view we can only 
move into the negative dimension. 
c) The negation 
The 'more than' cannot be a being in the order of  the beings of  the world.  If it 
were it would not be a more than.  In respect of this  'more than' Rahner asks 
two questions and posses three possible answers: 
1 
"What is  the absolute totality of all  possible  objects of knowledge 
within the horizon of  which the particular object is grasped?" 
similarly: 
2 
"What  is  the  transcendental  reference  for  human  pre-conceptual 
cognition when it is grasping its particular object?" 
The three possible types of  answer are: 
1.  "A turning of  this 'negation' into the absolute 'nothing' as the genuine truth 
of  the cognizand, and which is ever to be discovered afresh." 
2.  "A  constant concealment of this  negation as  that which is  fundamentally 
outside knowledge. " 
152 3.  "By this transcendental experience of  the negation being expounded as the 
mode  in  which  absolute  reality  makes  itself  present  by  perpetually 
withdrawing, and precisely thus drawing the intellect upon itself. ,,64 
The negation is of course the negation of the limit of the finitude in respect of 
any particular object.  This negation of  the limit in this way appears to take the 
human  epistemology  into  the  place  of non-being  or  no-thing,  therefore  it 
appears to human consciousness as a negative dimension of  'nothingness'. 
All three types of answer can be conceded as having some force in the sphere 
of human existential reality.  In his  discussion following the statement of the 
three possible types of answer (which I have felt  it necessary to quote in full) 
Rahner appears to twist the knife.  He argues by use of  what he refers to as the 
scholastic answer to the above questions, which corresponds to answer three, 
towards an  affirmation and  not  a  negation.  He argues  in  terms of the pre-
concept for the human grasping not of non-being but of unlimited being which 
is  of course  God.  It must  be  conceded  though that,  from  the  bottom up, 
secondary delimitation is  and  must be conceived  in  negative terms  as  being 
outside of human perception and of  the ordinary capacity of human cognition. 
Let us see how Rahner argues in this respect: 
64 
"Human cognition is  related,  at  least  at first,  to that which is  and 
thus to affirmation.  To the extent, therefore, that knowledge of the 
finitude  of the  immediately  given  object  of a  cognition  can  be 
explained in terms of  an affirmative knowledge (and thus in terms of 
a pre-concept which  is  related to affirmation,  to being  and  not to 
non-being),  to the  same  extent the transcendence cannot  and  may 
not  be  interpreted  as  a  transcendence  correlative  to  non-being. 
Further, a transcendence relative to non-being was not indicated as 
the pre-condition for the possibility of  experiencing the inner finitude 
of  the immediately given, present, and existent thing.  Now because 
the  pre-concept  relative  to  'more'  is  the  particular  object,  it 
represents  a  sufficient  and  clear  condition  of the  possibility  of 
negation,  of the transcendental experience of nothing (of no-thing) 
and  thus  of the  knowledge  of the  finitude  of the  immediately 
perceived  objective  particular.  Non-being  does  not  precede 
negation, but the concept relative to the unlimited is in itself already 
the negation of the finite,  to the  extent that,  as  condition for the 
possibility of  its cognition, and through its rising above the finite,  it 
reveals,  eo ipso, its finitude.  The affirmation of the thing that is in 
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153 itself unlimited is therefore the possibility for negation,  and not the 
other  way  around.  Thus  we  are  not  required  to  assume  a 
transcendence relation to non-being,  which,  preceding all  negation 
and providing its foundation, would have to disclose the finitude of 
an  existent  thing  for  the  first  time.  Positive  unlimitation  of the 
transcendental horizon of human knowledge automatically displays 
the finitude of all that does not fill  up this horizon.  That is,  it does 
not  destroy  non-being,  but  the  infinitude  of being  to  which  the 
preconcept  is  correlated  discloses  the  finitude  of  all  that  is 
immediately present to sense.  Thus to begin with we can deal only 
with  the  question  whether  the  'more'  of the  preconcept  denotes 
merely a relative unlimitation, or the intrinsically pure unlimitation of 
being  in  such  a  fashion  that  this  preconcept  opens  up  a  sphere 
beyond that of space-time  sense-perception.  Our first  assumption 
contains  a  contradiction,  though  not  in  the  pure  content  of the 
concept  itself,  as  though  the  totality  of the  objects  of  human 
knowledge  on  the  one  hand  were  set  in  immediate  conceptual 
contradiction  to  'finite'  on the  other  hand.  The  contradiction  is 
between  the  setting  of this  assumption  and  its  content.  The 
recognition  of the  inner  finitude  of the  totality  of the  objects  of 
human knowledge certainly does demand a pre-concept that reaches 
out  beyond  this  finitude,  in  order that  this  inner  finitude  can  be 
grasped as such and not merely recognised as factually present.  This 
pre-concept, reaching beyond the inner finitude of  the human sphere 
of objects,  beyond  the  level  of sense  perception  (the  pre-concept 
which alone can name a datum of this finitude as  such) would have 
therefore  to  be  directed  towards  non-being,  because  by 
presupposition  it  may  not  be  directed  to  the  infinitude  of being. 
However,  such  a  pre-concept  relative  to  non-being  has  just been 
exposed as an unrealisable assumption.  The pre-concept that is the 
transcendental  condition  for  the  possibility  of  an  objectively 
possessed object,  and thus of the subsisting-in-himself of man,  is  a 
pre-concept  relative to  being that  is  unlimited  in  itself  Thus  the 
ultimate question that remains is whether this unlimited being can be 
and must be knowable,  or whether this positively may be present to 
the intellect only by  constantly turning away from it.  Because this 
question is  unavoidable,  it  has  already been implicitly  answered  in 
the first  supposition, for the complete denial of a question does not 
void the knowability of the material about which we enquire.  The 
positive  answer  is  not  intended  to  obscure  the  specific 
insubstantiality  of  that  which  is  positively  experienced  in  the 
recognition  of non-being  in  the  experience  of limitation.  The 
intention is to make this present in terms of its hostile intractability 
towards the whole man who always lives in concrete fulfilment.  To 
the  extent that  out first  and  most  general  question  about  being  is 
only the formalised expression for every judgement contained in  all 
thought and action, it can be said of  that judgement that in it the pre-
concept is made concerning being pure and simple in its unlimitation. 
154 To the extent that judgement and free  action are necessarily part of 
man's existence, the pre-concept of being pure and simple in its own 
intrinsically proper infinitude is  part of the fundamental constitution 
of  human existence. ,,65 
The  whole  of human  cognition  is  necessarily  geared  to  affirmation.  This  is 
however involved with knowledge of what is,  of finite objects.  How then are 
we to think about that which is beyond the limits of the finitude,  that which is 
'more than' that which is relative to human perception?  How can this appear as 
anything other than negative to human cognition?  The very basis of  the more is 
the negation of  the finitude, the negation of  the limit.  Rahner concedes that the 
pre-concept relative to 'more' represents a clear condition of the possibility of 
negation of  the transcendent experience of  no-thing.  He argues, however, that 
the negation of the finite  is  a part of the very constitution of the pre-concept. 
We must remember that the pre-concept is  the condition of all  other human 
knowledge  in  affirmation.  How  then  can  the  basis  of human  cognitive 
affirmation be, itself, negation? 
It is really a question of  getting this the right way round, it is the affirmation of 
the thing that is  in itself unlimited which is the possibility for negation and not 
the  other  way  around.  We  have  then  a  positive  unlimitation  of  the 
transcendental  horizon of human  knowledge.  It is  this  positive  unlimitation 
that automatically displays the finitude  of all  that is.  In other words it  is  the 
infinitude  of being,  to which the  pre-concept  correlates,  which  discloses  the 
finitude  of all  that is.  Thus we need not assume a transcendence relative to 
non-being and negation.  In simple terms the pre-concept sorts this out for us 
by virtue of  its intrinsic constitution. In the pre-concept the negative instance is, 
as it were, reoriented. 
This deals with the negation for us but it does not destroy it.  The negation is 
still  the point of entry of the infinite  into  the finite,  of the unlimited into  the 
limited,  of God's historical revelation to man,  but it is  so  dealt with as  to be 
accommodated to human cogpjtion which is necessarily and always affirmative 
in its workings.  Rahner is  not denying that the pre-concept itself,  in terms of 
the 'more' must be directed towards non-being.  In other words the pre-concept 
opens  up  a  sphere  beyond  that  of space-time  sense  perception.  This  is 
65  Ibid. 
155 demanded if the pre-concept is  the means  of human recognition of the inner 
finitude of the totality of the objects of human knowledge.  It must reach out 
beyond the finitude in order that the inner finitude can be grasped as such. 
What  he  is  arguing  is  that  the  pre-concept,  relative  to  non-being  IS 
unrecognisable  to  human  cognition  and  therefore  a  contradiction  in  terms. 
Therefore the nature of the pre-concept must appear as  relating positively,  so 
rather than  non-being  we must  think  of unlimited  being.  The  question  still 
remains, of course, how can this positivity be presented to the intellect?  Can it 
only  be  known by  constantly turning  away from  it?  Rahner  states that the 
positive answer is  not intended to obscure the specific insubstantiality of that 
which  is  positively  experienced  in  the  recognition  of non-being  in  the 
experience of  limitation. 
Yet we come back to the bivalent nature of  the pre-concept.  In the judgement 
the pre-concept is made concerning Being, pure and simple,  in its unlimitation, 
to  the  extent  that judgement  and  free  action  are  necessarily  part  of man's 
existence.  So,  finally:  the pre-concept of Being,  pure and  simple,  is  its  own 
intrinsically  proper infinitude,  and  is  part  of the  fundamental  constitution of 
human existence.  In this way the unlimited Being which is God is presented to 
us by Rahner. 
d) God in the Pre-concept 
The pre-concept, argues Rahner,  is  directed at God.  It does not present God 
immediately, however, as the object of  the intellect because the pre-concept as 
the condition for the possibility for objective knowledge, does not present any 
object at all along with itself  However the nature of  the pre-concept, being the 
necessary  condition  for  every  human  cognition  and  every  human  action, 
necessarily offers, if not presents, the existence of an existent thing of absolute 
'having-being',  which of course is  God.  In the pre-concept the cause of His 
specific possibility is unknowingly affirmed: 
"It does not aim directly at God so as to present absolute being in its 
specific  self,  immediately  and  objectively.  It does  not  make  itself 
specifically  an  immediate  datum.  The  pre-concept  aims  at  the 
absolute  being  of God  in  the  sense  that  the  absolute  essence  is 
156 always  fundamentally  affirmed  through  the  former's  unlimited 
breadth. ,,66 
"Instead of  saying the finite existent thing,  affirmed as actually there, 
requires  as  condition for its  existence,  the existence of the infinite 
being of God,  we merely say (meaning in fact  the same thing);  the 
affirmation of  the actual finitude of  an existent requires, as condition 
for its possibility, the affirmation of an esse absolutum, which takes 
place already in the pre-concept of being of general, through which 
the limitation of the finite existent is for the first time recognised as 
such. ,,67 
5.2.5 Man as Spirit directed towards God 
In this  discussion about the openness of man to hear and  receive the further 
revelation of God we discover that this very openness is the finite spirit which 
is  man's essential being.  Man is  a spirit in  direct relation and indeed in unity 
with the absolute Spirit of God.  Man's whole being and existence as  spirit is 
necessarily directed towards God (whether he knows about it or not).  This to 
Rahner  is  a  universal  reality,  without  exception.  Man's  total  objective 
knowledge  is  grasped  against  the  background  of the  horizon  of being  in 
general.  Knowledge and being are a unity and the necessary presupposition for 
all human knowledge is knowledge of  God (indirectly) in the pre-concept: 
"The  intellect  is  intellect  because  it  grasps  all  things  ...  this 
comprehension of all  things against the horizon of being in general 
does not mean that man sums up the knowledge of particular objects 
retrospectively in a universal backward glance,  but means that man 
is  intellect  (spirit)  because  a priori  by  his  self movement  towards 
being in general he grasps particular objects as parts making up this 
infinite movement of his.  He sees them a-priori against that horizon 
of  being in general through which man is perpetually receptive to the 
absolute being of  God. ,,68 
Man  is  spirit  ever  movmg  towards  God,  necessarily,  by  virtue  of  his 
constitution as a human being.  Man moves towards God because the concept 
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157 of God  is  the  ultimate  in  all  knowledge,  and  because  the  illuminative  pre-
concept of  Being in general, and hence of  the absolute self-luminosity of  Being, 
is  the prior condition even of the initial  conceptual  cognition.  Therefore  in 
every particular cognition God is  already implicitly known.  This  means  that 
according to this reasoning all men have already implicit knowledge of  God and 
are  open  to  a  further  revelation.  Indeed  it  could  be  said  that  this  implicit 
knowledge of  God constitutes man's spiritual being.  Rahner says further: 
"This basic constitution of  man which he affirms implicitly in each of 
his  cognitions and  actions we designate as  his  spirituality.  Man is 
spirit,  that is  he  lives  life  in  a perpetual reaching  out  towards the 
absolute,  in  openness  to  God.  This  openness  to  God  is  not  a 
contingency which can emerge here or there at will in man, but is the 
condition for the possibility of  that which man is and has to be,  even 
in the most forlorn and mundane life.  The only thing that makes him 
man is that he is forever on the road to God. ,,69 
Again this applies across the board to all men even those who have turned aside 
from God,  sin and 'fallenness' which, according to the New Testament requires 
a turning back to  God  in  repentance,  appears  to  have  no  ultimate  meaning. 
Indeed, in the ultimate sense, this major factor in respect of  'Gospel coherence' 
of  justification and forgiveness appears to be completely irrelevant.  Rahner is 
saying that whether man wants to or not he is  always the infinite openness to 
God,  therefore  the  (universal)  ground  of a  possible  revelation  from  God  is 
already and necessarily laid.  All men are already in an implicit relationship with 
God, which can only be accepted or suppressed.  It cannot, by virtue of  its very 
nature, be broken.  Rahner says further of  revelation: 
69 
"A revelation from God is thus possible only if the subject to whom 
it is supposed to be addressed in himself presents an a priori horizon 
against which such a possible revelation can begin to present itself in 
the first place.  Only if this horizon is utterly unlimited is  a possible 
revelation not subject antecedently to law and restriction in respect 
of  what it will be possible to reveal.  A revelation which is supposed 
to reveal the depths of divinity,  and  which at  bottom is  the reflex 
objectification of  man's calling to participate in nothing less than the 
supernatural life of  God Himself, can only be conceived as possible if 
man  is  conceived  as  spirit  ...  And  so  the  proposition  about  the 
necessary explicit transcendence of knowledge correlative to being 
in  general  as  the  basic  constitution  of man  as  spirit,  is  the  first 
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158 proposition of a metaphysical anthropology, an anthropology that is 
slanted  towards  a  philosophy  of religion  as  foundation  for  the 
possibility of  a verbal revelation. ,,70 
All of  this amounts to man as a 'potentia oboedientialis' for a possible revelation 
from God.  Being is luminous and as such can be revealed in the Word.  Man as 
spirit has  an  ear that is  open to any word whatsoever that may proceed from 
the mouth of  God. 
70  Ibid. 
159 CHAPTER 6 
CONTRAST OF MACQUARRIE AND 
RAHNER'S VIEW OF REVELATION 
6.1 Contrast of Macquarrie and Rahner, 
under 4 points 
The  contrasts  of Macquarrie  and  Rahner  are  given  their  grounding  by  very 
different methodological approaches.  Macquarrie, who began with the task of 
an  enquiry  into  the  suitability  of existential  philosophy  as  a  medium  of 
expression and understanding of systematic theology,  develops the use of the 
phenomenological descriptive method.  Rahner's theology,  on the other hand, 
which may possibly be described as a variety of  'Transcendental Thomism' with 
other  major  influences  from  e.g.  Immanuel  Kant  and  Martin  Heidegger,  IS 
based on the development of  an epistemological and ontological metaphysic. 
We consider the contrasts and indeed the similarities under four significant and 
major aspects. 
6.1.1 Verbal Revelation by the Divine Logos vs. Revelation 
by the presence and manifestation of the 'numinous' 
In  Rahner  revelation,  which  is  a  self-communication  of the  divine  essence, 
comes through the Word and only through the word.  In Macquarrie,  on the 
other hand,  revelation, which is not a communication of God's essential Being 
but rather an existential experience of the numinous quality of Holy Being,  is 
received by  man through his  conative faculty,  and  not primarily his  cognitive 
160 faculty.  In  a  sense  we  have  a  companson  of word  and  sacrament,  of 
propositions, intellection, reason and mystery, awe and sensation. 
a) Verbal Revelation by Divine Logos 
We have already seen in the previous chapter that according to Rahner, there is 
no other possible mode of revelation than by God speaking in  human words. 
Only human words have the adequacy to act as the gate of God's revelation in 
and to human history.  Indeed man's whole life should be an obedient potential 
to hear the further possible revelation, which mayor may not be given by the 
free and  sovereign God.  Man is  originally constituted by God's speaking the 
word at Creation, and he is essentially constituted to hear the message of God 
in his own history. 
Man is essentially a hearer of  the word.  Rahner states: 
"If revelation is to be the disclosure of  the absolute, by itself, to the 
finite  spirit,  then two things  are presupposed.  First that all  that is 
can fundamentally be turned into a true speech, into an information 
addressed to the mind.  Only on this condition can the possibility of 
imparting facts that are hidden in God, be considered at alL  This at 
the  very  minimum  is  what we mean  by  revelation.  The  ultimate 
presupposition  for  God  in  his  divinity,  communicating  to  men 
through speech,  that is  through the word,  is  the ultimate union of 
being  and  knowing.  Only if the being of that which  'is',  is  'logos' 
from the very start, can the incarnate Logos utter in words what lies 
hidden in the depths of  God. "I 
Through  revelation  a  message  is  communicated  between  two  realities,  the 
supra-mundane to the mundane.  From the infinite  to the finite,  from  God's 
Personal History to man's personal history, from the Spirit of God to the spirit 
of man.  The supra-mundane reality coincides with the mundane reality at the 
precise point of  the human word, as and when God speaks through it.  Through 
the negation of the upper limit  achieved in  the word alone,  the human spirit 
transcends itself to coincide with God's Spirit.  The word, according to Rahner, 
is  the conceptual  symbol  of the  spirit,  therefore  it  possess the possibility  of 
Hearers of  the Word - Karl Rahner, p.Sl, see also chapter S sec 2.4 
161 defining the existent things which are both inside and outside appearance.  It is 
indeed the mode of revelation of each and every existent thing.  The whole of 
supra-mundane and mundane reality is  capable of comprehension in the word. 
The human word, according to Rahner, has the capacity to bear the full weight 
of  God's revelation of  Himself to man.  But just how can this be so? 
It is  not difficult to imagine the concept of the human word referring to and 
revealing the inner nature of the existent things which appear to us,  but how 
precisely can it reveal the inner nature of the existent things which are supra-
mundane?  The answer is; through the negation.
2  The negation, claims Rahner, 
cannot take place in any other medium: 
"Insofar as the human word as a bearer of a concept gained through 
the negation of a supra-mundane existent thing,  is  heard as  spoken 
by God, it is able to reveal the existence and inner possibility of such 
a thing. ,,3 
"The only possible place for anegation is in the word ... the whole of 
supra-mundane existence is capable of  comprehension in the word. ,,4 
The human word, then,  through 'the negation',  is  the gateway of supernatural 
revelation of the essential Being of God to mankind.  Rahner argues strongly 
that there can be no other mode of  revelation.  A different means of revelation, 
he  claims,  would require to annul  the already established  structure of human 
knowledge,  which  is  a  unity  of  'spiritual  transcendence'  and  'sensible 
appearance'.  Man has a created or delimited ontological structure,  as  already 
discussed, and as long as this structure remains, (and it must if man is to remain 
human)  any  other form  of revelation,  if it  were  possible,  would  have  to  be 
translated into it, if  it is to reach mans perception and have any meaning to him. 
"God can only reveal what man can hear. ,,5  In other words it would have to be 
translated into human words, therefore revelation must be contained in human 
speech.  The word is the only possibility of  the synthesis of  the two realities. 
2 
3 
4 
5 
For a more full discussion of "The Negation" see chapter 5 sec 2.4 d 
The full quote can be seen in chapter 5 sec 1.2 a (ii) 
Hearers of  the Word - Karl Rahner, p.1S4f 
Op.  Cit. p.llS 
162 The word defines  reality,  both natural  and  supernatural.  But it  also  inheres 
reality as its inner logic or inner principal,  indeed,  since knowledge and Being 
form an original unity, in Rahners thinking,  and knowledge is considered to be 
in terms of reason and the logos, then the logos is  the essential nature of the 
reality of  all Being.  With this in mind Rahner says of  the Incarnate logos: 
"Only if the being of  that which is,  is logos from the very start, can 
the Incarnate Logos utter in words, what lies hidden in the depths of 
God.,,6 
It should  now  be  clear  as  to  why  Rahner  lays  full  emphasis  on  God's  self 
revelation to man as coming only in and through the vehicle of 'human words'. 
The word as the symbol of the spirit is  the inner principle of reality;  it  is  the 
most essential part of the nature of being.  The significance of this metaphysic 
for man is  that revelation of the free  and  sovereign God not only  constitutes 
man's  essential being in  the  first  place but that  progressively it  reconstitutes 
man's being through and  in  his  personal history.  We are  not talking here of 
merely  a  change  of  self-understanding,  as  with  Macquarrie,  but  of the 
completion of  the ontological development of  man as a hearer of  God's word. 
b) Revelation by the presence and manifestation ofthe 'numinous' 
Macquarrie's understanding of revelation appears to be diametrically opposite 
to that of Rahner.  It  should  be  noted  however,  that  both theologians  have 
produced anthropological theologies,  and  as  already stated, as they were both 
strongly influenced by Martin Heidegger, we might say that their starting points 
were  relatively  close.  The  theological  development  of  both  thinkers, 
particularly in  respect of their respective  doctrines of revelation,  upon which 
both built their theologies,  however,  is  radically  different.  Rahner's thinking 
betrays an essential idealism whilst Macquarrie's thought has the appearance of 
deriving from an underlying pantheism. 
7 
6 
7 
Op.  Cit. p.51f 
Macquarrie  denies,  though  not  strongly,  that  he  is  a  pantheist,  but 
concedes that he  may  be  a panentheist.  It  is  fair  to  say  that there  are 
marked similarities between Macquarries understanding of panentheism or 
higher pantheism and Rahner's understanding of  transcendental experience. 
163 "In the religious  sense of revelation",  states Macquarrie,  "the initiative in  the 
disclosive  experience is  not man's,  it  lies  with the knowledge which  is  to be 
disclosed,  itself  ,,8  Otherwise put it is  the initiative  of Being itself,  or when 
thought of in the religious sense, Holy Being.  When man is attuned through a 
certain psychological state or 'mood' he is conditioned to receive a revelation of 
Holy Being which simultaneously draws near to him in revelatory encounter.  It 
does appear that any  man who becomes suitably psychologically attuned will 
encounter Holy Being (in the psychological dynamic  of the contrast of Being 
and  nothingness).  Macquarrie's strong assertion that it  is  Being itself,  of its 
own initiative, which encounters the attuned one, is difficult to understand, as it 
strikes the mind  as  contradictory.  According to Macquarrie, man experiences 
this  initiative  from  beyond  himself through  a  sense  of 'numinous  presence' 
which produces a wonder and awe of Being, which strikes him with the force 
of  revelation. 
Macquarrie borrows Rudolf Otto's term "Mysterium tremendum fasininans",  as 
already  discussed
9
,  to  describe  the  nature  of the numinous  presence.  In an 
analysis of  Macquarrie's and Otto's description of  this numinous presence one is 
involved in a kind of  vague but holistic understanding of  the experience of  Holy 
Being which is  both mysterious and awe inspiring; this is  an incomprehensible 
depth of  numinous presence and manifestation which is a self communication of 
Holy Being; which as such is  a self giving.  Revelation, then, is a self giving of 
Holy Being which,  as  a disclosure of Being itself,  seizes  the whole being  of 
man,  and throws him to the ground,  as it  were.  This  awesome experience is 
conative rather than cognitive, it is not given in propositions or statements, but 
in  a mysterious,  subliminal  presence which addresses itself primarily to man's 
emotions and  not his mind.  The encounter cannot therefore be expressed,  at 
least  initially  within  the  bounds  and  limits  of language.  The  content  of 
revelation then,  is  a non definitive ontological experience rather than a logical 
cognitive encounter.  However, Macquarrie argues that there is  no  excuse for 
remaining utterly vague about the content of  revelation, it must be expressed in 
words in  some way  or other,  at  some  stage,  if it  is  not  to  remain  a purely 
8 
9 
See chapter 4 sec 1.2, for a discussion of  the initiative of  Holy Being in the 
revelatory encounter. 
See chapter 4 sec 1.2 a 
164 private affair.  "It is like a bell ringing which eventually becomes words. ,,10  All 
experiences of  this mystical encounter of  Being, if  they are to be communicated 
to others, must be translated into human words, however, these are descriptive 
terms produced by the ingenuity of  man, and never God's speech.  In effect the 
descriptive accounts are the basis of  the theological development which runs in 
tandem with the ritualistic and sacramental development, eventually resulting in 
a world religion.  The question remains; Just what is the content of revelation 
in Macquarries view?  The answer is  that the content of revelation is  'Being', 
therefore  the  question  becomes;  What  precisely  is  the  nature  of the  Being 
which is revealed?  At this point we are faced with methodological difficulty; if 
Being is an incomprehensible and awesome mystery, which Macquarrie asserts, 
then the  phenomenon of Being  as  disclosed  to man  cannot  be described  in 
human language, in any immediate and direct way, rather it is  a felt  experience 
which 'must' remain essentially private. In the revelatory experience of  Being, in 
which it takes the initiative and communicates itself,  Being manifests itself in 
and through the particular beings. In this manifestation we see the openness of 
Being.  Being opens itself  to the beings in the elements of  grace and judgement. 
This  openness of Being is  therefore the content of the revelatory experience 
which man 'participates in';  a fuller description is left to Otto which,  at risk of 
repeating ourselves, we will summarise. 
According  to  Otto  the  nature  of the  nummous  IS  understood  or  rather 
suggested as it is reflected upon in the mind in terms of  feeling.  The encounter 
produces certain 'feeling states' which Otto calls 'affective determinative states'. 
The numinous  grips  the human mind  with this  and  that  determinative  state. 
These  determinative  states  are  alternatively  termed  'moods'  which  are 
occasioned by the presence of  the mysterium tremendum.  An  example of one 
of these moods is  when the feeling  of the numinous  comes  sweeping like  a 
gentle  tide,  which  pervades the mind  with tranquillity,  producing  a  tranquil 
mood of deepest worship.  On the other hand the element of awfulness  can 
produce a shuddering and a tremor in the being of  man this produces what Otto 
terms 'creature feeling' in the participant. 
'Creature feeling'  is  a  feeling  of personal  nothingness  and  abasement.  The 
numinous quality which produces this tremor is the 'wrath of  God' which seizes 
10  Professor Macquarrie stated this to me in  answer to my  question;  what 
precisely 'is' revelation? 
165 a man with paralysing effect and produces in him 'the fear of  God'.  Macquarrie 
agrees that the 'the fear of  God is the beginning of  wisdom'. II  Otto claims that 
this  particular  experience  is  the  very  ground  and  foundation  of primitive 
religions.  The wrath of God is really God's majesty, His overpowering  might, 
it is this majesty which results in  'creature consciousness' in the mind of man. 
The mysterium which is  beyond conceptuality is  experienced then in feelings, 
which when we discuss them,  become clear to us.  In actuality however, the 
mysterium produces a stupor in the mind,  a blank wonder which defies reason 
and words. 
Revelation understood in  this  way is  an  intense  and  awful  experience of the 
Mystery of Being,  which through a variety of intense feeling  states  severely 
effects the psychology of  the participant.  At the end of  the day little or nothing 
is  said  of the  essential  nature  of the  numinous  itself,  because  it  is  an 
indescribable mystery,  all  that we have which is  capable of description is  the 
effect  on the human mind.  In reality this  leaves us with a  purely  subjective 
view of God  in  terms  of the  affects  on our own individual  psychology  and 
conSClOusness. 
The  significance  of this  kind  of revelation,  in  respect  of our  theological 
understanding,  is  that God is  an  impenetrable  mystery  whom we can  know 
nothing  about,  at  least  in  respect  of His  own  Being.  Revelation  then  is 
experienced through our feelings and emotions.  It is  completely irrational and 
indefinable in human words, which would be completely inadequate and indeed 
unsuitable for the task.  Revelation, thought of  in this way, eventually translates 
into words and religious language.  Yet,  as already indicated these words are 
merely descriptions of  the effects of  the encounter with Holy Being in terms of 
human psychology.  They have little or nothing to say about Holy Being itself 
All  that  can  be,  objectively,  said  is  that  some  mysterious  force  or  energy 
produced the effects. 
The contrast between Rahner and Macquarrie's understanding of revelation, in 
respect of the logos versus the numinous presence, can only be described as  a 
stark contrast of directly opposite positions.  Such a distinction throws light on 
the  primary  and  underlying  contrast  of  the  different  methodologies; 
11  Principles  of Christian  Theology  - John  Macquarrie,  p.87,  ref  to 
Ps.1l1:10, Prov.1:7,9:10 
166 metaphysics (with its definitive precision) and the phenomenological descriptive 
method (with its mystical obscurity) respectively. 
6.1.2 The Transcendence of God who is wholly other versus 
The Immanence of Holy Being 
The theological concept of  the Self-Revelation of God makes little or no  sense 
if what can be known of God is  already available to man in terms of his  own 
mundane  reality.  To  make  any  kind  of sense  revelation  must  be  the  self 
disclosure  of a  'wholly  other',  transcendent  Being  who  is,  until  revealed, 
absolutely  hidden  from  him.  This  factor  poses  a  serious  problem  for  the 
theological approaches of  both Macquarrie and Rahner. 
a) The problem of transcendence for Macquarrie 
Macquarrie's problem is  essentially one of method and  approach;  having  laid 
aside  metaphysics  in  favour  of the  existential/phenomenological  descriptive 
method he cannot then utilise it in talking about God in His transcendence.  His 
problem, then, concerns the adequacy and indeed relevancy of  human language 
about  God;  conceived  in  ontological  and  existential  terms  as  a transcendent 
'Numinous Being' (who is present only in the mode of  the 'Numinous').  Such a 
problem permeates and underlies all  of Macquarrie's theology,  often rendering 
it  vague  and  obscure.  The  insufficiency  of human  words  and  therefore 
language  structures,  in  this  respect,  renders  human  speech  empty  and 
meaningless in respect of God in His transcendent aseity.  Holy Being cannot 
be  talked  about  in  its  own  terms.  It  simply  'bumps  into'  man,  in  silent 
revelatory  encounter;  with  such  force,  however,  that  it  throws  him  to  the 
ground of his own being,  and in so  doing effects a profound change in his life 
and  understanding.  Yet  the  objective  reality  remains  a brute  'bumping  into' 
which cannot, in itself, be comprehended and therefore articulated. 
What is  eventually articulated (through a theology) is  man's  reaction,  and the 
precise  nature  of his  changed  understanding,  in  respect  of the  revelatory 
experience.  The Self-Revelation of Holy Being is  articulated in terms of man 
167 and not God; it is,  in effect,  no more than a description of  the phenomenon of 
the revelatory encounter as it strikes the human subjective.  Such is the basis of 
a  new 'World'  religion.  The  theological  development  which  arises  through 
time, in respect of  the revelatory phenomenon, can be more properly termed an 
anthropology,  as  it  is  not  primarily  about  God,  but  man.  Indeed  it  is  a 
description of man's reaction to, and 'participation' in,  the Being which bumps 
into him.  'Participation' is a key concept in respect of the knowledge of Holy 
Being in Macquarrie's development.  He asks: 
"How are we to determine the meaning of  the word 'being', how are 
we to show that it has an intelligible use in the context where we are 
employing it,  and how precisely do  we propose to relate it  to the 
traditional religious word 'God'." 12 
His answer is that: 
"We  ourselves 'are'  and  only in  our participation in  being  can we 
think of  it or name it and only on the basis of  its self giving and self-
disclosure to us can we know it. ,,13 
We are able, then, to take cognition of  Being only in relation to our own being 
through  participation.  We  can  think  about  it  and  name  it  because  we 
participate in it.  OUf knowledge of  it is,  at best, relational, and, at worst, really 
only a deeper knowledge of ourselves.  Human Language about Holy Being is 
no  more  than  a  description  of  the  subjective  cognitive  reaction  and 
interpretation of our participation in it.  Meaning is  derived from the precise 
nature and ethos of  the 'effect' of  the participatory experience of  the revelatory 
encounter and not from the 'cause'.  Through the revelatory experience man is 
gifted  with  a  new  way  of describing  his  own  being;  which  is,  in  effect,  a 
transcendence of his  old  subjective.  In reality,  man can  only talk about the 
immanence of Being as  it is present and manifest in the beings which appear; 
more precisely,  as it strikes his  own subjective.  Theology, understood in this 
way,  is  'talk  about  the  immanence  of God'  through  a  description  of the 
hermeneutic activity arising from the effects in the having-being of the beings. 
Macquarrie's  problem  is  that  theology  requires  him  to  talk  about  the 
transcendence of  God. 
12 
13 
Op. Cit. p.l07 
Op. Cit. p.1 06 
168 b) Macquarrie's understanding of transcendence 
Macquarrie states that Being which discloses itself to man is like nothing else, it 
is 'sui generis'.  How then can we even begin to talk about it?  It does not have 
a  referent  in  the  reality  of the  appearances.  Macquarrie  pours  scorn  on 
anthropomorphism, God does not exist as we do,  indeed as far as  our kind of 
existence is  concerned God does not exist.  He is  not a thing and he is not a 
being, He is 'more than' a thing or a being and He has 'more than' existence.  He 
is Being itself which is an utter transcendence and an impenetrable and terrible 
mystery.  Macquarrie quotes Heidegger's statement:  "Being is the transcendens 
pure and simple".  However, whilst arguing that Being is a transcendens which 
as above all categories must remain mysterious, he asserts that Being is not just 
a blank incomprehensible.  Being  is  not just nothing  as  far  as  this  reality  is 
concerned; the word 'Being' is not an empty word.  The question is; How is the 
word to be given positive meaning?  The answer lies in Macquarrie's concept of 
'letting be'.  Being 'is not' but 'lets be'.  The nature of  the 'letting be' is of course 
seen through participation in being as  'a' being; it is the beings who are 'let be' 
therefore we  see  the  'letting  be'  of Being  actualised  in  the  existence  of the 
beings. 
"Being  is  the  incomparable  that  lets  be  and  that  IS  present  and 
manifests itself in and through the beings. ,,14 
Talk  about  Being,  then,  translates  to  talk  about  'letting  be'.  This  ultimate 
'letting be' is itself the essential part of  the mystery of  Being which is present to 
us  in  that  we  are  those  who  are  'let  be'.  'Letting  be'  is  prior to  existence 
therefore Being 'more than exists',  it  is  a 'more than'  in  respect of all  of the 
categorial existents including personhood.  The transcendence of God, then, is 
a 'more than' which,  in itself,  cannot be talked about.  It must be regarded as 
strictly incomparable, not falling under any of the usual categories of thought. 
Perhaps Wittgenstein sums Macquarrie's position up when he states: 
14 
15 
"One can point but one can not say anything ... God does not reveal 
himself in the world. ,,15 
Op.  Cit. p.llS 
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169 c) Macquarrie's understanding of immanence 
Macquarrie's view  of revelation demands the transcendence of Being;  and  it 
follows that since the transcendent Being which confronts man in the revelatory 
event,  is an incomprehensible mystery which does not impart any words (and 
therefore meaning)  in the event,  the theology which arises  from  the event is 
entirely in terms of man himself and not at all  of the essential Being of God. 
Indeed it  is  only because man participates  in  Being that  he  is  able  to know 
Being itself.  Presumably, when Being reveals itself to man,  man receives and 
understands that revelation in  terms of his  own participation in  Being.  The 
interface of  man's participation in Being and Being's participation in man clearly 
is the point of  coincidence of  the two realities. 
The point of coincidence is the being of  the beings which Being is present and 
manifest in,  the beings and nowhere else.  Therefore revelation has to do with 
the  immanence  of Being  and  not  its  transcendence  (which  man  can  never 
grasp).  The  theology  which  arises  from  this  revelation,  then,  is  properly 
speaking an anthropology.  The mysterious transcendence serves only to thrust 
man into a new self orientation, concerning his own existence.  The essence of 
this new orientation is  the beholding and recognition of Being in the beings, 
therefore he sees the same things but in a profoundly deeper way. 
How then does Macquarrie understand this immanent God who is  manifest in 
the beings?  He defines Him as: 
"His  immanence ...  refers  to  his  indwelling  of the  creation,  his 
presence and agency within the things and events of  the world. ,,16 
"In the expressive and unitive modes of his being",  states Macquarrie, "God is 
thoroughly  immanent  in  the  creation."  Indeed,  although  we  must  leave 
discussion of creation to the next section, Macquarrie argues that God did not 
make the world,  so  much as it  came into being through emanating from Him. 
The emanation of the Being of God extended beyond or indeed transcended 
16  Op. Cit. p.127 
170 Himself into the material space, time universe; which means that the universe is 
an  extension  of the very Being of God Himself  God  is  therefore  not  now 
external  to  the  beings  of the universe but internal  and  indeed  intimate  with 
them.  The material universe, as an emanation from God, is a necessary part of 
God himself,  and  God is  enriched by it  and would  suffer loss if it  ceased to 
exist.  God  suffers  with the beings  and  indeed  their very  suffering  is  in  the 
ultimate sense his own suffering.  Participation in Being is then participation in 
God Himself 
God, in his Primordial mode of  Being, is the source of  all the beings, this is the 
mode of being which is  wholly other,  supra-existent and utterly transcendent, 
yet when God comes out of  his hiddenness to bring the universe into being and 
to reveal  himself to the  beings  in  terms  of his  (now)  openness  he  is  in  his 
expressive mode which is of an intimate sharing of himself with the beings of 
the universe (which was from all eternity).  Revelation, which must therefore be 
considered  to  be  an  expression  of God's  Being,  is  an  event  involving  not 
primarily the transcendence  of God,  but His  immanent,  expressive  mode  of 
Being.  We are contending, that whilst Macquarrie states quite clearly that he is 
concerned to oppose anyone sided version of theism,  that his  conception of 
God is in purely immanentist terms and therefore one sided itself  Macquarrie's 
position  appears  to  be  based  on  an  essential  pantheism  which  seeks  to 
marginalise the transcendence of  God.  A revealing statement in this respect is: 
"I  have  more  than  once  suggested  that  the  divine  transcendence 
might be conceived in  a more dynamic way in  analogy with human 
transcendence, namely, as God's capacity to go out from and beyond 
himself ,,17 
The transcendence is  not understood by Macquarrie in  terms of God's aseity, 
but rather His going out from Himself  The question which Macquarrie must 
answer is;  In respect of the revelatory dynamic,  where is He going out from? 
the answer appears to be: from His immanence in the world! 
He emerges  and  confronts man in  the event  of a mysterious  and  ontological 
revelation  which  is  the  revelation  of Being  to  man,  which  in  effect  is  the 
revelation of  man to Himself  Otherwise put, it is the revelation of  the presence 
17  Ibid. 
171 and manifestation of  the Being of the immanent God to the being of man who 
already participates in Him (though inauthentic  ally) and must now participate in 
a new  and  authentic way.  It is  little  wonder that  no  new thing  happens  in 
revelation, what does happen is that man now recognises Being which was all 
the time there anyway, he just didn't see it, because it was too close!  When he 
recognises it,  through revelation,  nothing  essential  changes;  man  does  not in 
any  way  become  a  new  being  who  is  essentially  changed  by  receiving 
knowledge  of the  essential  Being  of God  (because  that  does  not  happen). 
What happens is  that man is  given  a new self-understanding whereby he  can 
now realise  his  true potential,  which was  always  before  him,  but before the 
revelatory encounter, unrealisable in actuality. 
Since revelation is an event involving the immanent God who is clearly limited 
by the finitude of  the beings whom He indwells, we must derive the conclusion 
that - no  free  act  of God  is  involved  in  revelation  - It is  an  almost  natural 
extension of  the beings as they participate in the Being of God; which involves 
recognition of that which was,  forever,  already there.  Macquarrie anticipates 
the implications of this criticism,  firstly he  states Thomas Aquinas'  summation 
concerning God's absolutely sovereign freedom: 
"Nothing  apart  from  God  has  been  from  all  eternity.  We  have 
shown that God's will is the cause of  things,  so then the necessity of 
their  being  is  that  of God's  willing  them.  Next  it  has  been 
established that there is no need for God to will anything but himself, 
hence  there  is  no  need  to  will  an  everlasting  world.  Rather  the 
world  exists  just  so  long  as  God  wills  it  to,  since  its  existence 
depends on his will as its cause. ,,18 
This is  clearly a statement of God's absolute freedom,  Macquarrie finds  it too 
arbitrary,  he  sees  in  this  view,  God  portrayed  as  a  somewhat  capricious 
Monarch.  He agrees that there can be no talk of God finding it necessary to do 
anything, there can be no force that can compel God to do things, if  there were 
God would not be God.  However he states: 
18 
"Whether we can properly talk of  either necessity or freedom of God 
is  doubtfuL..  In  any  case...  freedom  has  nothing  to  do  with 
randomness or arbitrariness ... Freedom is structured and purposeful, 
and to be free means to be able to move towards the goals that one 
Summa Theologiae - Thomas Aquinas,  1  a 36.1 
172 has chosen for oneself. .. To be free is not to be able to act otherwise 
or to refrain  from  acting  at  all.  The truly free  person would  not 
dream  of acting  otherwise  than  his  own  nature  has  determined. 
Freedom has nothing to do with unpredictability, that is caprice and 
is typical not of a free person whose character is  rational and stable 
but of the unfree  person who  is  blown  of course by  impulse  and 
passing  desires.  If God  is  a  God  of love  then  he  would  not  do 
anything  but  create...  He freely  creates because in  so  doing  he  is 
following his own nature which is loving and  giving." 19 
Macquarrie's argument here concerning the nature of  freedom, appears strained 
and unconvincing.  It echoes with anthropomorphism as  it  draws  an  analogy 
between an existential understanding of human freedom and God's freedom.  It 
is  interesting  to  note  that  Macquarrie  relates  the  freedom  of God  to  an 
understanding  of personhood;  when  he  has  elsewhere  argued  that  strictly 
speaking God is not a person (He is beyond personhood). 
Considering the argument  or rather assertion of what freedom  is  and  is  not, 
Macquarrie is  skating  on thin ice.  He wants to argue that The  God who  is 
imprisoned by the limits of  the finitude because He is immanent, is in fact free. 
He does that by standing the concept of  freedom upon its head.  "Freedom", he 
states "is to be able to move towards the goals that one has chosen for oneself', 
which  are  determined  by  ones  nature.  Freedom,  is  not  to  be  able  to  do 
otherwise.  Whilst  there  is,  no  doubt,  truth  in  this  argument  it  is  a  most 
accommodating doctrine, which argues for necessity as being of the nature of 
freedom.  The necessity, according to Macquarrie, is none other than the nature 
of  God, which, to be free, He must comply with.  But it is also in God's nature 
to utterly transcend the creation, in which case to comply with his nature means 
to be free from its necessity,  which is  to remain free to act upon the creation 
should He so wilL  In Macquarrie's reduction of God's freedom He is making a 
profound assertion that  God is  immanent in  the  creation  and  exists  nowhere 
else  in  no  other  mode.  In  so  doing  Macquarrie  strains  against  his  own 
theological methodology, in respect of his 'dialectical theism'.  Let us consider 
this understanding of  freedom (based on the freedom of  human persons) a little 
further,  in terms of the concept of original  sin.  Macquarrie  states elsewhere 
that original righteousness precedes original sin
20
,  this seems to be reasonable, 
but if it  is  so,  then  applying  his  rational  of freedom  man  would  never  have 
19 
20 
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173 sinned,  because he was completely free,  (within the finite limits)  and freedom 
requires  action  in  accordance  with  and  not  against  ones  nature.  By 
Macquarrie's definition,  man,  whose original nature was righteous and sinless, 
could not at the same time exercise his freedom, and commit sin, as sinning was 
contrary to his  nature.  Man's freedom,  thought of in  this way,  did  not allow 
him a free choice to remain righteous or to sin,  and therefore it appears to be a 
contradiction, and if so  Macquarrie's argument is  fallacious.  If God is  free in 
the full  sense then he must be free to act in a different and new way from his 
previous action.  This is not necessarily arbitrary and certainly not capricious, it 
merely involves the concept of beginning and  end,  which may indeed have to 
do  with  God's  long  term  goals  and  retain  absolute  consistency  with  God's 
loving  creativity.  Rahner's  understanding  of freedom  is  the  motion  of 
abstraction and judgement in terms of  the epistemic dynamic in respect of other 
beings.  Freedom in Rahner's understanding requires the capacity of abstracting 
to judge, and it is in the judging that the knower is a free  spirit.  If we extend 
this concept to God then God must be able to transcend the creation in order to 
judge it,  and  in  the judging  of it  He radically  demands  and  maintains  His 
freedom. 
d) From Pantheism to a higher Pantheism! 
Macquarrie started out as a pantheist.  He says as much in his Festschrift in the 
opening chapter "Pilgrimage in theology,,21;  and from his complete rejection of 
any possibility of God acting externally on the world in terms of intervention in 
its affairs he doesn't appear to have strayed much from his early path.  His view 
is that we must understand God's action in the world in terms of the ordinary 
world process, within which, God's Being is closely and intimately integrated?2 
Macquarrie,  however,  rejects  pantheism  as  a  viable  alternative  to  classical 
theism; he defines it as "the view that all things in their unity constitute God, or 
that God is  all things or is  in  all  things. ,,23  He rejects this as  being one sided 
and the dialectical opposite of Classical theism.  Yet he concedes that at first 
21 
22 
23 
Being and Truth- Professor Macquarrie's Festschrift 
He is prepared to concede the activity of God and man within a frame of 
reciprocity  - it  seems  to  us  that  such  a  condition  is  little  more  than  a 
qualification of  God's immanence. 
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174 sight pantheism seems to be more satisfactory than classical theism.  He does 
however clearly reject it: 
"So pantheism, in spite of its attraction for certain types of people, 
tends to break down, being either reduced to atheistic materialism or 
else dissolving the world in a mystical acosmism. ,,24 
Yet he goes on to say of  pantheism: 
"Pantheism is  usually religious,  frequently mystical  and therefore it 
may be said to lean more towards theism than atheism.  If we think 
of the so  called 'higher pantheism' of the poets, we are led to much 
the same conclusions.  Wordsworth had an intense awareness of  the 
beauty and unity of nature, but his feelings were not directed simply 
to  the  physical  universe.  There  was  more  to  the  world  than  its 
physical being.  His sentiments were not only aesthetic and directed 
to the highest pitch of  beauty which we call sublime and which, in its 
overwhelmingness,  is  not  far  from  the  Holy.  His  feelings  were 
definitely religious, they had a sense of affinity with the surrounding 
reality, and we have seen that something like that lies at the heart of 
1"·  ,,25  re IglOn. 
He continues by quoting a verse of  Wordsworth poetry which he claims, shows 
that Wordsworth saw  a  deeper level  of reality,  than  the  material,  in  nature. 
This  Macquarrie  calls  'spirit'  and  likens  it  to  God  because,  as  he  says,  one 
witness said 'God is  spirit'.  Macquarrie uses this concept of higher pantheism, 
as  seen  in  Wordsworth,  to  demonstrate  that  spirit  (God)  is  found  through 
mediation of the material/natural reality around us.  True pantheism or higher 
pantheism Macquarrie  claims,  is  not the mere  identification  of God  and  the 
uruverse. 
24 
25 
26 
"So  in  pantheism the  natural  world is  not  as  such  identified  with 
God.  The  world  may  be  mysterious  and  awe  inspiring  but  it  is 
hardly adorable.  It becomes divine  only when a new dimension of 
being is introduced and the world is seen as the manifestation of an 
indwelling spirit  .. "  it  is  the presence of the spirit that divinizes  the 
world. ,,26 
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175 Macquarrie rejects pantheism on the  grounds that the  pantheist fails  to hold 
together  spirit  and  matter  in  an  indissoluble  union,  either  one,  ends  up 
predominating.  It does appear however,  that this union is  possible in  'higher 
pantheism' or 'panentheism' because this in effect is the dialectical synthesis of 
spirit  and  matter  (transcendence  and  immanence).  It appears  that  'higher 
pantheism' bears some relation to Rahner's transcendentalism and therefore the 
plane or interface of  the coincidence of the spirit of God and the human spirit, 
this is  an interesting similarity.  However,  in the last analysis 'panentheism' or 
'dialectical  theism',  may  tum out to  be  nothing  more  than  a frame  whereby 
Macquarrie can talk about the transcendence of God whilst holding firmly  to 
the belief in His total immanence.  If  this be the case then 'dialectical theism' is 
in fact  the means  of rationalising  and  marginalising the transcendence,  rather 
than being a balanced synthesis of  the two poles. 
e) The problem of transcendence for Rahner 
Rahner wants to  affirm  the real  transcendence of God who  is  wholly  other, 
absolutely and totally objective (external) to man.  He wants to affirm that the 
purpose of man's being is as a listener for a possible revelation of the free and 
sovereign God, in his (man's) personal history.  Such (further) revelation must 
come from outside; from God's transcendent otherness, and it must necessarily 
be a fresh and new disclosure of  His essential Being. 
We  have  the  picture  of a  mysterious  absolutely  transcendent  God  who 
delimited the being of the creation from nothing,  and  who will  further delimit 
the  being  of man  through  a  fresh  revelation  of Himself  This  new,  fresh 
revelation of the person of the free God will come to man through the vehicle 
of human words in which God will  speak.  This secondary revelation inbreaks 
world history disclosing in an explicit thematic and definitive way, the nature of 
God, which, up until then, in creational revelation, was implicit and vague. 
The  problem that Rahner faces  in  developing,  arguing,  and  affirming  such  a 
view  has  to  do  with  his  theological  approach,  and  as  such  calls  his  whole 
theology into question as being inconsistent.  The apparent inconsistency arises 
in  respect  of Rahner's  starting  point;  he  begins  with  the  development  of an 
anthropological metaphysic therefore his  whole theology is  anthropocentric in 
basis,  indeed it  is  described  rightly  as  an  anthropological theology.  It is  the 
176 very  nature  of Rahner's  anthropocentric  epistemological  ontology  which 
provides  the  bite  in  the  neck,  concerning  the  possibility  of a  further  (new) 
revelation from a completely transcendent and mysterious God.  Rahner defines 
the problem: 
"If man is  the infinitude of absolute  spiritual  openness to being in 
general,  and if he must be this because in transcendent openness to 
being in general he is spirit first and foremost ... then this proposition 
of our anthropology  ... is the very thing which would seem to make 
revelation  to  man  impossible  once  again,  in  virtue  of the  basic 
spiritual  constitution of man. ..  If man is  the infinitude of absolute 
intellectual openness to being ... then all  appears as knowability and 
to fall within the sphere of  his transcendental openness. ,,27 
This is  an  essential problem for Rahner,  concerning the relationship  between 
creational and historical revelation, and the possibility, and indeed necessity of 
a further revelation in man's history.  If God's essential Being is  open to being 
completely known by man in virtue of  man's very constitution as a transcendent 
spirit,  then it  appears  that no  further  revelation is  required,  and  theologians 
should  give  themselves  over to the  domain  of natural theology and  nothing 
else.  Revelation then is a matter of an a-posteriori, epistemic process in terms 
of creation.  Rahner's articulation of his  problem and his  proposed solution is 
very  enlightening  especially  when  compared  with  Macquarrie's  position  as 
discussed above.  We can do nothing better than to quote Rahner, at length, on 
this aspect.  Rahner states that, if  man, in his transcendental openness as a finite 
spirit, is the full measure of  things, then: 
27 
28 
"Everything is  outstripped by the absolute breadth of man's  (own) 
natural transcendence. ,,28 
"Then the presentation by revelation of a  specific  object,  because 
already falling  'a-priori'  within the sphere of human transcendence, 
could have at most the significance of a  contingent and temporary 
aid ... Revelation would be an act of  the God of  the philosophers but 
not the God of Abraham, of  Isaac and of Jacob ... All of  the content 
of revelation  would  fundamentally  ...  have  to  be interchangeable 
with  knowledge  derivable  from  the  'a-priori'  structure  of man ... 
Revelation would merely be the first  step of philosophy, merely the 
Hearers of  the Word - Karl Rahner, p.71 
Ibid. 
177 awareness of  the 'absolute spirit' which breaks in on man at the level 
of  imagination. ,,29 
Rahner continues: 
"Stated in general terms the difficulty we have in mind consists in the 
fact that our consideration so far would make it seem that there can 
be no  such thing as  a revelation in the sense of a free  disclosure of 
something  essentially  hidden...  So  revelation  could  only  be  an 
immanent, necessary, unfolding of  being. ,,30 
"Revelation  would  be  nothing  other  than  the  progressive 
spiritualisation of man himself  God himself would be  intrinsically 
the one who was uncovered and manifest.  Revelation could not be 
the  free  act  of God  because his  light,  of necessity,  would  always 
radiate and shine with every man.  'Light inaccessible' would have to 
be  a  contradiction because  'being-light'  would  by  its  nature  shine 
upon all things. ,,31 
The essence of the issue here is  the  ontological differential between man  and 
God.  If God is  to be God the ontological difference must be taken into  full 
account.  Just how this is to be done, to what extent and in which way, is what 
Macquarrie would call "the centre of all heresies".  If  the ontological difference 
is  perceived  to  be too  great then  revelation  of the  essence  of God  to  man 
becomes  impossible  to  conceive.  If,  on  the  other  hand  the  ontological 
difference is  reduced to totally immanentist  and  pantheistic proportions there 
can be no  revelation because nothing is intrinsically hidden from man and it is 
possible  by  his  own  (even  diverse)  means  to  work  out  God.  As  Rahner 
suggests this would appear to result in a humanist philosophy rather than a true 
theology. 
Rahner must clarify his position as being consistent in this respect, he asks: 
29 
30 
31 
"How can  a  Christian  anthropology  and  metaphysics  expound  the 
nature of  man so that, without violating his transcendence relative to 
being  in  general  . . .  or  his  interior  luminosity  of  being,  this 
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178 transcendence  does  not  anticipate  the  content  of  a  possible 
revelation. ,,32 
"This free self disclosure of  the personal God must remain possible 
with God having  someone to whom he can utter his  free word of 
revelation,  with  what  he  says  being  perceptible  to  man  ...  who 
knows what it means for him personally. ,,33 
Rahner's concern is with the balance of the precise nature of the ontological 
difference.  For revelation  to  be  possible  it  has  to  be  a  disclosure  of the 
hiddenness of  the essential Being of God, on the one hand,  and on the other, it 
must be within the capacity of man to receive it,  in terms of his own essential 
being as a finite spirit.  This precise relation can only be created in the primary 
delimitation, where man,  as  created in the image of God,  is  able,  by his very 
constitution, to know The God who exists in a different reality from himself  If 
man is  created as a spirit which is continuous, in some way,  with God's spirit 
the  problem  is  intrinsic  to  this  essential  relation.  The  very  principle  of 
continuity itself demands an epistemic coincidence whereby man,  by virtue of 
his essential constitution, has epistemic accessibility to God, and the ability and 
capacity to know all there is to know about God through his own (a-posteriori) 
effort. 
It appears that the negative  answer to this  question is  also  the place of the 
solution to the problem.  We must realise that the relationship is of  the finitude 
and the infinitude,  in a  sense then the solution is  one of proportion.  Rahner 
states:  "  ...  even as spirit man is finite ... God is  essentially the unknown to the 
finite  spirit...  The  infinitude  of God  seems  to  be  knowable  only  in  the 
perception  of the  finite  thing  which  'is'  (however) ...  The  infinitude  would 
remain unrecognised by man on his own because it is expressly grasped as such 
only in the transcendental experience of limitation, that is a negatio remotio of 
the finite at the cognition of  which the excessus is known for the first time. ,,34 
so: 
32 
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"The infinitude of God is known only in the negatory experience of 
limitation of  the finitude of the finite ... it appears to be sufficiently 
[bid. 
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179 unknown, unrevealable, and shut up in its specific self... so that ... 
a fresh disclosure of  the infinite makes sense and still has something 
which may yet be revealed. ,,35 
What Rahner is  saying is that the infinitude of God is  experienced only at the 
limitations of  man's knowledge, which are the extent of  man's finitude.  In order 
for  man  to transcend  his  finitude  he  has  to  experience  the  negation  of the 
limitation of his  knowledge in respect of the infinitude in  any perception of a 
finite thing.  He has to go beyond that which 'is'  in  his  perception.  (We have 
seen already that the word is the only possible vehicle of  such a negation of  the 
limitation.)  Rahner states: 
"Man subject to the laws which govern his knowledge, cannot reach 
positive knowledge of  the 'beyond' of  the eternal world .. .in his own 
strength. ..  in  spite  of the  fact  that  the  beyond  present  in  his 
transcendental  experience  of limitation,  is  the  condition  of the 
possibility of  his mundane knowledge. ,,36 
We have then a reference to the pre-concept, whereby man has a total, though 
empty,  vague,  knowledge of all  Being and indeed of Being in  general (God). 
Therefore the question arises;  "If man gained the whole definitive knowledge 
made possible by the preconcept, would he not have by his  own right,  arrived 
at  an  absolute  knowledge  of being  in  general,,?37  Rahner's  answers  is  no, 
because it is not possible for man to achieve such a vast knowledge by his own 
efforts,  there  always  remains  a  vast  and  indeed  infinite  beyond  which  must 
remain a mystery.  Further whilst man is  able through the pre-concept,  at the 
point of the negation of the particular limitation,  to  recognise  that which is 
beyond, he has not the strength to achieve the negation in his own right.  Whilst 
in  every  cognition,  in  respect  of the  mundane  reality,  by  means  of the 
preconcept of Being in  general, man does in a real respect gain knowledge of 
God.  However, whilst the supernatural is involved, as the condition for natural 
knowledge, the reverse does not also apply. 
Rahner  proceeds  to  discuss  the  possibility  of gaining  knowledge  of God 
through natural means in terms of a 'visio beatifica' sought in Nature Mysticism 
35  Ibid. 
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180 and non Christian Mysticism.  This visio beatifica seems to be the natural goal 
of man,  whereby  the  essence  of God  is  disclosed  in  a  superior way  to  any 
possible revelation in mere words.  Rahner states: 
"The  basic  conception  of all  non  Christian  Mysticism  is  a  direct 
grasping of the transcendence of spirit. ..  that is,  in  a grasping not 
mediated  through  an  object...  Such  a  supreme  knowledge  of the 
absolute  (possible for  man through his  own nature)  fundamentally 
transcends any revelation of  God in words." (or so it is said) 38 
"A mystical experience (usually dark night ecstatic) in which man by 
an  ek  -stasis,  a  standing  outside  himself,  experiences  the  infinity 
beyond  his  own  finitude,  is  regarded  as  an  experience  which 
surpasses  and  supersedes  all  revelation given  in  words...  Mystical 
piety,  even  if only  to  the  extent  of a  dark  sensing  of God  in  the 
limitless infinity of the spirit itself,  which finds  its springs in natural 
means  and  regards  itself as  unsurpassable,  would  always  already 
have  superseded  any  prophetic  piety  of the  revealed  word  in  its 
historical confinement. ,,39 
Rahner's whole thrust is to deny this kind of experience, as being incompatible 
with  his  whole  position.  It  can  not  be  established  that  such  an  ecstatic 
experience  is  supernatural,  rather  it  is  felt  by  Rahner  to  be  a  natural 
phenomenon and therefore it cannot possibly be a revelation of God.  Such a 
mystical experience is  ruled out as  a possible alternative to Rahner's position. 
Indeed,  Rahner argues  against  the validity  of the  inner  possibility  of a visio 
beautifica as  a real,  human,  spiritual  phenomenon.  He  claims  that  the visio 
beatifica cannot be unequivocally demonstrated to be the natural end of  man: 
"The possibility of such a thing offers no  proof, at least not in an a-
priori metaphysical anthropology which can proceed only from  the 
essence and function of a transcendence which would have meaning 
and purpose only if  there were or could be no such mysticism. ,,40 
Clearly,  if this kind of mystical non-verbal experience of the numinous can be 
established as being a natural phenomenon in terms of  human ontology, it could 
not also  be  considered to be a revelation of God.  Only if the hiddenness of 
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181 God itself stands  inviolate  and  distinct  from  finite  beings  can  there  be  any 
possibility of  an historical revelation: 
liN ot until we go beyond the free knowledge that God is more than 
what we have hitherto known of him by our human knowledge ... 
and discover that he can speak or remain silent,  can we conceive of 
an actual speech (revelation) of  God as it really is. 1141 
1) The nature of the Transcendence of God in Rahner 
i) The transcendence 
The transcendence (of God) is that which is absolutely beyond the disposal of 
man; it is beyond the control of  the finite subject both physically and logically. 
To say that God is transcendent is to say that He is absolutely different than the 
world (creation).  To fail  to understand this  difference,  claims Rahner,  is  the 
error of pantheism.  42  This term 'transcendence' is  present only in the mode of 
otherness and distance. 
Rahner argues  that the transcendent  difference  can  not  be  understood  as  a 
difference of categorial realities, their difference is antecedent to them because 
they  presuppose  a  space  which  both,  contains  and  differentiates  them;  the 
categorial differences in no way establish their own difference from each other, 
nor are they themselves the difference.  It is God who both establishes,  and is, 
the difference of the world from  itself  All  difference  comes from  God and 
indeed God Himself is the difference of  the difference: 
41 
42 
"God to be sure is different from the world, but he is different in the 
way that he  is  different ...  difference is  experienced in  our original 
transcendental experience in  such a way that the whole of reality is 
born by this term and this  source and  is  intelligible  only  within it. 
Consequently it is  only the difference which establishes the ultimate 
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God is  the absolute reality,  the original ground and the ultimate term of 
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182 unity  between  God  and  the  world,  and  the  difference  becomes 
intelligible only in this unity. ,,43 
Rahner  understands  the  transcendence  as  itself absolute  difference.  It is  a 
wholly  other  different  difference;  conversely  immanence  is  the  difference  In 
closest unity which we understand as similarity (similarity in difference). 
ii) Naming the transcendence 
We  have  seen  that  Rahner  has  named  the  transcendence  "the  absolute  and 
ultimate difference".  Rahner goes on to state that the term and the source by 
which the transcendence is borne can be called 'God', but there are a thousand 
other names  for  example;  Being,  Ground,  Ultimate  cause,  revealing  Logos, 
Abyss, Father of  Jesus etc.  It can be seen that it is a profoundly difficult task to 
precisely name the transcendence.  In this  difficulty we see the emergence of 
mystery.  We  seek to  name the transcendence  as  we experience  it  and  it  is 
experienced as mystery therefore Rahner finally names it 'Holy Mystery': 
"Mystery  - because  we  experience  it  as  that  which  cannot  be 
encompassed  by  a  pre  apprehension  which  reaches  beyond  it  and 
hence it  cannot be defined.  Holy - because when we speak of the 
transcendence  which  is  the  condition  of possibility  for  categorial 
knowledge  as  such,  we  mean  also  and  just  as  much,  the 
transcendence of  freedom, of  willing and love. ,,44 
Rahner is  speaking of the transcendence of 'Person', who in  absolute freedom 
exercises His will through love.  Transcendence, then, is primarily; free, willing, 
loving Person.  The essential character of the source of transcendence is love 
and absolute love demands absolute and unconditional freedom: 
43 
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"A subject who is present to himself to affirm freely another subject 
means ultimately, to love... Transcendence as love,  is a term which 
possesses absolute freedom and this term is at work in freedom,  and 
in love, as that which is nameless and not at our disposaL ,,45 
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183 This transcendence, which offers itself,  opens up our transcendence and never 
the other way around, we have no  power to transcend ourselves to reach that 
which is beyond.  We are therefore entirely at the disposal of  the Transcendent 
God who  moves  in  freedom  and  in  love.  It is  this  transcendence,  which  is 
present  in  freedom  and  in  love,  which  Rahner  means  by  the  name  'Holy 
Mystery'.  These two terms are a unity which bears an intrinsic difference,  and 
expresses equally the transcendence of knowledge, freedom and love.  Indeed 
nothing  other than Holy belongs to this  infinite  term of love,  and  in  saying 
'Holy Mystery' we are saying God's love and freedom are beyond definition. 
iii) The freedom of the transcendence (of God) 
For God to be transcendent, He has to be absolutely and unconditionally free. 
In  a  sense,  loving  freedom  is  the  character  of the  transcendence.  Man's 
freedom is man's transcendence and God's freedom is God's transcendence and 
indeed God's freedom is the necessary condition of man's freedom.  Man is in 
every way contingent  on the Being of God,  his  being is  accidental.  Rahner 
states: 
"The first metaphysical affirmation of an absolute necessity is,  at one 
and  the  same  time,  the  affirmation  of human  accidentality  and 
abandonment. ,,46 
"At the foundation of  human existence there constantly takes place a 
necessary  and  absolute  affirmation  of the  accidental  reality  that  is 
man  himself,  that  is,  of wilL  At  the  same  time  however  the 
luminosity of  being in general is affirmed ... From this it follows that 
... the deliberate necessary delimiting of  an accidental such as occurs 
in  the affirming  attitude of human existence towards itself,  can be 
conceived  only  when  it  is  itself affirmed  as  delimited  by  a  free 
deliberate act of  delimitation ... This free primeval delimitation of  the 
thing  which  is,  that  is  man,  can  however  be  nothing  but  the 
delimiting of  the absolute being of  God. ,,47 
Man in his necessary absolute attitude to his contingency affirms himself as the 
free deliberate delimiting of God,  and Rahner says that man as a spirit stands 
46 
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184 distinct  from  the absolute Being (God) who  is  a  free  autonomous powerful 
Person.  This personality of God is  displayed in the self disclosure of absolute 
Being before human transcendence. 
The  constitutional  nature  of the  primary  delimitation  of man  included  the 
distinguishing of God from creation.  God passes his freedom on to the being 
of man, that is the essence of delimitation, however in so doing God stands in 
contradistinction from His creation,  and in His transcendence faces  man as  a 
free  power from the very start.  Therefore,  there is  always  before man the 
possibility that God will  reveal Himself in  another,  new way.  God must still 
possess free scope for His free action towards His creatures.  Indeed this is the 
very condition, says Rahner, of  any delimitation at all.  His creation, so far,  may 
not be the exhausting of  His free possibilities, indeed it cannot be.  There must 
still be an object of  a further free act of  God. 
Man, in the excellence of his constitution, stands before the free God and the 
possibility of the free  action of God upon him  through a  material  revelation. 
Rahner says that it is  of decisive  importance to man for  him  to  see that he 
stands  in transcendent  openness towards  a  God who  deals  freely  with him. 
Man's purpose in life is to listen for a further fresh revelation which will effect 
some form of  further delimitation of  his being. 
The point is frequently made that the secondary revelation of  the person of  God 
in  the history of man,  is  a  'fresh'  revelation,  it  is  something new,  something 
different.  This arises from a fresh free will of God.  A fresh act of God from 
the depths of his transcendent mystery.  How could man expect anything less 
from a free living spirit (person) who is at the same time a God who subsists in 
Himself alone. 
48 
iv) The person of the transcendence (God as person) 
"Whoever stands as a free person before another forthwith discloses 
Himself. .. He discloses Himself precisely as the one who desires to 
be in the eyes of  the other. ,,48 
Op.  Cit. p.92 
185 In this  light,  man  is  always  addressed  by  revelation,  whether  in  speech  or 
silence, of  the free Person of  God.  Revelation does not come to man by virtue 
of his nature it is  a product of a fresh free will of the Person of God Himself, 
and it is His essential hidden person that is disclosed: 
"On  account  of freedom  a  person  is  disclosed  ultimately  only 
through  the  deliberate  act  of the  person  himself,  who  is  to  be 
known. ,,49 
This fact  determines the necessity of a further  personal  revelation of God to 
man if God wishes to be  known by  man.  The relationship  of man with God 
always involves free delimitation therefore that relationship must always be the 
product of God's loving will  in His free  purpose towards us.  Man is  always 
utterly dependent, then, upon the intention and free purpose of  God. 
It is necessary to consider further what Rahner means by the Person of  God: 
"The statement that God is a person, that he is a personal God is one 
of  the fundamental Christian assertions about God. ,,50 
Rahner  thinks  of the  Person  of God  in  two  ways;  firstly  whether  God  in 
Himself can be  called  a Person and  secondly whether He is  a Person only in 
relation  to  us.  If God  is  hidden  from  us  in  His  absolute  and  transcendent 
distance, then it follows that He is a Person who does not enter into the kind of 
personal relationship with us which we presuppose in our religious activity; in 
our turning to God in prayer and in faith hope and love. 
Clearly  God  who  is  the  absolute ground  of everything  is  radical  originality. 
The  Personhood  of God  is  not  an  individual  Personhood,  so  much  is  self 
evident.  The assertion that God is the absolute Person, who stands in absolute 
freedom with respect to everything He has created as different from Himself is 
similar to the assertions that God is;  absolute being,  absolute ground, absolute 
mystery, absolute good and the absolute, ultimate horizon within which human 
existence is lived out in freedom, knowledge and action.  All of  these absolutes 
define God in terms of  His self-sufficiency and not in relation to us.  God is not 
an  individual  person  because  he  does  not  experience  Himself as  defined  in 
49 
50 
Op.  Cit. p.89 
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186 relation to another nor indeed is He limited by  any other.  Again he  does not 
experience any difference from Himself because ultimately He is the difference, 
therefore  personhood  of the  individual  different  type  cannot  apply  to  God. 
However Rahner  is  very  strong  that  personhood  must  be  asserted  of God 
above all else: 
"Obviously the  statement that God  is  a person  can be asserted of 
God and  is  true of God  only if in  asserting and  understanding this 
statement we open it to the ineffable darkness of  the Holy mystery ... 
In this way we allow God to be person in the way in which he in fact 
wants  to  encounter us  and  has  encountered  us,  in  our individual 
histories, in the depths of our conscience and in the whole history of 
the human race. ,,51 
Rahner is clear that it is a gross error to consider that the absolute ground of  all 
reality  is  something  like  an  impersonal  cosmic  law,  an  unconscious  and 
impersonal structure of  things.  He stresses that to talk of  God as some kind of 
source which empties itself out without possessing itself, the notion of a blind 
primordial ground which cannot even look at us,  is  to talk of a notion whose 
model is taken from the context of  the impersonal world of  things.  It does not, 
he says,  come from that source in which a basic and transcendental experience 
is  really rooted; namely from a finite  spirit's subjective and free experience of 
itself  The  constitution of the finite  spirit  always  understands  and  expresses 
itself as  having  its  origins in  another.  It cannot interpret this  other as  being 
impersonal, but as the free personal source of its person. 
6.1.3 The Nature of Creation as a Revelation of God 
a) Rahner - Creation as Primary Delimitation 
Creation, for Rahner, is primarily about the passing on of God's freedom.  This 
passing on of freedom to creatures, constitutes God's love as  expressed in the 
revelatory act of delimiting that which is nothing,  into free  conscious,  (though 
finite),  spirits.  "Delimitation",  states  Rahner,  "comes  about  through 
51  Op.  Cit. p.75 
187 intentionality  as  an  act  of free  will".  God's  will  is  the  cause  of primary 
delimitation in  creation,  therefore,  we have at  the root of all  created being a 
living conscious will.  This act was a choice,  and as  a choice which was truly 
free,  it  may just as  well  'not'  have been made.  There could,  as  the result of 
God's will,  be nothing other than God.  Before there could be anything then, 
there had  to be the will  for  something to  exist.  This  is  Rahner's  answer to 
Leibniz's  question:  "Why  should  there  be  something  rather  than  nothing?" 
There is something rather than nothing because of  the will of  God. 
Delimination, by its very nature, as the passing on of freedom,  is also an act of 
love.  Will acting through love is the reason for delimitation in creation.  What 
God wills to do  in His act of delimitation is  to disclose Himself to the beings 
that are delimited.  The free self disclosure of God is the presupposition of  the 
being of man as a finite spirit.  Since the creative delimitation of all of creation 
is the result of  the free act of  God's will, then God's will is the inner factor in all 
of created being.  Being  comes  to  be,  by  God's  will  expressed  through His 
loving free act. 
Of course 'knowledge'  is  the nature and  content of the revelatory,  delimiting 
act.  Knowledge  opens up  being  for  existence,  however,  being  comes to  be 
through will.  The will  of God and the knowledge of God are the two factors 
involved in the creative delimitation; indeed they come together in the delimited 
being,  the  will  necessarily  affirming  the  knowledge.  This  necessary  and 
absolute affirmation of will  and knowledge takes place at the very foundation 
of human existence.  What this  means  in  effect  is  that man  must  necessarily 
affirm the knowledge of God  as  his  essential  constitution.  As  he  affirms  his 
own being he must necessarily affirm God's own Being. 
In  terms  of free  will  acting  through  a  particular  loving  intentionality,  the 
essential Being of God and  the essential being of man  coincide in  respect of 
luminosity  of being.  Luminosity  follows  from  the  equation  of being  and 
knowledge.  Being  and  knowledge  are  an  essential  unity  therefore  essential 
being  is  necessarily  knowable  and  therefore  luminous.  The  fundamental 
characteristic of  being is luminous self presence.  All being, of  necessity, can be 
known,  indeed all  being is  knowability;  with the union of being and  knowing 
constituting 'spirit'.  Spirit  is  the luminosity  of being,  this  is  a luminous  self 
presence.  Because of the essential constitution of man,  as  a finite,  delimited 
188 spmt,  created in  the knowledge of God,  man's  own luminosity,  his  own  self 
knowledge,  is  at the same time knowledge of God.  Man's luminosity of  being 
necessarily  coincides  with  God's  luminosity  of Being  therefore  he  has  the 
infinite capacity to receive a revelation from God. 
God in free autonomous power, then,  delimits the finite;  he reaches out to the 
finite spirits whilst standing in contra distinction to them.  The free delimitation 
of God is  passed  onto man in  terms of his  very constitution,  therefore when 
finite intellect knows God it does so based upon this free delimitation.  Man is 
constituted  by  the  primary  self revelation  of God  in  delimitation.  Man's 
essential  being  is  the product  of revelation,  whereby  essential  knowledge  of 
God passes to man constituting him a listener for further delimiting revelation. 
Man's will,  freedom,  power and capacity to know and be known is born in the 
delimitation of his  person by the Person of God,  and therefore man's being is 
continuous with God's Being,  in  the finite,  and  God is  truly the Father of the 
finite  spirits  in  creation  and  in  recreation.  His  loving  gift  to  man  is  man's 
freedom in relationship with God's freedom.  All being is the knowledge of God 
but only man is a conscious cognitive spirit who has free wilL 
b) Macquarrie's view of Creation as Emanation 
"Being (God) is not something that 'is' but rather a 'Letting-be' that is 
prior to  'is-ness'.. .  (This)  being  is  inseparable  from  beings  - it  is 
never  the  less  the  'fons  et  origio'  of all  beings ...  (therefore)  the 
beings are subordinate to and dependant on Being which lets them 
be.,,52 
God's letting-be is the way in which He goes out into His expressive mode of 
existence,  this  is  essentially  the  moving  out  of primordial  Being  through 
expressive Being to bring into being a world of  particular beings.  According to 
Macquarrie,  there is  no  such thing as  an undifferentiated  self enclosed Being 
(such a being could not really be called God and if there was such a being we 
could never know anything about it!).  God now exists as the differential of all 
being; and we are at the root of  the nature of  the numinous presence of  Being. 
52  Principles a/Christian Theology - John Macquarrie p.2l1 
189 The  numinous  is  the  immanence  of Being  in  the  beings;  whilst  Macquarrie 
states that this Being is  'letting-be' it  is  really the 'isness'  of being itself  The 
'isness' which  somehow transcends the beings  of its  existence perhaps as  the 
music transcends the orchestra. 
Macquarrie states clearly that only  a differentiated  (immanent)  God could be 
known,  an  undifferentiated wholly  other transcendent  God  could just not be 
known  by  human  beings.  Such  a transcendent  Being,  which  we  could  not 
really call God, would be outside of the human perceptive sphere.  Therefore 
for God to be God,  he  has to exist in  differentiation,  in the beings into which 
and  through which he  has  come forth.  Only  an  immanent  God will  do,  and 
indeed  can be  known.  But what  is  the nature  of this  knowledge?  Surely  it 
cannot in  all  honesty be called revelation?  Only that which is  utterly beyond 
human perception and therefore fully and absolutely hidden,  could be revealed 
in the true sense.  We contend that the immanence of God which is the Being 
of  the beings, cannot be revealed, it can only be recognised.  We propose, then, 
that Macquarrie's theology of  revelation is in reality a theology of 'recognition'. 
This recognition, which of course may  strike one with the force of something 
like a revelation, produces no new knowledge, as one would expect, merely the 
recognition of something which was up  to the point 'unseen'.  This results in 
seeing the same things in a different way! 
What is  the character of this new vision?  Presumably the recipients become 
aware of  being 'Let-be', they become aware of  their dependence on Being, who 
creatively lets them be.  This results in a new ultimacy in their being which, in 
tum, results in a new self-understanding.  But what of  the 'letting-be' itself, this 
expressive mode of God's Being?  The letting-be is the creative activity which 
presumably continues to  exist  in  the perpetual letting be  of the isness  of the 
beings.  It would  appear that the  letting  be  in  the  expressive  and  even  the 
unitive mode is essentially passive.  It appears that the letting-be, lets be more 
evil than good; it is difficult to understand how the letting be of destruction can 
be  creativity?  It  remains  to  consider just  how  the  letting-be  lets  be  in  its 
primordial mode, the answer appears to be by emanation.  The letting be lets be 
by an emanation of  itself, indeed the emanation of  the essential being of  Being, 
appears to be the only understanding of the nature of creation that would be 
appropriate to Macquarrie's theology.  He discusses two models of creation: 
'emanation' and 'making'. 
190 i) Emanation and Making 
Macquarrie  in  effect  argues  for  a  balance  to  be  struck  between  these  two 
models which represent immanence and transcendence.  Making is the Biblical 
model,  which is  of a  transcendent  God who  makes  everything in  the world 
including the world itself.  He makes  either directly  or by 'the word'.  This 
analogy of making stresses the distance and difference of Being between God 
and His creatures, it represents the creation, as a free act on the part of God. 
Existence is  seen  under this  model  as  consisting  primarily  in  a  relationship 
between  Being  and  the  beings.  This  is  a  relationship  of a  wholly  other 
transcendent God and his creation which he made as 'good'.  The image which 
Macquarrie associates with this  model  is  that of a  craftsman who makes an 
article for use. 
The  image  which  Macquarrie  associates  with  emanation  is  that  of the  sun 
sending forth its rays.  This is a concession to the transcendence of God as the 
sun clearly transcends its rays.  However, emanation represents God as being 
immanent, and is understood as the dialectical opposite of 'making'.  Through 
emanation God, as it were, changes into His creation and is no longer external 
to it.  In the emanation process He has 'put himself into his creation', so much 
so that he has become vulnerable and has placed himself at risk. 
Macquarrie  considers  that  the  'making'  model  which  represents  God's 
transcendence is suitably modified by the concept of  '  emanation': 
53 
"Our teaching has been that Being combines its transcendence as the 
mysterious  act  of 'letting-be'  with  its  immanence  as  present  and 
manifest in all the particular beings.  The image of making presents 
us with the idea of transcendent letting-be, but, unless it is  suitably 
modified,  it  may  entirely  miss  the idea of an  immanent  presence. 
The image of emanation insists,  on the other hand,  that God really 
does put himself into the creation, so that the risk of creation really 
matters to him,  and he is  really involved in  it  and  concerned with 
it. ,,53 
Op. Cit. p.219 
191 There  appears  to  be  a  confusion  of terms  in  this  summary.  'Letting-be'  is 
equated with 'making' yet these concepts are definitely opposite.  On the other 
hand,  'letting-be'  and  'emanation'  correspond  appropriately  and  logically. 
Indeed the concept of letting-be  seems  to  demand  the  'emanation'  model  of 
creation;  and  in  this  case  it  has  to  do  with  the  immanence  and  not  the 
transcendence of God.  In effect,  Macquarrie appears to have  a  reductionist 
position in respect of  the creation as 'made' by God. 
The  central  and  fundamental  doctrine  of 'creatio  ex  nihilo'  undergoes  the 
reduction of being understood as merely the result Qf a polemic with Platonic 
dualism;  Macquarrie favours  the idea of creation 'emerging'  from  a  formless 
undifferentiated matter, as he considers that such a substance would be similar 
in nature to God in  any case,  so  much so  as to be indistinguishable.  He does 
think that the doctrine is useful existentially because of the dialectical opposite 
of Being and nothing.  Being is fragile and weak, the risk God took in letting 
Being be and indeed letting Himself be extended into the beings, is that at any 
time being may collapse into nothing.  Nothing is that which opposes being and 
in this  sense being came out of nothing and therefore has the nothing or the 
nullity as  an  essential element  of its  nature.  If we were to  allow that Being 
emanated from nothing however,  we would have to say that God is  nothing, 
this may be in order especially, as Macquarrie would have it that God is not an 
'isness' he is not a being as we are beings and he is not a thing.  However this 
nothing that opposes man's being and seeks to claim him back, appears to be an 
alien and evil element.  55 
Macquarrie asserts letting-be's goodness: 
"This letting-be is both his (God's) creativity and his love.  It is out 
of his goodness that God bestows being on others, his self giving to 
the beings. ,,56 
If being  emanates from  God as  rays  from  the  sun  and  God is  therefore the 
source  of being,  then  how  can  there  be  a  risk  in  terms  of nothingness? 
Especially if God is not arbitrary and external but close and intimately involved 
in the beings which he has lovingly let be.  Macquarrie's position here appears 
54 
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It is  interesting  to  compare  Karl  Barth's  understanding  of evil  as  'das 
nichtige', in this respect.  See C.D. 4.3 
Principles a/Christian Theology - John Macquarrie p.22S 
192 to resemble that of  Karl Barth whereby the nothingness is at war with God as it 
seeks  to  draw being  back  to  itself  For Barth however,  the  nichtige  is  in 
opposition to God and not ofRis own nature as Macquarrie teaches.  This does 
appear to be an instance oflogical inconsistency in Macquarrie's thinking. 
In contrasting the two models of  'making' and 'emanation' Macquarrie sought to 
strike a balance between the transcendent Creator and the immanent Creator, 
but this,  excellent  perspective fails  to be borne  out as  Macquarrie makes  it 
quite  clear  that  God  in  no  way  is  external  to  creation,  and  therefore 
Macquarrie's interest lies  entirely with the immanence of God in  creation as 
understood by the creatures themselves in terms of  their own existence: 
"We  must  get away  from  the  idea  that  a  doctrine  of creation  is 
intended to tell us about the production of beings who belong in  a 
world,  by a being who is  outside of the world...  The question is 
not,  How did the world begin? or Who made it?  but rather,  What 
does it mean to be a creature?,,56 
6.1.4 - The Epistemology of Revelation 
We need  not  be detained  by the  process  of outlining  the  elements  of both 
Macquarrie's and Rahner's epistemology of revelation,  as  they are sufficiently 
well discussed elsewhere.  We may therefore simply summarise their respective 
positions. 
a) Rahner's epistemology of revelation 
We may sum up Rahner's position by saying that if knowledge is Being, then 
the  being  we  are,  is  already  the  knowledge  of God,  our  creator.  Our 
'luminosity of  being' which is our 'being present to ourselves', and our ability to 
behold and know ourselves is  at the same time the luminosity of God's being. 
Therefore we coincide with God in terms of  our luminosity, which is our spirit, 
and we are open to God's further revelation to us.  Knowledge is in words, as 
words are the only vehicle capable of  bearing the essential Being of God to the 
56  Op.  Cit. p.212 
193 essential being of  man.  Only in words can we reach beyond our limitation into 
the transcendental beyondness or otherness.  This is achieved by the capacity of 
words to bear the negation, which is the only means of our going beyond our 
present  limited  being,  and  reaching  out to  the  supra-mundane,  transcendent 
reality. 
Man must receive the first instance of  knowledge through his senses before the 
spiritual  abstraction  may  take  place  in  the  cognitive  realm.  Therefore  his 
finitude  still  claims  him  and  he  must  work  to  gain  knowledge  through 
discursive  means  which  are  open  to  perversion.  A  perfect  and  explicit 
knowledge  of God,  through  the  primary  delimitation,  is  in  this  light,  not 
possible for man.  Secondary delimitation by further revelation in man's history, 
must take place if  man is to rise above his finitude. 
Involved  in  this  epistemology of revelation,  are the  elements  of knowledge, 
will,  love  and  freedom.  These  elements  are  the  essentials  of the  delimited 
reality; which is  creation.  Both the knowledge and the will,  which are passed 
on to man, are free.  God's loving intention and purpose are brought to focus in 
His willing the universe into being.  Indeed God's loving free will is the reason, 
and the only reason, for the creative act.  This free will is passed on to man as 
the essential inner factor of his  constitution as  a finite  spirit, which consists of 
His faculty of abstraction, judgement and choice.  Knowledge, however, is the 
substance of the Being.  Being holds  together in  the unity of love;  and  love 
appears only as the increasing quality of freedom.  The 'word' is the means of 
the  communication of knowledge  in  freedom;  without  itself interfering  with 
that freedom. 
It is  knowledge of God that is  the  constitution of spirit  beings  and  it  is  the 
knowledge  of the  freedom  which  is  passed  on  through the  intentionality  of 
God's gracious will.  Essentially the knowledge of God, whilst coming through 
revelation  by  the  word,  is  a  knowledge  of an  incomprehensible  mystery;  a 
silence.  It is a personal silence, because it is not alien but purposive in the unity 
of love, however, it is always transcendent, it is always the infinite depth.  It is 
always  that which  is  absolutely  and  ultimately  beyond  man  as  that which  is 
wholly other.  Man by virtue of his  constitution as  a spirit  delimited by  God 
must  necessarily  seek to know more  of the  essential  Being  of God  through 
194 God's spoken word in man's personal history or of  God's silence, in terms of  his 
(man's) metaphysical questioning. 
b) Macquarrie's epistemology of revelation 
Knowledge  of God  through  revelation,  according  to  Macquarrie,  is  of an 
object/subject kind.  It is not an essential revelation of one person to another, 
but the presence of a terrible and awesome mystery which draws close to man 
by  its  own  initiative,  coincidental  with  man's  psychological  preparation  or 
attunement, through the mood of anxiety.  As man draws the ultimate in upon 
himself;  at  the  same  time  ultimate  Being  draws  near  to  man  in  numinous, 
mysterious,  presence,  which breaks in  on man's  awareness.  In  a sense  what 
Macquarrie describes here is an 'anthropology' of  revelation, whereby, man,  for 
the first time, recognises the presence of  Being, which was all the time, already 
manifest in the beings.  This recognition constitutes, in our view,  the essential 
nature of a new epistemology;  for now man recognises,  and therefore knows 
something,  which  was  unrecognised  and  unknown  before.  This  new 
recognition produces a new awareness and a resulting new self-understanding. 
Such an epistemological transformation is understood to be, at the same time, a 
transition from inauthentic to authentic life. 
Man in this object/subject epistemological encounter is thrown to the ground of 
Being itself, to arise with a reoriented existence and a new,  more ultimate and 
profound, identity.  In this encounter there does not appear to be any increase 
of being  passed  to  man,  merely  a  new  perspective  on  the  world,  including 
himself  Correspondingly no  new knowledge is passed to man in any essential 
sense; he simply sees the same things in new depth. 
6.2 Analysis 
It can  be  seen  that  there  are  essential  and  fundamental  differences  between 
Macquarrie  and  Rahner.  Perhaps  the  most  basic  is  that  of the  difference 
between the 'word' and the 'numinous presence'.  For Macquarrie, there can be 
no  possibility  of revelation  through  words.  For  Rahner  there  can  be  no 
195 possibility of any other medium of revelation, human words are the immediate 
vehicle of the self-communication of God.  This is  so  for Rahner because he 
understands the word as the coincident point of  the Spirit of God and the spirit 
of man,  for Macquarrie on the other hand,  the coincident point is  the beings 
themselves,  therefore revelation takes  on an  'event'  nature  as  participation in 
being is the revelatory medium.  If one fully participates in Being then one has 
an 'authentic life',  but such a condition only arrives when one has  come to the 
quality of  consciousness which can only be described as 'nothingness'.  57 
It is  interesting to  consider that this  difference  may  be that of the difference 
between word and sacrament, words are heard and sacraments are participated 
in,  yet whilst there is  no  doubt considerable force in  such a comparison,  it is 
unlikely  that  Macquarrie  and  Rahner  would  have  thought  in  these  terms. 
According to Rahner, the human word, through the 'via negationis' and at the 
same  time  the  negation  of  the  present  limit,  is  the  means  of  man's 
transcendental  experience  of both  himself and  God.  Whilst  the  numinous 
ontological awareness, which is the essential element in Macquarrie's revelatory 
dynamic  is  a presentation of the  immanence  of God to  man's  consciousness 
which produces a new  depth of ontological immanence  in  man's  own being. 
This  new  depth  is  at  the  same  time  a  new  height  which  lifts  an  essential 
pantheism to a 'higher pantheism' or 'panentheism'. 
Rahner's understanding of  the word as constituting the inner principle and logic 
of  the beings which appear is echoic of idealism, yet clearly Rahner is strongly 
influenced  by  the  'logos'  motif in  Scripture,  on the  other hand  Macquarrie's 
whole thrust appears to derive from  an  underlying materialism complete with 
its  characteristic  deterministic  lack  of the  freedom  of persons  including  the 
Person of God.  In this  respect,  we find  Rahner's  argument for the  essential 
element  of the  freedom  of the  Person  of God  entirely  convincing  and 
Macquarrie's  attempt  at  a  rationalisation  of freedom  through  redefinition, 
unconvmcmg. 
Macquarrie's phenomenological mysticism takes us deeper into the immanence 
of Being whereby Being itself or Holy Being' or 'God' is  understood as being 
so close to the beings which appear that He 'is' the beings which appear.  This 
57  Both of  these positions could be seen to have some scriptural warrant. 
196 radical  immanence  is  recognised  through  the  sinister  awareness  of various 
affective states or conditions of the human mind.  The depth of mystery and 
shuddering awesomeness of the realisation of such a closeness produces what 
Otto  terms  "a  stupor in  the  mind,  a  blank  wonder  that  defies  reason  and 
words".  Such  extreme immanence  effects  an  ontological  redefinition  of the 
known reality which then acts as the centre of ontic and noetic reorientation. 
When  given  linguistic  shape  this  is  properly  a  theology  of the  radical 
immanence of God and not primarily an anthropology.  Such a theology, in our 
view, is valid (though dangerously unbalanced) as God's immanence in creation 
'is'  radical,  and indeed is  arguably the radical facticity of the apparent reality. 
The theology of the radical immanence of God in  creation, by its very nature, 
must  rely  on phenomenological  description,  which  is  its  strength  but  at the 
same time its weakness as it  is  dependent on truth claims  and involves value 
judgement on the basis of  human psychology. 
Rahner's  theology,  on  the  other  hand,  IS  properly  a  transcendental 
anthropology.  Rahner is  wholly  concerned with human transcendence which 
presupposes  the  absolute  transcendence  of  God,  indeed  God's  free 
transcendence is the condition for the possibility of  human transcendence.  This 
position is  consistently argued in Rahner's powerful metaphysic which is  built 
upon the  basic  elements  of the  equation  of knowledge  and  Being  and  the 
coincidence of divine  and  human spirit  which  is  revealed  in  human language 
(words).  Rahner's understanding of  the transcendence of God is no less radical 
than Macquarrie's understanding of  God's immanence. 
Ironically,  the exact same problem exists for both Rahner and Macquarrie in 
respect of the integrity of a real revelation of God to man.  As we have seen 
with Rahner the problem exists in terms of his  concept of 'luminosity of being' 
and  the relative  coincidence  of the essential  being  of God and  the  essential 
being  of man.  If Being is  essentially  and  wholly  knowable  and  indeed  has 
knowability  as  its  essential  nature,  then  no  fresh  revelation  or disclosure  is 
necessary or even, apparently possible.  Whilst Rahner has dealt fully with this 
problem (see section 1.2 e) he fails to remove all doubt in the matter. 
As far  as  Macquarrie's position is  concerned,  in  respect of the knowledge of 
Being through  participation  and  recognition,  it  is  hard  to  see just how  an 
historical revelation, which is  in nature a disclosure or self communication of 
197 God  in  terms  of his  transcendent  hiddenness,  in  fact  takes  place.  It seems 
rather,  that  God's  radical  immanence,  which  is  His  closeness  to the beings, 
breaks into human awareness through participation and recognition,  which is, 
of  course, a form of  disclosure, but can it be properly termed revelation. 
We see too the stark contrast between Macquarrie and Rahner in terms of  their 
respective understandings of the nature of creation.  In Rahner's  concept of 
delimitation and Macquarrie's concept of emanation the two opposite positions 
are  seen,  in  foundational  perspective,  in  respect  of human  creaturehood.  In 
such  a  creation  dynamic  the  essential  element  of creaturehood is  that  God 
enters into and is intrinsic to the human mind (as it seeks to transcend itself), in 
Rahner's case; and God enters into and is intrinsic to the human corporeal state, 
in Macquarrie's case (the fine arts are examples of  human attempts to transcend 
this state). 
Revelation  is  understood  by  both  Macquarrie  and  Rahner  as  being  an 
epistemological  dynamic  (as,  of course,  it  is  understood  by  most),  the 
difference  lies  in  the precise  epistemic  nature,  as  effected  by  the revelatory 
encounter.  For  Rahner,  since  knowledge  is  Being,  revelation  effects  an 
essential  and  constitutional  change  in  man,  whereas  for  Macquarrie,  since 
Being  is  necessarily  in  process  of becoming  (apart  from  revelation),  the 
revelatory encounter produces only an attitudinal change which results in a new 
and richer perspective.  Both would concede to revelation as opening the way 
to a higher consciousness, which to one is  essential to increased being and to 
the  other,  non  essential.  Similarly,  both would  agree,  though  for  different 
reasons,  that revelation,  variably understood,  is  of soteriological  significance 
and indeed is salvific in power. 
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COMPARISON AND CONTRAST OF 
MACQUARRIE AND RAHNER 
ON THE NATURE OF FAITH 
7.1 - The Nature of Faith 
7.1.1 The Nature of Faith in Macquarrie 
Faith,  according  to  Macquarrie,  originates  in  the  revelatory  encounter  of 
certain individuals,  or prophets,  with the numinous  presence of Holy Being. 
This  particularisation  of the  universal  revelation  of Being  develops  and 
perpetuates  through  a  particular  symbolism,  ritual  and  doctrinal  systematic 
theology into the proportions of a world faith  or religion.  The followers of a 
particular faith receive the revelation through repetitive thinking which involves 
a  thinking  back  or  meditation  into  the  nature  and  content  of the  original 
encounter  and  its  ritualistic/theological  development.  In,  "The  Faith  of the 
People of God", Macquarrie states that faith has a four fold structure.  Firstly, 
there  is  a  basic  element  of commitment,  which  implies;  loyalty,  obedience, 
attachment  and  trust-towards.  Secondly,  the  commitment  is  to  an  'ultimate 
concern'.  Thirdly,  a  commitment  to  our  'ultimate  concern'  involves  the 
acceptance of some beliefs which arise from  reflection  on the ground of our 
concern.  Fourthly, faith is always experienced as 'response'; it is not something 
that we can create ourselves. 
1 
The  Faith of  the  People of God - John Macquarrie  SCM press  1978, 
p.llf 
199 It can  be  seen  that  Macquarrie  understands  'faith'  in  universal  and  general 
terms.  Faith is primarily an ontological phenomenon, it is indeed an existential 
attitude  towards  'Being',  concerning  the  whole  of man's  own  being.  It is 
fundamentally a response to the revelation of Being which  comes through a 
certain quality of man's 'ultimate concern'.  Nothing new happens in respect of 
the  revelation  of Being  but  those  who  come  to  faith  in  and  through  this 
revelation come to see the 'same things' in a different way.  Since Being reveals 
itself to man by its own initiative, there is an objective element to the resulting 
faith which is of  course a subjective disposition: 
"Faith is  awakened in us by a reality outside of ourselves  claiming 
the allegiance of  that which is most deeply within ourselves. ,,2 
The revelation of Being which awakens man's subjective response,  is  then,  of 
the initiative of  'Holy Being' itself  Yet the medium of  the revelation appears to 
be the meditation of  man in respect of  his 'ultimate concern'.  The nature of  this 
meditation as an 'affective state', a mood, or a means of  attunement, has already 
been discussed in  chapter four.  The precise term 'ultimate concern',  which is 
borrowed from Paul Tillich, remains to be dealt with here. 
F  or a definition of the term 'ultimate concern' we can do no better than quote 
Tillich in full: 
2 
3 
"Ultimate  concern  is  the  abstract  translation  of  the  great 
commandment 'The lord our God is one; and you shall love the lord 
your God with all  your heart,  and with all  your soul  and  with all 
your mind,  and  with  all  your  strength.'  The religious  concern  is 
ultimate; it excludes all  other concerns from ultimate significance; it 
makes  them  preliminary.  The  ultimate  concern  is  unconditional, 
independent of any conditions of character,  desire or circumstance. 
The unconditional  concern is  total:  no  part of ourselves or of our 
world is excluded from it; there is no 'place' to flee from it.  The total 
concern is  infinite:  no  moment of relaxation and  rest is  possible in 
the  face  of a  religious  concern  which  is  ultimate,  unconditional, 
total, and, infinite. ,,3 
Ibid. 
Systematic Theology - Paul Tillich,  SCM press 1988 vol.la  p.llf  - Tillich 
quotes  Matt. 12:29  &  PS.139  R.S.V  Macquarrie cites this ref in his use 
of  the term 'Ultimate Concern'. 
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of religious  experience."  He argues  that the  object  of religious  experience 
becomes at the same time the subjective of religious experience.  The attitude 
of  ultimate concern is that which the ultimate gives itself to  .  We have therefore 
an objective reality which is  given context in  the subjective reality of human 
attitude.  We are primarily dealing with an attitude which is different because it 
has ultimate proportions.  It is a total, existential attitude which concerns man's 
be-all and end-all.  Nonetheless it is an attitude of  the human mind,  at the same 
time however: 
'lilt is the object of  total surrender, demanding also the surrender of 
our subjectivity while we look at it.  It is a matter of  infinite passion 
and interest' (Kierkegaard), making us its object whenever we try to 
make it our object. ,,4 
In terms of the objective  reality  itself,  however,  there is  little  but the  most 
vague  of descriptions,  leaving  the  stress  on  a  special  quality  of human 
consciousness as the focus and occasion of  the revelation of Being to man and 
his response of faith.  It must be understood however that this overwhelming 
and momentous event of revelation,  and of grace,  is  not at  any  time held by 
Macquarrie to be anything other than by the creative initiative of Holy Being 
(God).  Therefore,  he  considers  the  total  existential  attitude  of ultimate 
concern, which he calls "faith", as being a gift from without: 
"(Faith)  ...  is  made  possible,  and  so  granted,  by  the  gracIOUS 
approach and self-disclosure of  Being. ,,5 
The  gift  however  is  paradoxical  in  nature.  God  gifts  His  self-disclosure 
(revelation) to man,  which awakens,  and is  the content of,  faith,  but man,  to 
fully receive this gift,  must work out its content in terms of his  own cognitive 
understanding; 
4 
"faith  does  have  its  cogrutlve  dimension,  here  again we meet  the 
paradox of  a gift which is at the same time a task. The knowledge of 
God in Christ is the gift of  his revelation, but every disciple has a 
Ibid. 
Principles  of Christian  Theology  - John  Macquarrie  p.345.  See  also 
Studies in Christian Existentialism p.247ff 
201 duty  to  clarifY  and  work out the  content  of his  faith  the  best  he 
can. ,,6 
We can say,  too, that faith discovers a meaning for existence which is  already 
given with existence, but not seen outside of  faith: 
"The  difference  between  the  attitude  of religious  faith  and  the 
attitude of  the man without it is also clear.  Religious faith,  as faith in 
being, looks to the wider being, within which our existence is set, for 
support;  it  discovers  a meaning for  existence that  is  already given 
with existence. The alternative attitude looks for no  support beyond 
man. ,,7 
The attitude of  faith then is seeking ultimate meaning for life,  clearly it seeks to 
make  sense  of existence,  the  sense,  as  seen  through  the  new  attitude,  lies 
beyond man and his own resources.  If  the attitude of faith is on such a quest, 
for meaning  and  self fulfilment,  it  follows  that it  relates to  the very heart of 
man's being. 
"The  attitude  of faith  arises  from  the  very  structures  of human 
existence itself  It is  not a luxury but arises from  our innate quest 
for selfhood and for meaningful existence. ,,8 
Faith is  therefore demanded by the very structures of human existence as  the 
only facility for attaining wholeness and  meaning for human life.  In this root 
we have the very wellspring of  the different faiths or world religions. 
According to Macquarrie  "religious faith"  is  a universal  reality,  it  is  'faith in 
Being', therefore the great world religions, as being different expressions of  this 
one reality, are all equally valid as ways to wholeness and meaningful existence, 
and therefore, presumably, to salvation.  Religion, by Macquarrie's definition is 
an expression of  the experience of 'Holy Being' touching human life, this is the 
experience of  the holy, grasping man therefore: 
6 
7 
8 
9 
"The essence of religion .. .is the self-manifestation of Being as this 
is received and appropriated in the life of  faith. ,,9 
Op.  Cit. p.374 
Op. Cit. p.80 
Op. Cit. p.81 
Op.  Cit. P  .161 
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revelation of Being
lO
)  there is  genuine knowledge of God and genuine grace. 
All religion flows from the self-giving of  the one God in revelation.  It follows 
that,  if all  religion  flows  from  God,  the  different  religions  with their  vastly 
varying  doctrines  and  practices  are  merely  different  expressions  of the  one 
universal faith.  This is  'Faith in  Being',  it  is  a faith  arising  and  expressing  a 
relationship  with the  'immanence  of God'  as  that  immanence  is  present  and 
manifest to man in nature, or more primordially in 'Being' itself 
a) How does this understanding of 'faith' relate to the self-revelation of 
God? 
This question has its ground and its 'whence' in the above discussion, therefore 
it is already, primarily, addressed.  Faith in any religious sense is the term which 
describes the relationship  between God and man.  Macquarrie is  right  in his 
statement that faith is man's response to God's self-revelation; he is also right in 
that the faith response arises in respect of  the very centre and structure of  man's 
existence and  being.  Further,  faith  has  its  subjective and  objective elements, 
indeed the precise character of 'a faith'  is a product of the coincidence of these 
two elements.  The meaning and purpose of man's  existence must be derived, 
and follow,  from the nature of that coincidence.  However, the articulation of 
the  coincident  interface  depends  on  the  nature  of  the  accompanying 
hermeneutic.  We are involved in the first instance and the last,  as  a result of 
the  freedom  which  the  gracious  God  confers  on  man,  in  non  compulsory, 
interpretative activity.  It is inevitable, this being the case,  that some form and 
shape of  pluralism will always be the order of  the day.  Yet it is far short of  the 
mark to  demand  that  God  always  reveals  himself in  the  one way  (although 
variably expressed) - this follows the line of  reasoning which claims that God is 
One,  and therefore all that he does in revelation always applies, universally, to 
all men.  It seems clear that the precise nature of  revelation is vital to the nature 
10  Macquarrie does  argue that a  'general'  revelation is  hardly possible;  but 
only on the grounds that every human person does not necessarily receive 
the  universally  available  revelation.  General  revelation  therefore is  not 
intrinsically impossible. 
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character of a particular  faith  defines,  for  us,  the  nature  of the  relationship 
between God and Man, of  which this 'particular' faith is the vessel.  A universal 
faith whose structures apply generally,  which arises  from  a universal  'natural' 
(or general)  revelation,  such  as  that  which  Macquarrie  advocates,  leaves  us 
with a vague shadowy mystical  and  largely undefined  relationship  with God. 
Such roots in 'Ontological Mysticism' are conducive to agnosticism as they fail 
to define theism.  The new existential attitude (faith) which results is concerned 
more with the  fe-definition  of humanity  than  the  Being  of God.  It is  clear 
however, that those who come to the place (mood) of a universal nihilism,  as 
those  who  do  not  believe  nor  have  religious  faith,  are  mostly,  radically 
translated, through the revelatory encounter, to people of belief and faith.  We 
contend that in reality this belief and faith rests entirely on the single doctrine 
that Holy Being (God) exists,  and little else.  This particular, root doctrine, is 
expanded,  in  due  course,  through  the  particular  and  available  symbols  (of 
Being), into a comprehensive ritualistic and doctrinal system, which gives form 
to a world religion. 
Our  argument  is  that  this  type  of faith,  which  anses  from  the  kind  of 
(creational)  revelation  which  Macquarrie  teaches,  has  as  its  object,  the 
'immanence  of God'  in  creation,  and  we  have  termed  this  type  of theism; 
'Ontological  Mysticism'.  Classical  Theism,  on  the  other  hand  arises  from 
historical  (logos)  revelation,  in  which  a  certain,  though  not  comprehensive, 
definition of God is given through the divine logos, as it encounters and enters 
the human  logos.  Such  historical  revelations  come  in  many  different  forms 
culminating in the incarnation of  the divine Logos Himself  Through the logos, 
God  speaks  explicitly  and  definitively  to  man,  and  He Himself Chooses  the 
essential symbols through which man must understand and  receive Him.  For 
example, Bread and Wine and the Cross.  In this instance the word defines the 
sacrament whereas  in  Ontological Mysticism  the  sacrament  remains  implicit, 
non thematic,  and undefined;  it  remains  at the level  of 'feeling'  and  therefore 
emotion,  rather  than  thought  and  therefore  cognition,  as  is  the  case  with 
Classical Theism. 
In other words, the nature of faith  which Macquarrie propounds involves the 
relationship  with God in  His immanence,  in  and  through creation.  This  is  a 
mystical  vague  and  shadowy  relation  which  finds  major  expression  in  the 
204 relationship that man has with himself, with his inner and most essential being. 
Perhaps this could be expressed as  a relationship with God-within-us.  It is  a 
finding  of the  way  to  full  human  realisation  which  Heidegger  refers  to  as 
'authentic  life',  through  the  new  awareness  and  recognition  of the  ultimate 
reality of Being itself (God) as  the principle of meaning  and  grace for finite 
being.  Since no  new knowledge of God is  imparted through God's (Being's) 
self revelation to man,  then  authentic  life  cannot  be brought  about  through 
anything  additional  or  further  to  the  knowledge  already  available  to  man. 
Therefore, it must, and indeed does, involve only a dispositional change in man. 
"F aith is an existential attitude", it is entirely by this attitude difference that man 
passes  from  inauthentic  to  authentic  life.  Through  the  divine  'numinous' 
encounter  with  Holy  Being  the  existential  attitude  which  was  producing 
inauthentic life, is subject to a metamorphosis.  In this way man receives a new 
vision (he sees the same things in a new way) but he does not receive any new 
knowledge of God,  or indeed of himself,  or the world he  is  a  part of.  He 
understands (or comes to) the same things in a different and new way whereby 
he  now recognises  Being  (God).  He has  seen  that,  'Being  in  total'  exists; 
therefore  'God'  exists  for  him,  whereas  before,  God  did  not  exist  for  him. 
Salvation, from within this particular thought frame, is understood as existential 
fulfilment,  the achievement of full  human potential through the choice of the 
right  and  most  wholesome  and  indeed  fruitful  possibilities  open  to  us. 
Salvation, appears to be, essentially, this worldly, relating to temporal, earthly, 
reality,  with only  a very fleeting  and  equivocal relation to the eschatological 
and ultimate reality which, we contend, lies before all of  mankind. 11 
b) How is this particular faith (that is, Macquarrie's understanding of 
faith) given expression in the praxis of those who hold it? 
The universal, general faith which is available to all  of mankind in and through 
the universal (though not universally received) revelation of  Being to man,  is an 
existential attitude whereby authentic life is achieved and lived in.  In authentic 
11  It is interesting to note that the negative expression of the free existential 
choice  leading  to  authentic  life  and  fulfilment  continues  by  increasing 
degree,  in Macquarrie's view,  to ultimate annihilation.  Inauthentic  life, 
then,  leads  to  final  annihilation.  See Principles of Christian  Theology 
p.366f 
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universal  faith  are  the  various  great,  world  religions,  which  are  therefore 
different  understandings  and  articulations  of 'authentic  life'.  To  answer  the 
question posed as  our heading  in this  section,  we must  consider the  specific 
religions,  in  terms of the praxis  arising  from  the  particular understanding  of 
faith, in respect of  the variances of  cultural symbolism. 
Our concern however,  is  not with the praxis itself,  but with the  question of 
'how'  this  natural universal faith  is  given expression in  terms  of praxis.  The 
praxis  itself could  be  described,  in  general  terms,  as  the  coming to  and  the 
living  in  a  unified  existence  of wholeness  and  completeness,  where  human 
potential is fully realised.  "Authentic selfhood implies an attaining of a unified 
existence in which potentialities are actualised in  an  orderly manner and there 
are  no  loose  ends  or  alienated  areas." 12  The  condition  for  this  authentic 
selfhood  and  unified  existence is  the  existential  attitude  of commitment  and 
acceptance which is  'faith in being'.  The man of (religious) faith is  concerned 
with the wider being which is the context of his  own being.  This immediately 
implies community: 
"The bond which holds together the people of God and  constitutes 
them a community is  different from anything like race,  language or 
common interest.  The bond is faith,  and the people of God can be 
described as fundamentally a community of  faith. ,,13 
The precise nature of the praxis  is  understood in  terms  of the nature of the 
bond. 
The  panicular  faith  is  given  expression  m  the  praxis  of the  particular 
community  in  terms  of the  nature  and  character of the  particular bond  that 
holds the community together.  The existence of the particular bonding finds 
concrete actualisation in and through the institutions which grow up.  We are 
saying then,  that revelation produces the response of faith,  which if true and 
authentic (and of course in its  primary form,  i.e.  as  given to the founder of a 
world  religion)  finds  expression  in  and  through  the  praxis  of a  religious 
institution which grows up  around the particular faith  expression.  (Always in 
terms of  the particular essential symbols of  the particular culture of  origin.) 
12 
13 
Principles of  Christian Theology - John Macquarrie p.77 
The Faith of  the People of  God - John Macquarrie p.ll 
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institution is what Macquarrie terms 'embodiment', this represents the necessary 
facticity  of human  existence.  Paul  referred  to the  facticity,  or being-in-the-
worldness,  of human existents as the 'earthen vessels'.  Macquarrie cites him: 
"we have this treasure in  earthen vessels,,14.  These are the earthen vessels of 
our embodied existence: 
"To  exist  is  to exist  as  an  embodied  person,  involved whether we 
like  it  or not  in  institutions,  laws,  customs  and  the  like.  Man's 
possibility  is  always  inseparable  from  his  facticity,  and  this  means 
that  he  needs  earthly  structures  - institutional,  ritual,  legal, 
customary, and of  many other kinds - in which his spiritual activities 
can be channelled and stabilised. ,,15 
"(These)  'earthen vessels'  of religion bring  grace  and  revelation to 
bear on the life of a society within the world.  Without such worldly 
means faith would remain vaporised and disembodied,  and certainly 
no communal faith could long survive in such a manner, and still less 
could it be effective. ,,16 
The praxis of a particular revelation-faith,  according to Macquarrie,  is  of the 
nature of  earthly 'organisational structures'.  The faith which produces authentic 
life,  it  appears,  comes to rest in  rather ordinary,  and  even  secular apparatus. 
Macquarrie uses the term 'association' to describe community. An association is 
an  "organisation established  within  society for the  achievement  of conscious 
and therefore limited purposes. ,,17  The community of  faith then, takes the form 
of an 'association' and  an  associations can not operate apart from institutions; 
but surely the  elements  of a religious  institution are  different  from  that of a 
secular institution? 
14 
15 
16 
17 
"Among  the  structures  of institutionalised  religion,  one  would 
mention the ritual acts in which the cult embodies itself; the sacred 
books which  are the repository of revelation,  though not identical 
with revelation; the creeds and  dogmas in which the common faith 
has expressed itself  There are also offices, for every religion ... has 
Principles oj Christian  Theology  - John Macquarrie pp.372-4  - CorA:7 
R.S.y' 
Ibid. 
Borrowed from The Modern State by RM MacIver pAf 
Principles ojChristian Theology - John Macquarrie p.375 
207 its  leadership  and  its  special  functions.  Finally  there  must  be  a 
minimum  of commonly  accepted  laws  or  rules,  to  ensure  the 
coherence and proper functioning of  the apparatus." 18 
It  would  appear  then,  that  a  religious  association  differs  from  a  secular 
association only in the precise content and nature of its rituals, writings, creeds 
and dogmas.  It is  not surprising that there are essential structural similarities 
between religious and  secular associations in  respect of religions born from  a 
natural  revelation  of the  immanence  of God.  Such  a  revelation-faith  event 
could  be  expected  to  issue  forth  in  a  religion  which  could  not  be  easily 
distinguished  from  the  normal  structural  shape  of the  particular  culture  and 
society of origin.  Christianity which,  in accordance with Macquarrie's schema, 
is  primarily  the  expression  of the  revelation  of 'Being'  given  to  Jesus  of 
Nazareth, finds its praxis in and through the institutions which are of  the shape 
of  Western culture. 19 
Macquarrie states: 
"To recognise the necessity of earthly forms in religion is  simply to 
accept who we are and  where we are,  this  is  more properly called 
'worldly' Christianity than the kind of religion that aims at bypassing 
all  institutional  forms  in  the  hope  of expressing  itself in  a  purely 
'spiritual' manner. ,,20 
What Macquarrie  is  arguing  here,  is  that there  can  be  no  possibility  of 'the 
kingdom of  God' existing on earth.  Therefore the praxis of  'God's people' (that 
is  the followers  of a major world religion),  is  an  earthly  praxis which  exists 
within society and is in terms of  the particular society'S culture.  The 'rituals' of 
religion will be taken from,  and be similar to, the rituals of  the particular culture 
of the  particular society.  The 'way'  (via)  to  God  appears  to be a particular 
expression of  the outworking of  human society at large.  It could be argued of 
course,  that  any  society comes to be,  through  some  Founder's  revelation  of 
18 
19 
20 
Ibid. 
Christianity appears to be embodied in the structures of Western culture; 
which  is  confusing  as  Jesus  was  born  into,  and  presumably  had  His 
revelatory encounter in terms of the symbols of,  Eastern culture?  It does 
strike  the  mind  that  this  factor  counts  against  Macquarrie's  schema  of 
revelation, the alternative being that Western Christianity is a perversion of 
the original, primordial revelation given to Jesus. 
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208 Being.  However,  the  argument  is  a  circular  one  in  view  of the  scheme  of 
events whereby any  revelation of Being to a particular prophet (recipient)  is 
given expression through the symbols of the particular social culture of which 
the prophet is a member.  The question is then, which came first the culture or 
the revelation?  And the circularity is  seen as  inescapable.  This remains  as  a 
weakness  in  Macquarrie's  position.  The  further  theological  weakness  is  the 
absence of  an eschatological dimension in the equation: 
"Presumably the  eschatological  idea  (the  kingdom  of God)  would 
not need the apparatus that man needs while he is still 'in via'.  In his 
vision of heaven the writer of Revelation says,  "I  saw no  temple in 
the city, for its temple is the lord God the Almighty,  and the Lamb". 
Voltaire's  hero  in  the  land  of Eldorado  saw  no  temples  and 
wondered if the people had any faith in God;  he was told that they 
had  indeed  but  that  their  worship  was  constituted  by  their  daily 
work.  But what might be true 'at the end' ... is not true of  man as he 
actually lives  in world history and to pretend that it  is  would be a 
strange  kind  of angelism.  To  try  to  escape  or bypass  historical 
institutions is  impossible for two  reasons  - man's  embodiment  and 
also his sin. ,,21 
Macquarrie goes on to  cite  Calvin  to  support  his  case:  "Calvin  had  a more 
realistic  and  less  utopian  view  of the  matter when  he  recognised  that  civil 
government  is  necessary to man's  condition,,?2  Because of the fallen,  sinful 
condition  of man,  Macquarrie argues,  not  unreasonably,  for the necessity  of 
religious  institutions;  but  need  the  institutions  be  'worldly'?  Apparently  so. 
Macquarrie  argues  that:  "The  faith  of the  community  can  continue  and  can 
make itself felt  in  the world,  only if it  is  willing  to  embody itself in  worldly 
institutions. ,,23 
Clearly  there  is  much  truth  in  this  argument,  however,  it  is  in  the  precise 
difference of  the church (or the body of  Christ) and the world, that the church's 
essential value and indeed meaning, lies.  Therefore the church and indeed the 
individual Christian, which/who is  in the world,  is  called,  at the same time,  to 
be  separate  from  it.  Such  an  imperative  is  echoic  of the  New  Testament 
teaching that the kingdom of God is both here, in the present, and yet to come, 
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209 in the future.  There is  therefore the principle of ambiguity,  in  respect of the 
kingdom of God,  which Macquarrie concedes in  other respects,  but denies in 
this one.  The statement of Jesus:  "My Kingdom is not of this world,,24 is  also 
clearly  understood  to  pertain  to  the  structure  and  value  of the  Christian 
institution.  Our contention here is that which is  called 'eternal life',  whilst still 
in the temporal realm,  is  styled in  respect of the tension between realised and 
ultimate eschatology.  Such a tension, which itself differentiates between those 
who are inside the Christian (faith)  community and those who are outside,  is 
not  accepted  by  Macquarrie;  apparently  where  there  is  embodiment  in  the 
world  and  sin,  there cannot  be the Kingdom of God,  therefore he  does  not 
distinguish between the people of God and society as  a whole.  The institution 
of the  church then,  can be thought of as  a worldly institution,  and  a normal 
aspect of  the institutions of  secular society.  This is Macquarrie's 'via media' and 
as such it comprises the 'risk' of faith for the Christian community.  This risk is 
involved in the life of  faith lived in the earthen vessels of  the world; it is in this 
factor that Macquarrie sees the greatness of  the Christian faith: 
"Part of  the greatness of Christian faith is precisely its ability to take 
up  the  earthly  and  to  make  it  the  vehicle  for  holy  being's  self 
expression. ,,25 
Macquarrie  argues  that  Christianity  is  the  most  materialistic  religion, 
epitomised  by  the  incarnation  itself  Macquarrie  cites  William  Temple: 
"Christianity is the most avowedly materialist of all the great religions."26  We 
have then a revelation, a faith,  and a corresponding praxis of  a materialistic and 
immanentist  type,  indeed  such  a  mundane  'faith'  praxis,  which  rests  on  the 
underlying concept of 'embodiment' can only be pantheistic; and as such fails to 
do  justice to  God's  transcendence in  historical  relationship  and  juxtaposition 
with the  earthen  vessels  of human  finitude.  In  our view,  what  Macquarrie 
describes  for  us  is  'natural  religion'  which  is  desperately  poor  of the 
supramundane,  transcendent  and  infinite  reality.  Macquarrie's  'via  media'  is 
indeed  strange;  one  must  ask,  just  what  is  it  the  middle  of?  The  term 
'embodiment' would seem suitable as a catch word for Macquarrie's theology as 
a whole, as his whole materialistic, pantheistic expression is concerned with the 
nature and character of  the 'embodiment' itself, and not with the self revelation 
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210 of  the transcendent God Himselt! (which would clearly enrich man with a 'new' 
knowledge of God, which he was without access to, prior to God's revelatory 
act in his history). 
7.1.2 - The Nature of Faith in Rahner 
We have  seen (see Chapter 5) that,  according to Rahner,  man is  a  "Potentia 
Oboedientialis" for a possible word of God spoken in his personal history; his 
essential being is  that of a  hearer of the word of God.  It follows  that the 
character of  faith therefore, must be 'hearing'.  Karl Weger says, in this respect: 
"The  character  of faith  as  hearing  is  interpreted  a-posteriori  and 
empirically on the basis of certain dogmatic statements which reveal 
that what is addressed by this word of  'faith-as-hearing' seems almost 
to  be  a  formal  ability  to  understand  some  true  statement  that  is 
comprehended insofar as it is made familiar to the hearer in a correct 
legitimate and suitable way. ,,27 
The object of faith  as far  as  the Roman Catholic  church is  concerned is  the 
Church's doctrines; faith,  for them, is therefore, belief in these doctrines.  The 
reference  to  the  a-posteriori  and  empirical  mode  of interpretation  of the 
actuality of faith  is  the position of the RC  Church.  Rahner argues for an  a-
priori capacity to believe,  and for God's revelation of Himself as  primordially 
taking place  at the finite  level  of the finite  creature.  The basic  constitutive 
factor at this level is  God's freedom which is passed on to man at his creation. 
Weger again: 
27 
"It is only possible if  there is an ontological deification of  man which 
is  already present in freedom,  even though it has not been accepted 
by  that  freedom  in  faith.  It  is  possible,  in  other  words,  if the 
fundamental  datum  of man's  ultimate  sphere  of knowledge  and 
freedom within which he expresses his  existence is transcendentally 
deified.  Faith  can,  in  the  sense  of an  analogous  experience,  be 
brought about by a lasting gift of grace by God to man,  that is  by 
means of  this supernatural existential factor (which at the same time 
also  contains  the  transcendental  aspect  of  God's  revelation  of 
Karl  Rahner - An Introduction  to  His  Theology  - Karl  Heinz  Weger, 
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211 himself).  The  spatio-temporal  and  historical  revelation  of God's 
word comes to man who  is  also,  on  the basis  of his  supernatural 
existential  element,  always  a-priori  and  transcendentally-oriented 
towards this word of  God in history. ,,28 
The key concept here is that of an "inner, a-priori, grace" whereby there exists 
within man a supernatural, transcendental element which corresponds to God's 
objective revelation.  Otherwise put,  there is  both an internal (in man's being) 
and external, word of God.  The internal being is the whence of the capability 
to  receive  and  understand  the  external.  Therefore,  there  is  a  supernatural 
transcendental a-priori faith capability, innate to man.  This is faith-as-hearing. 
a) Faith-as-Hearing - more precisely defined, in terms of the elements of 
its nature. 
The elements are;-
1.  Faith is courage. 
2.  Faith is hope. 
Therefore faith is 'courageous hope'. 
3.  Faith is self-abandonment. 
4.  Faith, is total commitment to the person of  Jesus Christ. 
5.  Faith as necessary for salvation. 
6.  Faith is 'inner grace'. 
7.  Faith lies between rationality and emotion. 
8.  Faith is identical with the realisation offreedom. 
28  Op. Cit. p.103 
212 (faith is the united and fundamental totality offreedom itself) 
Rahner's  central tenet of the  existential  experience  of faith  is  the  concept of 
'Courageous Hope'.  The element of courage is  a radical relation to the whole 
of  human existence: 
"Christian  faith,  contrary  to  popular impressions,  is  really  a  very 
simple  affair  and  difficult  only  because  it  is  the  concreteness  of 
something that we can describe as  'courage'.  All  this assumes that 
this kind of courage is understood in all its radicalness in relation to 
the totality of  human existence. ,,29 
By courage, Rahner means the reaching out beyond the marks of individuality, 
to  the  totality  of existence.  This  courageous  reaching  is  facilitated  by  a 
particular category of concepts.  For example;  Freedom,  Love,  Joy,  Fidelity, 
Responsibility and Fear.  These are not individual definitive terms; examples of 
terms that define individual reality are;  Hydrogen, beetle,  house etc.  The first 
group  of terms involves the whole person,  they are  radical  in  their meaning, 
they  involve  the  human  'person'  in  reaching  out  beyond  the  individual, 
definitive, particular reality. 
"When he is very busy a person can in fact allow himself to be driven 
by the variety of the individual things in his life and by the detailed 
knowledge of these things and of the particular moods they create; 
he can't forget himself in all the thousand details of  what he is doing 
'0  and what he has. ,,~ 
Yet it is not possible to be human and to continually and completely avoid the 
substantives of  the first group, though man tries to suppress them they present 
themselves to his  consciousness in  the form  of irritation and frustration.  No 
human being can live only with the second group of terms, the first group are 
unavoidable because:  "this  whole  existence  of man  as  one  and  the whole  is 
always  imposed  on the person; in  his  discouragement  or irritation  he  cannot 
simply leave them (the first group of  terms) aside as incomprehensible. ,,31  Man 
cannot continually shut the door on the existential reality which involves the 
totality of his  existence,  in favour of the individuality which he wants to cling 
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213 on to.  Being involved in Love, Freedom, Fidelity, Joy, Fear and Responsibility, 
in the totality of his being,  even although their meaning is obscure and beyond 
him, he cannot avoid them, as they point to the totality of  human existence. 
"The term 'courage'  is  also  one  of those unavoidable terms which 
point to the mysterious totality of human existence.  What is to be 
shown is  that this  courage,  if it  is  understood in  its  necessity  and 
radicalness, is precisely what Christian theology describes as faith. ,,32 
In this respect Paul Tillich states: 
"Faith is the state of  being grasped by the power of  being itself.  The 
courage to be is  an  expression of faith  and what 'faith'  means must 
be understood through the courage to be.  We have defined courage 
as the self affirmation of being in spite of non-being.  The power of 
self-affirmation is the power of  being which is effective in every act 
of  courage.  Faith is the experience of  this power. ,,33 
Courage,  clearly is  a part of what it means  to  be human there is  a greatness 
within  man  which  could  be  described  as  an  inner  grace,  a  supernatural 
transcendental  element.  Courage  rises  up  from  within,  it  is  a  universal 
phenomenon which applies to the religious and the irreligious alike.  'Courage' 
always points towards the mysterious totality of  human existence. 
Rahner considers that the principal terms for the Christian are; 'faith', 'hope' and 
'love'.  All  three terms  and  each of them  apart  look to the one whole  basic 
realisation of Christian existence.  Each of  these three terms acquires its radical 
and full  meaning only when it is  'elevated' into the other tw0
34
.  The key term 
for this  "age  of creative  freedom,  (and)  of openness  towards  the  future"  is 
"Hope". 
32 
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"If...  someone really and radically hopes, he also believes and loves, 
since  hope  has  always  also  an element of knowledge  of faith  as  a 
constituent of itself and only reaches its own plenitude when hoping 
means love for the other or when loving is  hope for the other.  If 
today perhaps hope is the 'principle' the key term, the term 'courage' 
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214 promptly springs to mind.  For courage in the last resort is hope, and 
hope is not hope if  it is not courageous. ,,35 
This kind of courageous hope is not a way of escape or a feeble consolation, it 
is  dynamic  in  that  it  involves  decision,  deed,  and  venture.  The  courageous 
element is the key to the precise nature of  this courageous hope.  This courage 
represents the distance between the actual human capacity and power, to carry 
out the task of self actualisation, (salvation) and the actual, life's deed itself  It 
is  then,  the  courage  for  the  deed  which  relates  to  the  totality  of human 
existence  in  the  face  of the  distance  or  gap  between  the  actual  and  the 
possible.
36  This is where the hope comes in,  and this courageous hope is faith. 
The context of this hope is freedom and it is a hope which is at the very heart 
of  existence.  Rahner states: 
"This  courageous hope  ...  is  itself faith  in  the properly theological 
'7  sense of  the term. ,p 
Rahner  states  that  whilst  many  theologians  would  agree  that  this  hopeful 
courage has the character of trusting belief, they would shrink from describing 
it,  as itself, faith.  They concede that hopeful courage is essential for a person's 
existence  but  they  argue  that  faith  is  assent  to  God's  Personal  revelation. 
Human hope,  they  say,  is  from  below and  thus  cannot  be  accepted  as  faith. 
Rahner argues that this hope is in fact faith in God's revelation: 
35 
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"Hope is  centred on the uttermost reality,  on everything,  in fact  on 
God  Himself,  transcending  all  particular  individual  realities  and 
individual goods which man encounters in the course of  his history ... 
(this) hope is in God Himself  (The fact) that the movement of  mind 
and freedom, transcending all individual realities that can be grasped 
successively,  does  not in  the last  resort  peter out into  the void  or 
need eventually to come to a stop at any individual reality however 
significant,  as  the  sole  really  possible  fulfilment,  at  a  'creaturely' 
good, but will reach God Himself, the original fullness  and  creative 
ground  of all  individual  realities;  (and)  that  God  Himself is  the 
absolute future of  our hope, (means) that these things do not amount 
simply to an obvious possibility of our own,  but purely and  simply 
(to)  grace.  God  Himself  is  the  innermost  dynamism  of this 
Ibid. 
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215 boundless movement of hope towards Himself  The very fact  that 
God Himself thus becomes by grace the dynamism and goal of our 
hope means that revelation has taken place. ,,38 
For Rahner, God is the ultimate ground of  the hope which all  men and women 
possess in order that they may live in a world which is in despair.  They cannot 
give up the ground of their hope and they cannot continually avoid the act of 
hope which is the unconditional acceptance of  their existence.  God is the most 
real, the ultimate goal, whether this is known or not. Hope, which is faith,  is a 
necessary constituent of human existence and  it  cannot provide a goal of its 
own creation, the goal already 'is', a-priori: 
"And yet the ultimate ground of my hope in the act of unconditional 
acceptance of my existence, this I can reasonably call God.  God is 
far from being thereby the projection of my hope into the void.  For 
the moment I think of  Him as a projection, He becomes meaningless 
and ineffective in my life.  On the other hand I can no  more give up 
the ground of  my hope than I can surrender the hope itself  So  God 
must be what is  most real,  what embraces and  sustains everything. 
For  only  thus  can  he  be  the  ground  and  goal  of my  hope  as  I 
conceive it in the act of  trust by which I accept my own existence. ,,39 
"Hope is the act whereby personal existence is accepted in trust and 
hope is therefore ... a letting go of oneself into the incomprehensible 
mystery of  God. ,,40 
This letting go of oneself on the basis of courageous hope through 'the act of 
trust'  is  faith  as  self-abandonment.  Rahner understands  this  act  of absolute 
trust and therefore self-abandonment, principally as being in the person of  Jesus 
Christ: 
"Christianity is convinced that, despite every reason for scepticism in 
man,  we  may  with  innocent  trust  and  total  abandon  surrender 
ourselves to one man in absolute dependence. ,,41 
Rahner argues that there is no other historical personality in which mankind can 
trust that their hope is fulfilled,  apart from Jesus.  "We cannot find any other to 
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216 name except the one presented by the witness of  the apostles. ,,42  Faith is then 
understood as  absolute trust and  dependence inion another 'person'  and  that 
person, who  has various names,  can only be Jesus Christ.  Faith then is  total 
commitment to Jesus Christ: 
"Faith occurs as a result of an absolute trust, by which one commits 
oneself to the  other  person  and  thereby  embraces  the  rights  and 
privileges  of such  a  total  self abandonment  with  a  hope  without 
reservations.  This  extends  to  all  areas  of existence,  which  on 
account of  the absolute quality of  this self abandonment, do not need 
to be seen in-toto nor to be specified in advance. ,,43 
Jesus is trusted and hoped in as the Omega of  the development of  the universe, 
He is the meaningful conclusion to history.  "The most diverse approaches to 
Him are  all  intended to be gateways to the one radical  self-committal of the 
whole  man  to  Jesus  Christ,  and  it  is  only  in  this  sense  that  they  have  any 
meaning at alL ,,44  In the explicit and ultimate sense faith must be in the person 
of Jesus Christ, and this faith is necessary for man to be saved.  Rahner holds 
that no man can be saved outside of  Christ, this indeed is one of  the elements of 
Rahner's dilemma of salvation, the other being that God wills that all  will  be 
saved! 
"We  find  ourselves  then  in  the  following  theological  position; 
genuine faith  in  revelation  is  necessary for  salvation  - mere  'good 
will'  based on a purely natural knowledge of God is  by  itself quite 
inadequate for salvation and justification - But it  is  not immediately 
plain  what  exactly  is  meant  by  faith  universally  necessary  for 
salvation. ,,45 
Apparently  there  are  two  kinds  of faith  involved  in  Rahner's  theology,  one 
could  be  said  to  be  'ultimate  courageous  hope  for  existence'  and  the  other 
'explicitly  Christian faith  in  Jesus  Christ,  crucified  and  risen'.  Rahner claims 
that these  are  really  two  moments  of the  one  Christian faith.  The  unifying 
factor is an inner dynamic of  the grace of  God in an men.  This inner movement 
is  of the  character  of the  coincidence  of the  'ultimate  courage  to  hope  for 
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217 existence' and 'ultimate faith in the risen Christ'.  The central point however is 
hope: 
"When there is  such a courage for total hope in the success which 
itself is grace rooted in the incalculable freedom of another - of God 
- and  precisely  in  this  way  hoped  for  in  the  ultimate  courage  of 
existence, then faith in the Christian sense is present and achieved in 
freedom. ,,46 
All men have an inner experience of faith whether they are aware of it  or not, 
according  to  Rahner  a  man  has  a thousand  experiences  which  he  does  not 
reflect on and indeed represses and pushes to the edge of  his consciousness; but 
a man is  aiways summoned by  divine grace, which lies ever before him  and is 
continually operative in his life: 
"Therefore grace  not  only  possesses  an  inner  point  of connection 
with human existence but also a seed in every man out of which the 
whole history of human salvation and revelation may grow, both in 
Christianity and in all the great religions. ,,47 
There is an inner movement of divine grace operating in all human finite spirits 
and  this  inner  movement  is  itself a  great  mystery.  This  is  a  mysterious 
'movement  towards  God'  which  all  cannot  ultimately  resist.  As  for  the 
Christian: 
"From the inmost heart of his  experience a Christian knows that he 
himself is  sustained  by  this  mystery  in  his  trust  and  hope  for  the 
fulfilment of his being.  So  he  calls this movement towards God at 
work within him 'grace', the Holy Spirit.  The movement directed to 
the  immediate  presence  of God  he  interprets  as  faith  hope  and 
love. ,,48 
We  might  ask:  Where  is  this  inner  movement  of grace  - which  is  faith  -
precisely located in the human subjective?  Rahner's answer is that it is located 
between rationality and  emotion - the cognitive and the conative elements of 
the finite spirit.  Rahner says:  "the notion of faith itself forbids one to regard it 
as  an  absolutely irrational phenomenon and  to locate it  outside the sphere of 
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218 reason,,49  Faith and rationality have something to do with each other.  Rahner 
quotes Rom 12.1: "faith is a reasonable act of  worship".  Emotion is defined by 
Rahner  negatively  in  respect  of rationality:  "emotion  signifies  everything  in 
human  consciousness,  both  individual  and  collective  which  escapes  the 
control...  of rationality. ,,50  Therefore whilst  emotion is  primarily in  harmony 
with rationality the aspect of  emotion which Rahner states as the other element 
of the in-between faith,  is  the part of the  emotion which is  not rational  and 
therefore  cannot  be  thought  through  and  organised,  therefore  it  cannot  be 
adequately  analysed.  This  definition  of emotion  includes  feelings  of the 
greatest variety: 
"Particular moods and individual dispositions,  patterns of behaviour 
biologically determined  and  conditioned by historical  development, 
impulses  and  repressions,  aggression  and  fears...  unthought  out 
ideals,  opinions,  realms  of understanding  which  are  biologically, 
radically or socially conditioned.  A completely different category of 
emotion,  however,  must  also  be mentioned:  the reality of freedom 
and its objective expressions in history. ,,51 
Faith, then, relates both to the rational and the irrational-emotion, the volitional 
aspect comes in also  in  respect of the aspect of emotion,  which is  'freedom'. 
"Free decisions and  objective expressions inevitably are based on something, 
and  a  condition of their possibility  lies  in  all  the  emotional  states  described 
above. ,,52  We  can  say,  then,  that  Faith  has  three  elements,  which  are; 
rationality,  emotion and  will.  The  'in  between'  draws  from  some  form  and 
shape of  synthesis, of  the three. 
Considering the relationship of  faith and the particular type of  emotion which is 
'freedom', Rahner develops this to the point that faith and freedom are identical. 
He defines freedom as follows: 
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"The essential nature of freedom is  not in itself a neutral possibility 
either to  act  or not  to  act  with  regard  to  this  or that  particular 
categorial object  of choice  experienced  in  an  a-posteriori  manner. 
Although freedom is always mediated through a particular categorial 
act, it consists much more in the capacity of the spiritual subject to 
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219 exercise  definitive  control  over  himself,  even  if  this  self-
determination occurs in space and time, in the length and breadth of 
an individuals history and therefore cannot be tied down by personal 
reflection to a particular moment of a man's  life.  The subject and 
object  of freedom  is  constituted  by  the  whole  man  acting  with 
ultimate decision.  Freedom means the capacity to act once and for 
all  for  oneself  without  being  a  mere  point  of intersection  of 
influences  which  come from without.  _.  if we take this  concept  of 
freedom for granted, then our thesis runs that according to Christian 
understanding the realisation of  freedom is identical with faith. ,,53 
Faith,  then,  is  the "united and  fundamental  totality of freedom  itself,54  This 
means, for Rahner, that when a person unconditionally accepts himself for what 
he is and does not reject himself in a final denial, and does not utter an ultimate 
protest in total scepticism or despair,  faith is  present.  It must be understood 
here that when a person rejects himself he  also  rejects God and if he  accepts 
himself he also accepts God (and vice versa). 
Rahner is  arguing that faith  is  a 'free act';  the essential nature of this freedom 
exists in and through the transcendence of  the finite spirit to the person of  God. 
Freedom then is  "freedom for  or against  God".55  God is  the goal of human 
freedom;  awareness  of this  reality  is  experience  of what  is  really  meant  by 
'God'.  Human  transcendence,  according  to  Rahner,  is  ordered  to  God  in 
knowledge  and  freedom  (freedom here  of course is  understood  as  emotion) 
therefore freedom and faith are identical. 
53 
54 
55 
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"This transcendence is raised up by the self-communication of God 
and brought into direct contact with His presence  ...  (therefore) if a 
man  freely  accepts  himself as  he  is,  even with regard to  his  own 
inner  being  whose  basic  constitution  he  inevitably  has  not  fully 
grasped, then it is God he is accepting.  As long as it is  a matter of 
the  conscious,  though  unreflective,  acceptance  of  God  in  His 
authentic self-communication, the acceptance is of  the self-revelation 
of  God and is therefore faith. ,,56 
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220 b) 'Anonymous faith' and 'explicit faith' 
The  whole  question  of 'anonymous  Christianity'  is  dealt  with  in  chapter  9, 
therefore the particular aspect  of 'anonymous  faith'  need  only be considered 
briefly here. 
Rahner's definition of  anonymous faith: 
"By  anonymous  faith  is  meant  a  faith  which  on the  one  hand  is 
necessary and effective for  salvation( under the general  conditions 
which  are  required for justification and  final  salvation)  and  on the 
other  occurs  without  an  explicit  and  conscious  relationship  (i.e. 
conceptual  and  verbal  and  thus  objectively  constituted)  to  the 
revelation  of  Jesus  Christ  contained  in  the  Old  and/or  New 
Testament  and  without  any  explicit  reference  to  God through  an 
objective idea of  God. ,,57 
Rahner argues that such an anonymous faith  can exist;  which is  sufficient for 
salvation.  This mode of faith has,  intrinsic to it,  both the obligation and the 
dynamism to find full  realisation in explicit faith.  None-the-Iess the sufficiency 
for salvation does not demand the actualisation of  this realisation provided that 
the  person  is  not  to  blame  for  this  non  achievement.  Rahner's  underlying 
presupposition is that the universal and supernatural will of God is working for 
human  salvation;  because  of this  fact,  the  unlimited  transcendence  of man, 
which we have already seen as having its goal in  God,  is  raised up by divine 
grace in order that the possibility of  saving faith in revelation is made available. 
Man however, who is to be saved by this 'anonymous faith',  must freely accept 
his own unlimited transcendence.  (So lifted up to the presence of  God.) 
We are dealing then,  essentially, with two factors, of such an anonymous faith, 
which are:  the will of God for salvation and the transcendent character of the 
human  spirit.  Rahner  models  a  synthesis  of the  first  factor;  the  accepted 
doctrine that faith in the revelation of Christ (or faith in the person of Christ) is 
necessary for the salvation of sinners,  in terms of the second factor; of human 
transcendence.  This is what Rahner calls the inner movement of  grace which is 
operative  even  in  spite  of the  particular  man  who  is  unaware  of it.  The 
acceptance that is required for salvation is the acceptance of such a man's own 
57  Op. Cit. p.52 
221 self in his  own unlimited transcendence.  In other words he  accepts the inner 
movement,  from  below,  as  it  were,  as  it  is  raised  up  by  grace,  albeit  sub-
consciously, to the immediate presence of  God: 
"If  a  person,  by  a  free  act  in  which  he  accepts  himself 
unconditionally in  his  radical reference to  God raised up  by grace, 
also accepts the basic finality of this movement of his  spirit,  even if 
without reflection, then he is making a genuine act of  faith. ,,58 
This faith which is held to be genuine and sufficient for salvation is 'anonymous 
faith'.  What's  to  be  said  then  of 'explicit  faith'?  It does  seem  somewhat 
superfluous,  by this line of argument.  The answer is  that 'historical Christian 
revelation' is the underlying basis and foundation of transcendental revelation. 
Indeed: 
"If historical Christian revelation is  understood as  the process  ...  by 
which  the  transcendent  revelation  becomes  present  to  itself  in 
history,  then there exists no  insuperable obstacle to the solution of 
the problem.  Transcendent and  historical revelation have  a mutual 
reference: the former acquires historical shape in the other (similarly) 
...  historical revelation only realises its proper character through its 
transcendent  counterpart,  since  it  is  only  effective  for  salvation  if 
through  it  the  transcendent  self-communication  of  God  finds 
historical expression. ,,59 
Because of the nature of this  mutuality it  is  impossible for  a person to have 
anonymous  faith  when  its  explicit  (thematic)  expression  in  Christian  belief 
(explicit faith) is culpably rejected. 
7.2 - Comparison of Maquarrie and Rahner 
An essential  similarity between Macquarrie and  Rahner,  concerning  'faith',  is 
that  they  both understand  it  as  being  primarily  and  essentially  implicit  and 
universal, in respect of all of  mankind.  Both consider faith as being intrinsic to 
the very structure of human existence itself.  They differ however in respect of 
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222 the precise means  of actualisation of faith  in  the individual  life.  Macquarrie 
argues that the faith,  which is already a-priorily or innately rooted in the human 
subjective,  is  awakened  by  the  encounter with the  objective  reality  of Holy 
Being  (either  primordially  or repetitively).  The  faith  which  was  implicit  or 
dormant  in  the  human  subjective  becomes  explicit  and  active  through  this, 
apparently,  historical  encounter.  Faith then,  according to Macquarrie,  arises 
through  some  form  of synthesis  of subjective  and  objective  elements.  The 
objective  encounter  has  the  effect  of transferring  man's  innate  and  a-priori 
knowledge  of 'wider'  Being  from  his  sub-conscious  realm  to  his  conscious 
awareness; as his new principle of 'authentic' life.  Rahner understands no  such 
synthesis, for him faith is a gift of God which passes to man as intrinsic to his 
essential,  delimited,  constitution as  a finite  spirit.  Faith is therefore a product 
which  comes  with  the  created  constitution  of man,  under  the  guise  of 
'courageous hope'.  It is  true that faith  or courageous  hope  can  exist  either 
implicitly or explicitly but all that is required to effect the transformation of  the 
one  to  the  other  is  that  the  individual  courageously  affirms  his  own  total 
existence; there is therefore no necessity for an objective element. 
A further  essential  difference  is  that,  for  Macquarrie,  the  object  of faith  is 
'Being'  (or  wider  Being),  therefore  he  understands  faith  in  terms  of an 
ontological universality;  which  permits us  to term his  concept of faith  as  an 
universal 'natural faith'.  For Rahner,  on the other hand,  the object of faith  is 
always,  and  only,  the  person of Jesus  Christ.  Faith  is  always  faith-in-Jesus-
Christ either implicitly (anonymously)  and  consciously unknown,  or explicitly 
and consciously known.  Everyone therefore, is by definition, either a Christian 
or an anonymous Christian, irrespective of  whether he is  a member of another 
religion or is  a (non culpable) atheist.  It should be said  however,  that whilst 
Macquarrie's understanding of faith is ontological and general in its primordial 
nature,  it  can  only  be  actualised  in  and  through  a  particular  religious 
community.  It, therefore, becomes particular in this way, but at the same time 
it  remains  universal  in  that  it  is  essentially  faith-in-Being;  the  particularity 
pertains only to the particular nature and  character of the  expression of this 
universal faith.  In the terms,  'natural faith'  and  'anonymous faith',  we sum up 
this particular difference between the two theologians. 
223 7.2.1 - Faith as Self-Affirmation 
We believe that it is safe to claim that the concept of 'self-affirmation', which is 
a key aspect of Rahner's understanding of faith,  is  also  a fundamental though 
underlying  element  in  Macquarrie's  position.  According  to  Macquarrie,  the 
individual recipient of 'primordial revelation' becomes attuned to the reception 
of revelation through the mood of angst,  whereby the individual  comes to  a 
nihilistic view of  existence as meaningless and valueless.  He comes to the place 
of nothingness in respect of his  own being.  It is  from  this  affective state (of 
inauthentic life) that he is awakened to the wider context of  Being itself, by the 
objective initiative of  Holy Being.  What he receives in this mystical ontological 
experience is a new 'self understanding' whereby he passes from a negative to a 
positive existential attitude.  This, in effect, must be a kind of  self-affirmation in 
the  face  of Being  itself,  whereby  the  individual  involved,  comes  to  a  new 
acceptance of  himself in the wider context of  Being-in-total. 
Such a one is transformed from despair to hope, which Macquarrie describes as 
an:  "affirmation of the future,,60.  This affirmation is understood by Macquarrie 
in  general  and  universal  terms  in  respect  of human  existence  as  a  whole, 
however,  it  has  meaning  only  in  so  far  as  it  relates to the individual who  (in 
faith) is hoping for the future; this affirmation then, must, by definition, involve 
the self-affirmation of the hopeful  one.  The  difference  between Rahner and 
Macquarrie, in this respect, is that the positive self-affirmation, in Macquarrie's 
view,  arises from the dark,  despair of nihilism,  which encounters wider Being; 
whereas with Rahner,  it  arises from  an  inner courage of being,  which merely 
asserts itself 
Heidegger's  term  which  corresponds  to  Rahners  'self-affirmation',  IS 
'resoluteness', he states: 
60 
"This  reticent  self projection upon one's  own most Being-guilty in 
which  one is  ready for  anxiety is  'resoluteness'.  Resoluteness as  -
authentic-being-one's-self,  does  not  detach Dasein  from  its  world, 
nor  does  it  isolate  it  so  that  it  becomes  a  free  floating  'I'. 
Resoluteness brings the self right into its  current concernful Being-
Christian Hope - John Macquarrie, pA 
224 alongside what is ready-to-hand, and pushes it into solicitous Being 
with Others. ,,61 
This  'authentic  life'  attitude  of 'resoluteness'  echoes  Macquarrie's  'new  self-
understanding'  which  results  from  the  revelatory  encounter with Being,  and 
produces authentic life.  Resoluteness also  carries the sense of 'the courage to 
be'.  Further, in Heidegger's discussion ofDasein's being as 'Care', he describes 
his concept of "Being-ahead-of-oneself'; this concept has to do with ones own 
potentiality for  being,  and  as  such,  the  concept  of self-affirmation  arises  in 
terms of  one's freedom of self-realisation: 
"In  Being-ahead-of-oneself  as  being  towards  ones  own  most 
potentiality-for  -Being,  lies  the  existential-ontological  condition  for 
the possibility of  Being-free for authentic existential possibilities. ,,62 
The  self-affirmation which we are claiming  as  being in  some way inherent in 
these Heideggerian concepts is clearly not an affirmation of  the individual over 
and against others, rather it is an acceptance of  the self as being with others.  It 
is not, and can not be,  an isolated attitude of the self,  but rather it is a attitude 
towards  the  potentiality  of authentic  life  as  a  Being-with-others  in  a  self 
affirmatory, yet caring (for them) way.  None-the-Iess what this 'Heideggerian' 
thought involves is man's facing up to the reality of  his being-in-the-world with 
the sufficiency of force to release him from inauthentic to authentic life.  This 
involves acceptance of  the reality of  his existence as a Being-in-the-world, and 
the affirmation of  his individuality in the face of 'averageness' or 'everydayness', 
which seeks to swallow up his existence in banality. 
7.2.2 - The concept of faith as 'Hope' 
Hope, to Rahner, is the act of faith whereby a person unconditionally accepts 
his existence in its totality.  Hope therefore, is the means of the affirmation of 
self,  in the face of  being in total; its concern is the gap between the actual task 
of self actualisation and the finite  human power to carry out the task.  Hope 
reaches  out  beyond  itself to  God,  who  is  its  ultimate  ground;  its  power 
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225 therefore lies,  not in man,  but solely in God Himself.  It follows that hope can 
truly be called 'faith', and as  such, of course, its capacity lies wholly within the 
range  of human  possibilities.  Hope  is  the,  apparently,  innate  facility  in  all 
human beings  whereby they reach  out beyond themselves  and  to Rahner  all 
forms  of this  reaching  out  are  essentially  reaching  out  to  God  who  is  the 
ultimate goal of all reaching.  Such reaching beyond is,  according to Rahner, a 
supranatural transcendental capability, therefore hope is a supranatural element 
of  'inner grace' in man. 
Macquarrie does not equate hope and faith as precisely as Rahner.  In his book; 
"Christian Hope",  he  seeks  to  expose  its  nature,  both as  a universal  human 
phenomenon and as  a theme of the Christian Faith.  It can be seen that whilst 
Macquarrie does not expressly treat hope and faith as  synonyms, his treatment 
of 'hope'  could  equally  apply  to  'faith',  and  therefore  he  is  comparable  with 
Rahner in this area. 
a) Hope as a universal human phenomenon 
The  nature  of Rahner's  universality  of faith  IS  equalled  by  Macquarrie's 
universality of  hope.  This universal hope in its various forms is directly related 
to  'Christian hope';  and  the precise  nature of the relation will  be seen to be 
Macquarrie's  equivalent  of  Rahner's  'anonymous  faith'.  Of  this  hope 
Macquarrie says: 
63 
"Before  anything  is  said  about the  specifically  Christian  hope,  we 
shall  try  to  grasp  the  nature  of  hope  as  a  universal  human 
phenomenon,  one  which  appears  in  many  forms  and  has  many 
objects from the most trivial to the most profound.  Then,  when we 
are in  a position to go  on to reflect on Christian hope, we shall be 
conscious of how it is  related to all  the other hopes of the human 
race, and we shall be less likely to fall  into the error of separating it 
off as  a highly peculiar kind of hope having nothing to do  with the 
hopes that belong to our everyday life in the world. ,,63 
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226 And generally: 
"If Christianity - or any other religion - brings revelation in the sense 
of  disclosing the new and letting us become more aware of  what had 
previously been hidden from  us,  then we must be careful to let it 
speak. ,,64 
Clearly Macquarrie is arguing for the corrective of  letting every religion speak, 
in  order that there may be a general  sharing of the particular expressions  of 
Being in the various world religions.  The universal hope which is  differently 
expressed can then be seen in the different expressions, and the precise relation 
of  one hope to the other will be clearly understood.  It appears that all religions 
and  therefore  all  hopes,  according  to  Macquarrie,  are  equally  valid.  Yet, 
Macquarrie later states that:  "Christ  has  opened  a  new hope for  the human 
race" and "we must let that hope confront us in its own integrity. ,,65  It follows 
that, if  the hope in Christ is new, and if it is for the whole human race, then it is 
for  other  religions,  and  for  the  irreligious  as  well  as  for  Christians.  This 
particular  relation,  which  is  very  similar  to  the  relation  presupposed  by 
'anonymous Christianity',  seems to be potentially explosive.  If,  on the other 
hand  there is  something new for  the  human  race  in  the hopes  of the  other 
religions,  this potentiality is  defused;  at the expense of making  Christ  merely 
one among many.  It appears however that Christian hope,  as presumably the 
hopes of the other religions,  is  ordinary and mundane and therefore it  relates 
easily and harmoniously with human hope in general: 
"If Christian hope is not related at the outset to the perspectives of 
human hope in general, then we run the great danger offalling into ... 
the  misunderstanding  of  Christian  hope  as  something  quite 
otherworldly  in  character  and  thus  unrelated  to  the  hopes  of the 
mass of  mankind. ,,66 
Macquarrie argues that there is no  absolute disjunction between the two kinds 
of hope.  He states that:  "We can come to an understanding of the Christian 
hope  only  because  we  already  have  from  common  experience  some 
understanding of  what hope is. ,,67  Again, this echoes the epistemological basis 
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227 of 'anonymous  Christianity'  and,  in  Macquarrie's  continuing  statement:  "If 
Christian hope has the unique depth and totality claimed for it,  and is therefore 
truly revelatory, then in the light of  it we shall be led to a new understanding of 
the  hope that we have  come to know in  general  experience. ,,68  We find  a 
coincident epistemological point in the thinking ofRahner and Macquarrie. 
Christian faith, in this line of  reasoning, appears as the 'unique' fulfilment of  the 
universal  and  general  hope  known  to  all  of mankind  in  ordinary  (general) 
experience.  We see hope used in this context as being synonymous with faith, 
and the roots of  this unique, Christian, faith are already innate and embedded in 
the whole of humanity.  It is  an easy step from here to the supposition that all 
religions  and  religious  systems  including  irreligious  systems  are  in  fact 
anonymous expressions of Christianity, though Macquarrie would find  such a 
supposition to be arrogant and in error.  Yet he does appear to be advocating a 
universal  implicit  hope which becomes explicit  in  Christian  hope.  If this  is 
conceded then Christian hope is not merely another particular expression of  the 
universal human hope,  nor is it  an equivalent to the hopes of the other world 
religions,  but rather it  is  a  unique  and  superior hope,  which  points towards 
Christianity as  a unique and  superior faith.  This  point,  of course,  would be 
absolutely agreed by Rahner. 
The  coincidence  of  Macquarrie's  'implicit  hope'  and  Rahners  'implicit 
(anonymous) faith'  cannot be denied, indeed, the very wording of Macquarrie's 
discussion  is  so  strongly  echoic  of Rahner,  at  this  point,  that  it  becomes 
impossible  to  distinguish  the  two.  This  is  clearly  seen  in  Macquarrie's 
statement concerning 'human hope': 
68 
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"Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that it is hope in a diffuse, 
implicit form.  It is  hope that has not yet been explicitly formulated 
in words.  Perhaps this  pre-reflective hope should not properly be 
called hope, but is rather the basis or condition of  hope already there 
in the constitution of human existence as the fundamental tendency 
of  the human being toward hoping. ,,69 
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228 Macquarrie is unequivocal that all the (implicit) hopes of the world ultimately 
converge in Jesus Christ.  Christianity is the home where all hopes coalesce, it 
is therefore, the place of  total hope: 
"In modern times  many  positivistic  philosophers  have urged us  to 
abandon  ultimate  questions,  and  confine  ourselves  to  the  limited 
problems with which the sciences can deal.  But in  spite of this man 
remains  incurably  a being  with  'a  sense  and  taste  for  the  infinite' 
(Schleiermacher),  a  questioning  being  who  keeps  questioning  no 
matter where his questions may lead.  He has to find  an  orientation 
for  himself in  the  world  and  so  he  looks  beyond  all  the  limited 
contexts of meaning for  an  all  embracing context ....  (Ernst Bloch's 
statement)  "where there is  hope there is  religion" ... draws  attention 
to the fact that isolated hopes tend to coalesce into a unified or 'total' 
hope. ,,70 
And: 
"If the  line,  'where  there  is  hope,  there is  religion',  applies  at  all, 
Christianity  with  its  vigorous  starting  point  and  its  rich  heretical 
history (of apocalyptic revolutionary movements) seems like a final 
emergence of  what religion is - a total hope and an explosive one. ,,71 
This total hope reaches out beyond particular situations of hoping to embrace 
life  as  a whole,  it  reaches  out to  the wider  and  indeed  the  widest  possible 
context.  But  what  is  the  human  motivation  behind  such  a  total  hope? 
Macquarrie's answer is  both positive and  negative;  man has  an inherent drive 
towards transcendence and he  desires to overcome the total threat to his  life, 
which is of course, death.  The threat of death should obliterate all  other hope 
but it  does not,  man hopes in  a 'beyond  death'.  "Death,  according to  Sartre 
removes all  meaning from  life  it  destroys the context in  which hope lives.,,72 
Macquarrie  argues that  death  can  be  an  inspiration to  life,  and  he  cites  the 
deaths of  both Socrates and Jesus as examples of  this kind of death.  Further he 
quotes Heidegger  as  maintaining  that  it  is  death  that  makes  meaningful  life 
possible.  For meaning  we require  definitive  shape,  death  sets  the  definitive 
boundary, which makes it possible for human life to constitute a finite whole. 
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229 Death, in Heidegger's view (contrary to Sartre) is the very provider of meaning 
to  existence,  indeed  'death  awareness'  is  the  means  of the  transition  from 
inauthentic  to  authentic  life.  This  factor  lies  at  the  heart  of Macquarrie's 
understanding of revelation.  It does appear that in  some way the motivation 
which draws  all  particular hopes to  itself is  that which hopes for life  beyond 
death.  This ultimate hope is a universal human phenomenon, which cannot be 
put down.  In precise terms this must be a hope for the 'ultimate good' of all of 
humanity.  Macquarrie quotes Pannenberg: 
"The phenomenological analysis of man's life  as we know it,  shows 
that it is inherent in man to hope beyond death. ,,73 
Hope then is an inherent human factor, which rises up in the face of the threat 
of death and annihilation,  and  hopes beyond it.  This  is  the total hope which 
coalesces in Christian hope, but how is this so?  Macquarrie states: 
"If there is  any  validity at  all  to the sense of a constraining power 
called  'God'  and  which  summoned  Abraham  from  his  home  and 
worked on all those who came after, the lines converge unmistakably 
on Jesus Christ as the supreme manifestation of God, the God-man, 
the incarnate word. ,,74 
Christ, according to Macquarrie, is the founder of  the new people of God, and 
He is the fulfilment  of the first people of God.  He is  also the fulfilment of the 
widespread aspirations, of all  mankind,  toward a fuller humanity.  Macquarrie 
appears to agree with the Christian community in their view that Christ is  the 
very  meaning  and  goal  of the  cosmos:  "Christ  is  both the  founder  and  the 
fulfiller the beginning and the end,  the agent of creation and the prototype of 
creation".75  From this discussion it  appears that Christ must be the fulfilment 
and  ultimate  goal  of all  religions,  hopes  and  faiths;  yet  of this  possibility, 
Macquarrie  equivocates.  Such  equivocation  and  ambiguity  in  Macquarrie's 
position produces Christological reductionism in this respect. 
What is  clear,  is  that,  for Macquarrie,  Jesus  Christ  is  the new total religious 
hope,  and  further,  he  claims  that  such  a  hope  must  include  the  (necessary) 
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230 element of  resurrection.  How could any ultimate hope, in the face of death, be 
total  in  any  sense  without  some  form  of continuity  of life  after  death?  In 
Christ's resurrection from the dead - into  a new  "spiritual body",  the first  of 
many  brethren,  total  hope  is  complete.  It  must  be  argued  that  of all  the 
prophets  Christ's  death  and  resurrection  as  the  incarnate  God,  is  entirely 
unique, therefore if  hope cannot be complete apart from a hope in resurrection, 
Christianity is the ultimate religion of  hope, and therefore, the supreme religion, 
and not merely one amongst equals.  Through the resurrection of Jesus Christ 
humanity is taken up to a new life of  participation in God Himself.  Macquarrie 
is no where clear,  on just how this total and complete hope can be realised in 
any other world religion. 
b) The relationship of hope to freedom 
Hope,  according to Macquarrie,  (similarly to faith,  according to Rahner)  has 
three  elements;  cognitive,  emotional  and  volitional.  It  is  to  the  volitional 
element that we must turn in respect of  hope's relationship to freedom: 
"The relation of hope to freedom was already hinted at when noted 
that the emotional mood of hope relates to the environment  as  to 
something having fluidity and not yet rigidly determined in its shape. 
Such an  environment is  open to the possibility of change through 
human action.  In a world where the course of events was already 
fully  determined  in  advance,  there  would  be  no  place  for  hope 
... (there) could be no active hope dedicating the will and energies to 
chosen goals.  Hope implies that there is ... an empty space before us 
that  affords  us  room for  action.  Thus  hope  is  inseparable  from 
human freedom and human transcendence. ,,76 
Hope,  according  to  Macquarrie,  is  an  essential  part  of personal  human 
existence, he says that where hope is denied freedom is denied and where hope 
is  denied persons are destroyed."  Where there is  hope there is  freedom and 
where there is freedom there is hope. ,,77 
As  we  have  seen,  Rahner  considers  'faith'  and  freedom  to  be  identical. 
Freedom is real self-determination, the capacity and power to act once and for 
76 
77 
Christian Hope - John Macquarrie, p.8 
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231 all  for  oneself.  This  defines  faith  as  the  act  of self-affirmation  and  self 
acceptance.  Faith  is  a  free  act  which  is  essentially  of the  nature  of the 
transcendent capacity of  finite spirits to freely choose themselves and therefore 
freely  choose God.  This  compares closely to Macquarrie's understanding in 
that if hope is  denied then the human person is  denied and in  fact  destroyed. 
The human transcendence required for truly personal existence and  authentic 
life is dependent on freedom therefore it is dependent on hope.  Again hope and 
faith,  and now freedom,  are  seen to be  a necessary unity in  respect  of both 
Rahner's and Macquarrie's usage of  the terms. 
This kind of hope and this kind of faith appear to be necessary products of  the 
existential reality of created finite  spirits.  To be a human being in the world 
means to have this faith and this hope, whether affirmed or denied.  Both this 
faith and this  hope reaches beyond itself as  it  seeks to be free  of its present 
limitedness.  Indeed faith  and hope,  thought of in  this way,  appear to be the 
very dynamics of existential life; grounded in God's creative grace; in the 'inner 
grace' of  Rahner and the divine 'letting be' of  Macquarrie.  The problem is that 
this  type  of hope  and  this  type  of faith  are  clearly  inadequate in  respect  of 
human  realisation  and  fulfilment.  Such  a  concession  is  implicit  in  both 
Macquarrie and Rahner, in respect of  the need for a further revelation of God. 
The change from inauthentic to authentic life,  according to Macquarrie, takes 
place through the revelation of Holy Being by its own initiative;  man,  by his 
own powers can never achieve such a transition.  According to Rahner Man's 
whole life  is  about  listening  for  a  further  revelation  of God  in  his  personal 
history, clearly realisation and fulfilment depend upon this hearing of the word 
of God in  secondary revelation.  It appears then that freedom in the ultimate 
and supreme sense require a different type of  faith and a different type of  hope. 
This  is  what Macquarrie means by  his  concept of a new total  and  complete 
hope in Jesus Christ.  It seems to us that this new hope and new faith,  are a 
further,  objective,  gift  of God,  which  as  such are not  implicit,  innate and 
a-priori given with the creation of  human being, but given through the free self-
revelation of God in human history.  We are not arguing that the new salvific 
hope and the new salvific faith bear no relation to the ordinary hopes and faiths 
of everyday human existence, indeed they are addressed to them, as the means 
of recognition and reception.  We are contending, that the ordinary mundane 
faiths  and  hopes of the human race produce only a temporal  and  ephemeral 
freedom; ultimate freedom to participate in the Being of God both in this realm 
232 and the next, requires the new 'supranatural' hope and faith,  which is the gift of 
the saving grace of God;  available through historical revelation,  yet  received 
through the capacity, which was the gift of  creational revelation. 
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MACQUARRIE'S DEVELOPMENT 
AND UNDERSTANDING OF 
SYMBOL, IN INCARNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE. 
8.1 The Articulation of 'Primordial Revelation' 
Through Hermeneutic Activity in terms of 
particular 'symbols' 
Those who receive a primordial or classical revelation and who go on to found 
world  religions,  become  necessarily  and  essentially  involved  in  hermeneutic 
activity  in  respect  of the  symbols  which  have  been  given  in  the  revelatory 
encounter.  These, of  course, are the available symbols in which Holy Being has 
presented  and  manifested  itself,  and  through  which  it  has  addressed  the 
particular recipient  (or prophet).  The  recipient's  conscious  awareness,  with 
respect  to  the  precise  nature  of his  hermeneutic,  becomes  the  perceptive 
medium,  in terms of  the given symbols,  of the religious community which will 
inevitably  arise.  As  adopted,  this  medium,  along  with  the  given  symbols 
themselves,  become the structural basis  of the particular developing  religion. 
The  shape and  form  of this religion and indeed,  according to Macquarrie,  all 
world religions,  is  given  definition  by  these  essential  factors;  which  become 
concrete through rituals/sacraments, doctrine and eventually, institutions. 
Clearly,  in  this fundamental  theological  development,  based  on the particular 
expressions  of  universal  ontological  revelation,  we  see  the  basis  of 
234 Macquarrie's  religious  pluralism.  That  which  we  contend  is  properly,  the 
immanence of God in creation, Macquarrie understands as 'Being' itself, which 
is totally immanent in that it is,  almost pantheistically, present and  manifest in 
all of  the beings which appear (to a greater or lesser extent), and it is nowhere 
else.  The central concept in this position is the unity of  the particular 'cultural' 
symbols  and  the  variable  hermeneutic  activity  (in  respect  of the  different 
religions)  concerning  these  essential  symbols,  through  which  Holy  Being  is 
made present and manifest. 
8.1.1 Primordial Revelation and Symbol 
Religions which arise from primordial revelation, as understood by Macquarrie, 
are particular expressions of  the universal revelation of  Being.  The differences 
between  the  religions  lie  in  the  different  symbols  through  which  Being 
manifested  itself  to  them,  and  in  the  particular  nature  and  character  of 
hermeneutic  activity in  respect of these  symbols.  This  interpretative activity 
becomes  embodied  in  a  particular  religious  language,  which,  at  the  most 
profound  level,  translates  into  a  particular  and  distinct  theology.  It  is 
appropriate that Macquarrie should label the distinctly Christian section/part
l  of 
his  major  theological  work  'Principles  of Christian  Theology',  as  'Symbolic 
Theology'.  The  first  part,  which  is  universally  applicable,  he  labels 
'Philosophical  Theology'.  The  discussion  on  primordial  revelation,  as 
universally applicable, falls under the first part. 
In the primordial revelatory encounter, Being becomes present and manifest, to 
particular individuals,  in the immediate symbols,  presumably of the revelatory 
context.  Wp..i.lst  these  particular  symbols  are  not  arbitrarily  chosen  by  the 
particular individual,  and indeed they are given,  as  chosen,  by Being, they are 
not  produced  'ex  nihilo',  as  it  were,  but  already  exist  within  the  particular 
cultural  situation.  Macquarrie  states  clearly  that the recipient  of primordial 
revelation  sees  'no  new  thing';  what  does  happen  is  that  he  sees  the  same 
Christianity  is  understood  as  one  of the  different  expressions  of the 
(universal) primordial revelation of Being.  The first  part of this work is 
concerned with the universal aspects of existential and ontological reality -
this section includes the discussion about primordial revelation itself. 
235 things/symbols in a new way.  He sees the chosen symbols, which were all the 
time  around,  in  new  depth;  we  have  termed  this  new  depth  the  'depth 
dimension' . 
a) The 'depth' dimension 
Seeing the beings of our everyday world,  including  our own being,  with new 
depths,  appears to be the essential revelatory  dynamic  involved in  primordial 
revelation.  What  appears to be  seen,  or perceived,  (which was not  seen,  or 
perceived, prior to the revelatory encounter), is Being itself, or wider Being: 
"  .  ..  what is known is  not another being,  but rather being itself,  the 
being which communicates itself through all the particular beings by 
which it is present, by which it manifests itself, and not least through 
the depth of  our own being. ,,2 
There appears to be some kind  of coincidence between the depth of our own 
being, which is unlocked by the revelatory encounter,  and the depth of Being, 
which  can  be  perceived  in  the  particular  given  symbols.  Clearly  a  radical 
transformation of the recipient's consciousness takes place in this  experience, 
through which the synthesis of the depths of his  own being and the depths of 
the symbols of the manifestation of  Being becomes accessible to him as a new 
principle  of existence  or life.  This  new principle,  in  which the  disclosed  or 
opened up  primordial depths of human being,  is  itself the subjective means of 
the disclosure and  opening up  of the depths  of primordial being;  in  all  of the 
other beings which appear (but most particularly in the given symbols).  This 
new 'depth consciousness'  is  the medium  of the  self-communication of Holy 
Being as  it  is  present and  manifest in  the beings and focused in the particular 
symbols. 
This  new  'depth  consciousness'  is  what  Heidegger  refers  to  as  'essential'  or 
'primordial  thinking'.  The  new  depth  appears  to  be  a  cognitive  potentiality 
which is  a kind of "thinking which  answers to the demands  of being". 
3  The 
new depth is reached or actualised through an "occurrence ofbeing,,4, which is 
Heidegger's equivalent term for primordial revelation.  The actualisation of the 
2 
3 
4 
Principles a/Christian Theology - John Macquarrie p.94 
What is MetaphysiCS? - Martin Heidegger, p.47f 
Ibid. 
236 depth  dimension  in  man's  conSCIousness  results  in  a  new  knowledge  which 
Macquarrie claims is 'revealed knowledge': it is revealed knowledge because it 
was previously hidden to man's conscious awareness, yet it is not knowledge of 
a different type or order of being but rather a depth knowledge of  the ordinary 
beings which are already present. 
"What is  revealed  is  not another being,  over and  above those that 
can be perceived  by  anyone.  Rather,  one  should  say  that the  one 
who receives the revelation sees the same things in a 'different' way. 
We might say that he sees them in depth ... he notices the features of 
the  situation  that  otherwise  escape  notice,  as  if he  saw  an  extra 
dimension in it. ,,5 
The  recipient  of primordial  revelation  becomes  aware  of the  'Being'  that  is 
present and manifest in 'the beings' of  the ordinary situation, which take on the 
reality of essential symbols of  Being itself  The 'depth dimension' is in nature a 
new symbolism,  whereby Being (or God) is  perceived as  present and manifest 
in these particular symbols.  Schleiermacher displays  something of this  depth 
dimension in his  statement concerning revelation,  in  his  second speech to the 
cultured despisers of  religion: 
"Every original and new communication of the universe to man is  a 
revelation. ,,6 
The  emphasis  here  is  on  the  special  understanding  of new  and  original. 
Anything that is repeated or learned,  is  not new and  original.  Therefore, it is 
not revelation.  The communication of the universe as  a total entity breaks in 
creating  new  depths  in  man's  consciousness  transforming  it  from  'sin' 
consciousness to 'God consciousness' leaving man with the feeling of absolute 
dependence on God.  This transformation of  man's consciousness resembles the 
transformation  that  takes  place  in  primordial  revelation,  as  understood  by 
Macquarrie. 
The  point  here  is  that the  depth dimension  is  an  extension  of the  depths  of 
man's potential for being.  It is  a product of man's  sub-consciousness,  which, 
called to his  awareness by the deep  abyss of his  'ultimate concern', undergoes 
5 
6 
Principles ojChristian Theology - John Macquarrie p.89 
On  Religion  - Speeches  to  its  Cultured  Despisers  - Friedrich 
Schleiermacher, Harper Torch Books, Harper & Low 1958, p.89 
237 the  metamorphosis  of conscious  articulation  and  expression  in  terms  of the 
essential symbols of  the particular man's being.  What happens, in effect, is the 
transfer of the  abstract,  unthematic,  abyss  of Being,  which  initially  presents 
itself as a nihilistic despair in man's consciousness, to the form of the concrete 
symbols,  which  are  able  to  bear the weight  of such  an  ultimate  load.  The 
symbols  of man's  new  awareness  are  therefore  the  bearers  of his  shock  of 
being,  and  at the same time the bearers of the presence and  manifestation of 
God.  This in itself produces the feeling of  absolute dependence. 
In the interpreted understanding of these given  symbols,  there exists,  for the 
recipient, the objective synthesis of his  own sinful reality (which produced the 
affective state of  Angst within him,  that is; of  guilt and meaninglessness, which 
are the elements of  his deep despair) and the grace of God in both forgiveness 
and  judgement.  The  flow  of the  revelatory  experience  of the  numinous 
presence  in  'mysterium  tremendum  et'  fascinans',  through  the  perceptive 
consciousness  of the  recipient  (or prophet)  and  in  the  precise  shape  of the 
particular,  given,  concrete  symbolism,  eventually  finds  expression  through a 
distinct 'symbolic' theology.  There is a sense in which the two realities of God 
and man coincide in these (now) theological and indeed sacramental symbols; 
God's supramundane reality enters into man's mundane reality,  in  and through 
the symbols,  with the force  of something like  'transubstantiation',  or perhaps 
'transfiguration'.  This transforming (and even salvific) coincidence of God and 
man  changes  the  ordinary and  mundane  into  the  transcendent  and  divine,  in 
such  a way that the  ordinary  and  mundane is  left  intact.  Examples  of such 
essential symbols, from the Christian faith,  might be the person of  the God-man 
Jesus Christ Himself and perhaps the cross, where God and man die together. 
The RC  doctrine of transubstantiation, which developed,  of course long after 
the initial Christ event, is particularly interesting in respect of  the entry of God 
into  the  given  symbols.  The  aspect  of the  'depth  dimension'  is  variably 
understood  by  theologians;  for  example,  the  Dutch  theologian  G.  C. 
Berkouwer  understands  what  he  calls  the  'depth  aspect',  to  be,  God's 
sovereignty, 'in' man's responsibility.  In the existence of  the sovereignty of God 
within man's responsibility,  the ultimate exists in the temporal as  the essential 
basis of its reality and  meaning.
7  Rudolf Bultmann expresses a similar idea in 
his  discussion  of 'the  depths  of God'  and  'the  depths  of man'  (variably 
7  Ibid. 
238 understood as the abyss,  the depths of the forces of life,  the depths of Satan 
etc.).  This is  certainly,  of two coincident realities,  one infinite and the other 
finite,  one of the depths of the great and infinitely creative power of God, and 
the  other,  the  confusion  of the  depths  of the  abyss  of death  and  devilish 
powers.  He uses a musical metaphor: 
"  ...  we not only see a  confused and senseless strife of powers, but 
also hear in all  of the enigmatic and abysmal darkness the sound of 
one  great  and  deep  tone,  which  hovers  everywhere,  giving  to 
everything,  rest  and  security,  and  blending  it  all  in  one  mighty 
harmony.  It frequently happens that in listening to a piece of music 
we at first do not hear the deep, fundamental tone, the sure stride of 
the  melody  on  which  everything  else  is  built,  because  we  are 
deafened by the fullness  of detail,  the veritable  sea of sounds and 
impressions  which  overwhelms  us.  It  is  only  after  we  have 
accustomed our ear that we find  law and  order,  and  as  with one 
magical  stroke  a  single  unified  world emerges from  the  confused 
welter of  sounds. ,,8 
Here we have an excellent example of  the 'depth dimension' which bears a very 
considerable similarity to Macquarrie's understanding of  it. 
We can perhaps see something of the 'depth dimension' in the thinking of Karl 
Barth in respect of the word of God and the word of man.  Barth argues that 
God's word, which is not to be identified with human words, is an event which, 
from time to time as it pleases God,  enters the human words of proclamation 
whereby the human words are changed into the word of God in a similar way 
to the Roman Catholic  doctrine of transubstantiation.  This  is  the  event  in 
which proclamation becomes real proclamation.  In the event the language of 
man  becomes  the  bearer  of  the  proclaimed  word  of  God,  but  the 
inconsistencies and errors of  human language remain. 
8 
"Bread remains bread and wine remains wine.  We should have to 
say in the language of  the doctrine of  the Lord's supper.  The realism 
of  sacramental consecration does not destroy the proper existence of 
the signs (symbols).  But on the other hand through the new robe of 
righteousness thrown over it, it becomes, in this its earthly character 
a fresh event, the event of God speaking Himself in human events  ... 
real proclamation as  this new event,  in  which the event of human 
Existence  and Faith  - Rudolf Bultmann  Collins:  Fontana library  1964, 
p.28f 
239 language about God is not set aside, but rather exalted,  is the word 
of  God. 119 
The word of God is,  as  it were,  the depth dimension in the human words of 
proclamation.  The human words remain fully  human words but the word of 
God is  (miraculously,  according to Barth) heard in  and  through them.  They 
become the (  ordinary) vehicles of the supernatural and transcendent logos for 
the  individuals  who  are  chosen  by  God  to  be  hearers.  In  this  way  God 
encounters man in and through the proclamation of  his word in human words. 
The  'depth dimension'  could also  be thought of in  terms  of Platonic  dualism 
whereby 'the real'  is  the depth aspect of the beings which  appear;  indeed the 
appearances are  a kind  of shadow of the transcendent  reality.  The essential 
ontological and existential symbols,  of the particular culture,  as understood by 
Macquarrie,  do  appear to possess this kind  of dualism.  Whilst  remaining,  in 
themselves,  a part of the ordinary time  space world,  they take on a new and 
powerful  significance  when  chosen  by  Being,  in  the  revelatory  encounter. 
Whereas Barth,  and  indeed Rahner,  consider that the dualism  exists,  when it 
happens, in terms of  the logos, Macquarrie understands it in terms of material 
objects,  for example;  'the burning bush',  through which God was present and 
manifest to Moses.  It is  recorded however that God also  spoke to Moses in 
words, therefore in this Old Testament instance of primordial revelation, there 
does appear to have been a unity of  logos and material object.  In Macquarrie's 
thinking,  however, the word of God in revelatory encounters is  substituted by 
the  reactive,  interpretative  activity  in  the  subjective  consciousness  of the 
particular  prophet.  What  is  vitally  important  here  is  that  the  power  of 
significance of the symbols of the revelation experience lies  in that they have 
been given,  as the medium of revelation by Holy Being.  The precise nature of 
the  dualism  in  respect  of the  symbols  lies  in  the  precise  nature  of their 
givenness.  In terms of this givenness dynamic,  Being becomes focused in the 
particular ontological and existential symbols which have been chosen.  In the 
factor  of choice  of symbols,  the  initiative  of Holy  Being,  in  the  revelatory 
encounter,  is  preserved.  concerning the givenness  and  the  chosenness  of the 
revelatory symbols, Macquarrie states: 
9  Church Dogmatics - Karl Barth,  vol 1.1  p.l06 
240 "There  are ... 'classic'  or  'primordial'  revelations  that  give  rise  to 
communities of  faith,  so we may say that while everything that is has 
the  potentiality  for  becoming  a  symbol  of being,  there  are  also 
classic  symbols  that  establish themselves  in  a  community  of faith. 
These  symbols  are not  arbitrarily  adopted but associated  with the 
classic revelation. they are not chosen by us but rather they are given 
by Being which has addressed us in and through them. ,,10 
b) Symbol 
We come to the concept of 'symbol' itself.  Having seen from above,  and the 
whole thrust of Macquarrie's understanding of primordial revelation,  that the 
revelatory event is  completely devoid of words,  it  is  all  the more interesting 
that he develops his  argument on the concept of symbol under the heading of 
'the language of  theology'.  In respect of  the symbolic expression of 'primordial 
revelation' the recipient is involved in a theological 'language event' and so too 
are the members of the community which he founds.  In general,  Macquarrie 
thinks of  symbols as anything which stands for something else: 
"In  the widest  sense  of the  word  a  'symbol'  is  anything  which  is 
presented to the mind as  standing for something else.  In this broad 
sense,  symbolism  is  all-pervasive  of life,  and  there  are  almost 
innumerable kinds of symbols. "II 
In this  broad  sense  also,  Macquarrie states that  all  language  has  a  symbolic 
character.  Further,  that  which  serves  between  language  and  its  ultimate 
referent may also be called a symbol.  He gives the example of Christ  as  "the 
light of  the world" On 8: 12), both, this language is symbolic and light itself is a 
symbol.  Very  important  here  is  the  fact  that  light  possesses  the  actual 
properties  of the  nature  of that  which  it  symbolises.  There  is  a  definite 
connection  between the  symbol  of 'light'  and  that  which  it  symbolises.  A 
symbol of this kind Macquarrie categorises as  an 'intrinsic'  symbol,  whereas a 
symbol  which  does  not  have this  connection,  he  categorises  a  'conventional' 
symbol.  Clearly  there  is  a  profound  difference  between  the  two  types  of 
symbol  however,  in  Macquarrie's  view,  the  difference  is  enigmatic,  because 
some  conventional  symbols  can  be  taken  to  participate  in  the  thing  they 
10 
11 
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241 symbolise,  though artificially,  through historical  association.  For example;  a 
national flag  is  taken to be an  inherent part of the Nation it  symbolises,  but 
clearly of  itself it is not. Macquarrie also gives the example of  the wheel, which 
in the West is the symbol of  industry, and in the East is taken as the symbol of 
the cycle of existence.  Both uses of the wheel are claimed to be intrinsic but 
they are so only by historical association, therefore they are not essentially so. 
Because  of the  necessary  factor  of 'historical  association'  the  concept  of 
intrinsic symbol becomes a relative concept, in respect of  the particular culture. 
Therefore,  the  confusion  between what  is  universally,  ontologically  intrinsic 
and  that which  is  relatively  intrinsic  (and therefore  'conventional'  in  the true 
sense)  results,  itself,  in  an  intrinsic problem;  which is  at  the very root of the 
nature and reality of  pluralism. 
If  it can be shown that there are a class of  symbols which are unequivocally and 
universally 'intrinsic' in the absolute sense,  this would have major implications 
for the validity of Macquarrie's case in  support of religious pluralism.  If any 
element  of reality  can  be  seen  to  be  absolute,  all  systems  of relativity  are 
rendered less adequate or even possibly fallacious.  One primary relation must 
remain as  the principal moment of diverse  elements however,  and that is  the 
relation  between  the  absolute  and  the  diversity  itself.  The  necessary 
hermeneutic  activity  concerning  an  absolute,  'intrinsic'  symbol  (  if it  can  be 
shown that such an entity exists) would itself,  of necessity, be so  diverse as to 
render it to be at least 'thought about or understood in different ways'.  Yet of 
itself it could remain absolute, possessing its own integrity, and not necessarily 
merely  the  product  of historical  association  (and  therefore  in  essence  a 
conventional symbol).  It must be true, or so it would appear, that:  "Religious 
symbols belong to a community of  faith.  The cross speaks to the Christian and 
the crescent to the Muslim,  but without  a participation in  the history of the 
community no one could recognise what is conveyed in these symbols. ,,12 
This appears to be true, but is it completely so?  If it is agreed that humanity is 
unable, by its own power, to realise itself,  and that this inability,  in its various 
elements  and  forms,  is  universal  and  leads to the  utter  despair  of guilt  and 
meaninglessness, which leads to nihilism,  then the 'cross'  does not seem to be 
12  Op. Cit. p.136f 
242 so  'conventional',  indeed it has  a distinctly 'intrinsic' ring to it.  The same can 
not be said, we believe, of  the crescent. 
Macquarrie  does  not  agree,  however,  that  there  can  be  such  a  thing  as  a 
universally accessible 'intrinsic  symbol',  rather he  proposes that there exists  a 
symbolic ladder which rises from "the less widely to the more widely received 
symbols,  from those which operate in the small  group to those which have a 
wider accessibility." 13  We arrive then at  the symbols  which have the widest 
possible accessibility: 
"It  is  for  this  reason that  so  much  stress  has  been  laid  ...  on  the 
language  of being  and  existence,  for  this  is  something  like  a 
universally  communicable  language,  arising  as  it  does  out  of 
existential structures and experiences common to all  human beings. 
In so  far  as  religious symbols  can be  related to this language,  they 
are also related to the world of  common experience. ,,14 
The  interpretative process  concerning  religious  symbols  then,  develops  from 
the linguistic  root of the smallest group to the most widely understood,  and 
therefore accessible language  of the largest  community (Nation).  It appears 
however,  that  this  development  can  not,  through  necessity,  extend  to  the 
superlative group of  mankind in total. In this, apparent, light, Macquarrie turns 
to consider the facet of  hermeneutical reciprocity.  Interpretation, he states, is a 
reciprocal affair,  therefore two or more languages throw light  on each other. 
Because the particular symbols in each case are illuminated by the language of 
existence  and  being,  there  is  the  possibility  of some  kind  of universality. 
However,  it  is  reasonable  to  think  that,  bearing  in  mind  the  category  of 
'intrinsic' symbols, it is the individual 'concrete symbols' which would require to 
be  universal,  and  clearly  they  don't  appear  to  be  so.  Being,  is  in  itself, 
undeniably absolute and universal, the self-revelation of Being is the revelation 
of a universal reality and whilst the particular expressions of  Being are distinct 
this principle of universality clearly underlies them.  The concrete symbols are, 
in  themselves,  along  with  the  related  hermeneutic  activity,  a  part  of the 
expressive distinction.  However, Macquarrie says of  them: 
13 
14 
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243 "  .. these concrete symbols become in turn illuminating for relatively 
abstract statements of  an existential or ontological character."  15 
It can be seen that whilst Macquarrie's underlying principle of  universality is the 
primordial revelation of Being itself,  and his underlying principle of pluralism 
lies in the particular expression of  Being through the particular symbols, which 
are essential to the particular culture, the ultimate universality which the unity 
of these  two  factors  demands,  is  found  in  linguistic  and  philosophical 
abstraction of an  ontological  and  existential  character.  This  is  a  movement 
from  a  primordial  abstraction  (in  the  mystery  of the  numinous  presence  of 
Being) to a concrete particularisation (in the particular concrete symbols) and 
back to existential and ontological abstraction (in religious language/theology). 
Macquarrie's  scheme  appears  to  have  reasonable,  although  not  watertight, 
adequacy,  however,  if it  could  be  shown  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  a 
universally,  intrinsic,  concrete,  symbol,  then his  case,  in  our view,  would be 
severely weakened. 
Macquarrie is  arguing,  In effect,  that there  is  no  such  thing  as  'a universal 
particular  (concrete)  symbol',  but there  is  a  symbolic  universality  when the 
particulars are related to existential and ontological language and conceptuality. 
This (secondary) universality exists then in and through the abstract realm of 
existential/ontological  conceptuality,  which  can  be  applied  variably  to  the 
particular, concrete symbol, rendering it universal in relative terms.  It remains 
to be seen just how 'religious symbols' are related to the category of existential 
and ontological, abstractive conceptuality and language. 
Macquarrie's underlying presupposition in this respect, is  that of the 'analogia 
entis': 
"  .. .let it be said that the general ground for any possible symbolising 
of  Being by the beings must be some analogia entis." 16 
He divides his treatment of  the 'analogia entis' into two perspectives: 
1.  From the view point of  the particular beings looking towards Being, and 
2.  From the side of Being as it is  present and manifest in the beings which it 
lets-be 
15 
16 
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244 We  will  consider  Macquarries  treatment  III  respect  of this  division,  under 
several key terms, which are: 
1.  Existential response 
11.  Similarity of  relation 
111.  Prior enabling condition 
IV.  Presence and Manifestation 
v.  Adequacy, Range of  participation, Hierarchy of  beings, and 
VI.  Paradoxicality 
1. From the view point of the particular beings 
According to Macquarrie symbols open up  or illuminate Being to the beings, 
but just how is it possible that they can do so?  How does the 'depth dimension' 
become recognisable  and  therefore  accessible?  Our  outline  of Macquarrie's 
answer is given under terms i.  - iii .. 
i. Existential response 
The symbol is,  in a particular sense,  a communication of Being,  to the beings. 
It illuminates  Being,  in  which  it  itself participates.  The  recipients  of the 
illuminative  communication have,  of course, interpretative freedom,  therefore 
the integrity and adequacy of their hermeneutic, would appear to be always a 
highly questionable matter.  In Macquarrie's view however, there is a category 
of symbols which, by virtue of  their own properties, evoke a certain existential 
response of  a definitive nature: 
"There  are  particular beings  which  can  arouse  III us  the  kind  of 
response that is aroused by Being itself"  17 
This capacity to bear, in  some way,  the revelation of Being,  demonstrates the 
existential and  ontological appropriateness of certain symbolslbeings,  to stand 
for Being itself  An example of such a symbol would be 'goodness'.  When 
human  beings  come  across  'goodness'  of any  real  moment,  an  emotional 
response is evoked whereby they enter an 'affective state' through which 'Being' 
17  Op.  Cit. p.l39 
245 (God) is  disclosed to them.  (The major influences on Macquarrie's thought in 
this respect are Martin Heidegger, C A Campbell, and RudolfOtto
I8
.) 
"  ...  it is  the case that there are things,  persons,  qualities and  so  on 
that awaken in  us  such affective  states  as  awe,  reverence,  loyalty; 
and it is in these states that Being discloses itself to us." 19 
This 'existential response',  then,  is  an  essential part of a symbol's nature as  a 
symbol,  whereby it has the power to evoke an  emotional affective state in the 
recipient  through  which  he  is  attuned  towards  the  disclosure  of Being.  It 
appears that the attunement,  as  already discussed at length,  is  objectively,  and 
not  subjectively  stimulated,  if not produced,  by  these  high  order ontological 
symbols; we see now that the symbols of  the revelatory encounter are not only 
used to manifest Being but,  at the same time they facilitate  and  stimulate the 
receptive, affective state. In this way the immanence of God is revealed to man, 
and this seems quite acceptable, it is hard to understand however, just how this 
disclosure takes place by the initiative of Being itself  Initiative implies  some 
kind of  active part, but what could be the nature of  an 'active part', in respect of 
these particular symbols?  The answer can only be in the original creation of  the 
symbols themselves and in the choice and givenness of  the particular symbols in 
the particular revelatory encounter. 
ii. Similarity of Relation 
Macquarrie's second aspect is that symbols illuminate Being in terms of  what he 
calls 'similarity of relation'.  We must be clear at the outset that by similarity of 
relation, Macquarrie does not mean a similarity between Being and a particular 
being, although an affinity must exist between the two, but rather: 
18 
19 
20 
"The  similarity  is  between  a  relation  of beings  and  a  relation  of 
Being to a being. ,,20 
In  this  respect  see  Selfhood  and  Godhood  - C  A  Campbell  - For 
Macquarrie's ref  to Campbell see Principles of  Christian Theology p.139 
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246 Similarity,  of course,  is  the basis of analogy,  and as  such Macquarrie equates 
'similarity  of relation'  directly  with  'analogy  of proportionality';  this  is  an 
analogy in terms of  the concept of 'ratio'.  He claims that of the four terms of 
proportion, three relate to the beings and the fourth to Being itself; he gives an 
example of  what he means from psalm 103. 
"'As  a father  pities  his  children  so  the Lord pities those who  fear 
him.'  Here the image of  the father is applied to God,  on the ground 
that those who 'fear' him stand in a relation to him that is  similar to 
the relation between a child and a father. ,,21 
Fatherhood, is the similarity of  relation, but we are not talking about God as He 
is in Himself, but in relation to us.  The first  relation here is the earthly one of 
father and child it is to this relation that the relation of God and those who fear 
Him is  similar.  There is  a ratio between these two relationships,  the second 
being far greater than the first,  but it is essentially similar to the first because it 
is a logical derivative of it.  It is  seen that the nature of this type of analogy is 
proportionality.  However  the  father/child  symbol  when  projected  to  the 
God/child  proportion is  inescapably  anthropomorphic.  The  extension  of the 
ordinary to  the  transcendent  is  achieved  by  logical  deduction,  which  in  our 
view,  struggles  for  ontic  credibility.  If,  on  the  other hand,  the  universally 
accessible symbol of  father/child relationship is used by Being in the revelatory 
encounter, then the power in the symbol is  supplied at the precise moment of 
revelatory dynamic;  in which case the cognitive aspect of logical deduction is 
superseded  by  the  conative  element  of  'feeling'  and  the  analogy  of 
proportionality is given new and vital force.  Again, the revelatory experience is 
understood as being essentially emotional and not cognitive. 
In both of these  aspects;  existential  response  and  similarity  of relation,  the 
underlying presupposition is that of an essential principle of continuity between 
Being and the beings, but how can we know that this continuity exists?  And 
precisely what is its nature?  Macquarrie deals with this in his concept of  'prior 
enabling condition'. 
21  Ibid. 
247 iii. Prior Enabling Condition 
"We have  seen that Being  'is'  neither  a being  nor a  property,  but 
since it is the condition that there may be any beings or properties at 
all, it is more 'beingfull' than any being or property.  ,,22 
Macquarrie  is  arguing  that  Being  is  the  condition  for  the  existence  of the 
beings.  The essence of this  condition is  God's (or Being's) 'letting-be'.  God 
lets-be  and  therefore  the beings  lare'.  God,  through letting-be,  is  the prior 
enabling  condition  for  all  being.  Letting-be  is  the  precise  nature  of the 
condition,  and  it  is  the  essential  basis  of continuity between God  and  man. 
Indeed letting-be is the prior condition for the existence of all being, therefore 
our concept of God and our language  about Him must take account of this 
underlying reality.  The symbols of being then, have their power in that Being 
has let them be; this letting-be, as the prior enabling condition of the particular 
symbol is at the same time its inner logic, which ensures its power of  analogy. 
An example of  just how Macquarrie understands the force of 'God as the prior 
enabling condition' is available, again, in the symbol of  goodness: 
"We have no  understanding of what the word 'good' could literally 
mean when applied  to  God,  for  it  must  transcend  any  notions  of 
goodness that we may have.  Yet we are entitled to use it because it 
is more appropriate to say that God is good than that he is not good, 
for he is the prior enabling condition of  all goodness whatsoever.  II 
It is  the force  of appropriateness in  respect of God's letting-be,  as  the prior 
enabling  condition for  the  existence  of the illuminating  symbols,  which  acts 
together with the existential response to provide the nature and power of the 
kind of  analogi a entis which Macquarrie advocates. 
2.  From the Side of Being as  it is  Present and Manifest in  the beings, 
Which it Lets-Be. 
In this section we deal with terms; iv.  - vi., although it will be seen that vi. must 
be considered as standing on its own, as a separate factor. 
22  Op. Cit. p.141 
248 iv. Presence and Manifestation 
We have dealt with this aspect extensively elsewhere
23  and need not give much 
further consideration to it under the present discussion.  Being is  present and 
manifest in the beings, and indeed in all beings,  and apparently, apart from this 
appearance of Being,  the existence of Being is  rightly  described  as  'nothing'. 
We can not know what nothing is  in itself,  we can only know it  in relation to 
something,  our principle  concern  therefore  is  in  the  nature  of the  relation. 
Clearly,  some beings (symbols) have a greater capacity to make Being present 
and manifest than others.  Macquarrie categorises the symbols which are most 
capable, in this respect, as 'classic symbols'.  These symbols are associated with 
primordial or classic revelation, and are therefore particularly given by God.  It 
follows  that  classic  symbols  will  be  more  adequate  in  communicating  or 
disclosing Being than others. 
v. Adequacy: in terms of 'Range of participation in Being' and 
'Hierarchy of beings' 
Macquarrie states: "The test of  a symbol is its adequacy in lighting up Being. ,,24 
It does appear to be reasonable that the more adequate a symbol is in lighting 
up Being the more 'intrinsic' and universally accessible it will be.  There can be 
little adequacy,  in  any  real  sense,  attached to symbols which are esoteric to a 
small group!  It seems to us, that if a symbol is powerfully adequate it will light 
up Being, equally, to all who behold it,  and not just the particular culture of its 
origin.  Indeed it would be capable of  translation, without loss of power, to all 
distinct cultures.  The reality is however, that the different religions are built on 
symbols  which  will  not  translate  and  are  indeed  often  contradictory.  This 
results in 'truth claims' to assert the superiority of one symbol  over the other. 
The  'range  of participation  in  Being'  and  the  'hierarchy  of beings'  can  be 
discussed together as  they are mutually dependant concepts.  Concerning the 
latter, the different categories are determined in respect of  their power to serve 
23  See chapter 4 
24  Principles ojChristian Theology - p.143 
249 as  symbols of Being.  Inanimate objects are  at  the bottom of the ladder and 
personal beings are at the top. 
"In man,  a material body and an animal organism are united with his 
distinctively personal being.  This is  the widest range of being that 
we know,  and  therefore  symbols  and  images  drawn from  personal 
life have the highest degree of  adequacy known to us. ,,25 
Adequacy is also judged in respect of  the degree of participation in Being that 
the symbol is capable of  Inanimate objects participate the least and (personal) 
human beings, the most  Human beings themselves then, are the most adequate 
symbols  of Being.  It seems reasonable to consider the individuals who  have 
received  a  primordial  revelation  of Being,  as,  in  terms  of that  revelatory 
experience,  participating in  Being more highly than all  others;  therefore they 
themselves would appear, by this criterion, to be the most adequate symbols of 
Being accessible to man.  If we go further and consider that Christ was/is the 
incarnate  Son of God,  and  as  the second person of the Trinity God Himself; 
then, we must concede that He is the supreme symbol of  Being, as God surely 
participates in Himself to an  altogether superior order,  than any  other being. 
(As far as we are aware Macquarrie nowhere concedes this.) 
As  Macquarrie states, the concept of a hierarchy of beings is  a very old one, 
from Origen to Augustine and beyond,  however, Macquarrie's view is  distinct 
in that its most essential criterion is (again) letting-be. 
"  ...  as one surveys the rising grades of  being, the character of Being 
is itself more clearly manifested.  For whereas the lowest or simplest 
beings  'are',  the  higher  ones  not  only  are  but  let-be,  and  this  is 
peculiarly true at the level  of man's personal being,  with its limited 
freedom and creativity. ,,26 
This  aspect  of personal  being,  of course,  has  to  do  with  love,  indeed 
Macquarrie  argues  that the  essence  of love  is  precisely  letting-be,  therefore 
love appears as a necessary attribute of  the higher order of symbols. 
25  Ibid. 
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250 vi. Paradoxicality 
Paradoxicality does not come under the second division but stands on its own, 
as a major feature of  theological language.  All symbols by their very nature are 
paradoxicaL 
"Just because symbols are symbols, that is to say they both stand for 
what they symbolise,  and yet fall  short of it,  they must be at  once 
affirmed and denied. ,,27 
A symbol, then, is in itself a synthesis of  tensions,  and a religious symbol is  at 
the same time, an existent in its own right, (as it is in itself), and an illumination 
of Being which it participates in.  Macquarrie argues that a symbol cannot be 
absolute, it always falls short of  what it symbolises: 
"To  absolutize  a  symbol  is  to identify it with its  'symbolizandum', 
and in the case of religious symbols this means idolatry,  and all  the 
distortions and errors that go with it. ,,28 
A  symbol which is  absolutized and becomes an  idol,  fails  to  act  as  a  symbol 
because it ceases to point beyond itself to wider Being,  and indeed effectively 
captures  its  worshipers  to  a  small  complete  (that  is,  no  gaps)  parochial 
existence of which it,  though in  itself lifeless  in  the  full  sense,  is  the centre. 
Perhaps this is what Sartre calls 'being-in-itself.  To live in  such a state,  is  to 
live in sin and 'bad faith', this is the essence of  inauthentic life. 29 
On  the  other hand  a  symbol  must  have  the  ability  in  itself to  disclose  and 
illuminate Being  (God),  or it is  not an  adequate symboL  In this  sense  it  is 
univocal and if it is not so it is an entity which is empty in respect of  the Being 
which its purpose is to disclose and illuminate.  If a symbol is equivocal it is a 
meaningless entity and  if it is  univocal it  is  an  idol,  therefore it  is  necessarily 
paradoxical in  nature,  as  it  is  at  the  same  time  both of these  opposites  and 
neither. 
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251 Macquarrie,  sees  in  this  paradoxicality  of  symbols,  the  answer  to  the, 
apparently, irreconcilable different and contradictory symbols, in respect of the 
different world religions.  The weakness in this thrust,  as  we see it,  is  that he 
finds the solution to the contradictory nature of the distinct symbols,  in terms 
of equivocation  and  not  in  terms  of a  synthesis  of the  equivocal  and  the 
univocal.  In  our  view  this  leads  to  a  reductionist  position  which  is 
unsupportive of  his 'symbolic theology' as a whole. 
Our contention is that if a symbol is  truly and really 'intrinsic' then it  must be 
univocal,  however it must be univocal in  a way that,  outside and  apart from 
faith,  retains  the  element  of the  equivocal,  or else  it  becomes  a  compulsory 
presence of God.  The nature of Faith demands paradoxicality.  The greatest 
paradox must be the Christological enigma of  the God/man, those who had the 
eyes of  faith saw God in the man and those who didn't saw only a man. 
8.1.2 The Concept of Symbol in Tillich and Dillistone 
In comparison with Macquarrie,  and with special consideration of the idea of 
an 'intrinsic' symbol. 
a) Tillich 
As  may  be  expected  there  are  remarkable  similarities  between  Macquarrie's 
thinking on symbol and Tillich's.  Both understand symbol in ontological terms, 
although Tillich is more free with his use of  the term 'God', than Macquarrie. 
There are, however, what must be seen as fundamental differences between the 
two.  For  example,  Tillich's  division  of symbol  and  sign,  is  repudiated  by 
Macquarrie, as a misuse of  the English language.
3o 
Of  the division of  symbol and sign Tillich states: 
30  Principles ojChristian Theology - John Macquarrie p.l35; see esp note 10 
252 "Special emphasis must be laid on the insight that symbol  and  sign 
are different; that, while the sign bears no necessary relation to that 
which  it  points,  the  symbol  participates  in  the  reality  of that  for 
which it stands.  The sign can be changed arbitrarily according to the 
demands of  expediency, but the symbol grows and dies according to 
the  correlation between that which  is  symbolised  and  the  persons 
who receive it as a symbol. ,,31 
Macquarrie refutes this distinction because, he says, it is at variance with good 
English usage.  He gives the example of clouds as a sign of rain; clearly clouds 
participate intrinsically in the rain that is to follow.  Whilst this is true in itself, 
it  is  one  of a  few  exceptions,  and  therefore  does  not  cancel  out  Tillich's 
important distinction here.  In refusing to accept the precise distinction of sign 
and symbol Macquarrie, in our view, undermines the truth value, and therefore 
the adequacy and integrity of religious symbols, to stand for God.  Macquarrie 
prefers the use of the term 'conventional symbol',  to sign.  His  corresponding 
distinction being 'conventional' and 'intrinsic' symbols,  as we have seen.  Tillich 
argues that the distinction between sign and symbol is clear-cut, Macquarrie on 
the other hand  argues that the distinction between conventional  symbols  and 
intrinsic symbols is not as clear cut as some make it out to be.  (It is likely that 
this is a direct ref. to Tillich.) 
The significance of our argument here, is that whilst Tillich seeks to strengthen 
the  case  for  purely  'intrinsic'  (and  therefore  universal)  religious  symbols, 
Macquarrie seeks to weaken it,  and  indeed render it,  as  a possibility  of very 
little  moment.  In this  way  he  rationalises  the  contradictory  symbols  of the 
various world religions, in support of his underlying pluralistic presupposition. 
If Tillich's view, in respect of his primary distinction can be seen to stand, then 
Macquarrie's case for equality of all  (authentic) world religions,  (arising from 
primordial revelation) is considerably weakened. 
Before pursuing this significant difference, in terms of Tillich's development of 
symbol,  we  should  give  some  consideration  to  the  similarities,  concermng 
symbol, in the two theologies. 
31  Systematic Theology - Paul Tillich,  vol 1 p23 9. 
253 i) The similarities 
Tillich agrees with Macquarrie in respect of  the nature of symbol in terms of  its 
ability to participate in God.  He terms this,  "participation in the power of the 
divine, to which it points. ,,32  The power which Tillich rather vaguely refers to, 
corresponds  with  Macquarrie's  term  'letting-be',  although  Tillich  would  not 
understand it  in this way.  Another area of essential agreement is  that of the 
symbolic basis and nature of theology.  Man can not talk directly of God but 
mediately through symbols; Tillich states that God is 'Being-itself, which is the 
only non-symbolic statement he will allow: 
"  ...  after this has been said,  nothing else  can be said  about God as 
God which is not symbolic. ,,33 
In  this,  any  possibility  of a  'Logos'  theology  is  ruled  out  in  favour  of 
'ontological, mystical symbolism'.  Such a view would also  appear to rule out 
the possibility of a direct revelation of God to man as  being  constitutionally 
impossible.  This  view,  of course,  is  the  antithesis  of the whole Rahnerian, 
theological  scheme.  Tillich,  although  distinct  in  expression,  is  close  to 
Macquarrie in the symbolic priority, in revelation.  The symbols,  as a product 
of  the  ontological  structure  of  existence,  are  not  however,  themselves 
revelation, they are the mediatorial material of revelation, and as such the basis 
of  the theological language which arises. 
"The  ontological  structure  of being  supplies  the  material  for  the 
symbols which point to the divine life.  However this does not mean 
that a doctrine of God can be  derived from an  ontological system. 
The characteristic of the divine  life  is  made manifest in revelation. 
Theology can only explain and systematise the existential knowledge 
of  revelation,  in  theoretical  terms,  interpreting  the  symbolic 
significance of  the ontological elements and categories. ,,34 
The theological articulation which produces a doctrine of God, is to Tillich,  as 
with  Macquarrie,  an  hermeneutical  activity  In  terms  of  the 
ontological/existential  symbols  which  are  used  as  the  material  of revelatory 
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254 encounter.  The  theological  task  is  therefore  essentially  an  hermeneutical 
activity and not a metaphysical activity.  In this respect Tillich states: 
"Theology  has  neither  the  duty  nor  the  power  to  confirm  or to 
negate religious symbols,  its task is  to interpret them according to 
theological principles and methods. ,,35 
Another  area  of similarity  between  Macquarrie  and  Tillich  concerns  the 
paradoxicality of  religious symbols: 
"They  are  directed towards  the  infinite  which  they  symbolise  and 
toward the finite  through which they symbolise it.  They force  the 
infinite  down to the finitude  and  the  finitude  up  to  infinity.  They 
open the divine for the human and the human for the divine. ,,36 
Otherwise put: 
"  ... any  concrete  assertion  about  God  must  be  symbolic,  for  a 
concrete assertion is  one which uses a segment of finite  experience 
in  order to  say  something about him.  It transcends the content of 
this  segment,  although  it  also  includes  it.  The  segment  of finite 
reality which becomes the vehicle of a concrete assertion about God 
is affirmed and negated at the same time.  It becomes a symbol, for a 
symbolic expression is one who's proper meaning is negated by that 
to  which  it  points.  And  yet  it  is  also  affirmed  by  it,  and  this 
affirmation  gives  the  symbolic  expression  an  adequate  basis  for 
pointing beyond itself  ,,37 
For a symbol to be a symbol it must necessarily have a paradoxical nature.  The 
'depth aspect' and 'finite appearance' of a symbol,  both affirm and negate each 
other.  The  symbols  which  communicate  Being  are  dialectical  in  this  way 
because they  are  a  communication  of entirely  different  realities  which  exist 
together by coincidence in the locus of the symbol.  If Being was of the same 
order of reality  as  the beings  there would  be  no  paradox  and  no  need  for 
symbols.  The  reality  of religious  symbols  then  is  a  kind  of proof of the 
existence of a wholly other transcendent reality.  Macquarrie,  later,  develops 
this theme into what he calls "Dialectical Theism".  38 
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255 When Tillich asks, (what he calls) the crucial question: "Can a segment of  finite 
reality become the basis for  an  assertion about that which is  infinite?",  he  is 
seeking  for  a  solid  principle  of  continuity  between  the  two  realities. 
Macquarrie found  this  in  his  concept  of "prior  enabling  condition",  Tillich's 
answer is essentially similar:  "It can because that which is infinite is being-itself 
and  because everything participates in  being-itself. ,,39  The key is  that being-
itself is the ground of all being, therefore continuity between the two realms is 
guaranteed as is the validity of  the 'analogia entis'. 
"The analogia entis gives us our only justification of speaking at all 
about God.  It is based on the fact that God must be understood as 
being-itself. ,,40 
It must be said that Tillich, who builds his theology around the structural frame 
of 'correlation',  recognises the  analogia  entis  as  the  only basis  of theological 
articulation.  In  this  he  is  somewhat  dissimilar  to  Macquarrie  who  whilst 
recognising the absolute validity of this basis of the analogia entis,  considers 
'existential response' to be the major hermeneutical factor. 
ii) The differences 
Concerning the possibility of  truly 'intrinsic' and therefore universal,  symbols, it 
follows  that  we  must  look  beyond  meaning,  in  terms  of the  individual 
subjective,  to the  possibility of objective  truth.  This  must  be  thought of in 
terms  of the  integrity  of the,  already  defined,  intrinsic  symbol.  Whilst 
Macquarrie is concerned with truth, his concern is not with the intrinsic truth of 
symbols,  but with the truth  of theological  statements about them.  Truth to 
Macquarrie  is  not  owned  by  the  symbols  themselves,  but  refers  to  the 
statements  concerning  their  interpretation.  This  is  an  essential  difference 
between Macquarrie and Tillich.  Tillich states: 
39 
40 
"The truth of a religious symbol, has nothing to do with the truth of 
the  empirical  assertions  involved  in  it,  be  they  physical, 
psychological or historical.  A religious symbol possesses some truth 
Systematic Theology - Paul Tillich, vol 1 p.239 
Op.  Cit. p .240 
256 if it  adequately expresses a correlation of revelation in  which some 
person stands.  A religious symbol is  true if it  adequately expresses 
the correlation of  some person with final revelation. ,,41 
Tillich is clearly very concerned with the intrinsic truth of religious symbols in 
terms of  their revelatory adequacy.  He says further: 
"The judgement that a religious symbol is  true is  identical with the 
judgement that the revelation of which it  is the adequate expression 
is true.  This double meaning of the truth of a symbol must be kept 
in  mind.  (which  is)  A  symbol  'has'  truth:  it  is  adequate  to  the 
revelation it  expresses.  A symbol 'is'  true:  it is  the expression of a 
true revelation. ,,42 
It follows from this understanding that there must be true and false symbols, in 
which  case,  in  respect  of false  symbols,  contradiction  will  arise  between 
opposing symbols both of  which are the subject of a truth claim.  Theology will 
inevitably come across, and have to deal with, such contradictions.  Tillich says 
of this:  "theology  may  discover  contradictions  between  symbols  within  the 
theological  circle."  and  in  this  case,  "theology  can  point  out  the  religious 
dangers  and  the  theological  errors  which  follow  from  the  use  of certain 
symbols. ,,43  Macquarrie  admits  of no  such  possible  contradictions  with 
subsequent error; he wishes to maintain a relativism whereby symbols have no 
intrinsic  truth in  themselves,  indeed  he  is  concerned that if symbols  were in 
themselves true, they would become idols.  He states: 
"Different symbols may complements one another rather than stand 
in contradiction.  Of  course there may also be irreconcilable different 
symbols.  But  we  must  avoid  supposing  that  symbols  are  like 
theories,  where  presumably  one  is  to  be  accepted,  and  the  rest 
rejected as  false.  To exalt one symbol to the exclusive status is  to 
forget  that  even  the  most  adequate  symbol  falls  short  of what  it 
symbolises. ,,44 
This kind of  exaltation of  symbols, as Macquarrie chooses to call it, amounts to 
idolatry, Tillich however, argues that a symbol is true in itself and that this is its 
41 
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257 power to be a symbol, this is its adequacy; therefore a true symbol cannot fall 
short of  what it symbolises or it would not be a true symbol! 
The  contention  here  is  about  the  integrity  and  value  of religious  symbols, 
Tillich is arguing for absolute and therefore intrinsic value whereas Macquarrie 
is arguing for relative value in respect of  an (individual) subjective hermeneutic, 
which  is  profoundly  and  essentially  influenced  or  conditioned  by,  what  he 
terms,  'historical  association'.  Both  begin  at  the  point  of  ontological 
universality which Tillich  extends to the ontological symbols.  This extension 
requires  a  doctrine  of  objective  absolute  truth,  and  therefore  universal 
applicability and accessibility of the symbols,  which possess this truth intrinsic 
to their own nature (in themselves).  Macquarrie on the  other hand  supports 
and  indeed  appears  to  secure  his  doctrine  of religious  pluralism  by  firmly 
opposing  any form  of absolutism  in  favour  of a  subjective  relativism  which 
produces  'relative  truth'  and  eradicates  the  very  meaning  and  therefore 
possibility of  error, in this respect. 
It  must  follow  from  Macquarries  view,  that  'Christ',  whom  he  claims  is  a 
symbol  of Being
45
,  in  Himself falls  short  in  respect  of His  adequacy  to 
symbolise God; and therefore Christ's deity,  as  second person of the Trinity, is 
by  implication,  denied.  Nor can  Christ  be  a  representative  of God  in  any 
intrinsic or absolute sense, indeed according to Macquarrie, to absolutise Christ 
or to worship Him would be  an  act  of idolatry.  Clearly  such  a view lacks 
Christological tenability.  Tillich supports his  own view by the example of the 
symbol of  'fatherhood': 
45 
46 
"  .. .if God is symbolised as 'Father' he is brought down to the human 
relationship  of father  and  child.  But at  the  same  time  this  human 
relationship  is  consecrated  into  a  pattern  of  divine-human 
relationship.  If  'Father' is employed as a symbol for God, fatherhood 
is seen in its theonomous sacramental depth.  One cannot arbitrarily 
'make' a religious symbol out of a segment of secular reality ...  if a 
segment of reality is  used as  a symbol for God, the realm of reality 
from which it is taken is,  so to speak,  elevated into the realm of the 
holy. ,,46 
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258 Fatherhood is  seen then, in its capacity to say something of the Fatherhood of 
God, but also something is revealed of  the holy character of  human fatherhood. 
Human fatherhood is  a true symbol of the nature of God as  Father.  Human 
fatherhood,  in sacramental light,  is,  as  a true and  real  symbol of God,  holy in 
itself.  The  symbol,  in  revealing  and  saying  something  about  that  which  it 
symbolises, discloses the true and essential reality of  its own being. 
Fatherhood, appears to have the qualities of an 'intrinsic' universally applicable 
symbol.  It might  well  be  argued  that  through  historical  association,  for 
example, of  a Father who beats his children, and does not provide for them, the 
intrinsic quality of fatherhood is  unrealisable in  the realm of human existence. 
If we were to consider the Rahnerian position, all  children will  already have a 
pre-concept of  fatherhood which, as an a-priori factor, is already and essentially 
intrinsic.  There  is  some  support  also  from  Bultmann's  view  of 'essential 
concepts';  fatherhood  would  certainly  qualify  as  such,  and  therefore children 
would already have a vague, implicit though intrinsic knowledge of  fatherhood, 
which  whilst  influencible  by  historical  association,  would  surely  retain  its 
essential intrinsic quality.  Our contention is that truly intrinsic,  ontological and 
existential  symbols  do  not  loose  their  intrinsic  power  through  historical 
association or any other relativistic system. 
b) Dillistone 
In the first  chapter of "Christianity and symbolism,,47 Dillistone's essential task 
is to define the concept of symbol.  Interestingly, his major concern is with the 
articulation of  the difference between 'sign' and 'symbol'. 
An analysis of Dillistone's understanding in this respect avails us of a profound 
insight into Macquarrie's perspective, not only of his  understanding of symbol 
but also of his thinking in respect of revelation itself.  It is helpful to structure 
our analysis then, in terms of  this insight; and we will do so under three heads: 
i)  The intrinsic nature of symbols 
ii)  The  state  and  condition  of the  subjective  consciousness  which  connects 
with the precise quality of  the symbol( s), and 
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259 iii)  The nature of the relationship  between these two (that is:  conSCIOusness 
and symbol) in terms of  'existential response' 
i) The intrinsic nature of symbols 
In his treatment of the nature of symbolism Dillistone deals fundamentally with 
the distinction between sign and symbol.  Symbol itself is  rooted in  the wider 
concept of 'sacrament'; Dillistone chooses the narrower term as being the more 
meaningful and the most universally expressive: 
"The  word  'sacrament'  no  longer  carries  any  of its  original  Latin 
associations into common speech: it immediately suggests definitions 
and philosophical enquires and theological battles and religious rites 
within  the  restricted  sphere  of the  Christian  Church.  The  term 
'symbol' therefore is altogether more suitable. ,,48 
Clearly  the  terms;  sacrament,  symbol  and  sign  are  closely  related,  there  is 
something in  the reality and  significance of each that,  as  it were,  indwells the 
others.  The  nature  of the  distinctions  allows  a  profound  insight  into  the 
intrinsic  quality  of each.  The  sacrament,  from  Augustine  onwards  became 
understood (in Platonic terms) as  an outward and visible reality which was the 
means  of penetration to  the inner  reality  of the inner  spiritual world.
49  The 
sign,  on the other hand,  is  more pragmatic in  its  effects,  it  is  only  concerned 
with that which appears as  the objective reality,  and it  is  singularly used as  a 
means of  the efficient communication of  'this worldly' information. 
"  ...  a sign,  as we think of it today, is usually practical in purpose.  It 
is a shorthand way of communicating information, simply clearly and 
quickly. ,,50 
A sign then,  participates in  only  one reality whereas a symbol  participates in 
two: 
48 
49 
50 
"At the root of the word (symbol) there is to be found  the idea of 
throwing  together  or  putting  together:  through  a  symbol,  two 
Op. Cit. P.i6f 
See Dillistone's discussion in this respect. p.IS 
Op. Cit. p.17 
260 realities  are  related  to  one  another,  for  in  the  symbol  certain 
elements of  each are to be found.  The whole problem of  the symbol 
is to define or describe this relationship. ,,51 
The symbol, to be a symbol,  must participate in  some way in the two different 
realities;  it is,  in itself,  the interface of the synthetic tension between the two. 
For example, the Being of  God and the being of  man, can be though of  as polar 
opposites.  The very polar nature is,  according to Tillich,  rooted in  the divine 
life itself: 
"While the symbolic power of the categories appears in the relation 
of God to the creature,  the elements  give  expression to the divine 
life itself.  The polar character of the ontological elements is  rooted 
in the divine life. ,,52 
Dillistone, in his treatment of  the two realities, carries out an analysis of Oliver 
Quick's  thinking  in  this  respect,  in  terms  of the  categories  of 'outward'  and 
'inward'.  The outward category is of course the material reality which appears 
to us and Quick further divides this into 'instruments' and 'symbols': 
"Some (objects) take their character from  what is  done with them; 
and these we will call instruments.  Others take their character from 
what is known by them; and these we will call symbols. ,,53 
We see, then, that symbols are primarily epistemological in respect of the two 
realities.  The inward  reality  is  'symbol'  and  the  outward reality is  'material'. 
Symbols then, can be seen to both exist in and transcend the material realm as 
they are both essentially material and essentially epistemological. 
The divine  reality is  understood as  being the ideal reality which enters into  a 
relation with the worldly 'embodied' reality.  Symbols signify the divine ideal as 
they point to the divine nature.  At the same time,  if they are natural and not 
artificial  symbols  they  'participate'  in  the  divine  ideal  because  they  are  its 
51 
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261 outward embodiedness.  Such a  relation between two realities  demands  that 
natural symbols are intrinsic to that which they symbolise. 54 
It must be seen however that the coincidence of  the two realities exists in terms 
of 'inwardness' as far as man is concerned.  The 'inwardness' is of  the reality of 
the  ideal  itself yet  because of the  symbolic  embodiment  of this  ideal  in  the 
'outward' reality of  which God is the ground of  being, the inner ideal can never 
be merely a human notion.  Though of  in this way symbols of  Being are always 
'intrinsic' and cannot be robbed of  this intrinsic quality by historical association. 
i) 1. The difference between 'sign' and 'symbol' 
In an  analysis  of S K Langds book:  "Philosophy in  a New Kei' Dillistone 
proposes  that  the  difference  between  a  sign  and  a  symbol  is  that  'a  sign 
indicates' and 'a symbol represents': 
IIThis distinction between signs and symbols is most interesting (S K 
Langer's distinction) and in my judgement most valuable.  According 
to it the  sign  indicates,  the  symbol  represents:  The  sign  transmits 
directly the symbol indirectly or obliquely:  The sign announces, the 
symbol  reminds  or  refers:  The  sign  operates  in  the  immediate 
context of  space and time, the symbol extends the frame of reference 
indefinitely. 1155 
The  symbol  is  not  immediate  and  it  has  to  do  with  how  we  conceive  of a 
reality,  therefore it has to do  with thought and imagination.  The sign  on the 
other hand  is  a  direct  means  of announcing  or indicating  the  existence  of a 
thing.  A given example is that of  wet roofs, as a sign it has rained; the patter of 
rain on the roof is a sign that it is raining; a fall in the barometer is a sign that it 
is going to rain.  This is a past present and future sign of the existence of rain. 
This category of  sign, is clearly 'naturar, as demonstrated by our example.  This 
understanding removes the confusion which Macquarrie sees between signs and 
intrinsic symbols.  Natural signs are themselves a part of the condition which 
they announce or indicate,  artificial  symbols.  For example,  the blowing of a 
54 
55 
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262 whistle to indicate that a train is about to move of,  are not.  In this way and in 
the  light  of the  above,  it  can  be  seen  that  there  is  a  very  clear  distinction 
between sign and symbol,  signs rely on historical association whereas symbols 
are  of a  nature  which  removes  them  from  such  a  (variable)  context.  In 
summing up Dillistone considers signs as relating to a lower consciousness and 
symbols  to a  higher  consciousness.  Sub-conscious  life  relies  on  'archetypal 
images' and: 
"As soon as we move up into the daylight of conscious life, we enter 
the  realm  of sign...  the  sheer  practical  needs  of life  lead  to  the 
employment of signs ...  thus the ground work of all conscious life is 
the use of signs and this use is to be deprecated only when it stands 
in the way or takes the place of something higher or better. ,,56 
"Finally there is  the momentous step by  which man advances from 
the sign to the symbol. ,,57 
Symbols  go  beyond  signs  in  that  they  make  possible  the  conception  of an 
object.  Dillistone considers that symbols relate to the 'Transcending immediate 
consciousness',  they  are  therefore to  do  with  an  altogether  higher  order  of 
reality. 58  Dillistone differentiates between the higher order symbols in  respect 
of those that pertain to corporate life  and those that pertain to individual life. 
The former he considers to be 'analogical symbols' and the latter 'metaphorical 
symbols'.  In respect of  his thesis he states: 
"My main thesis ...  is  that only as  man  cultivates a constant inter -
relationship  between  these  different  levels  of his  experience  and 
above all  only as he maintains a constant dialectic between the two 
types of symbolism here defined can he move towards the fullness of 
his destiny in relation to God, nature and his fellow men. ,,59 
A strong case is  developing for the validity of the intrinsic nature of a certain 
class of symbols, if not all symbols (by definition).  It appears,  in this light, that 
Macquarrie's denial of  the possibility of intrinsic symbols is somewhat less than 
tenable. 
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263 ii)  The  state  and  condition  of the  subjective  consciousness  which 
connects with the precise quality of the symbols 
We refer here, primarily, to what Macquarrie terms 'attunement' and Heidegger 
terms 'affective states'. 
Dillistone argues (in respect of  the aspect of  intensity of symbols, and those of 
which he designates to be of 'contrast and novelty') that behind these symbols 
there lies an emotional experience, and further, that symbols of  this kind always 
express a leap towards the beyond.  There is always a tension involved with the 
subjective consciousness that connects with this kind of symbol. 
"Intensity  and  metaphorical  tension  I  have  defined  as  the  two 
essential principles of  this class of  symbol. ,,60 
There is  a new emotion involved here which has the nature of a 'metaphorical 
tension', as such this emotion produces a shattering experience.  The metaphor, 
unlike the simile,  relates to the unknown,  it  widens  our view,  it  "shatters in 
order to widen"  it  "widens, transcends,  overcomes,  gives birth to the new".  61 
Novelty is  an  extremely emotional experience especially if an  individual  goes 
contrary  to  that  which  is  acceptable  to  the  mass  of society.  Such  is  a 
profoundly  emotional  experience  which  shakes  his  emotional  life  to  its 
foundations.  62 
"The symbol which expresses the new emotion, however, may be so 
intense  so  enigmatic,  so  highly  individualised,  that  it  becomes  a 
locked mystery  ... the excessive use of  the principle of intensity leads 
to  the  production  of  esoteric  forms  such  as  the  riddle,  the 
apocalypse, the mystery story. ,,63 
Nonetheless: 
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264 "F or the reinvigoration of the general life of mankind the altogether 
important factor is the imaginative and the metaphorical symbol.  By 
means of this expression of emotion,  man gains freshness  of vision 
and  renewal  of energy and  sees  his  world  as  a place  of unlimited 
possibility and never-ending surprise. 1164 
What  Dillistone  is  describing  here,  in  terms  of  metaphorical  tension  IS 
remarkably similar to Heideggds understanding of 'affective states' and indeed 
Macquarrie's  derivative  of this,  in  his  term  'attunement'.  Clearly  when  one 
connects  with  the  kind  of symbols  described,  there  is  a  highly  emotionally 
charged  encounter which  could  be  said  to  result  in  some  new  form  of self 
understanding.  Yet Dillistone brings the encounter down to earth, so to speak, 
in  so  far as  the whole experience relates primarily,  not only to man's affective 
state, but also to his imagination.  Dillistone understands nothing so grand as a 
revelatory  encounter  with  Holy  Being  itself,  in  this  respect,  but  rather  an 
ordinary connection with a certain type of symbol,  which produces 'the fresh 
beyond' in man's awareness.  Since we are dealing here with a higher order of 
human epistemology which is the result of  the intrinsically powerful symbols of 
God's  creation,  we  can  properly  call  the  phenomena  'creational  revelation'. 
Dillistone's extensive analysis is then, essentially, of the dynamics and nature of 
such a revelation, of  the immanence of God in creation, without much pretence 
to being anything more. 
In the final analysis,  in this respect, we are concerned with the quality of man's 
subjective  consciousness,  which quite  clearly  is  prepared  in  some  way,  even 
attuned.  Whilst  there  is  the  objective  phenomenon  of symbols  (or  perhaps 
religious symbols) which represent God, and which man encounters, the whole 
impact of the quality of the symbol and the condition of man's  imagination is 
taken by  his  subjective  consciousness.  This  produces  a  profound  change  in 
man's understanding of  both himself and of  his reality. 
He has gone beyond himself, transcended himself in this experience.  We could 
say that the quality of  his inner spirit coincided in encounter with the quality of 
a  particularly  powerful  intrinsic  symbol,  which  pointed  to  the  reality  of the 
great liberating beyond (Which we may call God). 
64  Ibid. 
265 iii) Existential response 
Dillistone's  classification  of  metaphorical  symbol  involves  'images'  or 
'presentational  symbols'  which  by  their  very  nature  evoke  an  emotional 
response in  those who  come in  contact with them.  The  symbols  of art  are 
examples  of emotionally  charged  objects,  which  draw  the  beholder  into  a 
moving emotional encounter: 
"The symbols of art must be regarded as  belonging to the realm of 
emotion  ...  their chief quality is to be found in the fact that they are 
'emotive' symbols.  The man who  succeeds in  creating a symbol of 
this  kind  does  so  as  the  result  of a  deep  emotional  experience: 
Those who come in contact with the symbol likewise find themselves 
strangely moved by the encounter. ,,65 
The point here is that the artist sought to communicate, through the symbolism 
of his art, the nature of his emotional experience.  Those who will  never meet 
the  artist  but  who  come  across  his  work,  are  called  to  participate  in  the 
essential  nature  and  ethos  of his  emotional  encounter.  This  essence  is 
communicated through symbol  to the  subjective  emotional  realm  of the one 
who looks at his art. 
We could say here that whilst the onlooker was in the right place to view the 
symbol,  the  communication  was  by  the  artist's  own  initiative  and  not  the 
recipient's.  We could say,  further,  that if the beholder was in the wrong frame 
of  mind, the communication would be blocked. 
Similarly the poet uses images through the medium of metaphor to evoke all 
sorts of emotional  responses  in  the reader.  "The  (poetic)  image  ...  is  alive, 
evocative,  intense. ,,66  The  question  is:  Do  natural  symbols  evoke  such  an 
emotional response? and if so can they be considered to be a communication of 
God or Being, by analogy to artistic symbols and poetic images? 
In  respect  of the  different  types  of symbols,  S  K  Langer,  as  discussed  by 
Dillistone,  divides  symbols  into  two  types  or  forms,  'discursive  forms'  and 
'presentational forms'.  Discursive  symbols  represent determinate conceptions 
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266 and their relations; they have,  as  it  were,  one to one correspondence; they are 
clear cut, and obey certain definite rules.  Not so with 'presentational symbols': 
"  .  "  a  presentational  symbol  is  evoked  by,  and  evokes,  a  new 
experience and may break certain recognised rules in order that new 
forms may be created. 1167 
Presentational  symbols  present  themselves  to  the  observer,  but  not  in  any 
recognisable pattern, they break with convention as they present the new.  They 
deal in 'abstractive seeing',  but they are not rational,  rather they are emotional 
(even sensational)  in  ethos.  They evoke a holistic  response from  the  one  in 
contact.  This  encounter  leads  to  a  new  understanding  in  the  subjective 
consciousness  of the  recipient.  The  symbols  themselves  have  the  power to 
evoke  such  an  emotional  response.  The  salient  point  is  that this  is  a  'new' 
experience,  going beyond the  experience of the recipient.  It seems that this 
type of symbol is intrinsic to the essential nature of two realities, revealing one 
to the other. 
The  communication,  In  respect  of  presentational  symbols,  takes  place 
essentially in  the realm  of the response itself.  In  and through the  existential 
response  the  communicated  form  which  is  first  imposed  on  the  symbol  is 
transferred to the subjective consciousness of the beholder.  If the form  is  of 
some  aspect  of the  essential  nature of God then that  revelation is  indirectly 
communicated to the recipient through the intrinsic form of the symbol.  In our 
consideration,  this  is  principally what Macquarrie  understands  as  'primordial 
revelation'.  The  symbols  which  have  the  power to  communicate Being also 
have the power to reach into the emotional centre of  the Beholder, effecting an 
attunement of his  emotional  state,  to  which  the  evocative  communication  is 
made.  This  communication  is  always  of an  'ultimate'  nature  therefore  it 
produces a new understanding in the recipient. 
It must be made clear here that it  is  the immanence  of Being in  the intrinsic 
nature  of  the  participative  symbol  that  is  communicated,  and  not  the 
transcendence.  This communication of  the immanence does however cause the 
recipient to 'go beyond' himself,  therefore his  own being is  transcended.  The 
intrinsic  symbol  of Being  has  enabled  the  beholder  to  transcend  his  present 
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267 limitedness.  Clearly a new understanding of the nature of reality takes place 
and if  not blocked, a new pattern ofliving results. 
8.2 Primordial Revelation verses Incarnation 
In  seeking  to  understand  how  Macquarrie  relates  his  VIew  of Primordial 
revelation to the Christian doctrine of  Incarnation, we are essentially concerned 
with the consistency of Macquarrie1s christology, and especially his position on 
Ithe  uniqueness of Jesusl.  Our basic question concerns the deity of Christ.  If 
Jesus of Nazareth is  a recipient of IPrimordial revelationl then how can He be, 
at the same time,  the incarnate God? If the person of Christ is  understood as 
the greatest symbol ofBeing
68
, then how can the symbol of  the person of Christ 
itself receive primordial revelation through other, lesser,  symbols?  Indeed we 
might well ask how the incarnate God could possibly be a symbol of Himself. 
Macquarrie states quite clearly that he understands the person of Christ to be a 
symbol: 
IIIn  the central Christian doctrine of incarnation, it  is  a person who 
becomes the  symbol  of Being,  the  revelation  of God.  If anyone 
objects  to  Christ  being  called  a  Isymbor  on  the  ground  that  this 
detracts from  the reality of incarnation,  let  it  be  remembered  that 
God (Being) is present-and-manifest in the symbol,  and it  is  hard to 
see how anything more can be meant by lincarnationl.
1I69 
If we remember that Macquarrie will  not  permit,  as  valid,  the  concept of a 
universal intrinsic symbol,  then the symbol of the person of Christ, is  merely a 
relative  symbol  in  respect  of historical  association,  and  further,  as  we have 
already  stated,  according to Macquarrie  a  symbol  always  falls  short  of that 
which it  symbolises,  therefore  Christ  must  fall  short  of deity.  In  any  event 
Professor Macquarrie  holds  that  Christ  is  Himself a  symbol  of Being,  and 
indeed one of the most adequate symbols,  as  God is  greatly focused  in  Him. 
One  wonders;  can  this  be  said  of the  other  founders  of the  great  world 
religions?  Are  the  prophets  who  have  received  primordial  revelation, 
themselves,  symbols  of Being?  Are  they  also  to  be  thought  of as  IBeingl 
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268 incarnate, in any special way?  If so then they are all  equally God incarnate, in 
the way  that  Christ  is  God incarnate,  and  if not,  Christ  is  both unique  and 
absolutely supreme! 
To consider these questions  more fully  we must ascertain what Macquarrie's 
precise understanding of incarnation is.  Further to that we must ascertain as to 
whether  he  considers  the  incarnation  to  be,  itself,  primordial  revelation  or 
whether he will allow the concept of  historical revelation to be applied to it. 
8.2.1 Macquarrie's Understanding of Incarnation 
There are  essentially  five  key  concepts which  make  up  the  infrastructure  of 
Macquarrie's understanding of  the nature of  'incarnation', they are: 
a.  All of  being is,  as  a presence and manifestation of Being,  an incarnation of 
Being. 
b.  The human race has arisen out of  the cosmos in the process of evolution. 
c.  There is an open and infinite development of  human beings. 
d.  There is no qualitative difference between God and man. 
e.  The deification of  man ; 'raising a human being to God'. 
a) All of being is, as a presence and manifestation of Being, an incarnation 
of Being (God) 
This is Macquarrie's most basic presupposition in respect of the incarnation of 
God.  His ontological framework lends itself very much to this concept of the 
ordinary  beings,  both  animate  and  inanimate,  as  constituting  a  universal 
incarnation of Being itself.  Macquarrie's preoccupation is  therefore with the 
immanence  of God  as  He  is  present  and  manifest  in  ontological  symbols. 
According to Macquarrie, there is  no  such thing as  a direct communication of 
God to man, the revelation of  God is always in terms of  the focus of  His Being, 
in and through symbols.  God's Being is supremely, made present and manifest 
in personal, human beings.  It follows that there is no such thing as a mere man, 
all  men have the capacity to be sons of God,  therefore humanity is  of a very 
high and developing order. 
269 A  complementary  concept  to  Macquarrie's  posItion  was  that  of Athanasius 
(cited  and  adopted by  Macquarrie);  he  held  that  the  divine  Logos  has  been 
embodied in the whole world: 
"Perhaps it  is  only when we think of Jesus  Christ as  the true Man 
within the framework of a humanity upon which God has universally 
breathed his life and bestowed his image that we can see incarnation 
not  as  a  great  anomaly  of history  but  as  a  natural  step  in  the 
unfolding  of creation.  I  may  remind  the  reader  of Athanasius' 
argument  that  if there  is  a  sense  in  which  the  Logos  has  been 
embodied in the whole world, there is  no  difficulty in believing that 
the same Logos has been communicated in a man. ,,70 
The parallel idea here, is that of  the individual and particular incarnation of God 
in  the man Jesus  Christ,  arising  from  the  universal  incarnation  of God  in  all 
beings;  and  the individual  and  particular communication of the Logos in  the 
man Jesus Christ  arising  from  the universal  embodiment of the Logos in  the 
whole  world.  Incarnation  can  be  considered  to  be  a  part  of the  natural 
development, or unfolding of  creation; from universal to particular. 
b) The human race has arisen out of the cosmos in the process of 
evolution 
"The human race is linked to other living things and to the material 
cosmos  in  general  in  innumerable  ways.  It has  arisen  out  of the 
cosmos in the process of  evolution. ,,71 
It is safe to say that Macquarrie has been strongly influenced by the ideas of  the 
process  theologians  and  philosophers;  especially,  in  this  particular  respect; 
Norman Pittenger and Charles Hartshorne.  Macquarrie also  subscribes to the 
concept of the evolution of the species and indeed the evolution of all  being. 
Human  beings,  in  his  view,  have  evolved  from  lower  orders  of life,  and 
continue  to  evolve  to  a  higher  order.  This  is  conducive  to  an  incarnation 
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270 through evolution and  the existential process of being  as  becoming,  from the 
ground up, as it were.  It is an incarnation through the progressive development 
of a perfect humanity, from below to above. 
c) There is an open and indefinite development of human beings 
"  .. working  with  the  idea  of what  modern  anthropologies  have 
termed  the  'transcendence'  of human  nature,  the  idea  that  human 
nature is not a fixed essence but has an openness that seems to allow 
for indefinite development. ,,72 
As has been discussed at length in  other chapters, the concept of an infinitely 
transcending humanity, which manages to reach beyond its present limitations, 
is  at the heart of both existentialism  and  transcendental Thomism  (especially 
that of  Martin Heidegger and Karl Rahner).  This idea is particularly useful as a 
context and structure of  the concept of 'incarnation from below'. 
Man  is  forever  transcending  his  limitations,  surpassing  himself,  and  moving 
from a lower to higher order, towards perfect and complete humanity.  There is 
no such thing as  human nature, because humanity is  something unfinished and 
constantly  in  process  of becoming.  Christ  is  understood  as  the  perfect 
'archetype'  man.  He reached beyond  all  men  and  became  perfect.  "He was 
perfected in a process of  becoming perfect".73  And further: 
"We  recognise  him  as  the  representative  human  being,  the  word 
made  flesh...  He  has  attained  this  representative  status  not  in  a 
magical  or  instantaneous  way,  but  through  striving  and  the 
overcoming  of temptation,  though  the  striving  was  always  in 
response to the gracious action of God. ,,74 
In  this  way,  through  Christ's  attaining  off perfection,  God  becomes  fully 
incarnate in a Man.  Christ did not start out as the incarnate God however, He 
became God incarnate:  "  ...  the notion of degrees  of incarnation,  even in  the 
personal growth and development of  Jesus, has some probability. ,,75 
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271 The  'becoming'  of God  incarnate  in  Christ  through  stages  of a  process,  is 
. demanded by the  logic  of process theology,  if it  is  to  retain  its  consistency 
(when applied to Christian theology, by Christian Theologians) 
d) There is no qualitative difference between God and man 
The complimentary statement to the above, is that the difference between God 
and man is  one of degree rather than kind.  This precept is  also  applied to the 
. difference  between  Christ  and  other  men.  Macquarrie  finds  his  centre  of 
thought, in this respect, in Norman Pittenger who:  "did not hesitate to say that 
the  difference  between  Jesus  and  all  other  human  beings  is  a  difference  of 
degree, not of  kind. ,,76  And again: 
"Just  as  I  shied  away  from  the  doctrine  that  there  is  an  'infinite 
qualitative difference' between God and man,  so I would not want to 
urge some absolute difference between man and the lower animals. 
It is a difference of  degree rather than kind just as we said in the case 
of  the difference between Jesus Christ and other human beings. ,,77 
Whilst there is  no  infinite,  qualitative difference between God and man,  Jesus 
and other men,  and man and beast, in Macquarrie's view, there is a very great, 
yawning gap between each of  these categories.  So much so that the difference 
of degree may be taken as  a difference in  kind.  However the  point is,  that if 
there is  no  absolute difference then it is possible for each separate category to 
develop into the next.  That is, Beast into man and man into God.  What we are 
seeing here is virtually a monistic understanding of reality in respect of essential 
being.  We all come from the One and must return to the One. 
Macquarrie's understanding of incarnation is  that  of the  bridging  of the gap 
between man  and  God.  According to Macquarrie,  if the gap  is  qualitatively 
unbridgable incarnation would not be possible. 
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272 separates  him  so  absolutely  from  the  created  order  that  the  gulf 
between  can  never  be  bridged.  If there  is  no  affinity  whatever 
between  God  and  the  human  race,  if God  is  'wholly  other'  and 
separated from us by an 'infinite qualitative difference', then it seems 
to me that incarnation must be not only the 'absolute paradox' but a 
sheer impossibility. ,,78 
If God  is  'wholly  other'  then  according  to  Macquarrie  incarnation  is  not 
possible.  Macquarrie has both Barth and Kierkegaard in mind, in respect of  the 
. above quotation. Macquarrie says of  them: 
"I think these two writers lacked an adequate doctrine of the divine 
immanence, and without such a doctrine the difficulties, in the ways 
of  thinking of  an incarnation are enormously increased. ,,79 
It is clear that Macquarrie can not comprehend the possibility of  the nature and 
dynamics of 'condescension' in respect of the transcendence of God inbreaking 
human history through incarnation.  There can be no  question of  the resolution 
of the problem of the difference between the nature of God and the nature of 
man,  taking  place  in  the  person  of the  God-man  Himself.  The  central 
Christological problem of the two natures existing in  one  person,  which is  in 
itself the basis of  Christ's soteriological integrity, is given the same treatment by 
Macquarrie as was given by the Enlightenment thinkers; it just is  not possible. 
For  Macquarrie,  only  that  which  is  definitively  'this  worldly'  is  possible. 
Therefore only a Christology from below will do. 
e.  The deification of man;  'raising a human being to God' 
The question of incarnation,  for Macquarrie,  is  not;  'how can God become a 
man?' But rather,  'how can man become God?' Man, through reaching out to 
God by  ever transcending and  surpassing himself,  at  some point,  can become 
God.  Incarnation in its fullest expression is a man being raised to God.  Such a 
man would be a superman; the idea of a superman who  can reach beyond,  is 
found  in  the  works  of several  philosophers  especially  Friedrich  Nietzsche, 
Macquarrie cites him: 
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273 "In his view man is a thing to be surpassed, man is  a rope stretched 
between beast and superman ... The most anxious ask today, How is 
man to be preserved?'  But the question should be How is man to be 
surpassed?'."  80 
Nietzsche  was  most  surely  anti  Christian  however  Macquarrie  sees  certain 
. parallels with his  views and  Christianity,  particularly in  respect of man's  need 
for conversion and  reaching beyond himself.  Both Nietzsche and  Christianity 
are  seeking  the  realisation  of the  true  essence  of humanity.  Macquarrie 
understands this reaching out as  a 'reaching out to Godhood'; the superman is 
in fact the God-Man, Jesus Christ: 
"Nietzsche's superman is a secularised and dechristianized version of 
the  God-man.  The  superman  like  Sartre's  man  is  the  desire  to 
become God and, above all to exercise divine power.  The God-man 
by contrast, immerses himself in God and  manifests God's presence 
in him in terms oflove and service. ,,81 
Macquarrie understands the true essence of humanity, in its fully realised state, 
to consist in  the deification of man.  This  has  happened  in  the case of Jesus 
Christ  who  is  the  first  of a  new  higher  order  of 'deified'  humanity.  In  an 
analysis of the thinking of the neo-Marxist Ernst Bloch Macquarrie discusses 
the development of  man in the direction of  deification and the future creation of 
a kingdom which must be the right kingdom, he states: 
"This reference to a humanity that reaches out towards deification, 
and that connects with the 'kingdom' can scarcely be anything but an 
allusion to Jesus Christ.  His kingdom is the 'right' kingdom because 
it is not a kingdom of  power or founded on an ideology of  power. ,,82 
Incarnation is  seen in  this  light  as  a human being,  raised to God and  deified, 
therefore He, Jesus Christ, becomes the God-man by reaching beyond Himself 
to become God. 
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274 become so  closely united with the divine life that,  in the traditional 
language, it has become deified. ,,83 
. If we bring  these  five  elements  together we  gain  a  very  good insight  into 
Macquarries understanding of an incarnation 'from below' through the efforts of 
man,  or rather 'the' man Jesus Christ.  We have an  essentially ontological and 
existential  frame  which,  in  this  instance,  gains  much  support  from  Rahner's 
development  of transcendental  Thomism.  It  must  be  said  however  that 
Macquarrie understands incarnation  as  a two way movement which involves 
both  the  transcending  of man  but  also  the  transcending  of God.  In  man's 
development  God  also  surpasses  himself.  Macquarrie,  in  discussing  God's 
surpassing of  Himself states: 
"  ...  then  as  God fulfils  his  purposes  he  is  not just  perfecting  the 
world as  exterior to himself,  but is  increasing  his  own satisfaction 
and  therefore  'surpassing'  himself,  moving  on  to  new  levels  of 
perfection.  As  we  ourselves  move  towards  a  more  dynamic 
conception of God  and  think  of him  not  as  dwelling  in  a  distant 
heaven  in  untroubled  bliss  but  as  transcending  in  the  sense  of 
constantly coming forth  from  himself,  then the idea  of incarnation 
will not seem to be some improbable speculation or some fragment 
of a fantastic mythology.  Rather we can see it as the meeting point 
at which the transcendence of humanity from below  ...  is  met by the 
divine transcendence from above. ,,84 
8.2.2 The Question of Primordial Revelation in Incarnational 
Perspective 
Even if we agree that the difference between Christ and  other men is  one of 
degree  and  not kind,  and  if we accept Macquarrie's  concept  of incarnation, 
Christ is still in the unique position of having aspired to the highest order of  the 
God-man.  The  event  of this  achievement  took  place  in  human  history, 
therefore we can say that the incarnation of God in a man, who is the true man, 
is in itself historical revelation.  Christ,  who is  "the very truth of humanity,,85 
and the archetype of a new humanity:  "But now the archetype took shape in an 
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275 actual  human  being  and  a  new  humanity  was  formed. ,,86  This  essential 
archetype of deified humanity, must be the major revelation of  God to mankind 
in  human history.  Christ then is the universal archetype and representative of 
this new humanity, and in this he is alone, unique and supreme. 
Even from within such a Christology, from below, Christ must be conceded as 
being a universal symbol which is  of major,  essential and ultimate significance 
for all of  mankind.  Of  this significance, Macquarrie states: 
"Jesus  Christ  gets  his  significance  from  combining  ill  himself 
universality with his particular historicality. ,,87 
In  the  person  of Jesus  Christ  then,  the  universal  and  the  particular  are 
combined, they have become one and  the same thing,  and  this is  the peculiar 
mark of  His uniqueness.  We must claim, at this point, that the Christ event, is a 
historical  revelation  which  is  at  the  same  time  particular  and  universally 
applicable and accessible.  If Christ is  a symbol of God, then He is,  or at least 
He has become,  an intrinsic symbol with universal signification.  We consider 
this historical revelation further in terms of  two concepts, which are: 
a)  Christ as the 'focus of  Being' on earth, and 
b)  Christ as the 'perfect image of  God' on earth. 
a) Christ as the Focus of Being 
"The  incarnation  is  the  supreme  providential  act  or  miracle  of 
history.  It will  be  remembered  that the  characteristic  of such  an 
event is  that it  focuses Being in  its  presence  and  manifestation,  its 
advent and  epiphany.  Jesus  Christ may be  properly understood as 
the focus  of Being,  the  particular  being  in  whom the  advent  and 
epiphany take place,  so  that he is  taken up into Being itself and we 
see in  him the coming into  one of deity  and  humanity,  of creative 
Being and creaturely being.  And what we see in Christ is the destiny 
that God has set before humanity. "88 
Quite clearly this  person who focuses Being,  is  Himself a  special,  revelatory 
symbol.  In His person, is the supreme revelation of  Being (God) and according 
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276 to Macquarrie  above  He is,  at  the  same  time,  a  revelation  of the  ultimate 
destiny  of mankind.  This  incarnational  revelation  which  is  the  supreme 
providential  act  or  miracle,  is  surely  of a  different  quality  and  type  than 
'primordial  revelation'  as  defined  by  Macquarrie.  Primordial  revelation  is 
ontologically universal becoming particular through particular symbols and the 
. associated hermeneutic activity.  Incarnational revelation, through which Being 
is  focused  in  Christ,  as  a  providential  act,  is  historical  revelation  which  is 
particular in terms of  its historicity, but universal in terms of  the intrinsic nature 
of its  symbolism.  Therefore  it  is  significant  for  all  of mankind,  and  not  a 
particular culture alone.  Christianity, as  arising from incarnational or historical 
revelation in this way, is distinct from the religions which arise from primordial 
revelation in that it is  a particularisation which is,  at the same time,  universal, 
whereas the other world religions are particularisations of the universal, which 
find reification in cultural particularity.  Christianity then, can be seen to be the 
inverse  of the  others  in  that  it  is  a  movement  from  particular  to  universal, 
whereas they are movements from the universal to a particular. 
Macquarrie discusses the universal as focused in the particular: 
"  ... only if God makes himself present and known in and through the 
creation  generally  can  there  be  a  particular  point  in  which  he  is 
present and  known in  a  signal  way.  Jesus  Christ  would  not be  a 
revelation if  he was only an anomaly in the creation.  He is revelation 
because he  sums  up  and  makes  clear  a  presence that  is  obscurely 
communicated throughout the cosmos.  Elsewhere I have called him 
the focus of  Being. 1189 
This sums up very well the precise relationship between general or primordial 
revelation,  which  is  'obscure  throughout  the  cosmos',  and  particular  or 
historical revelation in the person of Christ, who is the focus of  Being.  Clearly 
Christ is seen by Macquarrie to be unique, even if the difference from all  other 
prophets is one of  degree, He is Himself revelation as He is Himself the deified 
Man;  and  therefore  He  is  not  at  the  same  time  a  receiver  of primordial 
revelation in the way that the other prophets are.  Primordial revelation is  the 
reaching  out  of Being  to  (attuned)  man.  Christ,  however,  according  to 
Macquarrie,  successfully reached out to God by  overcoming his  fallen  sinful 
humanity, and in so doing realised both the full  potentiality of human being and 
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277 Godhood.  Christls  death  is  the  greatest  revelation  because  according  to 
Macquarrie that was the precise point of  his deification.  This was His supreme 
. act  of self-giving  and  self-giving  is  the  likeness  of God,  therefore  in  this 
supreme  manifestation  of self-giving  by  the  person  of  Christ,  God  was 
supremely manifested on earth.  The self-hood of the human Jesus passes into 
Christhood through the death on the cross.  By Macquarriels own account, it 
does  appear  that  both  primordial  or  creational  revelation  and  historical 
revelation come together in the person of  Jesus Christ. 
b) Christ as the perfect image of God 
It appears that Macquarrie holds to something like Athanasiusl physical theory 
in respect of  the divine image.  The pure image of  God shines forth from Jesus: 
III  think we could even say that if God is  indeed a God who speaks, 
a God who communicates himself, then if he willed to communicate 
himself on this planet it would need to be in  and  through a human 
being or a human community.  I believe that to some  extent Godls 
image  remains  vestigially  in  every  human  being,  but  the  Christian 
claim is that in Jesus Christ that image has clearly shone forth. 11
90 
Clearly this shining forth of  Godls image in Christ is a revelation of  God on this 
planet.  Jesus  is  different  to  others  by  degree,  all  men  and  woman  carry, 
vestigially,  the  image  of God,  but  in  Christ  it  clearly,  and  therefore  purely, 
shines forth for all  to behold.  The divine image shines in  Christ because He 
sums up the whole range of created reality,  or the whole range of the reality 
which God has let be,  in Himself;  and He transcends it through the possession 
of  the spirit.  It is the possession of spirit which, for Macquarrie, constitutes the 
image  of God.  Christ  then  is  IBeingl in  Himself  and  therefore,  in  Himself, 
primordial  revelation,  which  has  been  clarified,  and  now  shines  forth, 
universally available and accessible, in human history. 
The  divine  image,  which  is  God  in  Christ,  is  the  potency  of Christls  God 
consclOusness.  Macquarrie  falls  back  on  Schleiermacherls  solution  to 
enlightenment rationalism.  Christ is  different from  other men because of the 
quality  and  extent of his  God consciousness.  In this theological  reaction to 
90  Op.  Cit. p.382 
278 · Kant we find ourselves thrust in to the area of  the human subjective in terms of 
conscience.  Christ had a deeper conscience indeed his  was conscience at its 
deepest level: 
"This deeper conscience is  an awareness which we have in virtue of 
our status  as  rational  and  spiritual  beings that  if we follow  some 
directions, we enhance our rationality and spirituality,  if we follow 
others we diminish them. ..  there is within us an archetype, an ideal, a 
lure which draws us on and in which we see fulfilled in a signal way 
in Jesus Christ. ,,91 
Christ then is the signal revelation of the essence of  true humanity, through the 
clear shining forth of  the image of God in Him.  The divine image is the depth 
aspect in the man Jesus.  In Him it is supremely clear, for all of  mankind to see; 
but Christ is  also the archetype man,  therefore in  Him,  the union of God and 
man is achieved, and Christ is the archetype of a new humanity, which in Him, 
can reach God. 
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279 CHAPTER 9 
RAHNER'S DEVELOPMENT OF 
ANONYMOUS CHRISTIANITY 
9.1 - 'Anonymous Christianity' as the synthesis of 
Rahner's dichotomy 
Anonymous Christianity, (otherwise called implicit Christianity) can be rightly 
designated the synthesis of the dipolar elements of Rahner's dichotomy.  The 
two elements are: 
1  It is  God's universal will that all  men will  be saved.  "  ... the scriptures tell 
(us) expressly that God wants everyone to be saved" (1 Tm:4), and 
2  There is no salvation outside of the church (meaning essentially that faith 
in Christ is necessary for salvation). 1 
If the sovereign free and omnipotent God wills all men to be saved yet there is 
no  salvation  outside  of Christ,  then  it  follows  that  all  men,  who  have  not 
rejected the grace of God (as those of  possibility 4,  p284) must in some way be 
'in'  Christ.  If they  are  not  explicitly  Christian  then  they  must  be  implicitly 
Christian.  Since  'anonymous  Christianity'  is  the  natural  development  of 
Rahner's theology in respect of salvation, we can give it  due consideration in 
terms of  its foundational factors, which are intrinsic to the essential ethos of his 
theological  understanding.  Because  'anonymous  Christianity'  is  a  logical 
development intrinsic to the very infrastructure of Rahner's whole theological 
position, it can be seen to be a doctrine which has great consistency in terms of 
Theological Investigations - Karl Rahner, vol 6 Baltimore; Helicon press, 
London; Darton Longman &  Todd Trans Karl H & Boniface Kruger 1969, 
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280 his theology as a whole.  It can be seen also to have some extraneous power in 
terms of  existential reality in respect of  the concept of  justice, and Biblically, in 
respect of  an exposition of  (highly selective) scriptural passages. 
9.1.1  The foundational factors of 'anonymous/implicit 
Christianity' 
The foundational  factors  are found  within  the following  aspects  of Rahner's 
theology; his epistemological ontology, the nature of saving faith,  the nature of 
supernatural grace and the nature of incarnation.  We will  identify the factors 
from within these specific areas. 
a) Rahner's epistemological ontology 
There are several things inferred by this heading, the first being the fundamental 
unity of 'knowing' and 'being' in Rahner's thought (as discussed in chapter 3).  It 
is also seen from Rahner's metaphysic, that being is equated to 'questionability'. 
Knowability,  questionability  and  being  are  a unity which  forms  the  essential 
content of the nature of finite (transcendental) spirit.  The precise moments of 
man's  existential  knowability  and  questionability  are  the  occasions  of his 
transcendental  spirit-in-the-world.  The  transcendental  intelligence  of man's 
spirit  is  man's  essential being  which is  his  'being-present-to-himself.  In this 
precise self presence or luminosity of  being, God is revealed to man in terms of 
man's own being.  In the transcendental reality the being of man and the Being 
of God coincide,  therefore, if man affirms  his  own being he  at the same time 
necessarily affirms the Being of God.  (Self-affirmation is  discussed later under 
the aspect  of faith.)  In  the  cognitive  act  of this  self-affirmation,  man  must 
necessarily  affirm  the knowledge  of God  as  his  essential  constitution.  This 
dynamic of human existence is the basis of what Rahner terms 'transcendental 
theism'. 
281 i) Factor Number 1 - Transcendental Theism 
Man's transcendental nature is  such that  God  is  present to  him  in  his  act  of 
knowing which of  course is also his act of  being: 
"Now  in  so  far  as  every  instance  of intellectual  knowledge  and 
freedom  on the part of the subject  and  his  act  is  a 'transcendental 
experience', i.e.  an experience of the intellect's unlimited rootedness 
in  absolute  Being,  on  the  subjective  side  every  instance  of 
knowledge is a real, even if implicit, knowledge of God. ,,2 
Man's  cognitive,  subjective  act  always  knows  about  God  either  explicitly  or 
implicitly,  this  knowledge is  a necessity of his  transcendental  nature.  This  is 
not to be thought of as  an innate knowledge but rather as  a living synthesis of 
a-priori and  a-posteriori  knowledge,  which  necessarily  has  God  as  its  proper 
object (either recognised or unrecognised): 
"It is true that there is no innate knowledge of  God in the sense of  an 
inborn conceptualised content, but never the less the conceptual and 
propositional  knowledge  of  God  is  the  objectification  of that 
rootedness of the intellect in absolute Being which is always present 
to  man's  transcendental  intellectuality;  that  rootedness  which  is  a 
concomitant  experience  in  every  intellectual  act,  whether  of 
knowledge or of freedom,  irrespective of the particular object with 
which this act is concerned. ,,3 
The reality and existential of human intellect, and its act, comes forth from and 
is  rooted  in  absolute  Being  (God).  Therefore,  as  a  man  gains  knowledge 
through the act of the intellect,  of any object,  he  at the same time necessarily 
gains knowledge of God.  This knowledge is  essentially primordial revelation, 
which is universal because it  is universally accessible by virtue of the essential 
human constitution in  respect of God's creative,  primary  delimitation of finite 
spirits.  The a-priori,  implicit  knowledge of God,  otherwise  termed  'the  pre-
concept of Being-in-general'  constitutes both the necessary  condition for  the 
possibility  of  receiving  any  further  a-posteriori  knowledge  through  the 
cognitive  act,  and  the  hearing  ear of man,  for  a further  revelation of God in 
history. 
2 
3 
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282 The a-posteriori element of  the implicit universal knowledge of God constitutes 
man's  transcendental  experience  of Him.  Clearly,  since  this  is  a  necessary 
knowledge there can be no  such thing  as  an  atheist  in  any  real  and  absolute 
sense;  the  transcendental  experience  of God  renders  man  a  transcendental 
theist.  The human will as the dynamic of  choice to affirm or reject, however, is 
the determining factor in  whether the implicit  knowledge of God avails  unto 
salvation. 
"  .. .it must always be borne in mind that a conscious or known reality 
present to man's mind  may exist in  the mode of free  acceptance or 
free  rejection,  since man is  not merely a being who  is  intellectually 
knowing but is also always a free being. ,,4 
The free rejection would constitute what is  known as  theoretical atheism;  and 
the  free  acceptance,  some  form  of implicit  (or  indeed  explicit)  Christianity. 
Whether the  order  is  acceptance  or  rejection,  God  is  present to  man  in  his 
transcendental  experience.  This  constitutes  some  form  of transcendental 
theism.  This also means that all men have some form of  relationship with God, 
which  constitutes  either  positively  or  negatively  the  reality  of their  lives. 
Rahner has drawn up  a table of the possible types of fundamental  relationship 
of  man with God.  He lists four possibilities. 
Possibility 1: 
"God  is  present  in  man's  transcendental  nature  and  this  fact  is 
objectified in a suitably and correctly explicit and conceptual theism 
and moreover is also freely accepted in moral affirmation of faith (in 
the practise of  living). " 
This is correct theism, both transcendental and categorial. 
There  exists  a proper relationship  with  man  and  God,  and  this  believer  is  a 
justified Christian. 
4  Ibid. 
283 Possibility 2: 
"Both categorial and transcendental theism are present,  man knows 
of God in his transcendental experience and also  his reflection upon 
the  latter  is  correct,  but  in  his  moral  freedom  he  rejects  this 
knowledge, whether as a sinner,  denying God,  or going on to reject 
the God whom he has correctly 'objectified' conceptually in real free 
unbelief. " 
This is ordinarily the category of  'atheist', although Rahner denies the possibility 
of  atheism in the strict sense. 
Possibility 3: 
"The transcendental experience of God is present of necessity and is 
also  freely  accepted  in  a  positive  decision  to  be  faithful  to 
conscience, but is incorrectly objectified and interpreted." 
This  produces an inadequate and  false  idea of God.  Such would be the case 
with other world  religions.  This  is  a form  of atheism which Rahner and  the 
Roman catholic Church believes to be 'innocent' and not therefore 'culpable'. 
Possibility 4: 
"The transcendental dependence on God is  present; objectively it  is 
interpreted falsely  or insufficiently correctly in  a categorial atheism, 
and  this  transcendental dependence on God is  itself simultaneously 
denied  in  a  free  action  by  a  gravely  sinful  unfaithfulness  to 
conscience. ,,5 
This  is  culpable  atheism which,  because it  is  a denial  of existence  itself and 
therefore  of the  existence  and  reality  of God,  excludes  the  possibility  of 
salvation. 
5  Ibid. (Possibilities 1-4) 
284 b) The nature of saving faith 
. We are concerned here with what Rahner terms 'implicit faith' or otherwise put 
'anonymous faith';  such a faith,  which  is  in  Christ,  is  sufficient  for  salvation; 
Rahner  does  not  equivocate  concerning  the  necessity  of  faith  for  the 
justification of sinners and for salvation.  This  reality is  essentially the second 
element of Rahner's  dilemma.  Much has  been  said  concerning the nature  of 
explicit  faith  in  Chapter  7,  what  we  are  concerned  with  here  is  a  further 
understanding  of the  nature  of the  minimum  form  of faith  which  will  be 
effective  for  salvation,  and  which  therefore  is  an  essential  element  of the 
doctrine of  anonymous Christianity. 
i) Factor number 2 - Anonymous faith 
Anonymous faith has been defined in  chapter 7,  and  we need not do  so  again 
here.  What  is  clear  is  that  the individual  who  has  anonymous  faith  has  no 
explicit relationship with Christ, nor indeed God.  Of course there can be forms 
of faith  which  are,  apparently,  'in'  God,  as  is  the  case  with  other  world 
religions,  but  are  not  'in'  Christ.  Rahner considers  these forms  to be those 
based on an inadequate and erroneous concept of God and as forms of explicit 
objective  and  categorial  faith  which  are  inadequate for  salvation.  However, 
implicit or anonymous faith if held in terms of  possibilities two and three above, 
would still prevail for salvation. 
What's involved in a genuine saving faith,  is  that a person must have  at  least 
implicit faith in God in terms of  his (own) transcendental nature, which is at the 
same time  a faith  in  his  own being  as  a finite  spirit.  It comes  down to the 
individual's conscience, which must not be offended against if implicit faith is to 
be real in the individual's life: 
"  ... genuine faith in revelation is necessary for salvation.  But it is not 
immediately  plain  what  is  exactly  meant  by  'faith  universally 
necessary  for  salvation'.  We  are  theologically  justified  in  our 
definition  of saving  faith  if we  take  into  consideration  that  the 
teaching of the church allows  a man the  chance of being  saved as 
long as  he  does not grievously offend his  conscience by his  actions, 
285 even if he  does  not  come,  in  the course of his  life,  to  an  explicit 
acceptance of  the Christian message in faith. ,,6 
The apparent weakness of Rahner's consideration here is  that, it  appears that, 
justification depends on a person being free from 'sins of commission' (that is; 
the category of sin which will  offend the individual's conscience); the question 
is however: Is there any person who has ever lived, apart from Christ, who has 
not offended against his conscience in this way? 
In any event those who do not offend in this way, against their conscience, are 
saved,  according  to  Rahner,  by  'anonymous  faith',  and  they  are  therefore 
anonymous believers.  What Rahner is saying is that: 
"because the universal and  supernatural will of God is  working for 
human salvation, the unlimited transcendence of man,  itself directed 
of necessity  towards  God,  is  raised  up  consciously  by  grace, 
although possibly without explicit thematic reflection, in such a way 
that the possibility offaith in revelation is thereby made available. ,,7 
Based on this  presupposition,  Rahner holds that one can speak of a genuine 
faith  in  such  a  case,  provided that the  anonymous  believer  accepts  his  own 
unlimited  transcendence  which  is  raised  up  by  God  to  His  own  presence. 
Anonymous  faith  then  appears  as  a  kind  of vague  empty  faith  which  God 
mysteriously elevates by His  own supernatural will  and  act,  to that of saving 
faith.  The emptiness is,  as  it were,  filled  out by God Himself in  order that it 
may be acceptable to Him as a saving medium.  Yet the anonymous believer is 
personally  involved  in  the  faith  dynamic,  because  by  accepting  his  own 
unlimited transcendent spirit which is  oriented towards God he is  at the same 
time accepting God in an act of  implicit faith: 
6 
7 
8 
"If a person by a free act in which he accepts himself unconditionally 
in  his  radical reference to God raised up by grace,  also  accepts the 
basic  finality  of his  spirit,  even  if without  reflection,  then  he  is 
making a genuine act of  faith. ,,8 
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286 The faith which is referred to here is of  course anonymous faith.  Rahnerls view 
is  that such a transcendental  experience  is  supernaturally raised  up  therefore 
revelation is  implied;  because this  act of acceptance of a person whereby the 
person becomes present to himself is  supernaturally elevated it must necessarily 
involve  a  revelation  of God.  This  is  what  Rahner  terms  a  transcendental 
. revelation.  Such  a  transcendental  revelation  which  comes  through  the 
realisation  of  human  transcendence,  makes  possible,  and  indeed  offers, 
anonymous faith.  The relationship of this transcendental revelation (creational 
revelation,  which  is  realised  a-priorily  through  the  transcendental  act  of 
knowing) to historical revelation is stated by Rahner: 
II Transcendental and  historical  revelation  have  a  mutual  reference: 
the former acquires historical form and shape in the latter, just as  in 
other  cases  the  transcendent  being  of man  is  mediated  to  itself 
through  history.  Historical  revelation  only  realises  its  proper 
character  through  its  transcendent  counterpart,  since  it  is  only 
effective  for  salvation  if  through  it  the  transcendent  self-
communication  of  God  finds  historical  expression,  the 
communication, that is,  to which we give the name of the grace of 
faith and justification.  11
9 
In other words the explicit, categorial, historical revelation of God is  addressed 
to the universal  transcendental  (primordial)  revelation,  which  all  men  are  in 
receipt of, by virtue of  their constitution as transcendental finite spirits; whether 
they have reflected on it  or are unaware of it.  This means effectively that all 
men,  provided  they  have  not  culpably  rejected  the  historical  or  the 
transcendental  revelations  of God,  or  are  explicit  Christians,  are  living  in 
anonymous faith as anonymous Christians.  They are, in effect, justified pagans. 
That  which  is  essential  to  anonymous  faith,  is  self affirmation,  along  with 
felicity and obedience to the individual's conscience.  This is,  in effect, faith in 
one's  own  transcendental  nature,  which  Rahner  considers  as  saving  faith, 
because onels own nature is the expression of God in the finite realm.  Faith in 
onels  own transcendental nature is  therefore an implicit,  though genuine,  faith 
in God Himself  Faith which is  salvific,  of course, must be in Christ.  We shall 
see that the implicit faith  described above is  held by Rahner to be anonymous 
9  Op. Cit. p.S8 
287 'Christian'  faith  and  therefore  constitutes  the  medium  of  'anonymous 
Christianity' . 
c) The nature of supernatural grace 
It should be conceded that salvation of sinners is  wholly and  absolutely of the 
will  and  work  of God.  Man  is  saved  not  through  his  own limited  (fallen) 
powers but  by  the  supernatural  grace  of the free  and  sovereign  God.  This 
grace, as unlimited by creation, may operate in modes unknown to man.  If  this 
. were  not  the  case  then,  in  the  strict  sense,  God  would  neither  be  free  nor 
sovereign.  However,  Rahner's basic  presupposition is  that:  "God's universal 
will  to save,  objectifies itself in that communication of himself which we  call 
grace".IO  Supernatural grace, then, is the communication of  the essential Being 
of God effected and empowered by God's will to save all of mankind.  Grace is 
seen to be a form of  universal revelation. 
i) Factor number 3:  Grace as  a universal form of revelation, which is 
constant, continuous and inescapable 
In this respect, Rahner states: 
"I mean by the essence of grace the self-communication of God to 
the transcendent spirit of man.  In virtue of this  self-communication 
the transcendence of man is  permanently and  necessarily ordered to 
the direct presence of God, whether this be the object of conscious 
reflection or not. "II 
All  men  are  oriented  towards  God  as  their  ultimate  goal  and  destination, 
through  this  supernatural  grace  which  is  communicated  to  man  in  his 
transcendental experience and by virtue of  his transcendental nature.  Whilst, at 
no time is  man's freedom abrogated, and he  is free to accept or reject this self 
revelation  of God,  the universal  dynamic  of this  grace  is  not  dependent  on 
man's acceptance and is continuous regardless of man's free choice.  We have, 
10 
11 
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288 then, a universal revelatory grace of God which is continuous and effected only 
by God's will to save; which in itself is  a continuous, unbroken and immutable 
reality. 
In this context of 'anonymous Christianity' Rahner is arguing that there are two 
basic forms  of revelation;  grace (which corresponds to  'creational revelation') 
and incarnation (which corresponds to 'historical revelation'), the latter we deal 
with below, it is intriguing that Rahner considers these two forms to be,  in their 
implicit mode, universal and indeed inescapable. In this respect Rahner states: 
"We might  apply the term anonymous Christian to every individual 
who, in virtue of God's universal will to save,  and thereby in virtue 
of  the supernatural existential (grace) is inescapably confronted with 
the offering of God's  self bestowal and  is  totally unable  to escape 
from this situation. ,,12 
It follows that every individual, whether Christian or non Christian, is justified 
through the grace of Christ,  which is  a universal self revelation of God.  This 
primordial  revelation  in  its  implicit  mode  is  the  ground  and  basis  for  the 
'justified  pagan'  who  is  an  anonymous  Christian.  The  precise  nature  of this 
revelation  makes  saving  faith  possible  for  the  pagan  and  includes  a  certain 
category of (non-culpable) atheists. 
What  we  have  here,  in  effect,  is  an  anthropological  and  anthropocentric 
(rational) justification from the source of a common grace which both Rahner 
and the church of  Rome would call'uncreated grace'. 13  This particular brand of 
common grace has been elevated to the rank of saving grace.  We have then, a 
soteriology which is  essentially built  on creational  (general)  revelation and  a 
common (primordial) grace, both of which are intrinsic to the constitution of 
creation itself and  in  that  sense  'a-priori'  yet  which  are  actualised  by the  'a-
posteriori' events of  the epistemic history of  the individual.  We have then both 
ordinary and supernatural realities co-existing within the one frame. 
12 
13 
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289 In consideration of the anonymous faith of the pagan,  which is the theological 
product  arising  from  this  framework  of anthropological  concepts,  Rahner 
states: 
"If we  take  these  concepts  of formal  anthropology  as  read  the 
possibility of personal faith in a 'pagan' makes two assumptions:  (1) 
The  supernatural grace of faith  and justification offered by  God to 
men need not be conceived of as  an isolated intervention on God's 
part at a particular point in  a world which is  itself profane.  On the 
contrary it  can perfectly well  be  interpreted  on the  basis  of God's 
universal will to save as a grace which,  as  offered (!), is a constantly 
present existential of  the creature endowed with spiritual faculties. " 
And:  (2)  "This  grace  constantly  implanted  in  the  nature  of the 
creature  and  the  historical  dimensions  belonging  to  it  as  the 
dynamism  and  finalization  of the  history  of man  is,  however, 
something of which man is aware in the manner upon which such a 
reality does  impinge  upon human  awareness.  This  awareness  does 
not  ipso  facto  or  necessarily  imply  an  objective  awareness;  it  is 
present  in  the  a-priori  formal  objects,  in  the  further  levels  of 
significance in the spiritual  and  intentional capacities of knowledge 
and freedom. ,,14 
The  case  for  'anonymous  Christianity',  or  more  accurately,  'anonymous 
Christians',  is  spelt  out  then,  in  terms  of the  supernatural  revelatory  grace 
intrinsic to the transcendental spirit of man.  It remains to see what Rahner has 
to say about 'incarnation' in this respect. 
d) The nature of incarnation 
What we have been discussing above, in respect of supernatural grace, is really 
the  precise  quality  of man's  unlimited  openness  to  God,  and  his  natural 
tendency and orientation towards God.  We have been exploring a further facet 
of creational revelation in terms of  its essential nature as a universal necessity in 
respect of  the 'uncreated grace' of God.  Creational revelation, of course, is the 
epistemic content of  man's conscious cognitive activity as he pursues his infinite 
quest for  knowledge.  It does appear,  that in  essence,  this  revelation is  of the 
14  Theological Investigations - Karl Rahner, vol 14 p.288 
290 mode of ordinary,  everyday,  'this  worldly',  knowledge.  Man's transcendental 
journey  towards  God,  then,  is  merely  his  ordinary  pursuit  of knowledge. 
Although Rahner would not consider that any knowledge is  ordinary, because 
for man to have knowledge at  all  requires  ontological coincidence with God, 
. indeed God and man  coincide in the cognitive act,  therefore we have implicit 
faith which comes to be in the revelatory, a-posteriori procedure of questioning 
and  gaining  knowledge  through  answers.  We  have  already  seen  that  this 
elevation of  the ordinary to the epistemologically supernatural, possess a great 
problem for Rahner and we approach the problem,  in this instance, in terms of 
the  question:  If this  is  so  then  what  possible  need  is  there  for  a. particular 
incarnation of  God in Jesus Christ?  Rahner puts the question in a similar way: 
"  ... how does this tendency towards God, which is on occasion quite 
implicit and incoherent,  and yet always completely permeates man's 
being  and  existence,  include  a  reference  to  the  incarnate  God,  to 
Jesus Christ. ,,15 
The fact  of Jesus Christ is  the most important and  decisive fact  of reality for 
man,  argues Rahner,  and  it  is  the fact  which has the most  obvious relevance. 
This  fact  is  the fact  of historical revelation in  the person of the  Son of God, 
who  is  God  incarnate.  Our  question  then,  becomes;  what  relevance  has 
historical (particular) revelation to creational (universal) revelation which every 
man receives either,  explicitly and thematically or implicitly  and  incoherently? 
And;  what is  the relationship  of the two?  For an  answer  we  must  look to 
Rahner's understanding of  the nature of  the incarnation itself.  He states: 
15 
16 
"If one takes seriously that God has become man,  then - it must be 
said  - man is  that which  happens  when  God  expresses  and  divests 
himself.  Man is  accordingly in  the most basic definition that which 
God becomes  if he  sets  out  to  show  himself in  the  region  of the 
extra-divine.  And conversely, formulating it from the point of view 
of man:  man is  he who realises himself when he  gives himself away 
into  the  incomprehensible  mystery  of God.  Seen in  this  way  the 
incarnation of God is the uniquely supreme case of the actualisation 
of  man's nature in general. ,,16 
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291 We have then,  a view of  the incarnation from the bottom up,  similar to that of 
Macquarrie's.  The incarnation is  the supreme  achievement  of the  man  Jesus 
. Christ, in actualising His human nature and therefore in becoming divine.  This 
actualisation, which clearly must have been in terms of creational revelation as 
understood by Jesus, takes place in human history, therefore, the ultimate effect 
of creational revelation in the person of  Jesus, becomes historical revelation for 
mankind.  In this way historical revelation arises out of creational revelation in 
its a-posteriori actualisation in the ultimate,  supreme, human being,  and it does 
not break in on human history from God's transcendent wholly otherness.  The 
incarnation is the full realisation of the potential of human existence,  and again 
. it  is  a transcendental  reality  in  terms  of the  immanence  of God  and  not  the 
transcendence.  The man Jesus was that which happened when God set out to 
show himself; as all men are to a lesser degree.  Jesus Christ, is,  as Macquarrie 
would  have  it  also,  different  by  degree  and  not kind,  in  respect of all  other 
human beings. 
Christ  achieved  the  ultimate  realisation  of God's  incarnation  in  himself,  and 
therefore became a new revelation of God to man. 
"Now  that  his  (man's)  thinking  is  illuminated  by  the  light  of the 
revelation  which  has  in  fact  been  made  in  the  historically 
accomplished reality of Christ, he can recognise this unapproachable 
height as that perfection of  his own being. ,,17 
In a very real sense, if we accept Rahner's argument here,  historical revelation 
is  the natural,  though ultimate,  realisation of creational revelation.  In effect, 
they are one and the same.  It can be seen,  that this view of the incarnation in 
no  way  detracts  from  the  consistency  of Rahner's  case  for  anonymous 
Christianity,  indeed,  it  counts  towards  it.  Incarnation  is  a  radical  mode  of 
man's spiritual being which eminently fulfils the transcendence of his being.  It 
comes together with  the revelation  of grace,  to  produce the  one  continuous 
revelation of God which has the potential of saving all  men,  whether they are 
consciously aware of it or not.  "This self-communication of God offered to all 
and  fulfilled  in  the  highest  way  in  Christ  ...  constitutes  the  goal  of all 
creation. ,,18 
17 
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experience of the revelation of God, his nature is  stamped by God's will and it 
is  therefore pre-determined in  respect of the supernatural existential which is 
the universal grace of God.  Man therefore necessarily experiences the reality 
of  the content of  this grace, implicitly and possibly incomprehensibly. 
"This means that the express revelation of the word in  Christ is  not 
something which comes to us from without as  entirely strange, but 
only the explication of what we already are by grace and  what we 
experience  at  least  incoherently  in  the  limitlessness  of  our 
transcendence.  The  expressly  Christian  revelation  becomes  the 
explicit  statement  of the  revelation  of grace  which  man  always 
experiences in the depths of  his being. ,,19 
What is being said here is that since the revelation of  grace is already 'in man', if 
he accepts himself he accepts Christ, therefore he is an anonymous Christian. 
9.1.2 The exception: Culpable atheism 
Rahner's doctrine of anonymous Christianity clears the way for the possibility 
of the salvation of all  men and  women,  with one exception,  that of 'culpable 
atheism'.  Rahner categorises atheists as  either 'innocent' or 'culpable'; this line 
of  thinking is very much in line with the Church of  Rome, since Vatican 2.  The 
official view of  the past has been: 
"in  scripture God's knowability seems  so  clearly given  and  atheism 
seems  to  give  evidence  so  definitely  of being  man's  most  terrible 
aberration, that it was only thought possible to understand it as a sin 
in which a man freely turns away in the mysterium iniquitatis, evilly 
suppressing the truth which everywhere impinges  in  on  him  (Rom 
1  :8).,,20 
In view of this, until recent times, it was held that it is impossible for any adult 
atheist to continue in this venial sin for any considerable length of  time without 
becoming personally culpable.  There could not be any  possibility of 'implicit 
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optimism however,  at  the second Vatican Council. 21  What emerged was that 
"  ... not every instance of  positive atheism in a concrete human individual is to be 
regarded as the result and the expression of personal sin...  such an atheist can 
be justified and receive salvation if  he acts in accordance with his conscience. ,,22 
Rahner  has  adopted  this  view.  The  essential  difference  between  a justified 
atheist  and  an  unjustified  atheist  has  to  do  with  obedience  to  the  particular 
individual's  own  moral  conscience.  This  has  already  been  discussed  above 
(esp.  under  the fourth  possibility  (1.1  a)).  Culpability  seems  to  be  a  grave 
sinful  unfaithfulness  to  the  individual's  own  conscience;  the  transcendental 
dependence of God which self affirmation demands,  is denied in this case,  and 
therefore salvation is impossible.  Culpable atheism consists of an ultimate 'no' 
to this transcendental dependence: 
"  ..  culpable atheism (exists) not necessarily merely in transgression in 
connection with any particular moral situation but in an ultimate 'no' 
to man's fundamental dependence upon God himself, that is,  in a free 
'no' to God himself. ,,23 
Categorial atheism,  therefore, is  considered to be 'innocent' but transcendental 
atheism is always 'culpable'.  In transcendental atheism God himself is really and 
truly  rejected  by  a free  decision,  whilst  in  categorial  atheism  it is  only  the 
objective knowledge of God  which  is  rejected.  It appears  to  be  possible  to 
reject the  objective  knowledge  about  God  and  at  the  same  time  accept  and 
affirm God himself.  Categorial atheism can be the result of false or insufficient 
interpretation of the dependence on God in his  transcendental presence.  This 
type of atheism is innocent because it  does not necessarily involve a denial of 
the  person  of God  through  gravely  sinful  unfaithfulness  to  the  individual 
conSCIence.  If such  a  real  denial  is  also  effected  the  wrongly  interpreted 
revelation  of  God  becomes  culpable;  this  is  so  because  the  erroneous 
interpretation, in this case, is sinful,  and the denial that follows is a rejection of 
21 
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294 God Himself because it is a rejection of existence as such.  Such a one can not 
have implicit faith and is therefore not an anonymous Christian. 
A culpable atheist who is  blameworthy and  unjustified  is  one who,  in  effect, 
banishes God from himself,  through gravely and sinfully acting against his own 
conscience.  This results in  a wholly negative relationship with God.  There is 
only bad will  in this  respect,  and  it  is  good will,  at  least,  that is  required for 
salvation.  The atheist who  acts  in  accordance with his  conscience,  and who 
seeks truth in respect of  his moral consciousness, acts in good will: 
"The  person who  accepts  a  moral  demand  for  his  conscience  as 
absolutely  valid  for  him  and  embraces  it  as  such  in  a  free  act  of 
affirmation - no  matter how unreflected - asserts the absolute being 
of God, whether he knows or conceptualises it or not. ,,24 
An  anonymous Christian requires to accept and  not  offend  against the moral 
demand of his  conscience, this is  understood to be positively in  keeping with 
Romans 1: 8 f. 
9.2 Anonymous Christianity and the Divine logos 
9.2.1 The beginnings: Justin Martyr 
We  are  told  that  the  2nd  century  apologists  sought  to  demonstrate  the 
reasonableness of Christianity to the educated classes: 
"They  were  particularly  solicitous  to  make  the  Christian  religion 
acceptable to the educated classes by stressing its rationality. ,,25 
This rationality was understood as the divine  logos which was present,  as  the 
universal principle of reason, in all men.  The most notable of the apologists in 
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says of  Justin: 
IIHis  starting point was the current maxim that reason (the germinal 
logos) was what united men to God and  gave them knowledge of 
Him.  Before Christls coming men had possessed, as it were,  seeds 
of  the logos and had thus been able to arrive at fragmentary facets of 
the truth.  Hence such pagans as  Ilived with reasonl were Christians 
before Christianity.  1126 
The precise quote from Justinls Apology reads: 
IIWe  are taught that Christ  is  the first  born of God,  and we have 
shown  above  that  He is  the  reason  (logos)  of whom  the  whole 
human race partake...  and  those who live  according to reason are 
Christians,  even  though  they  are  accounted  atheists.  Such  were 
Socrates and Heraclitus among the Greeks, and those like them. 1127 
Christ, then, is understood as the universal logos who is  present in reasonable 
men,  and  all  such  reasonable  men  whether  before  or  without  explicit 
knowledge of Christ are limplicit Christiansl.  Indeed any utterances of truth of 
any  man belongs to  Christianity;  such men were able to see the truth dimly 
through the implanted seed of  the logos dwelling in them: 
IIWhatever has been uttered aright by any men in any place belongs 
to us Christians;  for  next to God we love and  worship the reason 
(logos) which is from the unbegotten and ineffable God. 1128 
This divine logos is implanted in men by the grace of God, therefore any truth 
is,  as of the logos, Christian truth,  and Christian truth is the light that lighteth 
every man.  Christ, then, is the rational factor in God, related to manls reason. 
He is the immanent reason of God, therefore all men of reason (and that must 
surely mean all  men and women) as  displaying this  immanent  reason of God 
must be, in this way, Christians.  Even if  they have never heard of  the person of 
Jesus Christ. 
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296 The  essential  thesis  that  Justin  argues  for,  however,  is  that  there  is  an 
unbroken,  intrinsic  and  essential  continuity  between  creation  (and  creational 
revelation)  and  recreation  (and  historical  revelation)  in  terms  of the  divine 
Logos who is operative both at creation and recreation.  The, universal Logos 
then, is the essential link between these two realities.  Macquarrie states, in this 
context: 
"Not  only  St.  Athanasius  but  St.  Irenaeus  and  many  other  early 
Christian  writers  rightly  connected  the  doctrines  of reconciliation 
and creation.  Both of these activities were ascribed to the Logos, 
eventually conceived as the second person of the triune God ...  and it 
was believed that what the logos does in reconciliation is continuous 
with what he does in creation. ,,29 
The divine Logos is active and  essential to the original creation, and the same 
Logos is  active  and  essential  to reconciliation or re-creation.  At  a point  in 
human  history  the  Logos  had  been  made  flesh  in  Jesus  of Nazareth;  as 
Macquarrie sees it, it was not Jesus Christ who was instrumental at creation but 
the, as yet, impersonal Logos.  Macquarrie goes on to say: 
"St.  Justin  explicitly  deals  with  the  objection  made  by  opponents 
who pointed out that, according to Christian teaching, the logos had 
been incarnate in Jesus only one hundred and fifty  years before his 
time, and demanded to know whether all who lived before that were 
irresponsible. St.  Justin replies that the Logos had always been in the 
world, that the providential acts described in the Old  Testament are 
to be ascribed to the agency of the Logos and  furthermore  that in 
this same Logos 'every race of men were partakers'. ,,30 
Comparing Macquarrie's thinking in  this  respect,  he  argues that in  the Logos 
becoming flesh  there was  a new  revelation  of a reconciling  activity  that  had 
always been going on.  His underlying presupposition is  that creation and  re-
creation are equiprimordial, they have both been going on from the beginning. 
The vital bonding between the two is the Logos, which is universal in creation 
and particular in reconciliation.  The Logos, then,  is the medium of continuity 
between creational and  historical revelation.  It can be  readily  seen from  this 
position that the Old Testament prophets,  and  indeed all  (true) prophets of all 
religions  are  united  by  this  same  logos  whom  they  all  proclaim  in  differing 
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"the revelation of the mystery which was kept secret for long ages, but is  now 
. disclosed and through the prophetic writings is  made known to all  nations. ,,31 
God's saving activity which is from the beginning, and co existent with creation 
(and  indeed  co  extensive  with  it)  is  universal  through  the  universal  Logos. 
Creation  and  recreation  are,  to  Macquarrie,  moments  of the  same  activity. 
Therefore  creational  and  primordial  revelation  are  equally  primordial  and 
universal;  the  historical  mode  being  the  expression  of the  creational.  This 
expression is potentially available to all men but only a few realise it; those who 
do,  are the founders  of religions  in whom the Logos is  intensely present and 
. manifest.  They are the focus of  Being, Jesus Christ is understood as being the 
supreme focus of  Being, in line with the other prophets and of the same order, 
as indeed of the same order as  all  men,  but yet the superlative expression who 
became deified  and  understood as  the  son of God,  the  second  person of the 
Trinity. 
9.2.2 Rahner's understanding of the logos 
We have  already  seen that the  Logos  is  central  to  Rahner's  concept  of the 
human spirit  as  a transcendental reality.  The logos  is  the  essential  factor  in 
human epistemology, it is the medium of the coincidence of the divine and the 
human  spirit;  and  of supernatural  grace.  Rahner,  however,  distinguishes 
between two categories of logos; divine eternal Logos, and human logos.  It is 
the human logos that is the place of the coincidence of God and man,  and it is 
through the human logos that man is able to transcend his own being (through 
the negation which is possible only in the logos).  The Logos is 'essential being', 
therefore it is an ontologically primordial reality which is intrinsic to creation, in 
respect  of finite  spirits.  It is  a  universal  essential  element  in  the  human 
constitution, indeed it is 'the' essential element: 
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the incarnate logos utter in words, what lies hidden in the depths of 
God.,,32 
We have then, the idea of  the primordial Logos of creation, being passed on to 
man  as  constitutive  of the  nature  of his  spirit.  Coming  forth  from  the 
primordial, eternal, divine Logos we have the being of  the logos of man,  and a 
primordial and essential unity of both logos realities.  It is  to this context that 
. the incarnate Logos in the person of  Jesus Christ appears. 
Since there is  a sense in which all finite spirits in the world are incarnations of 
God and as  such,  bearers of the Logos, Rahner must clarifY what is  meant by 
the term,  and the reality,  'God became man',  (or more precisely 'the word of 
God became man'). 
a) The Word of God became man 
Rahner states: 
"Beginning as early as the prologue of John's Gospel, Christian faith 
says that the word of  God became flesh, became man.  (In 1:14),,33 
There is immediately, in this reality, the closest association between the divine 
Logos and man.  There is  also the concept of God 'becoming something'.  The 
question;  what  does  it  mean  that  God  became  man?  is  perhaps  the  vital 
question of  the incarnation.  Man is  something that God can become, this says 
a lot about the nature of  man,  and it is a revelation of  the reality of a God who 
according to classical theism, is immutable.  Rahner takes the doctrine of  God's 
immutability on board, and therefore,  is left with the problem of an immutable 
reality which  can  change  into  something.  However,  we  are  only  concerned 
here with two aspects: 
i) 
ii) 
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Rahner understands the subject and the predicate of the statement 'the Logos 
became man' to be mutually revealing, he states: 
"For it  is  precisely in this statement that we understand for the first 
time what the Word of God really means  ...  because it  is  from the 
statement:  God has  offered himself to  us in  immediacy precisely in 
history and as a man,  that we grasp that God, the incomprehensible 
abyss whom we call Father, really has a Logos, that is,  really has the 
possibility of offering his very own self to us in history. ,,34 
The nature of  the Logos is itself the possibility of incarnation in human history. 
Human nature is also seen as being the able bearer of  the divine Logos.  Rahner 
is  arguing that through the word becoming man we are able to define  human 
nature, as we are able in some way to define God, in respect of His taking the 
finitude upon Himself. 
The definition  of human nature can not be  achieved  apart from  God.  Such a 
definition is impossible, Rahner states:  "He is,  as we could readily 'define' him, 
that  indefinability  which  is  conscious  of itself. ,,35  This  consciousness  is,  in 
nature, a universal orientation towards God: 
"When  we  have  said  everything  which  can  be  expressed  about 
ourselves which  is  definable  and  calculable,  we have  not  yet  said 
anything  about  ourselves  unless  in  all  that  is  said  we  have  also 
included that we are beings who  are  oriented towards God who  is 
incomprehensible. ,,36 
Our whole existence is  constituted by  our relationship with God in respect of 
this necessary orientation which is  human nature.  All  men must merely accept 
or reject the orientation, this acceptance or rejection is what it  means to exist. 
The  mystery of God whom  all  are  oriented towards  is  at  the  same  time  the 
mystery of ourselves, acceptance or rejection of  this double mystery is the very 
act of our existence.  We are also a transcendent orientation and  in the nature 
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is therefore defined as: 
II ••• the poor, questioning and in itself empty orientation towards the 
abiding mystery whom we call God.  11
37 
Whilst this orientation is poor and empty it is also potentially limitless, the finite 
has an infinite potential in respect of  its orientation towards the infinite mystery 
of fullness.  It can be seen then, that the divine Logos can assume this empty 
potentially  infinite  orientation  as  it  is  prepared  by  God  in  respect  of the 
eventuality  of such  an  assumption.  Humanity  in  its  totality  then  is  an 
obediential for the hypostatic union.  It is  summed  up  as  that which  can be 
assumed by the person of  God. 
II ... anyone who  understands that  it  is  only  a  spiritual  and  personal 
reality  that  can be  assumed  by  God ...  knows that this  obediential 
potency cannot be an individual potency alongside other potencies in 
the structure of human being, but rather is objectively identical with 
manls essence. 1138 
In light of this kind  of thinking human nature itself must receive the logos as 
Ithe  highest  instancel  in  its  own  actualisation.  Indeed,  human  nature  is 
dependent  on  such  an  assumption  (by  the  divine  logos)  in  order  to  be 
meaningful.  The  incarnation  lisl  the  meaning  of human  nature  therefore,  a 
doctrine of anonymous  Christianity,  as  a universal  primordial  reality,  follows 
from the essence of  assumed human nature, whether potentially or actually. 
ii) The Logos which can become 
The question here is:  Why did the Logos become man?  The answer is, that the 
Logos is Godls immanent self expression to that which he created as other than 
Himself.  It is  Godls reality going out of itself to assume the created reality as 
its own: 
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301 outside of himself,  and  the  latter  is  the  identical  revelation  of the 
former. ,,39 
"If  this God expresses his very own self into the emptiness of  what is 
not  God,  then  this  expression  is  the  outward  expression  of his 
immanent word. ,,40 
It seems that the point to human being is that the divine Logos 'will', as the self-
expression  of God,  assume  it;  therefore,  the  Logos  is  itself the  point  and 
meaning of created human life.  However,  Rahner does state that there could 
have been men apart from the divine Logos, if this were not so there would be 
no  free  grace  in  the  incarnation.  God's  self communication  by  incarnation 
would not be free if the possibility of the assumption of human nature was not 
open in that it may not necessarily happen.  He argues that:  "there can be the 
lesser without the greater".  41  However, the greater is always the condition for 
the possibility of  the lesser. 
"  ...  there could be men,  that is the lesser, even if the Logos had not 
himself become a man.  But we can and have to say nevertheless: the 
possibility  that  there  be  men  is  grounded  in  the  greater,  more 
comprehensive  and  more  radical  possibility  of God  to  express 
himself in the Logos which becomes a creature. ,,42 
It must be understood that the divine Logos is  distinct from the human logos, 
and He is not just one who speaks words of God.  If this were so he would be 
no different than some other prophet.  Rahner states that: 
"The man Jesus must be the self-revelation of God through who he 
is  and  not only through his  words,  and  this  he  really  cannot be if 
precisely this humanity were not the expression of God. ,,43 
And further: 
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unbridgable difference  is  constituted by  the fact  that this  'what'  in 
him  is  spoken as  his  self-expression,  and  this  is  not the  case  with 
us. ,,44 
9.3 Christ in non-Christian religions 
Arising  from  the  presupposition.  that  all  are  saved,  with  the  exception  of 
culpable atheists, through Jesus Christ and not apart from  Him,  it  follows that 
Christ must be in some way present in other religions. 
All that is  said above concerning implicit Christianity applies in the case of the 
individuals  of other  religions,  but  the  question  here  is:  How can  Christ  be 
present and operative in other religions themselves?  Rahner's answer is that He 
is  present  in  individual  non-Christian  believers  and  hence  in  non-Christian 
religions  through  His  Spirit.  All  faith  including  the  faith  of non-Christian 
believers is of  the Holy Spirit: 
"If there can be a faith  which is  creative of salvation  among non-
Christians ...  then it is to be taken for granted that this faith is made 
possible and is based upon the supernatural grace of  the Spirit.  And 
this is the Spirit who proceeds from the Father and the Son,  so that 
as the Spirit of the eternal Logos he can and must be called at least 
in this sense, the Spirit of Christ. ,,45 
We have then a universal operation of the Holy Spirit in every place and time, 
both  within  and  outwith  explicit  Christianity.  The  Spirit  has  been 
communicated to the whole world and is  universally efficacious in His salvific 
power.  However,  "The Spirit who has been communicated to the world,  has 
himself. ..  an intrinsic relation to Jesus Christ. ,,46: 
44 
45 
46 
"Insofar as this Spirit always and everywhere brings justifying faith, 
this faith is always and everywhere and from the outset a faith which 
Ibid. 
Op.  Cit. p.316 
Op.  Cit. p.318 
303 comes to be in the Spirit of Jesus Christ.  In this Spirit of his  he  is 
present and operative in all faith. ,,47 
The vital thing to note, in Rahner's position here,  is  that the Spirit of Christ is 
not  operative  in  the  institutions  of the  other,  non-Christian  religions,  which 
might of themselves be quite perverse, but in the individual believer who has 
some form of faith.  The  Spirit through this  implicit  faith  brings to bear the 
merits  of the incarnation the death and  the resurrection of God in  Christ;  in 
respect  of the  justification  of this  believer,  who  may  be  believing  in  an 
erroneous knowledge of God.  Rahner says,  concerning the faith of this non-
Christian believer:  "Jesus Christ is always and everywhere present in justifying 
faith because this faith is  always and everywhere the searching memory of the 
absolute saviour. ,,48  Rahner has in mind here something like Plato's concept of 
anemnesis whereby  one remembers  what one already  implicitly  knows.  The 
searching  memory  constitutes  the  faith  of non-Christian  believers.  Plainly 
speaking the  searching  memory constitutes an  attitude of expectation and  of 
searching and hoping, which is understood by Rahner as constituting an implicit 
though saving  faith.  The  question which  arises  here  is:  Does the ritual  and 
dogma of the non-Christian religion not constitute a serious distraction to this 
searching, hoping,  memory?  Is there no  negative force which can act against 
this intrinsic a-priori reality of  implicit faith in Christ? 
It appears  that to be  human  is  to be  oriented  towards  God  and  there  is  no 
possibility,  apart  from  the  extreme  case  of culpable  atheism,  of any  other 
direction of orientation.  Even negative and  perverse religious rites cannot re-
orientate the participant.  It is  seen that fallen  and  sinful human nature, which 
Rahner  acknowledges,  does  not,  in  any  essential  way,  count  against  this 
position. 
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CONCLUSION 
RELIGIOUS PLURALISM 
10.1 - The Case for Religious Pluralism 
The basis  of the case for  the validity of religious  pluralism  in  respect of the 
theologies  of John  Macquarrie  and  Karl  Rahner  has  been  outlined  and 
discussed  in  chapters  2  - 9.  Both  Theologians  work  primarily  within  an 
ontological framework, developing existentially and epistemologically from this 
root,  and from within this  context.  Religious pluralism arises,  essentially and 
necessarily,  from the general  and  universal revelation of Being,  to the beings 
(more correctly, human beings); 'creational' revelation of this nature,  although 
distinct in  both theologies,  is  an  essential unity of ontological,  existential and 
epistemic  elements.  Such  a  revelation  produces  a  kind  of universal  faith, 
explicit  or implicit,  which  becomes  particular  and  concrete,  in  Macquarrie's 
understanding,  through  particular  (given)  symbols,  and  in  Rahner's 
understanding, through individual, existential epistemic activity.  Pluralism is  a 
function  of the  particular,  historic  expression  of the  universal  source  and 
ground,  which  is  given  facility  through  'particular'  symbols,  in  Macquarrie's 
case, and 'anonymous faith', in Rahner's case. 
It is  our view that the theologies of both thinkers shed very considerable light 
on the reality of religious  pluralism,  which by  it's  very  nature is  a confusing 
entity.  However, whilst it  must be conceded that these distinct theologies are 
built  in  the form  of brilliant  and  apparently consistent schemas,  they  posses, 
what we may term,  serious ambiguities,  in  respect of the precise nature of the 
305 transition from general to particular; and most especially in respect of 'historical 
revelation'.  Such  ambiguities,  which  are  implicit  within  a  large  part  of the 
preceding  discussion,  will  be  more  fully  articulated  in  the  latter  end  of this 
chapter.  We begin, however, with a review of  the positions of  both Macquarrie 
and Rahner, in respect of  religious pluralism. 
10.1.1 Macquarrie's view of Religious Pluralism 
Macquarrie's whole theological development, which in  our view is  in the form 
of a religious apologetic,  (perhaps in  similar  spirit to that of Schleiermacher) 
appears  to be  meticulously  designed  to  accommodate the  strongest  positive 
justification and validity of religious pluralism.  In this  light it  should be  seen 
that  Macquarrie  is  essentially  a  religious  apologist  and  not  a  Christian 
apologist, and therefore his  spirited defence is  not primarily of Christianity but 
of  all  religions  (including  Christianity).  Macquarrie's  domain  is  the 
phenomenon  of religion  itself and  therefore  he  rejects,  almost  of hand,  the 
critics  of religion;  e.g.  Barth,  Bonhoeffer,  Brunner,  Robinson,  and  in  this 
respect, to a lesser extent, Bultmann  1.  Clearly Some of  Macquarrie's criticisms 
of the above are well founded.  It is  also  clear,  however, that more often than 
not, Macquarrie's defence of 'religion in general',  is  at the (definitive) expense 
of 'religion in  particular';  and  most  especially  of the  Christian  faith.  Indeed, 
from the point of view of the Christian Tradition, Macquarrie is  often seen to 
be reductionist. 
Before  proceeding  with  the  statement  of Macquarrie's  VIew  of religious 
pluralism which we will  discuss under the headings  of a)  Factors of diversity 
and  b)  Saviour figures,  it  is  helpful  to  list  a few  relevant  passages  from  his 
writings: 
2 
"The  divine  initiative  in  revelation  and  grace  would  seem  to  be 
present in  some form in  all  religion,  and  is  certainly not peculiar to 
Christianity. ,,2 
For a discussion on this aspect see Principles of  Christian  Theology 2nd 
ed  plS3 - 161 
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received and appropriated in the life of faith.  We have assumed (in 
agreement with Catholic Christian teaching) that in  all religion there 
is  some genuine knowledge of God, genuine revelation and genuine 
grace, and we have turned away from the view (held  especially by 
such Protestant theologians  as  Calvin  and  Barth)  that there  is  no 
genuine knowledge of God outside of  the Christian revelation. ,,3 
"  ... we can also see that there is an underlying unity, in that all of  the 
religions  stem from Being's self-manifestation as  this  is  received  in 
faith. ,,4 
"  .. all religions can be seen as variations on a fundamental theme the 
impinging of  Holy Being upon the Being of  man. ,,5 
"The catholic view recognises a genuine knowledge of God in  the 
non-Christian religions,  while  the  extreme Protestant view sees  in 
them only error and idolatry.  The two series or types make it clear 
that the Christian faith  is  continuous with non-Christian faiths,  not 
discontinuous  as  Barth claims,  and  that there  is  no  one  exclusive 
revelation  of God.  We therefore  utterly reject  the  view that  one 
religion is true and all the rest false. ,,6 
a) Factors in religious diversity 
Macquarrie offers three factors  which  account for  the diversity  of religions. 
The three factors constitute his  answer to the necessary question:  "why,  if all 
religion flows  from the self-giving of the one God,  has he been so  differently 
represented  and  worshipped  in  the multitudinous  faiths  of mankind?,,7  The 
three factors are: 
i) 
ii) 
iii) 
3 
4 
6 
7 
The variation of symbolism 
Psychology of  the individual group 
Variation in Being's own self-disclosure. 
Op. Cit.  p.161f 
Op.  Cit. p.164 
Op. Cit. p.170 
Op.  Cit. p.171 
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Essentially Macquarrie is concerned with what he calls 'symbols of  Being' these 
are the most significant entities which have grown up or developed from within 
a particular culture.  These symbols  of the ultimate  existence of a particular 
culture  may  be  natural,  for  example;  the  sun,  historical;  for  example,  some 
great event,  or even personal;  perhaps a  hero  figure.  When ultimate Being, 
approaches  an  individual  in  grace  and  revelation,  it's  approach  and 
manifestation is  always  indirect;  and  it follows that the medium of revelation 
will be the particular 'ultimate' symbols which are available in  and through the 
particular  cultural  context.  Macquarrie  considers  that  some  of  these 
intermediate symbols are more adequate than others as bearers of,  or in respect 
of  the ability to focus,  the revelation of  Being, and some have greater potential 
for  development  than  others.  The  highest  order  of symbols,  in  respect  of 
adequacy, are human persons, perhaps followed by the objects which they use 
as instruments. 
God's self revelation is mediated and understood in and through these particular 
symbols which are available within the particular culture yet chosen by God in 
the  revelatory  encounter.  Whilst  the  particular  symbols  already  exist  as 
significant to the particular culture, they are seen in a new way as they manifest 
Being.  Nonetheless, it is reasonable to consider that the hermeneutic activity in 
respect of these existing cultural symbols,  which are now symbols of the self-
revelation of Holy Being,  is very much influenced by the existing culture,  and 
derives from the strands of meaning and significance of the particular, cultural 
world view.  To this existing scenario is added the new vision of  the experience 
of the  Holy,  in  numinous  encounter;  this  coincidence  of lesser  and  greater 
realities results in  a particular,  diverse,  world religion with particular,  diverse 
and distinct, tenets and rituals. 
Macquarrie states: 
8 
"The variation of symbols  goes a long way towards explaining not 
only the diversity of religions but also  many  of the distortions and 
perverSIOns.  All  symbols,  we  have  seen,  have  a  paradoxical 
Symbolism has, of course, already been fully discussed in Chapter 8 
308 character  and  need  to  be  both  affirmed  and  denied.  Where 
inadequate symbols are simply affirmed distortion takes place. ,,9 
The diversity of religions then,  is  largely due to,  and  directly proportional to, 
the  diversity  of symbols.  What  Macquarrie  means,  in  respect  of possible 
distortions and perversions, is that all symbols, however adequate, fall  short, to 
some degree,  of the great mystery of Being,  therefore they must be denied to 
this degree.  If they are not denied but rather absolutely affirmed they become 
idols and the religion becomes perverse. 
Macquarrie  argues  that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  an  absolute  or  lintrinsicl 
symbol of Being
lO
,  which means in effect, that if any religion does not deny its 
own  symbols  of revelation,  as  being  less  than  absolute  in  themselves,  and 
remains open to the possibilities of revelation through the  symbols of another 
religion,  it is  perverse and  not  authentic.  This  (major)  facet  of Macquarrie1s 
case,  in  itself effects  a  reductionist  dynamic  in  respect  of the  validity  of 
exclusivism  and  any  exclusive  truth  claim.  Exclusivism  is  written  off,  as  a 
perversion and religious universalism is  both demanded and secured. We have 
argued in  chapter 8 for the validity and integrity of intrinsic  symbols.  If our 
case  is  accepted,  then  Macquarries  argument  in  respect  of the  diversity  of 
symbols is severely weakened. 
ii) Psychology of the particular group 
"Persons brought up within the same religious community, nurtured 
on  the  same  classic  revelation  (primordial  revelation)  and  the 
symbols in which it  has found expression, may nevertheless respond 
in  diverse  ways,  though  all  of these  may  be  responses  of faith. 
Religion,  and  indeed  faith  too,  include  the  human  response,  and 
since no  two human beings are completely alike,  the nature of the 
•  1111  response vanes. 
This factor,  which accounts for pluralism within particular religions as well  as 
the  pluralism  of religions  itself,  is  a  function  of the  human  constitution  in 
respect of the uniqueness of persons and therefore of the personal psychology 
9 
10 
11 
Principles o/Christian Theology - John Macquarrie p.162 
See chapter 8 for discussion concerning lintrinsic symbolsl. 
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309 of individuals  within  a  cultural  group.  Beyond  individual  psychology, 
Macquarrie  considers  the  possibility  of  a  common  (group)  psychology: 
"Perhaps there is  also a psychology of groups, whole nations or races tending 
. to have certain mental or emotional characteristics ...  So while major historical 
faiths  may  contain all  kinds  of variations  due  to  individual  differences,  there 
may never the less be a kind of  normative position which is typical of  the group 
as a whole. 1112 
Macquarrie claims  here,  that the response  of faith  is  a highly  subjective  and 
individual  reality,  therefore,  differences  in  doctrine  and  praxis  are  inevitably. 
There can exist, however, the entity of a normative group psychology, deriving 
from particular social and  cultural forces.  The limiting case of this pluralistic 
differentiation,  is  of course,  the  absolutization,  exclusivism,  and  therefore 
claimed superiority of anyone group,  culture or religion.  This is  abhorred by 
Macquarrie as  a perversion of true religion,  which according to him,  can only 
be universal. 
iii) Variation in Being's own self-disclosure 
By the term;  , variation in Being's self-disclosure',  Macquarrie does not mean 
any  form  of special  revelation,  rather,  he  means  that there  are  variations  in 
God's initiative of disclosing Himself; for example there are ages of secularism 
where  God  seems  to be  silent  or removed,  and  there  are  other  ages  where 
God's presence is abundantly and overwhelmingly clear.  However the variation 
in Being's initiative is also considered as it's particular choice of  symbols.  Thus 
Macquarrie draws the  conclusion that  the variation in  symbolism  is  by  large 
degree a function of  the free choice of God in revelation.  Such a view requires 
the  element  of the  real  transcendence  of Being  and  indeed  a history  of this 
transcendence in relation to the beings.  In Macquarrie's argument that history 
belongs to Being, and not Being to history, however, we are drawn back to the 
immanence  of Being-in-process.  Nonetheless,  the  free  initiatory  choice  of 
Being  in  respect  of the  revelatory  encounters  and  their  particular  symbols, 
demonstrates the free  and  sovereign activity of Being (God)  in  some form of 
history of  revelation.  Since all genuine primordial revelations are considered to 
12  Ibid. 
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form of  manifestation of  the universal reality. 
b) Saviour figures 
The prophets, who receive primordial revelation, become saviour figures to the 
particular culture of their origin.  They themselves become personal symbols, 
. though, according to Macquarrie, not equally.  The difference, however, is one 
of degree and not nature.  By degree,  some religions founded by these saviour 
figures are greater and more authentic than others. 
In Macquarrie's view all genuine world religions have in common two essential 
elements  which  represent  the  transcendent  and  the  immanent  realities.  The 
transcendent element is the 'holy reality' and the immanent element is  a human 
figure  who  has  a  special  relationship  with  the  holy  reality.  The  human 
representative  is  able  to  transcend  his  humanity  in  order  to  reach  the 
transcendent 'holy reality', and in this way becomes a saviour of  others by being 
a bridge between the two realities.  The saviour figure  teaches humanity the 
nature of  the holy, he communicates the holy to the culture or group of  his own 
origins  (and  perhaps  beyond).  In  discussing  the  two  elements  Macquarrie 
states: 
liThe  first  is  the recognition of what I  shall  call  a 'holy  reality',  in 
some  cases the holy  reality may be  called  God,  but this  particular 
word  suggests  a  personal  being,  and  in  some  religions  the  holy 
reality  is  conceived  of as  an  impersonal  Absolute...  The  second 
characteristic which we find  in  virtually all  the world religions is  a 
human  figure  who  stands  in  a  special  relation  to  the  holy  reality. 
Perhaps this human figure has taught about the holy reality,  or has 
brought some communication from the holy reality.  Here I have in 
mind such figures as Buddha, Jesus, Moses, Krishna and so on."
l3 
All of the prophets or founders of  world religions mediate an understanding of 
'Holy Being' to their followers.  As personal recipients of primordial revelation, 
they themselves become mediators of  that revelation to others.  In a sense then, 
they  alone  stand  between the two  realities  of God  and  man,  therefore  they 
13  Jesus Christ in Modern Thought - John Macquarrie pA18 
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bivalency of  two realities is forged into a unity in respect of the prophet's own 
subjective  consciousness,  before being  issued  forth  to the  ordinary  realm  of 
human  existence.  Clearly  such  special  individuals  are,  necessarily,  heavily 
involved in interpretative activity in terms of  the precise relationship of  the two 
realities;  the  particular  'lesser  reality'  being  the  culture  and  language  of the 
individual prophet.  Indeed theirs is  the hermeneutic task concerning the great 
supramundane  mystery  and  its  translation,  through  symbol,  to the  mundane 
reality.  There is,  by this way of thinking,  no  such entity as  absolute truth or 
universally  intrinsic  symbols,  rather  there  exists,  by  necessity  of the  above 
factors,  a  relativism  which  is  the  incubator  and  perpetuator  of religious 
pluralism.  Religious pluralism, in this view,  is seen as a healthy,  natural and of 
course  valid  reality  which  renders  any  form  of religious  exclusivism  to  be 
unhealthy and perverse. 
It must be stressed again that Macquarrie is not claiming that all of the saviour 
figures,  or prophets, are equal,  it will be seen that he  considers Jesus to be of 
superior degree to all others.  However, He is not of a different nature to them 
or indeed to any man;  the  difference between Jesus  and  other men and  other 
saviours is  that of degree and not quality.  He did  not begin life  as  a being of 
higher order but was a sinner, as other men.  By personal effort He achieved a 
higher  order of existence  even  up  to  the  point  of deification.  Macquarrie 
states: 
"The  difference  between  Jesus  Christ  and  other  human  beings 
including the saviour figures,  is  a difference within humanity.  They 
have  all  shared  that  plastic  raw  material  of the  spirit  that  we  call 
human  nature,  and  each  has  fashioned  it  as  he  or  she  has  been 
able. ,,14 
Macquarrie  considers  that  in  the  aggregate  of the  saviour  figures:  "there  is 
concentrated for us the greatest spiritual striving and aspirations that have been 
known on earth. ,,15  Further: 
14 
15 
"  ... all  of these saviour figures  were  mediators  of grace.  We  have 
seen what this means in the case of  Jesus Christ, yet these others too 
Op.  Cit.  p.420 
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312 were emissaries of Holy Being.  They too had  given themselves up 
to  the  service  of a  divine  reality,  who  might  work  in  them  and 
through them for the lifting up of  all creatures upon earth. ,,16 
Aggregately  and  pluralistically,  (and  never  exclusively)  mankind  is  lifted,  or 
saved, from inauthentic to authentic life.  Clearly if such an aggregate of grace 
is  pluralistically  effective  it  must  be  universally  relevant  to  some,  essential, 
degree.  The question remains; how can the cross of Christ or the teachings of 
Mohammed be universally available and relevant to all  of mankind?  And how 
can  the  great  number  of  exclusivist  truth  claims  which  are  in  direct 
contradiction to  each  other be  resolved?  For example  Christians  claim  that 
Christ is  the only begotten Son of God,  and Muslims  claim  that  'God has  no 
Son'!  In  this  contradiction  the  essence  of one  religion  is  held  to  be  the 
antithesis (and a blasphemy) of  the other. 
10.1.2 Rahner's view of religious pluralism 
The  basis  of Rahner's  religious  pluralism  is  his  concept  of  anonymous 
Christianity,  as  discussed  in  chapter  9.  This  is  interwoven with the Roman 
Catholic position (as referred to by Macquarrie) since Vatican 2.  According to 
Rahner  the  knowledge  of God  is  a  universal  phenomenon  in  terms  of the 
essential  human  constitution,  the  complimentary  universal  reality,  concerning 
the will of God, is for the salvation of all  men.  These two aspects are essential 
ingredients of God's sovereign grace which is  effected through the revelatory 
nature of (finite) human spirit; which is  a quality of 'self-presence', through the 
'luminosity of being' which derives from the essential unity  of knowledge and 
being.  All  men,  by virtue of their constitution as  finite  spirits,  are necessarily 
oriented towards this grace of God and  therefore towards God Himself;  such 
orientation  is  actualised  in  the  ordinary  a-posteriori,  process  of growing  in 
knowledge.  Since knowledge and being are equated growing in  the one is,  at 
the same time, growing in the other.  The condition of such growth is the pre-
concept, and the route of such growth is the asking of metaphysical questions, 
which are essentially questions about Being.  All knowledge is,  at least implicit 
and  at  most explicit,  knowledge of Christ,  and  the faith  which  demands  self-
16  Ibid. 
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apart  from  culpable  atheists,  are  anonymous  or  implicit  Christians;  and  it 
follows that all religions are systems of  anonymous Christianity, to some degree 
and form.  It also follows that all  ideologies and philosophies are included in a 
wider  all  encompassing  pluralism  which  has  an  implicit  (though  intrinsic) 
relationship with Christianity.  The Christian world view and understanding of 
existence is an elevated higher order amongst a pluralistic existentiality. 
a) Rahner's Four Theses - concerning non-Christian religions 
In discussing what he calls lopen Catholicism\ which is a new attitude towards 
the  pluralism  of religions  and  ideologies  (powers)  which  have  a  different 
outlook on the world, Rahner states of  Ipluralisml: 
IIPluralism is  meant here as  a fact which ought to be thought about 
and one which, without denying that - in part at least - it should not 
exist at all,  should be incorporated once more from a more elevated 
viewpoint into the totality and unity of the Christian understanding 
of  human existence. 1117 
Rahner is referring to the pluralistic nature of modern life,  but most particularly 
he  is  referring  to  religious  pluralism.  By  religious  pluralism  he  means  the 
diversity of world religions and  not the pluralism of Christian denominations. 
Rahner does, however, understand the pluralism of other religions as,  in some 
part, a threat to Christianity, indeed there are two major threats to Christianity, 
which understands itself as  Ithel religion  lithe  one and  only valid  revelation of 
the one living GOd.
1I18  These are; the pluralism of other world religions and Ithe 
denial of  religion in generall.  Rahner states: 
17 
18 
19 
IIThis denial, organised on the basis of a state, represents itself as the 
religion  of the  future  - as  the  decided,  absolute  secularisation  of 
human existence excluding all mystery. 1119 
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314 This new religion, which is 'the denial of  religion', must be considered as  a vital 
part of  the pluralistic scenario facing Christianity, and within which Christianity 
has its being.  Perhaps this negative religion which,  according to Macquarrie's 
definition  of a  religion,  would  be  an  anti  religion,  is  a  key  factor  in  any 
philosophy  or  theology  of religious  pluralism.  A  full  blown  doctrine  of 
pluralism would have to accept 'the religion of denial'  as  an equal partner in a 
unity of diversity in  respect of existential reality.  This  factor  alone could be 
seen as  a factor of major inconsistency which militates against the whole-scale 
acceptance of  the validity and positivity of  pluralistic belief/faith systems. 
In any  event  Rahner  groups  all  world  religions  together  as  forming  a  unity 
based on the common enemy of the denial of religion (which is  a widespread 
secularisation of society).  Yet he  sees the fact of a pluralism of religion,  even 
after two thousand years of  Christian missionary activity as the greatest scandal 
for  Christianity.  The  absolute  claim  of the  Christian  faith  must  now  be  in 
question,  what  is  called  for,  according  to  Rahner,  is  "a  Catholic  dogmatic 
interpretation of the non-Christian religions,,20.  Rahner proposes his  dogmatic 
interpretation under four theses; 
i) First Thesis: 
This  thesis  represents  the  basis,  in  the  Christian  faith,  of the  theological 
understanding of  other religions.  The thesis states: 
"Christianity understands itself as the absolute religion,  intended for 
all men, which cannot recognise any other religion beside itself as of 
equal right. ,,21 
This  follows  from  Christianity'S  view that valid  and  lawful  religion  does  not 
follow  from  man's  self interpretation  of his  world  and  existence,  rather,  it 
follows from the sovereign free action of God in revealing Himself to man: 
20 
21 
"Valid and lawful religion for Christianity is  rather God's action on 
men,  God's free self-revelation by communicating himself to man.  It 
is  God's  relationship  to  men,  freely  instituted  by  God  himself and 
revealed by God in this institution.  This relationship of God to man 
Op.  Cit.  p.117 
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death  and  resurrection  of the  one  Word  of God  become  flesh. 
Christianity  is  God's  own  interpretation  in  his  Word  of  this 
relationship of  God to man founded in Christ by God himself. ,,22 
It follows,  from  this  basis,  that  Christianity  has  the  right  to  enter  into  the 
existential  reality  of other religions,  and  judge them  by  its  own  reality  and 
perspectives;  and  thus bring them into  question.  Its claim to absolute truth, 
based  on  the  revelation  of the  Incarnate  Word,  is  its  valid  and  adequate 
criterion of  judgement.  It would appear from this thesis that there could be no 
tenable case for the openness of  Christianity towards other religions apart from 
that of  judging them as  invalid and unlawful.  Yet Rahner can agree all  of the 
above and at the same time begin to construct a case for the positive reality of 
religious  pluralism.  He  begins,  still  in  the  place  of his  first  thesis,  by  a 
discussion of  the first element of  his argument, which is - chronology. 
To be an  absolute religion  Christianity would have to have  had  a pre-history 
going right back to the beginning of humanity;  and  it  has,  or at  least  it  lays 
claim to its origins in true Judaism and takes the history of Israel as  its  own. 
Yet the claim goes further back than Abraham, to Adam the first man.  Adam 
was the first 'type' of Christ.  However "the Christian religion had a beginning 
in history; it did not always exist but began at a point in time". 23 
"It has not always and everywhere been the way of salvation for men 
- at  least  not  in  its  historically  tangible  ecclesio-sociological 
constitution and in the reflex fruition of God's saving history in,  and 
in view of, Christ.  As a historical quantity Christianity has, therefore 
a temporal and  spatial starting point in Jesus ofNazereth and in the 
saving  event  of  the  unique  Cross  and  the  empty  tomb  in 
Jerusalem. ,,24 
Rahner  argues that this  absolute  religion  must  come to  men  in  an  historical 
way, confronting them as the only valid religion.  There is therefore a 'moment' 
when this  confrontation takes  place,  the  question  is;  is  the  moment  of this 
existential demand of Christianity (the absolute religion),  in  historical tangible 
form,  the same chronological moment for  all  men?  If not,  does this moment 
22 
23 
24 
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316 have,  itself,  a history? What Rahner is  getting at here is  the possibility of the 
existential  demand  of the  absolute  religion  as  existing  in  all  periods  of time 
before the Christ event (incarnation to resurrection).  The 'moment' before the 
tangible  historical  manifestation  of the  absolute  religion  in  Christianity,  is 
somehow  at  the  same  time,  an  event  in  the  pre-history  of Christianity  and 
suspended, in some way, until fulfilled in the historically tangible' moment.  We 
have as it were, a kind of  floating moment over all histories and cultures, and as 
such  we  must  remain  open  as  to  the  question  of the  precise  point  of the 
. 'obligations demand' on men.  The destiny of the 'moment' in  all  histories and 
cultures  is  of  course  the  absolute  religion  in  tangible  form,  which  is 
Christianity, that much is categoric. 
"From this there follows  a deliberately differentiated understanding 
of our  first  thesis:  we  maintain  positively  only  that,  as  regards 
destination,  Christianity is  the absolute and  hence the only  religion 
for  all  men.  We  leave  it,  however,  an  open  question  (at least  in 
principle) at what exact point in time the absolute obligation of the 
Christian religion  has  in  fact  come  into  effect  for  every  man  and 
culture,  even  in  the  sense  of the  objective  obligation  of such  a 
demand. ,,25 
The second thesis follows on from this point. 
ii) Second Thesis: 
"Until  the moment  when the gospel  really  enters  into  the historic 
situation of an  individual,  a non-Christian religion  does  not merely 
contain  elements  of  a  natural  knowledge  of  God,  elements, 
moreover,  mixed  up  with  human  depravity  which  is  the  result  of 
original  sin  and  later  aberrations.  It contains  also  supernatural 
elements  arising  out  of the  grace  which  is  given  to  men  as  a 
gratuitous gift on account of  Christ.  For this reason a non-Christian 
religion  can  be  recognised  as  a  lawful  religion  without  thereby 
denying the error and depravity contained in it. ,,26 
This,  of course, is an argument arising from 'anonymous Christianity',  or more 
properly  'anonymous  Christians',  because  it  rests  on  the  supernatural  grace 
25 
26 
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317 given to individuals and not any  particular non-Christian religion.  The whole 
power of the  case  for  a  particular  non-Christian  religion's  validity  is  that  it 
contains anonymous Christians, therefore the religion itself can be, to a relative 
degree, in error and depraved. 
Rahner's  second  thesis  is  not  to  be  taken  as  advocating  an  unqualified 
legitimization of all  non-Christian religions  for  all  time.  His argument is  that 
they are lawful only up to the point when the Christian gospel really enters into 
their actual, historical, life situation.  At this point their error would, or should, 
be seen.  This precise 'moment' of entry however is not certain in respect of  the 
precise  point  at  which the moment  occurs therefore  it  must  remain  an  open 
question.  Therefore the status of the non-Christian religion as being lawful or 
unlawful  also  must  remain open.  We need,  at  this  stage,  to  define  a lawful 
religion as Rahner understands it: 
"A lawful religion means here an institutional religion whose 'use' by 
man at a certain period can be regarded on the whole as  a positive 
means  of gaining  the  right  relationship  to  God  and  thus  for  the 
attaining of salvation, a means which is therefore positively included 
in God's plan of salvation. ,,27 
The extent of  this lawfulness is that a non-Christian religion is lawful only up to 
the point in which it comes into real historical contact with Christianity. 
"We are here concerned with dogmatic theology and so  can merely 
repeat the universal and unqualified verdict as to the unlawfulness of 
the non-Christian religions right from the moment when they come 
into real  and historically powerful contact with Christianity  (and at 
first only thus!).,,28 
The two other factors  in  this  thesis  are  the apparently 'a-priori'  supernatural 
grace filled elements in non-Christian religions and the issue that the containing 
of  error and depravity in a religion does not necessarily render it unlawful.  The 
feature of God's absolute, free sovereignty rates high in Rahner's perspective in 
this  area,  to the  extent  of an  almost  universal  predestinarian  position.  The 
burning  presupposition  is,  as  always  for  Rahner,  God's  will  and  serious 
determination that  all  men  shall  be  saved.  Every  man  who  comes  into  the 
27 
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318 world is then automatically pursued by  God's supernatural grace.  The serious 
salvific will of  God towards all men is won by Christ, yet this: 
"  .  .is  a  salvation  intended  for  those  millions  upon millions  of men 
who lived before Christ - and also for those who lived after Christ -
in Nations, cultures and epochs of  a very wide range which were still 
completely shut of from the viewpoint of those living in the light of 
the New Testament. ,,29 
Rahner  is  saying  then,  that in  light  of this  supernatural  salvific  grace  "every 
human  being  is  truly  exposed  to  the  influence  of divine,  supernatural  grace 
which  offers  an  interior union  with  God,,30.  This  powerful  influence  exists 
regardless of  the choice of  the individual to accept or reject it. 
There exists then a predestination which  does  seem to militate  against man's 
real freedom to choose or reject God which Rahner seems to uphold strongly in 
other places throughout his theology, he states: 
"It is furthermore impossible to think that this offer of supernatural, 
divinizing grace made to all men on account of the universal salvific 
purpose of God,  should in  general (prescinding from  the relatively 
few  exceptions)  remain  ineffective  in  most  cases  on  account  of 
personal  guilt  of the  individuaL..  we  do  have  every  reason  for 
thinking  optimistically  of God  and  his  salvific  will  which  is  more 
powerful than the extremely limited stupidity and evil mindedness of 
men.,,3! 
And further: 
"Christ  and  his  salvation  are  not  simply  one  of two  possibilities 
offering themselves to man's free  choice; they are the deed of God 
which  bursts  open  and  redeems  the  false  choice  of  man  by 
k·  .  ,,32  overt  a  mg It. 
Of course, it is  expected that the great many will freely accept God's salvation 
in  Christ,  but even in these cases it  is grace that has won the victory,  and not 
man of himself.  Grace is at work in all men, even evil, primitive, unenlightened 
29 
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319 and  apathetic  men.  The  supernatural grace which  is  powerfully  at  work in 
these men is  also the salvific grace in  Christ.  Where sin  already existed,  says 
Rahner, grace came in superabundance.  The nature of this grace, in its human 
interaction, is that whenever an individual makes a moral decision in his life this 
action is supernaturally elevated to the degree of a saving act.  This interaction 
reflects the sovereign will of God in actual saving efficacy.  The very ability to 
make a moral choice is  supernatural.  The right decision of human freedom is 
itself a gift from God. 
We  see  again  in  all  of these  deliberations  Rahner's  strong  emphasis  on the 
'individuals'  within  religions,  Nations,  cultures  and  epochs,  and  not  the  real 
moral status of  the particular religion itself (apart from Christianity).  However, 
there are several factors which link the individual (anonymous Christian) with 
the concrete form of a (any) religion.  Essentially salvation must take place in a 
concrete  form,  just  as  supernatural  grace  must  show  itself and  become  a 
formative factor in the concrete.  That concretisation must be in the social form 
and  nature of a  religion.  Religion  must  be  practised  in  a  social  form  even 
though man's  relationship  with God  is  both individual  and  interior in  reality. 
Concerning those who are outside of Christianity: 
"If one were to expect from someone who lives outside the Christian 
religion  that  he  should  have  exercised  his,  genuine  saving 
relationship  to  God  absolutely  outside  the  religion  which  society 
offered  him,  then  such  a  conception  would  turn  religion  into 
something  intangibly  interior,  into  something which  is  always  and 
everywhere performed only indirectly. ,,33 
Rahner considers that even the church would have no  necessity or justification 
to exist if religion was singly an interior intangible reality.  But man,  possessing 
a social nature, could not be thought of as  achieving and  indeed possessing a 
saving relationship with God outside of society and community.  Therefore it 
follows  that God  must  include  in  his  salvific  plan  the  use  of other religions 
whereby  the  Anonymous  Christian,  possessing  implicit  faith,  can  realise  a 
concrete and  tangible form  of his  relationship  with  God.  In this  sense  non-
Christian  religions  are  legitimised  as  being  included  in  the  salvific  will  and 
purpose of  God, and this, even in spite of  their degree of  error and depravity. 
33  Op. Cit. p.12Sf 
320 Moving  on to the  second factor;  that the degree of error and  depravity  in  a 
non-Christian religion (or indeed the Christian religion itself in all of its diverse 
forms)  does not render the religion to be unlawful.  It must be seen that even 
though there are  supernatural grace filled  elements in  non-Christian religions, 
this  does not mean that these religions  do  not  include  aberrations which  are 
both theoretically and practically harmful.  Indeed such is  always the case, to a 
greater or lesser degree, in a religion which is less than absolute.  Rahner's case 
for  the  lawfulness  of such  religions  is  based  loosely  on  the  impurities  and 
depravations  which  existed  in  Israel  of the  Old  Testament.  Even  including 
these  depravations  and  errors  Israel  was  still  held  to  be  a  lawful  religion. 
Rahner claims that there was no  objective criterion within the Old  Testament 
religion  for  judging  truth  or  falsehood,  this,  he  states,  was  left  to  the 
consciences of  the individuals.  In the last analysis it was down to the individual 
to judge whether there were corruptions and moral errors in his religion. 
Clearly there were corruptions in Israel as there are corruptions in Christianity, 
indeed the case is  that any  human society whether in accordance with the will 
of  God or not will include corrupt elements. 
"Hence it cannot be a part of  the notion of a lawful religion ... that it 
should be free from corruption, error and objective moral wrong in 
the concrete form  of its  appearance,  or that it  should  become the 
final  court of appeal for  the individual  to  enable  the  individual  to 
differentiate clearly and with certainty between the elements willed 
and  instituted  by  God  and  those  which  are  merely  human  and 
corrupt  ...  We must therefore rid  ourselves of the prejudice that we 
can face a non-Christian religion with the dilemma that it must either 
come from  God in  everything it  contains,  and  thus  corresponds to 
God's will, or be simply a purely human construction. ,,34 
And further: 
34 
"And since it does not at all belong to the notion of a lawful religion 
intended  by  God  for  man  as  something  positively  salvific  that  it 
should be pure and positively willed by God in  all its elements,  such 
a  religion  can  be  called  an  absolutely  legitimate  religion  for  the 
person concerned.  That  which  God has  intended  as  salvation  for 
him  reached  him...  in  the  concrete religion  of his  actual  realm  of 
existence and  historical condition, but this fact  did  not deprive him 
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321 of  the right and limited possibility to criticise and to heed impulses of 
religious reform which by God's providence kept on recurring within 
such a religion. ,,35 
The non-Christian  religions  are  considered  to  be valid,  even  including  their 
internal corrupt elements,  in  so  far  as  they are used by  God as  the available 
means  of salvation  for  anonymous  Christians.  They  are  still,  however, 
considered to be corrupt and in  serious  error from  within themselves.  Their 
validity  and  utilisation  as  a  substitute  for  explicit  Christianity,  in  the  last 
analysis, is not considered by Rahner to be either normative or even desirable. 
Such a doctrine follows from the sovereign universal  salvific will of God and 
the social nature of man;  in  recognition of the fact  that the real  entry of the 
explicit Christian Gospel into the religious and  cultural history of largely non-
Christian regions has  either not yet actually happened or at least must remain 
an open question. 
Theses three and four may be merely stated, as the greater part ofRahner's case 
for religious pluralism lies in theses one and two. 
35 
36 
iii) Third Thesis 
"If the  second  thesis  is  correct,  then  Christianity  does  not  simply 
confront the member of an  extra Christian religion  as  a mere non-
Christian but as someone who can and must already be regarded in 
this or that respect as an anonymous Christian. ,,36 
iv) Fourth Thesis 
"It is  possibly to much to hope,  on the one hand,  that the religious 
pluralism  which  exists  in  the  concrete  situation  of Christians  will 
disappear  in  the  foreseeable  future.  On  the  other  hand  it  is 
nevertheless  absolutely  permissible  for  the  Christian  himself  to 
interpret this non-Christianity as  Christianity of an anonymous kind 
which he  does  still  go out to meet  as  a  missionary,  seeing  it  as  a 
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322 world which is  to be brought to the explicit consciousness of what 
already belongs to it as a divine offer. ,,37 
10.1.3 Summary 
The  essential  element  of 'primordial  revelation',  in  the  theologies  of both 
Macquarrie  and  Rahner,  can  be  seen  to  be  the  context  of their  respective 
validations  of religious  pluralism.  Indeed  'primordial  revelation'  which  we 
maintain may be equated with 'creational revelation' is, for the two theologians, 
both origin and basis of religious pluralism itself.  Since primordial revelation, 
as understood by Macquarrie and Rahner lies  on the basis of both ontological 
and  epistemological  unity  in  respect  of 'all'  mankind  and  original  unity  and 
continuity with  God,  it  can be  seen  that  religious  pluralism  is  a function  of 
ontological  unity  in  diverse  expression  and  epistemic  unity  in  diversity  of 
context. 
10.2 - The Relationship of Creational and Historical 
Revelation 
The  element  of critique  in  this  thesis,  whether  explicit  or  implicit  is  based 
essentially on the perspective that the positions on religious pluralism taken by 
Macquarrie  and  Rahner  are  rooted  and  grounded  in  their  respective 
understanding  of the  self revelation  of God  through  creational  or  natural 
revelation, which as such,  is  a universal phenomenon; universally available and 
accessible.  Over  and  against  this  our  contention  is  that  whilst  it  may  be 
conceded that world religions (with the exception of Judaism and Christianity) 
may have arisen through this form of revelatory encounter with the immanence 
of God,  Christianity  is  a  product  of historical  revelation  and  not  primarily 
creational revelation.  Yet it  must be said that the distinction between the two 
types  of revelation is  not  abundantly  clear,  and  in  every  case  that  which  is 
particular  and  special  can  only  be  so  because  of that  which  is  general  and 
universal.  Historical  revelation,  therefore  addresses  itself to  the  context  of 
37  Op.  Cit. p.133 
323 creational revelation; in Rahner's terms secondary delimitation is  only possible 
because  of primary  delimitation,  the  one  being  continuous  with  the  other. 
Nonetheless,  we  contend  that  ultimate  salvation  is  an  incarnational  reality, 
necessarily  involving  the  incarnation  dynamic  of the  qualitatively  different, 
transcendent God.  We endorse the Chalcedonian Christo  logical formula of the 
coming together of the two natures of transcendent and immanent proportions 
in the one person of Jesus Christ; in this equation we have available the nature 
of the incarnation interface between the two opposite poles.  In the person of 
Christ and in the Christ event, we have in (developing) microcosm the principle 
and means of secondary delimitation in terms of primary delimitation, therefore 
Rahner can claim that the immanent Trinity is  the economic  Trinity and  vice 
versa
38
.  Historical revelation then, is not only inbreaking it is indwelling and if 
it is indwelling it is immanent and if it is inbreaking it is transcendent, therefore 
it  is  always,  and  must  necessarily  always  be,  ambiguous.  This  nature  of 
ambiguity  must  not,  however,  be  allowed  to  negate  the  very  real  dialectical 
distinction between the two types of revelation.  Such a reduction does appear 
to be  a function  of both the theologies of Macquarrie  and  Rahner;  although 
Rahner to a lesser extent. 
Our  underlying  presupposltIon  is  that  true  religion,  which  must  always  be 
ultimate and  absolute,  is  based on the living  (faith)  synthesis  of historical and 
creational revelation, and not ever one type alone to the exclusion of  the other. 
The reality  of the transcendental plane of authentic,  and  indeed,  eternal,  life, 
lies somewhere between the two in both an ontic and noetic dimension which is 
not merely the transcendence of the immanent reality of appearance (which is, 
in  essence,  monistic  Pantheism),  nor  is  it  a  metaphysically  constructed 
immanence  of the  transcendence,  which  is  the  short  coming  of the  classical 
theism of  past ages (this is essentially Deism). 
Both Macquarrie and Rahner do  not set out from  such  a synthesis but rather 
from  an  anthropological  perspective and  an  anthropocentric focus,  therefore, 
for their respective theologies to retain the power of integrity and  consistency 
as  Christian theologies, they must adequately demonstrate, with propriety, the 
priority of the principle of ontological and  existential immanence.  In order to 
do  this  they  must  necessarily  view  ontological  transcendence,  and  the 
38  See Rahner's  book  The  Trinity  for  the  full  discussion  on the  Rahnerian 
axiom that the immanent trinity is the economic Trinity and visa versa. 
324 transcendence  of  God,  through  the  spectacles  of  ontological  and 
anthropological immanence.  This requires some form of reduction of 'historical 
revelation',  as  understood  by  classical  theists,  in  favour  of some  form  of 
immanentist  structure  built  around  'creational  revelation';  termed,  Higher 
Pantheism  or  panentheism  (dialectical  theism),  m  Macquarrie,  and 
transcendental theism, in Rahner. 
a) Macquarrie 
Revelation for Macquarrie, is a 'bottom up' experience.  The vague concept of 
man, who is on both a quest for meaning and a quest for grace reaching beyond 
himself to  embrace the  'initiative'  from  beyond  can  not  in  any  real  way  be 
understood as  the Transcendence reaching down to man,  in  all  of his  (man's) 
pain and struggle,  rather, it is  man who reaches out to a passive transcendent 
Being-in-general.  In all of this reaching to the 'more than' in order that he can 
find  meaning  which  his  finitude  has  lost  (because  it  never  really  had  it) 
Macquarrie understands the immanence  of God,  as  'Unitive  Being',  to be  at 
work in the process of  gathering the 'rising-beyond-itself universe to a new and 
glorious ontological unity. 
It seems to us that this 'reaching-beyond' is itself the dynamic of revelation,  as 
understood  and  described  by  Professor  Macquarrie,  indeed  the  existential 
reaching-beyond  of man,  appears  to  be,  for  Macquarrie,  God's  means  of 
transcending Himself.  In this anthropocentric existential the 'depth dimension' 
as perceived in the primary dialectic of  Being and Nothing, strikes man's whole 
being with the full  force of God's immanence in  creation.  And  here we have 
the  dynamic  motive  of a  new  religion,  which  understands  itself in  the  new 
symbolism which has been unlocked by a powerful psychology, which has burst 
forth from a bud,  into the new bloom of a new species of flower.  Such is the 
nature  of being  in  becoming,  which  is  the  underlying  basic  principle  of 
existential philosophy. 
There  can  be  no  doubt  that  a  revelation  of God  has  taken  place  in  this 
primordial experience; which is  at  the same time transcendental in  that it  is  a 
reaching  beyond  man's  present  limitedness  through  some  form  of negation 
dynamic  and  perspective.  It  has  reached  beyond  to  the  content  of new 
325 imaginative powers, which are the gift of this new perspective of the ultimate. 
The prophet/saviour figures who have come to this experience gain new vision 
of new horizons  of being,  through radical  ontological  metamorphosis.  They 
see the same world in a new and different way, their eyes have been opened to 
the awful  reality  of Being-in-total,  the all  encompassing  'something' which is 
there,  in  place  of 'nothing'.  Being  itself has  become  present  and  manifest, 
effecting the  ontological radicalisation whereby they now derive  meaning for 
their  finite  relations  in  terms  of the  particular  symbolism  of the  immanent 
infinitude.  The  radicalisation,  which  is  the  motive  force  of the  rise  of a 
preceding  world  religion,  is  completed,  in  that  they  themselves  become  its 
major  symbol.  The  new  ontological  and  epistemic  adequacy  which  is  the 
product of this (particular) radicalisation becomes the ground and force of the 
particular  religious  existential  which  followers  must,  to  some  degree, 
reproduce,  by  repetition,  in  their  own  lives.  In  this  way  the  primordial 
revelation passes to them and is concretised in a religious ritualistic praxis, and 
in the linguistic medium of a relative theology.  One could,  without difficulty, 
maintain  the  view  that  Macquarrie  had  either  ignored  or  effected  a  total 
reduction of  the concept of historical revelation.  However, such a reduction is 
no more than the resolution of  the two types of revelation into two elements of 
his  concept  of 'primordial  revelation',  which  correspond  to  the  two  stage 
process  of man's  attunement  and  Being's  numinous  presence  by  its  own 
initiative  as  discussed  above.  Historical  revelation,  is  represented  by  the 
initiative  of Being  in  the  revelatory  encounter  and  creational  revelation  is 
represented  by  the initiative  of man  in  the attunement  process.  The  precise 
relationship  of these  two  elements  can  be  defined  in  terms  of Macquarrie's 
concept of  'letting-be'.  The interaction of God's Letting-be and man's letting-be 
takes place in  the revelatory  experience;  which  is  nothing  more  than  the  all 
encompassing and pervasive process of divine Letting-be in the first place.  The 
process dynamic of  being-in-becoming finds its power through divine energy, in 
the form  of Letting-be, which is  highly  active in the creation dynamic  (which 
merges  with  re-creation)  but  passive  in  the  realm  of historical  interaction. 
There is therefore 'no new thing' revealed in  primordial revelation.  Primordial 
revelation can be seen as  the resolution of the transcendence and  immanence 
dialectic (of historical and creational revelation) through ontological mysticism, 
which  is  aesthetic  rather  than  rational.  In  this,  one  could  be  forgiven  for 
thinking that Macquarrie's construction is  no  more than a restructuring of the 
essential  understanding  and  theology  of Friedrich  Schleiermacher  in  the 
326 clothing  of existential  and  process  philosophy.  We  concede,  however,  that 
such a construction, if viewed within the right frame  and  the right attitude,  is 
both brilliant and edifying for theology as a whole. 
b) Rahner 
If all  men,  by  virtue  of being  transcendental  spirits,  experience  In  this 
transcendental realm,  the real  self-communication of God,  there must  exist  a 
universal transcendental revelation,  which must itself have  a history.  Such a 
history is of primordial revelation yet the history of primordial revelation is not 
historical  revelation.  Rahner  admits  the  distinction  yet  seeks  to  merge 
historical and transcendental revelation in  such a close unity which,  in  effect, 
obscures the distinction.  A distinction, which Rahner does state clearly, is the 
distinction  between  transcendental  revelation,  which  is  in  terms  of human 
constitution as a personal, finite  spirit,  and 'natural revelation' which has to do 
with the inanimate part of creation.  Our task here, however, is to consider the 
relationship  between transcendental  revelation  and  its  relations  and  historical 
(categorial) revelation and its relations. 
i) Transcendental revelation, and its relations 
Transcendental revelation, as  stated above,  is  essentially primordial revelation. 
It relates  directly to  God's  creation of finite  spirits,  therefore  it  is  primarily 
about the essential nature of persons as  spirit beings,  and  not about corporeal 
existence as such.  Transcendental revelation is a revelation of  the word of God 
in human words, therefore it is  a revelation 'in word'.  The coincidence of the 
spirit of man and the spirit of God in  man's transcendental realm exists in the 
word.  We are discussing then a self-communication of  God to man in terms of 
man's cognitive constitution (mind).  Transcendental revelation is primordial in 
that it exists as a function of the creation of  human mind.  The human spirit, so 
created, is the image of God in the finite realm.  Our concern therefore is with 
the ordinary functioning and functionability of  the human cognitive faculty as it 
engages  in  normal  epistemic  activity.  Rahner  understands  this  epistemic 
activity  as  being  possible  only  in  terms  of the transcendental reality  wherein 
man is  open to  God;  and  further the existence of a pre-concept of Being-in-
327 total in  the human mind,  is  the necessary condition for the possibility  of the 
reception of explicit knowledge through man's openness.  In his life as  a finite 
spirit,  oriented towards God,  man  continually  steps beyond  the limits  of his 
present knowledge of being and of God; through his transcendental experience 
whereby he is ever moving towards God in a process ofDivinization. 
Clearly this process takes place in man's personal history, therefore, since it is a 
form of revelation of God to man which takes place in the moments of man's 
personal life,  it  has itself,  a history and it  is  itself,  seen in  this way,  historical. 
Yet, as already stated, we are not talking here about historical revelation, which 
is  about  objective  events,  but  rather,  about  a  history of man's  realisation  of 
primordial  revelation  in  the  moments  of  his  cognitive  transcendental 
experience.  This could be called a history of  man's spiritual luminosity. 
God is open to man and man is open to God, this spiritual openness means that 
the Being of both God and man is  essentially luminous.  Man's transcendental 
experience  is  therefore  a  journey  in  the  spiritual  luminosity  of God.  This 
luminosity is  the spiritual and  cognitive reality of the coincidence of God and 
man mediated through the word.  This  effectively  means  that what man has 
disclosed  to  him,  in  the  process  of the  moments  of his  ordinary  cognitive 
existence, is a self-communication of God.  Rahner understands this,  primarily 
ordinary experience,  as  possessing a supernatural element whereby God really 
encounters man,  in  a self-communication of this kind,  within man's  subjective 
history.  Rahner  sums  up  transcendental  revelation  which  he  terms  'the 
transcendental aspect of  revelation': 
39 
"First of  all historical and personal revelation in word encounters the 
inner,  spiritual uniqueness of man.  God communicates himself to it 
in his own most proper reality as  spiritual luminosity and gives man 
in  his  transcendence  the  possibility  to  accept  this  personal  self-
communication and self-disclosure, to listen and to accept it in faith, 
hope, and love, in such a way that it is not brought down to the level 
of the finite creature as  such.  Rather as  a self-disclosure of God in 
his  very self,  it  can really  'come' into  man's  midst.  For the  act of 
hearing,  the  acceptance  of  this  self-disclosure  and  self-
communication is  borne by  God himself through his  divinization of 
man. ,,39 
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328 This is  a process of God, giving of himself in the closeness of man's subjective 
consciousness.  We have  in  this  process the  a-posteriori  outworking of the 
coming to fullness  of the man's  a-priori  knowledge of God.  In  a sense,  this 
could be considered a process of anemnesis,  whereby man gains the explicit 
form of the knowledge which,  in total,  he  already possesses in  implicit  (pre-
conceptual) form. 
In this process of what Rahner calls:  "the absolute and forgiving closeness,,40, 
the supernatural grace of  God is at work both justifying and sanctifying.  In this 
forgiving  closeness  "God  gives  himself as  the  inner  fulfilment  of unlimited 
transcendentality,,41.  The man who through faith,  hope and love,  accepts this 
closeness in self affirmation, is elevated beyond himself en-route to divinization 
and beatification.  This particular beyond however, which may be understood 
as  God's  full  answer to  man's  question,  is  a  subjective  beyond  and  not  an 
objective beyond.  The transcendental journey into God is  a wholly subjective 
journey which God has pre determined, though not in such a way as prevents 
man's free choice of acceptance or rejection.  Man's freedom is involved, in this 
transcendental experience of God, in that he is  the interpreter, to himself and 
others,  of this apparently  supernatural experience which comes to him.  The 
'coming to'  cannot  be thought of as  the inbreaking  of an  object  into  man's 
subjective,  but rather as  the  a-posteriori,  explicit  realisation of that which is 
already implicitly held. 
The history of this transcendental subjectivity is,  as it were, a history of man's 
inner being in relation to God, and this must surely be a real history.  But it is a 
cognitive  and  perhaps  conative  history  which  lacks  objective  events. 
Nonetheless it is  history of the sequence of inner moments of transcendental 
expenence. 
40 
41 
"This  inner  self-communication of God in  grace  at  the  core  of a 
spiritual  person  is  destined  for  all  men,  in  all  of its  dimensions, 
because all are to be integrated into the single salvation of the single 
total person.  Therefore all transcendent subjectivity possesses itself 
Ibid. 
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329 not  for  itself alongside  history,  but  in  this  very  history,  which  is 
precisely the history of  man's transcendence itself. ,,42 
Yet where does this history of man's transcendence take place?  And precisely 
what  is  its  relation  to  the  other  relevant  histories?  Salvation  history  in  the 
world, the history of  religion, and world history.  Rahner relates these thus: 
"As  God's  real  self-communication  in  grace  ...  the  history  of 
salvation  and  revelation  is  coexistent  and  coextensive  with  the 
history of  the world and of  the human spirit, and hence also with the 
history  of religion.  Because  there  is  self-transcendence  on  man's 
part through God's  ontological and  revelatory  self-communication, 
the  history  of revelation  takes  place  wherever  this  transcendental 
history has its history, and hence in the whole history of  man. ,,43 
It would appear from this that the history of transcendental revelation and the, 
categorial,  history  of salvation  are  respectively  the  subjective  and  objective 
elements of the same  overall  history of revelation.  Therefore  creational  and 
historical revelation merge in the context of creational revelation, and therefore 
historical revelation undergoes a conceptual reduction in this way. 
ii) Historical (categorial) revelation, and its relations 
Rahner's  reduction  of 'historical  revelation'  proper  is  seen  in  that  historical 
revelation  for  him  is  essentially  the  categorial  mediation  of transcendental 
revelation in  the world.  It is  really the  reification  of a man's  transcendental 
experience in the historical material of his  life in  the world.  This mediation, in 
objective external form,  is itself revelation, but the heart of  this revelation is the 
inner transcendental revelation which finds  expression in  the historical life  of 
the individual. 
We have then a strange kind of historical revelation which proceeds from man's 
subjective and breaks into the world as it were.  This does appear as a fairly full 
blown idealism.  What is  essentially real about historical revelation then, is the 
transcendental revelation which is  its  origin and  base ground.  The  events of 
salvation  history  proceed  in  this  way  from  inmost  to  outmost.  There  is 
42  Ibid. 
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constitute  the  events  of  objective  revelation  which  breaks  in  to  manls 
subjective,  from  outmost to inmost.  Revelation must be  seen as  primarily a-
priori reaching out to a-posteriori outworking in the world.  Rahner states: 
IIGodls self-revelation in  the  depths  of the  spiritual  person is  an  a 
priori determination coming from grace and is itself unreflexive.  It is 
not in  itself an  objective  thematic  expression;  it  is  not  something 
known objectively, but something within the realm of consciousness. 
But none  of this  means  that  this  a-priori  determination  exists  for 
itself, and that in this a-priority it could only become the object of a 
subsequent reflection which would have nothing intrinsically to do 
with the a-priority of  grace as such.  Rather Godls gift of himself, the 
gratuitously  elevated  determination  of  man,  the  transcendental 
revelation  is  itself  always  mediated  categorically  in  the  world, 
because all of  manls transcendentality has a history.  It takes place in 
the historical material of a personls life,  but does not for this reason 
become simply identical with it. 1144 
The only objective element which inbreaks, it  does appear, is the interpersonal 
reality  whereby  one  person  talks  to  another  person  about  his  own 
transcendental revelation.  Or of course the more comprehensive reality of the 
otherls  historical  acts  in  the  concrete  manifestation  of  his  particular 
transcendental revelation as he interprets it.  In this way, through interpersonal 
communication, the transcendental revelation as  interpreted in absolute purity 
by  Christ,  and externalised in  the events of his  death and  resurrection,  passes 
objectively to others  as  objective historical  revelation.  Of course it  must be 
conceded that historical revelation through this interpersonal communication is 
not universal but special, as it is not made to all men in the respect that it is not 
necessarily practically available to them.  If an interpersonal communication of 
transcendental revelation is  understood as  the special revelation of individual 
persons  expressed  through  their  own  self-interpretation.  Then  it  seems 
reasonable to consider that every believer, if not every person,  as  one who has 
received  and  interpreted  the  revelation  of God  to  him  in  his  subjective 
consciousness, is a prophet.  How then can religion talk of  a special category of 
human beings, specially chosen by God, as prophets?  If there is  such a special 
category what  distinguishes  them  from  all  other  recipients  of the  real  self-
44  Op. Cit. p.l72 
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question: 
"In  theological  terms  the  'light  of faith'  which  is  offered  to  every 
person, and the light by which the 'prophets' grasp and proclaim the 
divine message from the centre of  human existence is the same light, 
especially since the message can really be heard properly only in the 
light of  faith.  Once again this light is nothing else than the divinized 
subjectivity  of  man  which  is  constituted  by  God's  self-
communication.  Of course the notion of the prophetic light implies 
that  historical  and  concrete  configuration  of the  light  of faith  in 
which the transcendental  experience of God is  'correctly'  mediated 
by  concrete history and  its  interpretation.  Looked at  theologically 
and  correctly, the prophet is  none other than the believer who  can 
express his transcendental experience of God correctly. ,,45 
The answer lies in the purity of  the self-interpretation of  the transcendental self-
communication of God.  The category of persons who are prophets appear to 
be  capable  of a  pure  and  correct objectification  of God's  revelation in  their 
hermeneutic articulation.  The pure and correct objectification of  the revelation 
made to the prophets constitutes special categorial, historical revelation.  This 
is received by others through 'interpersonal communication'. 
We have  then the  introduction of the factor  of corruption in  respect  of the 
purity  of the  transcendental  self-communication  of  God  to  every  man. 
Transcendental  revelation  is  universal  in  that  it  is  the  universal  act  of God, 
through supernatural  grace,  in  self-communication to every  man's  subjective 
consciousness, but it is  not universally received, to the same degree of purity. 
Its process of concretisation is  again,  a hermeneutic activity which as,  almost 
overwhelmingly  subjective  is  capable  of corruption  and  falsification.  This 
corruption is  no  doubt caused through human sinfulness and guilt, yet Rahner 
conceding  this  point,  minimalises  it  in  that  he  understands  this  corrupted 
transcendental revelation in the form of  historical revelation, as a form which is 
merely provisional en-route, as it were, to being perfected and purified: 
45 
"If  the  transcendental  and  supernatural  experience  of  God 
necessarily  interprets  itself  historically,  and  therefore  forms  a 
categorial  history  of revelation,  and  if this  is  present  everywhere, 
then  this  means  that  such  a  history  is  always  a  history  which  is 
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seeking itself, and it means especially that it is a history of revelation 
which is permeated and made obscure and ambiguous by man's guilt 
in a situation which is co-ordinated by guilt. ,,46 
Special historical revelation then, is  co-ordinated through a guilt situation and 
therefore is  not 'correct' and  pure,  in the case of the vast majority of persons 
who  are  not  'prophets'.  Rahner  says  further  of histories  of categorial  and 
special revelation that outside of the salvation history of revelation in  the Old 
and New testaments these partial histories (of other religions) are impure and 
erroneous: 
"In a history of guilt and of false  religion they will  always be  shot 
through  with  a  history  of erroneous,  sinful  or  merely  human 
interpretations  of this  original  transcendental  experience  which  is 
present thematically and unthematically everywhere in history. ,,47 
Rahner, in effect, maintains a minimalist view of  the devastating effects offallen 
human  nature;  which  he  utilises  to  facilitate  the  solution  of the  theological 
problem which his  argument faces;  in  that universal transcendental revelation 
does  not  result  in  the  universal  historical  concretisation  of  supernatural, 
subjective revelation.  However, even such a minimalist concession appears to 
count  against the authenticity of transcendental  revelation,  as  understood  by 
Rahner, and an element of (serious) ambiguity is introduced into his theological 
development. 
Rahner is clear that the historical revelation of  the Old and New Testaments, as 
'the official' salvation history, is an absolutely pure form of  historical revelation; 
yet the Old Testament is understood only in the light of the New.  The criterion 
for  the  purity  of historical  revelation  is,  and  can  only  be,  the  historical 
revelation of  Jesus Christ; 
46 
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"Not until  the full  and  unsurpassable  event  of the  historical  self-
objectification  of God's  self-communication  to the world  in  Jesus 
Christ  do  we  have  an  event  which,  as  an  eschatological  event, 
fundamentally and  absolutely precludes any historical  corruption or 
any  distorted  interpretation  in  the  further  history  of categorial 
revelation and  of false  religion...  In Jesus Christ,  the crucified  and 
Op. Cit. p.155 
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history of religion between what is a human misunderstanding of  the 
transcendental  experience  of  God,  and  what  is  the  legitimate 
interpretation  of this  experience.  It is  only  in  him  that  such  a 
discernment of  spirits in an ultimate sense is possible. ,,48 
All provisional interpretations are both judged and fulfilled in the full  and pure 
interpretation of  Jesus Christ.  In Christ there is the full and complete revelation 
of God.  The highest form of historical revelation is the Christ event which is 
the  objectification  in  the  personal  history  of  Christ  of  His  own  self-
interpretation of  His own transcendental experience of God. 
"The history of revelation has  its  absolute climax when God's self-
communication  reaches  its  unsurpassable  high  point  through  the 
hypostatic  union  and  in  the  incarnation  of God  in  the  created, 
spiritual reality of Jesus for his own sake,  and hence for the sake of 
all  of us.  But this  takes  place  in  the  incarnation  of the  Logos 
because  here  what  is  communicated  and  expressed,  namely,  God 
himself,  and,  secondly,  the mode  of expression,  that is,  the human 
reality  of Christ  in  his  life  and  in  his  final  state,  and,  thirdly,  the 
recipient  Jesus  in  grace  and  in  the  vision  of God,  all  three  have 
become absolutely one.  In Jesus,  God's  communication to man  in 
grace  and  at  the same time  its  categorial  self-interpretation  in  the 
corporeal, tangible and social dimension have reached their climax, 
have become revelation in an absolute sense. ,,49 
10.3 Religious Pluralism and Religious Exclusivism 
From  the  above  it  can  be  seen  that  both  Rahner  and  Macquarrie  effect  a 
reduction of  historical (special) revelation, through a dialectical synthesis which 
is  weighed  towards  an  anthropological  and  immanentist  view.  Such  a 
reduction clears the way for the apparent validity of the universality of God's 
revelation to all  men,  cultures and nations,  and of religious pluralism.  Without 
such a synthesis religious pluralism could find no facility; especially from within 
Christian  theology.  The  rejection  of a  synthesis  of this,  or  similar,  nature 
results in  religious  exclusivism,  whether of Christianity or any  other religion. 
48 
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relationship  of the  universal  to  the  particular.  In  Macquarrie's  case  all 
particular  religions  are  equally  valid,  though  variable,  expressions  of the 
universal reality of Being.  The achilles  heel  of Macquarrie's theology in this 
respect,  is  that if this  is  the case,  then all  religions  must  be  capable of being 
harmonised in respect of doctrine and praxis; there can be no  such thing as  an 
unresolvable  contradiction  between them.  Macquarrie  attempts just  such  a 
harmony  in  "In  Search  of Deity"  but,  in  our  view,  falls  far  short  of being 
convincing.  In  Rahner's  case  the  particular  expressions  of the  universal 
revelation  and  reality  of  God,  with  the  exception  of  Christianity,  are 
corruptions or perversions, to some degree or another, of pure religion.  The 
revelation as understood and interpreted, and indeed lived out by Jesus Christ 
alone,  is  the only pure and  absolute,  particular form,  therefore Christianity is 
the only pure and completely true religion;  and  as  such the ideal and supreme 
light  for  all  other  religious  perversions  (other  world  religions  including 
ideologies and  non  culpable atheists).  The ambiguity  in  Rahner's position,  in 
this respect, is that whilst religions other than Christianity are considered to be 
perversions of the truth, they still  retain sufficient adequacy to be efficacious 
means  of salvation  for  those  individuals  who  have  not  seriously  offended 
against  their  own  consciences?  The  further  ambiguities  in  Rahner's 
epistemological development are the real questions which hang negatively over 
the possibilities of any (fallen) human being possessing the ability not to offend 
against his  own conscience,  in the face of God; and whilst being both corrupt 
and perverse in  their own being (as freely  conceded by Rahner) they are still 
episemologically  oriented  towards  God,  and  therefore  have  the  power  to 
journey epistemologically towards Him? 
In  Schleiermacher's  view
50  particularisation  is  a  function  of the  diversity  of 
creation itself which  necessarily includes  psychological  differences.  For him 
pluralism is the natural result of  the diverse nature of the unity of the universe. 
Through  this  fundamental  reality  every  individual  has  a  different  quality  of 
consciousness which results in the complete particularisation of 'feeling'.  There 
are however 'common feelings'  which are the basis of particular religions,  and 
there  is  a  'central  feeling'  or  middle  point  of feeling,  at  which  all  of the 
particularisations converge.  If there is a middle, in  an  ordered structure, there 
50  For Shleiermacher's thinking in  respect of religious pluralism  see his:  On 
Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers esp p.36 - p.252 
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the sense of the whole,  in  the context of the fragmentation and this  results in 
'pious  feeling'.  Pious  feeling,  therefore,  is  the  universal  from  which  the 
particulars derive; the middle point, where they all  converge,  is  the feeling  of 
the sad  longing for redemption and  reconciliation;  and  of course this  central 
feeling is the common feeling of Christianity.  It follows that Christianity is the 
superlative and  supreme religion at the centre of all  the particular expressions 
of pious feeling,  and  therefore  of all  religions.  The  church then,  is  seen by 
Schleiermacher as the true mediator of  all religion. 
Schleiermacher  has  shown  the  possibility  of the  superiority  of one  of the 
particularisations  over the others,  and  indeed  any  other possibility  would  be 
chaotic.  Pluralism is  natural and an exc1usivism of a pure and central form is 
necessary due to corruption.  The greatest evil arises from pluralism within the 
one common feeling of religion, therefore it follows that Christian pluralism is 
an evil  corruption but a plurality of religions is natural, and therefore in  order. 
Schleiermacher has,  in our view, adequately demonstrated that pluralism within 
one religion and the pluralism of  different religions do not follow from the same 
root, and are therefore of a different nature. 
He has shown too, that it does not necessarily follow that all  particularisations 
are of  the same degree, and that one could not be superior to the others.  In his 
view Christianity is  'a  higher  power of religion',  this  does  not  invalidate the 
other religions, it merely locates them as,  to a variable degree, corruptions and 
therefore  of a lower  order.  This  view permits  a  valid  exc1usivism  within  a 
natural pluralistic context.  It seems right that such a nature of exc1usivism in a 
central coincident point is a natural function of an ordered universe, which God 
is  drawing together.  The alternative is  a unity whose diverse expressions,  in 
the  dynamic  of becoming,  are  becoming  more  and  more  chaotic,  and  are 
therefore becoming more and more remote and distant from the original unity. 
Such a becoming,  by  its very nature,  is  a becoming, which is  more and  more 
exclusivist and irreconcilable with the original unity.  We are claiming then that 
an exclusivism within the order of the original universal unity,  is  necessary for 
redemption and reconciliation of  the particularisations with the unity.  The lack 
of such  an  ordered  exc1usivism  necessitates  a  chaotic  and  irreconcilable 
exclusivism, which is an absolute exc1usivism and the dialectically opposite pole 
of absolute unity.  Religious pluralism,  then, if not reconciled,  develops to the 
336 chaotic  state of irreconcilable  religious  exclusivism.  It also  follows  that the 
particularisation which is  centrally concerned with,  and  whose nature follows 
from, the dynamic of  reconciliation and redemption is of  a higher order than the 
other particularisations. 
10.4 Christology:- Universal Significance 
The underlying presupposition of  this thesis is that the person of Christ, as the 
.  Son  of God  incarnate,  is  the  ultimate  and  absolute  particularisation  of the 
universal  Trinity  in  the  created  order.  We further  accept  the  chalcedonian 
formula  as  the  authentic  fundamental  statement  of the  essential  nature  of 
Christ.  Therefore we  disagree  with  Macquarrie's  understanding  that  Christ, 
and  indeed  God,  is  qualitatively the same  as  all  other men  and  women.  Our 
contention  is  that,  in  keeping  with  Chalcedon,  Christ  is  at  the  same  time 
qualitatively  distinct from  human beings  and  qualitatively the  same  as  human 
beings.  The  person  of the  God  Man  is  himself the  living  synthesis  of the 
transcendence and immanence of God.  The true balance of transcendence and 
immanence  involves  the  synthesis  of  a  Christology  from  above  and  a 
Christology from  below.  Failure to  achieve  this  balance  results  in  the  one-
sidedness of some form ofDocetism or Adoptionism respectively.  In our view, 
the anthropocentric and immanentist theologies of  both Macquarrie and Rahner 
demand  and  indeed  produce  'low  Christologies'  which  fall  under  the  latter 
category.  Macquarrie's  theological  development,  .as  already  stated,  is  in 
essence an  apologetic in  respect of late twentieth century secularism.  It is,  at 
the  same  time,  a deconstruction of 'classical  theism'  and  a reconstruction  of 
Christianity  along  pluralistic  lines  and,  of  course,  in  the  language  and 
conceptuality of existential philosophy.  Such a deconstruction effects a major 
Christo logical  reduction.  In  line  with  the  underlying  existentialist 
presupposition that existence precedes essence, Jesus of  Nazareth began life as 
an ordinary sinner, who by his own efforts in reaching beyond himself, achieved 
the realisation of the full  human potential and was therefore deified.  We have 
seen that Rahner has a similar Christological schema in terms of transcendental 
expenence. 
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inbreaking  of God  into  human  history  through the  process  and  dynamic  of 
incarnation,  and  thereafter  indwelling  the  creation  in  truly  human  being, 
requires a balanced  Christology.  Macquarrie quite  clearly  and  commendably 
seeks  to  balance  the  elements  of transcendence  (as  represented  by  classical 
theism) and immanence (as represented by various forms of  Pantheism), indeed 
this  is  the  stated  task  outlined  in  "In  Search  of Deityll,  which  results  in 
Uialectical Theisml; however,  in  our view,  he  singularly fails  to do  so,  falling 
back  on  an  extension  of the  immanentist  element,  which  he  terms  IHigher 
Pantheisml (another term for IDialectical Theisml 
The superiority,  at least of degree,  of Christ is  conceded by  both Macquarrie 
and  Rahner,  and  if  Schleiermacher  is  right  in  that  Christ1s  particular 
interpretation of the universe (  or whole) in  respect of His  particular form  of 
pious  feeling,  is  the  pure  and  uncorrupted  Icentral  point  of feeling I of all 
religion, (this is the feeling of redemption and reconciliation), then He is vitally 
and  essentially  relevant  for  all  of mankind.  Christianity  ought  then  to  be 
conceded  as  the  (ultimate)  way  of salvation  for  mankind,  and  its  particular 
symbolism - especially the tree (cross) and the person of Christ Himself - must 
be seen as lintrinsicl and absolute, crossing all cultural barriers of all nations and 
groups. 
10.4.1 The uniqueness of Christ? 
The uniqueness of  the particularisation of the universal reality of God, whether 
conceived in ontological terms or otherwise, of the incarnate Son of God, lies 
primarily,  in that, in his being there existed (and exists) the ultimate dialectical 
synthesis of absolute transcendence  and  absolute  immanence.  In His  person 
there was the unique merging of historical and creational revelation; and since 
this  synthesis did  not effect  a compulsory presence of God  on earth (at least 
before the resurrection appearances), it was presented as  an ambiguous entity -
it was possible both, through faith, to perceive Him as God and worship Him as 
such;  and through unfaith,  to perceive Him as  an ordinary man and reject and 
despise Him. 
338 Macquarrie  does  not  easily,  if at  all,  concede the uniqueness  of Christ,  nor, 
through the  denial  of the  existence  of any  'intrinsic'  and  absolute  symbolism, 
does  he  hold  to  the  uniqueness  of Christianity.  The transcendent  aspect  of 
Christ's essential nature is  denied from the concept of pre-existence onwards; 
the eternal Divine Logos is,  in  some way,  and to some degree, incarnate in  all 
creation - especially focused in Jesus Christ.  The Divine Logos did  pre-exist 
creation, in some way,  and it has been progressively incarnated in the beings of 
creation as  God continually surpasses Himself,  through becoming,  in the time 
space  realm.  Christ,  is  understood  by  Macquarrie,  to  be  the  climax  of this 
progressive incarnation of  the Logos, as Being is supremely focused in Him. 
"The  Logos,  as  we  have  seen  is  understood  to  hover  between 
identity  and  distinctness  in  relation  to  God.  Now  clearly  this 
Wisdom or Logos is  so  close in being to God that it  must share in 
the eternity of God.  Thus John can say:  'In the beginning was the 
Word'.  The Word pre-exists everything that has  been created,  for 
everything  has  been  created  through  the  Word.  If then  we  are 
prepared to speak of God, there seems to be every reason for saying 
that God's Word is  pre-existent.  But does this not mean that Jesus 
Christ  is  pre-existent?  ...  Strictly  speaking  Jesus  is  the  Word 
incarnate, so must we not say that prior to the incarnation, the word 
Pre-existed Jesus?  Perhaps even  during the  life  of Jesus  the  Word 
was more than Jesus. ,,51 
Macquarrie  affirms  that  the  pre-existence  of the  Word  does  not  imply  a 
personal  pre-existence  of Jesus  Christ,  such  would  be  a  denial  of His  true 
humanity.  Further,  the  pre-existent  Logos  is  not  exclusively  incarnate  in 
Christ: 
"If I were to offer a definition of 'incarnation', I would say that it  is 
the progressive presence and  self manifestation of the Logos in the 
physical and historical world.  For the Christian this process reaches 
its  climax in Jesus Christ,  but the Christ-event is  not isolated from 
the  whole  series  of events.  That  is  why  we  can  say  that  the 
difference between Christ and  other agents  of the Logos is  one of 
degree, and not kind. ,,52 
According to Macquarrie Jesus Christ is not unique through the factor of pre-
existence, nor was He unique through a virgin conception which resulted in His 
51 
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339 birth.  To  Macquarrie  such  a  thing  is  magical  and  cannot  possibly  be  true 
because it would deny the validity of  the true humanity of  Jesus.  Indeed: 
"  .  .if we  suppose  Christ  to  have  been  conceived  and  born  in  an 
altogether unique way,  then is  seems  that we have  separated  him 
from the rest of the human race and thereby made him  irrelevant to 
the human quest for salvation or for the true life. ,,53 
Further,  Jesus  is  not unique because He had  special,  a-priori,  Knowledge of 
God.  His knowledge of God and of himself in relation to God, if he was truly 
man,  must  have  been  what  Thomas  would  call  an  'acquired'  knowledge, 
something learned through experience.  He had no supernatural knowledge, nor 
was  he  the  exclusive  revelation  of God to  men,  other  prophets  or  saviour 
figures  were  also  the  means  of God's  revelation.  There  is  no  absolute 
difference between Jesus and these others. 
"We  remember the  words  of Jesus,  'I  have  come  that  they  might 
have life, and have it abundantly' (John 10: 10) ...  I believe that these 
same  words  might  express  the  intentions  of the  other  saviour 
figures. ,,54 
All  religions  have their human saviour figures  and they share this  position as 
one in  common with Jesus.  They are all,  human beings,  all  sharing the same 
human condition.  They were all seeking to achieve the highest possibilities of 
human potential.  "In them is  concentrated for us the greatest spiritual striving 
and aspirations that have been known on earth.,,55  They are all  also mediators 
of God's grace; all  emissaries of Holy Being."  They had all  given themselves 
up to the service of the divine  reality who  could work through them for the 
lifting up of  all creatures on earth. ,,56  The incarnation of  God's word took place 
in them all.  So what on earth is unique about Jesus Christ?  The answer is That 
Christ  is  superior  by  degree  only.  This  difference  between  Christ  and  the 
others  is  a  difference  within  humanity.  Yet  one  might  ask  did  Christ  not 
achieve  deification?  Whereas  the  others  did  not.  This  does  not  upset  the 
equation as there is no qualitative or essential difference between God and man. 
Macquarrie's  understanding  of the  relationship  of the  cosmos  and  God  is 
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340 essentially monistic, even animals are the same quality as God.  Concerning the 
difference of  degree however: 
"Just  as  I  shied  away  from  the  doctrine  that  there  is  an  infinite 
qualitative difference between god and man,  so I would not want to 
urge some absolute difference between man  and the lower animals. 
It is  a difference of degree rather than of kind just as we said in the 
case of the difference between Jesus Christ and other human beings, 
but a difference of degree can be quite decisive, and may be so great 
as to be virtually a difference in kind. ,,57 
Macquarrie,  in  our view,  equivocates in  this instance,  and  in  so  doing comes 
dangerously near to loosing consistency.  He uses the argument of 'difference 
of degree and not kind', to validate the equality of the other saviour figures,  of 
other  religions,  and  then  virtually  withdraws  the  argument  in  the  above 
statement.  He is  saying that Christ is different to all  others by  degree and not 
kind,  with one  breath,  and with the  next,  that differences  of degree  of such 
magnitude  are  in  effect  differences  of kind.  This  amounts  to  a  formal 
contradiction at the heart of  Macquarrie's Christology. 
The  soteriological  significance  of the  qualitative  difference  of Christ  is  well 
argued in Athanasius's "De Incarnatione", in addition to this,  it is our view that 
the  synthesis  of  absolute  qualitative  difference  and  absolute  qualitative 
similarity  'is'  the  perceivable  'difference  of degree'  in  Christ.  A  further 
ambiguity exists in Macquarrie's position,  in  respect of Christ  as  being at the 
same time a receiver of primordial revelation and Himself a revelatory event of 
God.  These  two  aspects  are  difficult  to  reconcile;  if Christ  is  Himself a 
revelatory  event  of the  highest  order,  how  can  He  be  merely  a  receiver  of 
primordial  revelation,  equally  with  the  other  saviour  figures?  In  any  case, 
Macquarrie holds that through Christ's great transcendental effort, He,  and He 
alone  achieved  human  perfection,  which  is  at  the  same  time  deification,  that 
means He is  unique amongst the other prophets and  therefore it  follows  that 
Christianity  must  be  both vastly  superior  to  and  unique  amongst  the  other 
world religions. 
This  is  never  explicitly  and  unequivocable  conceded  by  Macquarrie.  Jesus, 
however, becomes the (only) adequately representative man,  and in this reality 
57  Op. Cit. p.361 
341 lies  His  significance  for  all  of mankind.  Further:  "Jesus  Christ  gets  his 
significance  from  combining  in  himself  a  universality  with  his  particular 
historicality. ,,58  In this statement Maquarrie is seen to agree that the nature of 
.the Christian particularisation as existing in the person of Christ is qualitatively 
different and superior because it retains the element of universality that is  the 
dialectic of the universal and the particular lives in  synthesis in  the person of 
Christ therefore the person of  Christ is universally accessible and available to all 
men.  This means, in effect, that God's presence was supremely 'in' Jesus Christ, 
and in this He is the archetype man. 
10.4.2 The universal significance of Christ's death and 
resurrection 
It is not surprising that Macquarrie adopts the 'representative theory' in respect 
of  Christ's life and atoning death.  (Following in the footsteps of John Macleod 
Campbell, which he acknowledges.)  Christ is the representative man.  Christ is: 
"The true human being who has fulfilled in his humanity the image of 
God,  he  is  the  representative  of that  authentic  humanity  which  is 
striving for expression in every human person. ,,59 
Christ is  not a substitute but a representative, therefore the rest of humanity is 
not  passive  but  active  in  working  out  their  own  salvation,  in  the  light  and 
strength  of the  grace  given  to  Christ.  "The  Christian  must  consciously 
appropriate the work of Christ on his  or her behalf,  and  take up the cross. ,,60 
This, in effect, is a turning away from the temptations of  the world, with Christ, 
and a turning towards the kingdom of God. 
Again following Macleod Campbell, Macquarrie claims that Christ repented for 
the  whole  race,  as  their  representative.  Christians  join  with  Christ  in  this 
perfect  repentance,  but what  of those  of other religions?  The  cross  is  the 
salvific event because the representative of the whole human race died in this 
perfect act of vicarious repentance as  their representative,  but how does this 
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342 prevail for non-Christian religions?  How are they to  actively appropriate this 
saving event in their own being? 
If we are to avoid a kind of magical externalism,  surely it would be necessary 
for  men  to receive  and  follow  Christ,  who  as  their representative is  also  the 
power of example for them?  Macquarrie,  nowhere addresses these (real and 
vital)  questions.  He  agrees  that  in  the  life  and  existence  of Christ,  the 
archetype human being was achieved, and a new humanity was formed.  Clearly 
a new humanity, which through Christ, could also reach out and finally achieve 
deification;  but  again  how  is  this  to  come  about  for  those  who  do  not 
acknowledge and indeed deny Christ, in this respect?  And what of  the equality 
of the other saviour figures?  It is  clear that Macquarrie holds that the other 
saviour figures  open up  alternative  means  of salvation.  In this  we  have yet 
another unresolved ambiguity. 
Macquarrie does address the question:  "Can Christians still  claim that Jesus is 
the only son of God?"  His thrust, in this respect is that since there are varying 
degrees and stages of  incarnation, there are also many other sons of God of  the 
same  quality  but  not  degree,  as  Christ.  Only  Christ,  whom  Macquarrie 
concedes as 'speciar, achieved the human transcendence whereby humanity was 
identified with divinity.  Yet, still, he is not the only way of salvation? 
Whilst Christ's achievement, up to and including the death on the cross, renders 
Him the vicarious representative of all mankind, His achievement including His 
atoning death,  are not necessary for the salvation of the great majority,  as the 
great mass of people are saved through other prophets and other (equally valid 
and adequate) religions. 
In our view Christ's atoning death was both as  the representative man  and  as 
the substitutionary man; both elements together in inseparable unity; this is  not 
and can not be  claimed for  any  other prophet or saviour figure,  nor was any 
other saviour  figure  'God',  either  pre-existent  or by  deification,  therefore  it 
follows that the soteriological significance of Christ lies in  that He is  the only 
ultimate and absolute saviour, and His is the only ultimate and absolute way for 
all of  mankind. 
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